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A shrinking world is a knot of intertwined political, economic, ethnic, national, 
military, and environmental problems. Foreign and domestic matters have become 
inextricably linked in contemporary international relations. Nations are becoming 
increasingly interdependent in a highly developed industrialized society. In this process 
we may find a key to unlocking the riddle about how domestic and foreign policy 
stimuli interact in an environment characterized as 'cascading interdependence'.
In this thesis, I have attempted to highlight the internal and external factors which 
were very interactive under Gorbachev. Domestic policy within the Soviet Union had a 
profound impact on the nature of its foreign policy and, similarly, the impact o f the 
latter determined significant aspects of domestic policy-making.
The thesis concludes with an overall assessment of the linkage between 
perestroika and new political thinking. Are there any particular features of the link 
between Domestic and foreign policies under Gorbachev toward the Korean peninsula? 
There are some elements: international environment, the changes o f Soviet domestic 
politics, the economic factor, political leadership, timing, and Seoul's northern policy.
In the case of Korea, therefore, we can not say domestic factors had an important role 
or external factors an unimportant role. Rather, a dynamic of internal-external 
interaction went on under the situation of a reduction in cold-war hostilities and 
increasing accommodation between the superpowers in the late 1980s. Hence one has 
to construct a model of linkages between domestic and foreign policies under 
Gorbachev, if one is to understand why particular policies were chosen at a particular 
time.
In sum, although domestic factors played an important role, it is my position that 
neither domestic nor external factors alone best explain Gorbachev's policy but, rather, 
the complex interplay o f international politics on domestic politics and vice versa, 
within the context o f increasing global interdependence.
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C h ap ter  1. Introduction
True, we need normal international conditions for our internal 
progress. But we want a world free of war, without arms races, nuclear- 
weapons and violence; not only because this is an optimal condition for our 
internal development. It is an objective global requirement that stems from 
the realities of the present day.1
During the Gorbachev period, the Soviet Union underwent revolutionary changes 
in its political, economic, moral and cultural life. The Soviet people also had to acquire 
new ways of thinking. Gorbachev inherited a system in terminal decay, characterised by 
rampant corruption, coercion, and technological and economic obsolescence. His main 
problem was that this society had been frozen solid under the pressure of the 
totalitarian state ruled arbitrarily by a post-revolutionary bureaucratic class, organised 
in a minority party, enjoying a monopoly of power. So, he had to mobilise the 
constructive forces of Soviet society, provoke the adversaries of change into open 
opposition in order to be able to crush them with the popular power he tried to activate 
and to win the support of the people.2 In this respect, time was very important for the 
Soviet Union, because such a great power could not allow itself to fall behind second- 
class power status.
The starting point in the concept o f perestroika was the profound 
conviction that we couldn't go on living as we were.3
Gorbachev's response to the decline in power was perestroika. Perestroika began 
as a plan for radical economic reform, to lift the Soviet Union out of economic decay
1. M. Gorbachev, Perestroika i Novoe Myshlenie dlya Nashei Strany i dlya vshego Mira (Moscow:
Politizdat, 1988), pp.5-6.
2. Lothar Ruhr, Gorbachev - New Era, New Perspective?, in Armand Clesse and Thomas C. Schelling, eds., 
The Western Community and The Gorbachev Challenge (Baden-Baden: Nomos Publishing Company, 1989), 
p.265.
3. M. Gorbachev, The August Coup: The Truth and the Lessons (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991),
p. 102.
1
by introducing the use of market relations and advanced technology. Perestroika 
referred to the decentralization of authority to make major economic decisions, and to 
the creation of markets to coordinate those decisions. Perestroika meant an end to the 
cold war, stopping the waste of massive resources on defence, and bringing the country 
out of isolation from the West.4 Above all, Gorbachev held that true economic reform 
would bring a free flow of information and access to the West. The force of a mobilized 
population was needed to break the entrenched power of the bureaucracy, embodied in 
the Communist Party and the vast central ministries, which would naturally resist 
economic reform. In making this decision, Gorbachev deliberately opted for a different 
approach than that of the Chinese Communist leadership, which opened up the 
economy while keeping a lid on political freedom.
In order to prompt economic and political reform within the Soviet Union, it was 
also necessary for Gorbachev to endeavour to materialize his 'new political thinking' in 
external policies (see chapter 3). Gorbachev's policy of improving the international 
situation corresponded to the need to create favourable external conditions for reform 
in the Soviet Union. Moreover, domestic policy made it necessary to develop broad and 
multi-faceted cooperation with foreign countries (see chapter 2).
Soviet policy thus sought to call on external aid to help the internal environment, 
on condition that the political costs at home were held to a manageable minimum. 
Therefore, opening up the Soviet Union to global economic influences inevitably 
expanded the role of'low  politics' in the foreign policy process. Now, in world politics, 
it is accepted that the 'low politics' o f economic and social affairs dominates the 'high
4. For a detailed definition of perestoika, see Gorbachev, Perestroika i Novoe Myshlenie dlya Nashei Strany i 
dlya vshego Mira, p. 30.
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politics' o f military security.5
Gorbachev argued for domestic and foreign policies based on "Perestroika" and 
"New Thinking", i.e., interdependence among nations was increasing, and that big 
powers could not dominate small powers as they both became more interdependent. 
Shevamadze also said that the protection of the national interest increasingly depended 
on economic, technological, and financial factors, whereas enormous arsenals of 
weapons could not provide rational answers to the challenges of the day.6
1.1 Political Science / International Literature on Domestic and Foreign Linkages
The term 'linkage politics' was first used by James N. Rosenau to describe a 
relatively new approach within the discipline of political science. Rosenau defines 
linkages as 'any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and is 
reacted to in another'.7
Rosenau contends that the literature on economic and political development often 
refers to the ways in which foreign policies of modernizing societies are shaped by their 
internal needs, such as the sustaining of charismatic leadership, the need for elite 
identity and prestige, and the needs of in-groups to divert the attention away from
5. Commensurate to the deepening of interdependence, Joseph Nye acknowledges in his book, "power is 
becoming less fungible, less coercive, and less tangible". In other words, the military factor has become less 
decisive, whereas the economic factor has assumed an ever increasing importance in the discourse of building 
as well as maintaining a new global order. Taking into consideration that technologies, either for military or 
civilian use, have increasingly become "commercialized", the importance of the economic factor is 
undeniable, even in the field of security. With the end of Cold War, the tendency has turned to be a reality.
See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Challenging Nature o f American Power (New York: Basic 
Books, 1990), pp. 188-198.
6. Eduard Shevardnadze, Moi Vybor v Zashchitu Demokratii i Svobody (Moscow: Novosti, 1991), p. 105 ; 
On a changed conception of national interest, see Robert Jervis and Seweryn Bialer, des., Soviet-American 
Relations after the Cold War (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), p. 4.
7. James N. Rosenau, ed., Linkage Politics (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 44.
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domestic problems and thereby to placate their opposition.8
No matter what the system of government, many of the leaders of the new 
nations use foreign policy as a means to escape intractable internal dificulties and as a 
device to achieve domestic cohesion. The international arena provides an opportunity 
for drastic measures which are impossible at home.9 In this respect, Rosenau states:
[An] example...is provided by the leaders of underdeveloped 
countries who often seem to be better able to overcome domestic strife and 
inertia by citing the hostility of the external environment than by stressing 
the need for hard work and patience at home. In effect, they attempt to 
solve domestic issues by redefining them as falling in the foreign policy 
area.10
Rosenau asserts that in the absence of systematic efforts to delineate how the 
foreign and domestic areas might differ, contradictory assertions abound. Even if issues 
o f foreign and domestic policy are assumed to be distinct from one another, there also a 
tendency to stress that in a shrinking world, foreign and domestic matters have become 
inextricably linked and that only for analytic purposes can distinctions between them be 
drawn.11
According to Edward Morse, both the international and the domestic settings in 
which foreign policies are formulated and conducted are subjected to continual and 
revolutionary transformation once high levels of modernization exist.12 Internationally,
8. Rosenau, 'Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy', in R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches to 
Comparative and International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 33.
9. Henriy Kissinger, 'Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy', in Rosenau, ed., International Politics and 
Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 272.
10. Rosenau, Toreign Policy as an Issue-Area', in Rosenau, ed., Domestic Sources o f Foreign Policy (New 
York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 25.
11. Rosenau, Foreign Policy as an Issue-Area, p. 21.
12. Edward L. Morse, The Transformation o f Foreign Policies: Modernization, Interdependence and 
Extemalization, in Michael Smith, Richard Little and Michael Shackleton, eds., Perspectives on World 
Politics (London: Croom Helm, 1981), p. 146.
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modernization is accompanied by increased levels and types of interdependencies 
among national societies. Domestically, it is associated with increased centralization of 
governmental institutions and governmental decision-making as well as with increased 
priorities for domestic rather than for external needs.13
As a result o f these transformations, Morse indicated that three general sets of 
conditions have developed. First, the ideal and classical distinctions between foreign 
and domestic affairs have broken down, even though the myths associated with 
sovereignty and the state have not. Second, the distinction between 'high politics' and 
'low politics' has become less important as low politics have assumed an increasingly 
large role in any society. Third, although there have been significant developments in 
the instrumentalities of political control, the actual ability to control events either 
internal or external to modernized societies - even among the Great Powers - has 
decreased with the growth of interdependence, and is likely to decrease further.14
As Morse mentioned above, the linkages between domestic and foreign policies 
constitute the basic characteristic of the breakdown in the distinction between foreign 
and domestic affairs in the modernized, interdependent international system. This 
statement does not imply that foreign and domestic policies are indistinguishable; for 
with regard to articulated goals and problems of implementation they remain separate. 
Rather, Morse contends that it is suggestive of the ways in which foreign policies are 
transformed by the processes of modernization and the development of high levels of
13. Ibid.




Interdependence has doubtless produced benefits, but it has not been without 
costs. Increased trade can reduce as well as increase the number of available jobs, for 
example. Thus policymakers find that their domestic success is increasingly dependent 
on their ability to create a favourable political and economic environment abroad; and 
that in turn is often a product of what happens at home, economically as well as 
politically.16 More than ever, then, policymakers must play 'two-level games'17 
simultaneously, one at the domestic level, the other at the international.18
According to William Wallace, the characteristic which distinguishes foreign 
policy from domestic policy is that it is intended to affect, and is limited by, factors 
outside the national political system as well as within it.19 Students of foreign policy are 
all agreed in stressing the importance of the international environment in limiting the 
choice o f alternatives available to policy-makers. They are not agreed, however, on 
how compelling the pressures of external circumstances are - to what extent a nation's
15. Morse, The Transformation o f Foreign Policies, p. 149; Much thinking about interdependence was 
shaped by events of the early and mid-1970s. During that period, America's detente with the Soviet Union, 
recognition of China, and withdrawal from Indochina reflected a series of changes in superpower relations. At 
the end of 1980s, however, in light of revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the 
decline of East-West conflict, attention to questions of interdependence once again increased. See Robert J. 
Lieber, No Common Power: Understanding International Relations, Second Edition (New York: Harper 
Collins Publishers, 1991), pp. 342-343.
16. See Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake and G. John Ikenberry, Toward a Realist Theory of State 
Action', International Studies Quarterly 33 (December 1989), pp. 457-473; cited in Charles W. Kegley. Jr. 
and Eugene R. Wittkopt, World Politics: Trend and Transformation, Fourth Edition (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1993), p. 210.
17. Two-Level Games are dictated by the fact that interdependence implies mutual sensitivity and mutual 
vulnerability. See R. Keohane and J. Nye, Power and interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston, 
M.A.: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), pp. 3-22.
18. See Robert Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games', International 
Organization 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-460; cited in Kegley and Wittkopt, World Politics: Trend and 
Transformation, p. 210.
19. William Wallace, Foreign Policy and the Political Process (London: Macmillan Press, 1971), p. 17.
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foreign policy is determined by its external position, to what extent it is still open to 
choice or to manoeuvre - or on the weight that should be given to external, as opposed 
to internal, factors in the making of foreign policy. Most writers on international 
politics consider the external situation a more compelling factor in the formulation of 
foreign policy than domestic pressures: if not determining the course of policy, then at 
least severely limiting the options open to the policy-maker.20
Stem proposes interacting between internal and external factors: Attitudes in 
respect o f both domestic and foreign policy are shaped by the vicissitudes of domestic 
politics, pressures and personalities, by technological developments, and by the actions 
and reactions of other states.21
Aspaturian argues that some of those who approach the subject from the point o f 
view o f national case studies are more inclined to balance external and internal factors 
and to stress that foreign policy decisions 'are products o f internal responses to both 
external factors and domestic political considerations operating in dynamic interrelation 
or as discrete variables'.22
To conclude, academics perceive the relationship between domestic politics and 
foreign policy in different ways.
1.2 Linkages in the Soviet area literature
Western specialist on Soviet foreign policy can be divided into two major 
schools: those who stress the role of domestic factors (Marxist-Leninist ideology, the 
Communist political system, Russia's cultural traditions and the personalities of its
20. Ibid.
21. Geoffrey Stem, 'The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union', in F. R. Northedge, ed., The Foreign Policies o f  
the Powers (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), p. 71.
22. Wallace, Foreign Policy and the Political Process, p. 18; Vemon V. Aspaturian, 'Internal Politics and 
Foreign Policy in the Soviet System', in Farrell, e d Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, 
p. 235.
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political leaders) in explaining Soviet behaviour, and those who focus on the 
determining role of the international environment. The emphasis in each case is rather 
different. The former 'micro-analytic' approach explains Soviet foreign policy primarily 
in terms o f internal needs. This view generally insists that these internal forces exert 
powerful demands which Soviet policymakers cannot escape in their foreign policy 
choices.23
The second school stresses the 'macro-analytic' approach, focusing on variables 
external to the Soviet Union. Rejecting the view that, because of its internal 
arrangements or circumstances, the USSR is a unique phenomenon, this school usually 
considers the Soviet Union as a traditional power striving to survive in the hard and, at 
times, brutal international political environment. Its basic foreign policy objectives - 
national security, defence of strategic frontiers, national economic well being, 
international prestige - are seen as conventional rather than unique. Much depends on 
the particular shape of the international environment, on the specific possibilities and 
dangers confronting them.24
Foreign policy analysis became a significant branch of international relations some 
thirty years ago. But it is only relatively recently that this approach has been applied to 
the study of Soviet foreign policy.25
Foreign policy analysts began to examine what the effects of group decision­
making were, particularly in crisis situations; to utilise what had been discovered in
23. Morton Schwartz, The Foreign Policy o f the USSR: Domestic Factors (Encino, California & Belmont, 
California: Dickenson Publishing Company, 1975), p. 1.
24. Ibid; The nature of the interaction between micro and macro phenomena is the subject of controversy. For 
a historical account of the disputes over this question, see Jeffrey C. Alexander and Bernhard Giesen, "From 
Reduction to Linkage: The Long View of the Micro-Macro Link", in J. C. Alexander et al., eds., The Micro- 
Macro Link (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1987), pp. 1-42; On some approaches to the Micro- 
Macro Linkage, see Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory o f  Change and Continuity (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), pp. 141-156.
25. Margot Light, International Relations, in Tania Konn, ed., Soviet Studies Guide (London: Bowker-Saur, 
1992), p. 93.
8
other social sciences about how bureaucracies operate; and to apply the findings of 
organisational theory to the study of foreign policy. Their critics often objected that the 
shift in focus to the domestic political process had been made at the expense of 
examining policy outcomes or effects. Analysts, they pointed out, were neglecting 
foreign policy itself and they often ignored the international environment in which 
foreign policy was conducted. Many of these criticisms were justified, but whatever its 
shortcomings, foreign policy analysis encouraged a more rigorous and systematic 
ordering of data and the application of an explicit methodology. It also made it 
impossible to neglect domestic and perceptual influences on foreign policy. For many 
years there were few studies of Soviet foreign policy that incorporated these 
developments.26
During the 1980s the gap between foreign policy analysis and the Western study 
of Soviet foreign policy seemed to become narrower. For one thing, the aspirations o f 
foreign policy analysts became more modest. But specialists in Soviet foreign policy 
also changed. Even those who had been most opposed to 'theory' began to display 
greater methodological rigour. Moreover, some of their assumptions were tempered by 
the detente of the 1970s. More scholars began to be interested in Soviet perceptions 
and the domestic and international contexts in which Soviet foreign policy was made.27
The influence of foreign policy analysis is most evident in studies of foreign 
policy that are devoted to various aspects of the decision making process.28 Although 
many o f the books discussed in the general and historical section contain chapters 
devoted to domestic inputs, a number of works have been published in the last few 
decades that concentrate on the domestic context in which foreign policy matters are
26. Light, 'International Relations', p. 94.
27. Light, 'International Relations', p. 96.
28. Light, 'International Relations', p. 99.
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decided.29 Western writings on the interrelationship between domestic factors and 
foreign policy is not really explored in either. But, in an article, 'Domestic and 
International Factors in the Formation of Gorbachev's Reforms', S. Bialer said 'one 
cannot deny that domestic factors are fundamental in explaining Gorbachev's reforms.30 
Yet if one does not take the international factors that informed his actions into account, 
the explanations and analyses remain one-sided. Only by understanding the interaction 
o f domestic and international factors can we begin to grasp the nature of Gorbachev's 
revolutionary programme.31
What do Soviet sources have to say about the relationship between the internal 
and foreign policies of a Communist government? One Soviet so u rce^  states following 
Lenin that the internal and foreign policies of all governments are interconnected and
29. For example, writing on the domestic sources of Soviet foreign policy, see Jone A. Armstrong, 'The 
Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy', International Affairs, vol. 41, no. 1 (1965), pp. 37-47; Vernon V. 
Aspaturian, 'Internal Politics and Foreign Policy in the Soviet System', in Farrell, e d Approaches to 
Comparative and International Politics, pp. 212-287; also ibid., in Aspaturian, Process and Power in Soviet 
Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), pp. 491-551; Schwartz, The Foreign Policy o f  
the USSR: Domestic Factors (Encino, California: Dickenson, 1975); Alexander Dallin, The Domestic 
Sources of Soviet Foreign Policy', in S. Bialer, ed., The Domestic Context o f Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: 
Western Press, 1982); Seweryn Bialer, Soviet Foreign Policy: Sources, Perceptions, Trends, in ibid.-, Curtis 
Keeble, ed., The Soviet State: The Domestic Roots o f Soviet Foreign Policy (Aldershot: Gower for the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1985).
30. After 1985, when Gorbachev became general secretary of the CPSU, the issue of whether links exist 
between Soviet domestic reform and foreign policy suddenly became highly topical - aktual'nyi in the soviet 
sense. William Zimmerman, 'Reform, Democratization, and Soviet Foreign policy', in Jervis and Bialer, eds., 
Soviet-American Relations after the cold war, p. 77.
31. Seweryn Bialer, 'Domestic and International Factors in the Formation of Gorbachev's Reforms', Journal o f  
International Affairs, vol. 42, no. 2 (Spring 1989), p. 282; also Bialer, 'Domestic and International Factors in 
the Formation of Gorbachev's Reforms', in Dallin and Lapidus, eds., The Soviet System in Crisis (London: 
Western Press, 1991), pp. 28-29; On linkages between Soviet domestic and Foreign policy under Gorbachev, 
see Alex Pravda, 'Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policy in the Soviet Union' in Clesse and 
Schelling, eds., The Western Community and The Gorbachev Challenge, pp. 92-107; also Pravda, 'Linkages 
between Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policy under Gorbachev* in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Alex Pravda, eds., 
Perestroika: Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policies (London: SAGE Publications, 1990), pp. 1-24.
32. 'Nauchnye osnovy vneshnei politiki’, in A. A. Arzumanyan et al., StroiteTstvo Kommunizma i mirovoi 
revolyntsionnyi protsess (Moscow, 1966), pp. 409-415.
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puts emphasis on internal factors as the determinants of a government's transactions in 
the international field.33 Elgiz Pozdnyakov in an article in International Affairs 
(Moscow) stressed the connection between internal and external factors in the 
formation o f domestic and foreign policies, especially in the Gorbachev era. Under the 
pressure of objective processes, especially those linked with the needs of the 
internationalisation of production and with the danger of nuclear and ecological 
catastrophes, seemingly eternal "iron" and other curtains that divided the world into 
bellicose states and their groupings began to crumble. So, the traditional distinction 
between the internal world and the external world eroded as well. The development of 
transport and communications made easily their territory and population easily 
penetrable. This was furthered by the ever growing need for broad international 
economic, scientific and technological, and cultural exchanges.34
As a consequence of these developments the foremost problems of national life - 
economic, power-generation, ecological, food and many others took on external as well 
as internal aspects and dimensions. Furthermore, Pozdnyakov argued that it became 
obvious that they could not be satisfactorily solved within a narrow national 
framework.35
Hence the evolution o f the world has made all countries more interdependent 
than ever. One has to recognise the close connection and interaction between the 
internal and external factors of the state's development. The impact of these on the 
formation o f both its domestic and foreign policies and their degree depends on each 
individual instance, not on a recognised priority of one group of factors over others, but 
on concrete historical circumstances.36
33. Ibid.; cited in Ploss, 'Studying the Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy', p. 78.
34. Elgiz Pozdnyakov, Foreign and Home Policy: Paradoxes o f  Interconnection', International Affairs 
(Moscow), no. 11 (1989), p. 45.
35. Pozdnyakov, Foreign and Home Policy', p. 45.
36. Pozdnyakov, 'Foreign and Home Policy', p. 45.
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Perestroika and the attending political, economic and social changes in the Soviet 
Union exerted an influence not only on the formation of Soviet foreign policy, but on 
the entire international situation as well. Conversely, the restructuring drive and the 
domestic and foreign policies corresponding to it were largely conditioned by modern 
world processes, i.e., external factors.37 Another important facet of the interdependence 
o f internal and external factors was stressed during the Gorbachev years, namely the 
establishment in international relations of the priority of universal interests over class, 
party and any other narrow interest. The concept of class struggle in international 
relations was rejected, and the concept of the struggle of the two opposing systems was 
reviewed (see chapter 3.).38
According to Pozdnyakov, broad vistas for Soviet foreign policy opened up along 
this path. Progress in this direction gave it the scope, initiatives and creative impetuses 
it needed, and rid it of the fettering binds of ideological rigidness and petty 
reflexiveness. This progress made it possible to elaborate the central conceptual 
direction which, embodied in concrete plans for disarmament, economic development 
and cooperation in other fields, imparted to it the deep meaning and concrete goals 
without which disarmament, economic cooperation and interaction with the outside 
world in other spheres would hardly be able to extend beyond the framework o f the 
structures and practice of inter-state relations that took shape during the Cold War 
years.39
The starting point of the second chapter is a brief overview o f the links between 
Soviet domestic and foreign policies in the pre-Gorbachev era. This chapter will expose 
the major dimensions of perestroika that bear on the relationship between Soviet 
domestic and foreign policy reform under Gorbachev. To do this we need to see
37. Pozdnyakov, Foreign and Home Policy', p. 45.
38. Pozdnyakov, 'Foreign and Home Policy', p. 47.
39. Pozdnyakov, 'Foreign and Home Policy', pp. 47-48.
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linkages under three broad headings40: Resources (harnessing the military, the world 
economy), policy thinking and domestic politics affected in Soviet external policy, most 
notably in the Gorbachev period.
Chapter 3 will deal with the interrelationship between 'new thinking' and Soviet 
foreign relations. This chapter will show that it was the changes in the Soviet Union 
and in its foreign policy and security behaviour that was the most dynamic element 
propelling the revolution in world politics. The magnitude of change that occurred in 
Soviet external policy and behavior would have been unthinkable without profound 
internal change in Soviet politics. First, I will touch on the roots and the main 
principles of the new political thinking. This chapter also briefly reviews Gorbachev's 
main accomplishments in his Soviet foreign policy: U.S, Western Europe, and Eastern 
Europe.
Chapter 4 will explore the close relationship between the Soviet Union and the 
Asia-Pacific area. I think Gorbachev came to recognize that Asia and Europe were 
equally important for his country's domestic and foreign policy. Gorbachev's domestic 
reforms were linked both in their origins and potential effects to Moscow's intricate 
relations with the Asia-Pacific area.41 His Asia-Pacific policy, most notably the 
initiatives in Vladivostok (1986) and Krasnoyarsk (1988), envisaged a close 
interrelation between tackling domestic economic problems and a much more active 
Soviet involvement in the forming of a division of labour in the Asia-Pacific region, 
with enough potential to become a future "system of Asia-Pacific economic 
cooperation." These speeches were accompanied by a flurry of diplomatic activity in 
the region. This chapter will examine the various aspects of Soviet Asia-Pacific policy. 
The first part o f this chapter briefly reviews Soviet Asia-Pacific policy since Stalin,
40. For example, S. Bialer, 'Soviet foreign policy: sources, perceptions, trends' pp. 409-441; Bialer organizes 
his discussion under the headings capabilities, politics and beliefs.
41. Daniel C. Matuszewski, Soviet Reforms and the Asia-Pacific Challenge, in Pushpa Thambipillai and 
Daniel C. Matuszewski, eds., The Soviet Union and The Asia-Pacific Region: Views from the Region (New 
York:Praeger, 1989), p. 1.
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including Brezhnev's Asian Collective Security initiative. The second part of this 
chapter examines the moves and impacts of new political thinking in the Asia-Pacific 
region. The concluding part of this chapter explores the Soviet Union's attempts to 
build up economic cooperation and its efforts to construct a new security system in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Special emphasis will be given to factors that have been most 
important in determining Soviet policy towards this region.
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 deal directly and in some depth with Korea, from the 
perspective of the close relationship between domestic and foreign policies under 
Gorbachev. These chapters will analyze how much Gorbachev's linkage policy was 
really affected by the Korean peninsula. The new approach of the Soviet leadership in 
its relations with Korea was first and foremost connected with the evolution of 
domestic political life in the Soviet Union.42 Thus, the requirements of Gorbachev's 
domestic reforms and efforts to participate in the network of Asia-Pacific economic 
cooperation compelled Moscow to seek diplomatic relation with Seoul. In chapter 5, 
"The Soviet Union and The Korean Peninsula," the first part sketches a brief historical 
background covering the period (1860-1910) and needed to analyze current relations 
between the USSR and Korea. It goes on to consider some aspects of developments on 
the Korea peninsula and the policy of the Soviet Union towards Korea since Stalin, and 
also the new political thinking on the Korean peninsula. Chapter 6, "Gorbachev and 
North Korea," is devoted to North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union during the 
Gorbachev era. I will examine North Korea's responses to the new international 
environment created by Gorbachev's new political thinking, and also analyse the impact 
o f Gorbachev's reform on North Korea. Finally, I look at economic relations including
42. In his book [Charles E. Ziegler, Foreign Policy and East Asia: Learning and Adaptation in the 
Gorbachev Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)], Ziegler develops the concept of learning in 
foreign policy by exploring the link between Grobachev's domestic reforms and the radical transformation of 
Soviet relations with North-east Asia in the 1980s. He argues that, although international factors may have 
played a role, it was pressures for domestic change, and economic reform in particular, which had the greatest 
impact on Soviet new thinking.
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North-South Korean economic ties. In chapter 7, "Gorbachev and South Korea," I will 
touch upon the development of South Korea's northern policy. This chapter explores 
Seoul-Moscow relations during the Gorbachev era and China's policy changes after 
Moscow-Seoul normalization.
The thesis concludes with an overall assessment of the linkage between 
perestroika and new political thinking. Are there any particular features of the link 
between domestic and foreign policies under Gorbachev toward the Korean Peninsula? 
Thus, the major task is to construct a model which enables us to consider 
simultaneously the effects of Soviet foreign policy and domestic political factors in 
shaping the normalization between the USSR and the ROK. Some answers to this 
conundrum will be offered in this chapter.
The overall aim of the thesis is to produce a systematic analysis of the relationship 
between domestic developments and foreign policy reforms in Gorbachev's foreign 
policy. I have especially focused on his Far East Asian Policy(the Korean peninsula) to 
examine the connections between domestic circumstances and international factors.
This perspective has thus far been reglected in accounts of Gorbachev's Far East Asian 
policy. Hence my research hopes to fill this particular lacuna.
The sources employed for the thesis include a large volume of material from 
Soviet, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean journals and newspapers, as well as relevant 
Western literature. A 10-month stay in Moscow which coincided with Gorbachev's final 
period o f influence also aided a good insight into the development o f Far East policy 
under Gorbachev
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C hap ter 2. D om estic and Foreign Linkages in the Soviet Union
...at the present time domestic and foreign policy are so closely 
interwoven with each other that there is a direct connection between every 
question of internal policy and foreign policy as a whole...1
2.1 The Pre-Gorbachev Period
Soviet foreign and domestic policies have been closely related at various stages. 
Ambitious and costly foreign policies have impacted on domestic policies, and domestic 
conditions have necessitated changes in foreign policy.
The founders of scientific communism invariably stressed the interconnection and 
interconditionality of domestic and foreign policy. Marxism-Leninism, examining them 
in dialectical unity as a single whole and "policy generally", considers that they cannot 
be separated from each other, to say nothing of treating them as opposites. Lenin wrote 
in the article "The Foreign Policy of the Russian Revolution": "No idea could be more 
erroneous or harmful than to separate foreign from home policy".2
Lenin's diplomacy was actively engaged in the establishment of a system of 
international relations that would provide favourable external conditions for socialist 
transformation within the Soviet Russia.3 Lenin is cited to the effect that "the very 
deepest roots of both the internal and foreign policy of our state are shaped by the
1. A speech by Chicherin at the Third Soviet Congress in May 14, 1925. See Jane Degras, ed., Soviet 
Documents on Foreign Policy, vol. ii, 1925-1932 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 33.
2. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 25 (1964), p. 85; cited in Oleg Selyaninov, Lenin on the Connection 
between Domestic and Foreign Policy', International Affairs (Moscow), no. 10 (1987) p. 59.
3. Oleg A. Grinevsky, East-West: Problems of Security, Confidence and Disarmament, in Armand Clesse and 
Thomas C. Schelling, eds., The Western Community and The Gorbachev Challenge (Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Publishing Company, 1989), p.304.
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economic situation of the dominant classes of our state".4 Given the poor state o f the 
Soviet economy, Lenin's government could not survive for long without some 
assistance from the capitalist nations. In order to save the Soviet regime, therefore, in 
1918 Lenin had to accept a peace treaty with the Central Powers. Lenin's decision to 
make peace with Germany at Brest-Litovsk basically represented a choice between the 
immediate security of the Soviet state and the immediate, all-out promotion of world 
revolution. He evidently decided in favour of the former on the basis o f a rational 
calculation that the best chance for the eventual triumph of Communism throughout the 
world was its secure establishment in Russia - a calculation which eventually led to a 
Stalin's doctrine of'socialism in one country'.5 This set a seal on the dominance of 
domestic concerns.6
Lenin made economic and political agreements with a number of countries, but 
always on the assumption that these were merely of temporary validity. As Lenin said in 
March 1919:
We live not only in a state, but in a system of states, and the existence 
of the Soviet Republic side by side with the imperialist states for a 
prolonged period o f time is unthinkable. In the meantime a series of 
frightful collisions will occur.7
Such then was the Leninist conception of'coexistence' between the Soviet 
Republic and the Capitalist world.8 Peaceful coexistence, proclaimed in October 1917
4. Sidney I. Ploss, Studying the Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy, in Erik P. Hoffmann and 
Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., eds., The Conduct o f Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: Aldine Atherton, 1971), pp. 78- 
79.
5. John A. Armstrong, The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy, International Affairs, vol. 41, no. 1 
(1965), p.38.
6. Alex Pravda, 'Politics of Foreign Policies', in Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman, eds., 
Developments in Soviet & Post-Soviet Politics, Second Edition (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 255.
7. Geoffrey Stem, 'The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union', in F. S. Northedge, ed., The Foreign Policies o f  
the Powers (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), p. 77.
8. Stem, 'The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union', p. 77.
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as a key principle of Soviet foreign policy, implied that the contest between the two 
opposed socio-economic systems could and must be transferred, notwithstanding the 
persistence of ideological contradictions, from the sphere of military conflict to that of 
economic and social competition. It presupposed both rivalry and broad cooperation. 
For the first time in history the principle of peaceful coexistence was embodied in the 
Rapallo Treaty signed by Soviet Russia and Germany in 1922.9
In 1921 the New Economic Policy(NEP) quickly introduced large doses of 
private enterprise and markets in the economy. It demonstrated Lenin's willingness to 
deal with capitalist systems in the interests of the Soviet state. Lenin thought that "the 
very deepest roots of both the internal and foreign policy of our state are shaped by 
economic interests," and by "the economic situation of the dominant classes of our 
state." Thus, the holders of power who ruled in the name of the so-called dominant 
classes o f workers and peasants would give priority to the tasks of internal 
construction, the fulfillment of which would sooner or later improve the material lot of 
Soviet citizens, over schemes to aggrandize the Soviet Union abroad.10
Perhaps no leader since Stalin has been so persuaded of the decisive bearing that 
domestic strength has on the effective conduct of foreign policy. This persistent motif 
in his speeches recalls Stalin's famous inventory in 1946 of specific production goals 
essential for achieving security from attack and for fuelling the international advance of 
socialism. The Soviet Union joined the League of Nations in 1934 at a time when Stalin 
was engaged in costly industrialization. When the Soviet Union needed to avoid or 
postpone a war for which it was not prepared (as a result of the purging of the military 
and domestic dislocations), Stalin signed a non-aggresion pact with Nazi Germany. 
Although the Soviet Union was a victor in World War II, the wartime alliance was 
replaced by the cold war. Stalin closed the country to foreigners and lowered the 'iron
9. Selyaninov, 'Lenin on the Connection between Domestic and Foreign Policy', p. 63.
10. Ploss, 'Studying the Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy', pp. 78-79.
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curtain' because of the need to conceal the country's weakness and extensive wartime 
losses. When domestic conditions improved, the iron curtain was partly lifted in the 
mid-1950s.11
Stalin's foreign policy was viewed 'through the prism of internal needs and 
problems, principally that of maintaining the dictator's rule unchanged'; while post- 
Stalin foreign policy was limited in its ability to revise its external aims by the link 
between its ideological commitment (and the presence of external 'enemies') and its 
internal legitimacy.12 Foreign policy issues clearly act as a resource in the domestic 
political process in many countries. In the Soviet Union they provided a powerful 
resource in the factional struggle among the top leadership.13 The images of the outside 
world were also a resource for domestic politics.
Khrushchev simultaneously pursued ambitions, domestic and foreign policy 
change.14 The interconnection of domestic and foreign policy may also be surmised 
from Khrushchev's repeated advocacy of internal reform and detente with the U.S. at 
one and the same time.15
In January 1958 Khrushchev publicly proposed the sale of state-owned 
agricultural machinery to the collective farms, thus embarking on a course of raising 
collective farm income. Khrushchev in the same speech proposed a heads-of- 
govemment meeting, evidently to induce the kind of external atmoshphere needed to 
liberate investment funds earmarked for conventional military projects.16 The 1961
11. M. Curtis, Introduction to Comparative Government (Glasgow: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990), p. 384.
12. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1973 (New York: Holt 
Rinehart & Unwin, 1974), pp. 347, 606.
13. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p.403.
14. Pravda, The Politics of Foreign Policy', p. 255.
15. Ploss, 'Studying the Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy', p. 85.
16. Pravda, 25 January 1958, pp. 2-3; cited in Ploss, 'Studying the Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign 
Policy', p. 85.
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party programme declared that 'The CPSU considers that the chief aim of its foreign 
policy activity is to provide peaceful conditions in the USSR and developing the world 
socialist system, and together with the other peace-loving peoples to deliver mankind 
from a world war of extermination'.17 After high-level talks in July 1963 to conclude an 
agreement to limit nuclear testing, Khrushchev implied the linkage of effort to pull up 
weak sectors of the economy and curtail military procurement by telling a delegation of 
American farm experts: "Now we shall reduce expenditure on defence, and we shall 
direct this money to the production of chemical fertilizers".18 In August 1964, the 
premier fought for new approaches to the chronic peasant question, including a scheme 
for the decentralization of marketing practices in the socialized sector, and he told the 
British publisher Roy Thomson that he was ready for a summit meeting to ease the 
burden o f military spending.19 In sum, Khrushchev sought to employ foreign policy 
largely in the service o f domestic economic advance. He justified detente with the West 
as enabling a transfer of resources from military expenditure to the domestic economy.
Brezhnev showed the preeminence of domestic policy. Brezhnev's policy of 
technological cooperation with the West, a cornerstone o f detente, was partially 
motivated by the desire to avoid difficult reform of the domestic economy.20 The results 
o f Brezhnev's economic opening to the West were disappointing, apparently 
strengthening opponents of detente within the leadership. Nevertheless, the need for 
Western technology continued to strongly influence the making of general Soviet
17. Pravda, 1 November 1961, p. 3.
18. N. S. Khrushchev, Stroitel'stvo Kommuniznia v SSSR i razvitie sel'skogo khoziaistva (Moscow, 1964), 
VIII, 51; cited in Ploss, 'Studying the Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy', p. 85.
19. Pravda, 11,17 August 1964, p. 3; cited in Ploss, 'Studying the Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign 
Policy', p. 85.
20. Pravda, 10 August 1966, p. 3.
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policy.21 These technological considerations and diminishing Soviet potential for 
economic growth made it difficult to envisage a lengthy period of heightened 
international tensions without a further reallocation of resources to the military sector.22
There were two implications of recent technological advances, firstly as they 
related to economic development and secondly as they affected military matters. 
'Peaceful co-existence' signalled Russia's reliance on economic rather than military 
means in bringing about ultimate change. The Soviets had been blamed for the crises of 
1956, and the Khrushchev leadership introduced economism to prevent new ones.
Later on, Gorbachev reaffirmed economism before any new crisis broke out.
In the Soviet Union of the 1980s, economic and political issues, and domestic and 
foreign ones, were more intimately connected to one another than at any previous 
period in Soviet history. Soviet policy-makers faced not only the complexity of an 
advanced, late-industrial economy, but also unprecedented shortages of natural 
resources, capital,and manpower. Not since the 1920s had the Kremlin had to wrestle 
with the problem of economic stagnation. Not since the First Five-Year Plan had the 
Soviet leaders been so dependent on the West for technology and industrial equipment 
as they were during the 1980s, especially in energy. And most important of all, the 
economic strains of the 1980s would bring home to the leaders the full costs of their 
military programmes and the burdens of the empire, which raised the issue of military 
spending for the first time since the early 1960s.23 In the Gorbachev years domestic 
politics was shaped by economic and foreign issues more than ever before.
21. R. J. Mitchell, Soviet Foreign Policy Alternatives Under Gorbachev: Decision-Making Context and 
Prospects, in Alexander Shtromas and Morton A. Kaplan, eds., The Soviet Union and the Challenge o f the 
Future: Volume 4: Russia and the World (New York: Paragon House, 1989), pp. 13-14.
22. Mitchell, 'Soviet Foreign Policy Alternatives under Gorbachev', p. 14.
23. S. Bialer and T. Gustafson, eds., Russia and the Crossroads: The 26th Congress o f  the CPSU (Boston: 
Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 2.
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There was some careful thought about the effects of economic difficulties on the 
Soviet regime's sources of stability and on power formation within the political elite. 
This also included how the Soviet Union's domestic difficulties might constrain its 
foreign policies. In the past the Soviet regime had been quite successful at insulating its 
foreign policies from its domestic ones; maintaining such insulation was an objective in 
itself, and this explains much of Soviet behaviour in foreign trade and commercial 
relations with the West in the second half of the 1970s.24 Indeed, for a number of 
reasons the overall technological gap became even more important - and this was 
perceived by the Soviet leaders - than it was in the past. In this situation, strong 
expansion of trade and technological infusion from the West were major changes in 
Soviet economic life in the late Brezhnev era.
2.2 The Gorbachev Period
Gorbachev said "If we in the Soviet Union are setting ourselves such 
truly grandiose plans in the domestic sphere, then what are the external 
conditions that we need to be able to fulfill those domestic plans?"25
"The organic tie between each state's foreign and domestic policies 
becomes particularly close and practically meaningful at crucial moments. A 
change in the domestic policy inevitably leads to changes in the attitude to 
international issues. ..., in the conditions of perestroika, the uniformity of 
our activities at home and in the international arena is more striking and 
more tangible than ever before. "26
Perestoika was an economic and political restructuring of Soviet society.27 
Perestroika was brought to life by the objective need to overcome the crisis
24. Bialer and Gustafson, eds., Russia and the Crossroads, p. 5.
25. Time, 9 September 1985.
26. Gorbachev, Perestroika i Novoe Myshlenie , p. 134.
27. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 20 August 1989, p. 1.
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endangering national security and interests.28 Perestroika's main objective was to 
modernize the country and to redress the disastrous state of the economy that had 
endangered not only the Soviet Union's international position, but also its domestic 
stability. In a major interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel in March 1991 
the Soviet leader reaffirmed that the policy of far reaching reform had not changed.29 
The policy would be aimed at achieving greater democracy, reforming the relations o f 
ownership and establishing a mixed economy. Gorbachev stressed his determination to 
move towards a market-based economy and confirmed that a private sector would exist 
alongside the state and cooperative sectors.30
Under these new conditions, foreign policy had to assist the attainment of this 
main goal. There existed, in other words, a clear and visual causal connection between 
these two fields in the sense that the new features of Soviet foreign policy were a 
logical consequence of the innovatory processes taking place inside the Soviet Union 
itself.
The new foreign policy strategy was declared by Gorbachev at the April 1985 
Communist Party Central Committee plenary session. It was closely linked with the 
efforts of perestroika and democratization of society and the whole country. Soviet 
diplomacy had to make a direct, effective contribution to the new conceptual approach 
in the conduct of international affairs.31 In his speech to the Helsinki Conference in 
July 1985, Shevardnadze drew an unusual linkage between Moscow's internal and 
foreign policies as follows:
28. Shevardnadze,Moi Vybor v Zashchitu Demokratii i Svobody (Moskva: Novosti, 1991), p. 103.
29. Izvestiya, 25 March 1991, p. 4.
30. Soviet Weekly, 28 March 1991, p. 2.
31. Shevardnadze, Moi Vybor v Zashchitu Demokratii i Svobody, p. 88.
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The foreign policy of any state is inseparably linked to its internal 
affairs' and that to implement its vast internal plans to improve the 
economy, 'the Soviet Union needs a durable peace.'32
In his speech at the French Parliament, Gorbachev emphasised the necessity of 
interdependence to accelerate the social and economic development o f society as 
follows:
It is not difficult to understand that not only stable peace but a calm, 
normal international situation are paramount conditions for attaining these 
ends (internal requirements). These are the priorities that determine our 
foreign policy, a policy in which we naturally strive to take into full 
consideration the interests and requirements of other peoples, all the 
realities of the modern era....The interconnection and interdependence of 
countries and continents is becoming increasingly closer. This is an 
indispensable condition for the develoment of the world economy, scientific 
and technological progress, the acceleration of the exchange of information 
and the movement of people and things on earth and even in space, in short, 
for the entire development of human civilisation.33
At the 27th Party Congress in February 1986, Gorbachev said that everything is 
inextricably linked in this world, and that all nations are interdependent. In his report on 
"the contemporary world: its main tendencies and contradictions", Gorbachev noted the 
importance of interdependence:
The course of history, of social progress, requires ever more 
insistently that there should be constructive and creative interaction 
between states and peoples on the scale of the entire world.... Such 
interaction is essential in order to prevent nuclear catastrophe, in order that 
civilization could survive.... The real dialectics of contemporary 
development are in the combination of competition and confrontation 
between the two systems and in the growing tendency towards 
interdependence of the states of the world community. This is precisely the 
way, through the struggle of opposites, through arduous effect, groping in 
the dark to some extent, as it were, that the contradictory but 
interdependent and, in many respects, integral world is taking shape.34
32. Izvestiya, 31 July 1985, p. 5.
33. Izvestiya, 4 October 1985, p. 1.
34. Pravda, 26 February 1986, p. 3; also see Gorbachev, "Politicheskii doklad Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS 
XXVII s'ezdu Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza," Kommunist, no.4 (1986), p. 19.
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The new Soviet foreign policy was almost exclusively regarded as a function of 
domestic policy. As early as May 1986, Gorbachev asked the Soviet diplomatic service 
to secure peace and to "create the most favourable conditions possible for the 
acceleration of the socio-economic development of Soviet society". At a plenary 
meeting o f the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on June 
16, 1986, Gorbachev emphasized that foreign policy is a product of domestic political 
factors as follows:
...our extensive plans for social and economic development are in 
extricably linked with a foreign policy aimed at promoting peace and all­
round international cooperation.35
At the International Forum for a Nuclear-Free World and for Humanism in 
International Relations held in February 1987, Gorbachev said:
...before the whole world, I state with full responsibility that our 
international policy is, more than ever before, determined by domestic 
policy, by our interest in concentrating on constructive endeavours to 
improve our country. This is why we need lasting peace, predictability and 
constructiveness in international relations.36
In 1987, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze came up with the following formula: 
"First o f all, we must follow the basic guideline according to which foreign policy has 
to create the maximum favorable external conditions needed in order to conduct 
internal reform."37 In July 1988, the nineteenth all-union party conference ended, 
having reaffirmed the main priority o f securing by political means the favorable external 
conditions needed to bring about change inside the country.38 In a document adopted at 
the plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee on 10 January 1989, the profound
35. Pravda, 17 June 1986, p. 1.
36. Pravda, 17 February 1987, p. 1.
37. Shevardnadze, Moi Vybor v Zashchitu Demokratii i Svobody, p. 12.
38. Ibid., p. 52.
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changes occurring in the internal life of Soviet society were inseparably linked with the 
essentially revolutionary changes in foreign policy.39
How did the Soviets' internal situation affect their foreign policy and vice versa? 
In an interview with Soviet television on 19 November 1990 Gorbachev outlined the 
Soviet position thus:
"As we broadened the scope of restructuring, we looked around us: 
What was happening beyond our borders? How should we live in the real 
world today? We have realized the need to change our mentality.
Therefore, everything that is happening in our country has an impact on our 
foreign policy. Domestic and foreign policies are always interlinked. And, 
of course, domestic policy and internal processes give an impetus to foreign 
policy. Without the restructuring, renewal, democratization and 
humanization of our society, our foreign policy could never have become 
more domocratic and humane....By creating favourable conditions for 
international cooperation and by turning to civilization, we are creating 
favourable conditions for tackling our own problems. What we need now 
are favourable conditions and international cooperation, and we are 
benefiting from the new foreign policy and from the new state of 
international relations. All these things are linked very closely."40
As mentioned above, the linkage between domestic and foreign policy was an 
axiom of the Marxist-Leninist approach to international relations, and from the very 
beginning Gorbachev insisted that restructuring of the country's foreign relations was 
an integral part of domestic perestroika. The organic ties between each state's foreign 
and domestic policies become particularly close and practically meaningful at crucial 
moments. A change in domestic policy inevitably leads to changes in the attitude to 
international issues.41 International links, especially economic links, have come to effect 
a wider range of interests.42
39. Pravda, 13 January 1989, p. 1.
40. Izvestiya, 20 November 1990, p. 1.
41. Richard Sakwa, Gorbachev and his Reforms 1985-1990 (London: Philip Allan, 1990), pp. 315-116.
42. See Pravda, The Politics of Foreign Policy, in Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Gitelman, eds., 
Developments in Soviet & Post-Soviet Politics (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp.250-261.
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2.3 L in k a g e s  o f P e re s tro ik a :  D om estic  an d  F o re ig n  P o lic ies
Harnessing the Military
We intend to persevere in our pursuit o f real arms reductions. This is 
a difficult but essential process in order for mankind to advance to a world 
free of violence and nuclear weapons and for us to solve major domestic 
problems of an economic, social and moral nature.43
The close connection between security demands and domestic economic 
development had long been prominent in the Soviet Union. That domestic economic 
pressures themselves played a key role in the drive to reduce military expenditure was 
suggested by the growing emphasis placed on defence cuts since 1987 as the economic 
situation worsened.44 This shift stemmed from the twin imperatives of maintaining 
technological parity and modernizing the domestic economy, both of which required 
demilitarization of security and of the domestic economic system. The complex of 
interconnected security and domestic factors involved in harnessing the military thus 
constituted a very strong resource linkage between internal and external policy under 
perestroika.45 Following Gorbachev's accession to power in 1985, he became 
increasingly sensitive to the interconnections between the economic and security 
elements.
A new concept of national security of the USSR was formulated: protection from 
external and internal threats, stability against unfavourable external influence and the 
establishment of internal and external conditions that guarantee the inviability o f the 
state and the comprehensive progress of society and its citizens. Increased awareness 
that state security would be achieved by political negotiations as part of general and 
equal security led the Soviet political leadership to reject the arms race. Logically, this
43. Gorbachev's Odessa speech, Izvestiya, 19 August 1990, p. 2.
44. Hasegawa and Pravda, Perestroika: Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policies, p. 6.
45. Ibid., p. 7.
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entailed a new Soviet military doctrine to be based on the principle of reasonable 
defence sufficiency (see section 2.2),46 and the idea to establish a comprehensive 
international security system. The Soviet Union took practical steps towards reducing 
its armed forces and the military budget, recalling major military contingents and 
converting part of the defence industry to civilian production. So, military reform in the 
Soviet Union was closely related to the results of mutual disarmament, the military and 
political situation in the world and in the Soviet Union itself. Shevardnadze said 
'problems of strategic offensive weapons cuts and regional conflict resolutions were 
discussed along with the task of enlisting political and material support for perestroika 
at home.'47
Gorbachev admitted that the Soviet economy "has been the most militarized 
economy in the world with the biggest military spending."48 The military's share of 
GNP was pushing beyond a grotesque 25 percent. The weapons, forces and capabilities 
that the Soviet Union was building were of a size and potential menace consistent with 
its requirements. As for the internal economic effect of such politics, only one key 
figure should be taken into consideration - more than 60 percent of Soviet industrial 
facilities worked for the militarized sector of the economy. In view of such a
46. For the detailed discussion, see Josef JofFe and Lev Semeiko, 'Reasonable Sufficiency in Defence', 
Moscow News, no. 1 (1989), p. 6; Vladimir Dvorkin and Valery Torbin, "On Real Sufficiency of Defence: 
Military Specialists' Point of View", Moscow News, no. 26 (1989), p. 6; Mary Fitgerald, "Gorbachev's 
Concept of Reasonable Sufficiency in National Defence", in George E. Hudson, ed., Soviet National Security 
Policy under Perestroika (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), pp. 175-195.
47. Shevardnadze, Moi Vybor v Zashchitu Demokratii i Svobody, p.43.
48. Gorbachev, quoted from Henry Trofimenko, Pan-European Security, in Journal o f International Affairs 
(Summer, 1991), p. 114.
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disproportion any considerable export of arms could slow down the process of 
conversion and economic reforms in general.49
With nearly 5 million personnel under arms and an estimated 20 to 30 percent of 
gross national product devoted to defence, the Soviet Union had one of the world's 
most militarized economies. Under pressure to reduce military expenditure, the State 
Programme for the Conversion of the USSR Defence Industry50 was approved by a 
decree issued by the USSR Council of Ministers on 15 December 1990.51 According 
to the state conversion programme of 1990, 422 military factories and 100 non-military 
factories were to be converted to the manufacturing of civil products. The proportion 
of civilian products at military factories was to rise to 65 percent by 199 5.52 The 
minister in charge of defence conversion said that converting Russia's military industrial 
complex to civilian use would cost at least 48 billion dollars.53
Mr. Kortunov, head of the foreign policy department at the USA and Canada 
Institute in Moscow, said that defence conversion grew out of "Gorbachev's desire to
49. Kuzmenko, p. 12. The value of arms sales to the Third World by the former Soviet Union fell from 11.2 
billion dollars in 1990 to 5 billion dollars in 1991, according to a study by the US Congressional Research 
Service, as reported in The New York Times on 21 July, Soviet arms sales had peaked at 24.8 billion dollars in 
1986. SeeRFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 31 (31 July 1992), p. 59; Russia had exported 1.55 billion 
dollars worth of arms in 1991, resulting in a thirteen-fold drop in profits compared with the average level of 
profits from Soviet arms exports in the 1980s. It said that 69 percent of the arms sold in 1991 had gone to the 
Near (8%) and Middle East (61%). See Nezavsimaya gazeta, 29 September 1992, p. 1; this data is not 
corroborated by other sources. Various Russian sources have suggested that the value of arms exports fell 
from 14 billion dollars in 1990 to 8 billion dollars in 1991 and 3-4 billion dollars in 1992. See Stephen Foye, 
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the Fortner Soviet Union (New York: Westview Press for the Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1992).
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53. The Wall Street Journal (E u rop e), 31 January- 1 February 1992, p. 1.
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show the people a peace dividend out of the withdrawals from Eastern Europe. But 
letting individual plants produce consumer items changes nothing if the military simply 
adds a production line for civilian goods. The end result is that the military gets more 
resources than it had before and no structural change is made. Until the structural 
change is made and these enterprises are removed from the military command system, 
conversion won't really help''.54 Conversion, however, contributed to the extension of 
disarmament measures, as well as to the building of a new order of confidence. This 
created a vast potential space for international cooperation.55
The W orld Economy
The world economy is becoming a single entity, outside of which no 
state can develop normally, regardless of its social system or economic 
level.56
On the eve of the 21st century the world economy has approached an 
important landmark, as ideological confrontation gives way to a new 
perception of global integrity. This idea is substantiated by ever increasing 
interdependence as humanity is repeatedly challenged by global issues 
calling for greater cooperation and common efforts. So, the Soviet Union 
does not conceive of its future development without a greater participation 
in the world economy.57
As Shevardnadze suggested above, the world economy was becoming 
increasingly integrated, and interdependence was becoming more and more evident in
54. Jim Hoagland, 'The Soviet Military Complex is holding Gorbachev back,' International Herald Tribune, 
13 August 1991, p. 4.
55. Ksenya Gonchar, 'Soviet Conversion and European Security', in Jyrki Livonen, ed., The Changing Soviet 
Union in the New Europe (London: Edward Elgar, 1991), p. 162.
56. Izvestiya, 8 December 1988, p. 1.
57. Shevardnadze, Moi Vybor VZashchitu Demokratii i Svobody, p. 167.
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different spheres of international relations. One cannot deny the commitment of the 
Soviet leadership to integrate their country into the world economy.58
As Shevardnadze told a Ministry of Foreign Affairs audience in July 1987, 'we 
have to become a more organic part of the world economic system'.59 Shevarnadze said 
in 1989 that 'the diplomatic service must turn more boldly to the problems of the 
economy.... Our main priority is to provide conditions maximally favourable for 
perestroika in the country'.60 Thus, economic relations with other countries were 
important instruments of Soviet foreign policy.
After six years of failed economic reform with one still-born plan following 
another, the Soviet Union turned to the West for large-scale help. In a remarkable 
series of statements, signals and acts, Gorbachev warned that his nation must become 
part o f the world economy or face catastrophe. In other words, unless the Soviet 
economy was integrated into the world economy, a perestroika of the Soviet economic 
system would be impossible: active participation in the international economic system 
was crucial, and the advantages and benefits of the international division of labour had 
to be used.61
The most important function of increased economic involvement with the 
advanced world lay in stimulating and promoting radical reform and efficiency within
58. J.M.C. Rollo, The New Eastern Europe: Western Response (London, Pinter Publishers, 1990), pp. 109- 
110.
59. Shevardnadze, 'Bezuslovnoe Trebovanie - Povemut'sya Litsom k Ekonomike' speech on July 4, 1987 at a 
meeting of the aktiv of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 3 
(1987), p. 4.
60. Shevardnadze, 'Foreign policy begins at home,' interview by Galina Sidorova, Novoye Vremya, no. 28 
(July 7, 1989), pp. 8-10.
61. Nikolai Shmelev, 'Perestroika and East-West economic interaction', in Gary Bertsch and Steven Eliott- 
Gower, eds., The Impact o f Governments on East-West Economic Relations (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 
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the Soviet economy.62 A radical reorganization of the management of foreign economic 
relations began even earlier. A State Foreign Economic Commission, a standing body 
of the USSR Council of Ministers, was set up to coordinate ail work in this field. New 
legislation on foreign trade was worked out and effective instruments for the protection 
of Soviet state interests on the foreign market, including a new customs tariff of the 
USSR, were being created.63
Gorbachev understood that greater incentives and decentralization were the key 
to revitalising Soviet industry. In the summer of 1987, he produced his law on state 
enterprises, the cornerstone of a proclaimed "New Economic Mechanism".64 This law 
allowed the setting-up of the first wholly foreign-owned firms in Soviet history. It 
extended the principle o f khozraschet, a system of economic accounting that 
theoretically gave companies a degree of control over their own destiny. Since the 1917 
Bolshevik Revolution, the Kremlin kept a tight rein on the economy, maintaining direct 
ownership of all areas. State investment was directed into heavy industry at the expense 
of consumer goods and services. The law on state enterprises attempted to change this.
Foreign investors were given the same rights as Soviet investers, including tax 
preferences. Guarantees against nationalization were also given. Under the above 
mentioned law 100 per cent foreign-owned enterprises could be created, and 
concessions would be widened. Foreign capital was supposed to take part in the 
ongoing process of privatization in the USSR. Even though the basic law on foreign 
investment was adopted, there remained the need for many decrees and rules to be 
adopted by republican governments and ministries.
62. Hasekawa and Pravda, Perestroika: Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policies, p. 8.
63. A Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the USSR replaced two governmental departments - the 
USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade and the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations. The 
associations functioning under the new Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations trade in raw materials, 
foodstuffs, individual types of machines and equipment,and other commodities. The Korea Herald, 16 
November 1990, Supplement p. 3.
64. The Independent, 28 December 1989, Supplement, p. 1.
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The transfer of major enterprises to a corporate form of ownership would provide 
foreign investors with an opportunity not only to acquire shares, but to participate in 
the establishment and management of new corporations in the USSR as well. Here the 
laws concerning foreign companies' operations in the USSR were based on principles 
common to most countries of the world community. Besides, a meeting between 
Gorbachev and the leaders of the seven major Western nations was followed by a 
complete transformation of Western philosophy. Important agreements regarding the 
mechanism of the USSR's integration into the world economy were expected to be 
concluded.
Official data on joint ventures65 in the USSR show that in the first quarter of 
1991 the contribution of this kind of enterprise to Soviet output was still tiny but had 
grown fast. Some 2,600 joint ventures with firms from over sixty countries had 
registered by the end of 1991.66 When we see this trend, we can find the main factors 
which determined the investment climate in the USSR. First, the international political 
climate in relations between the East and the West was improving. Second, the internal 
political climate in the USSR was formed by diverse processes. On the one hand, Soviet 
society's rapid democratization created a freer and more creative atmosphere, which 
promoted the idea of Joint Ventures. On the other hand, political reorganization 
contained some tendencies that might lend to hinder the process.
Gorbachev placed more and more emphasis on reformist structures and 
orientations in East-West relations. He saw close East-West commercial ties as a vital 
part o f the USSR's response to domestic economic problems, especially declining 
productivity and low-quality manufactured goods, if the USSR was to avoid
65. The first normative act to govern the establishment and operation of joint ventures in the USSR were 
developed on 19 August 1986.
66. Vladimir Ranenko, "Sovmestnoe Predprinimatel'stvo v Rossii", Economika i Zhizn', no. 5 (1992), p. 13.
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international economic and political disparities.67 Gorbachev began his reforms of 
Soviet foreign economic policy with a diplomatic offensive designed to normalize 
Soviet relations with international economic organizations and therefore with the world 
economy.68 Gorbachev's government revised its policy towards a quite number of 
international organizations.69 The Soviet Union wanted to take part in world economic 
organizations, such as GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), IMF 
(International Monetary Fund), World Bank, OECD (Organization of Economic Co­
operation and Development) and the EC (European Community).70 Soviet policy 
towards international economic institutions underwent a transformation as part of the 
general change of course under Gorbachev. The Soviet Union wanted to become a part 
of the successfully developed Western world. Gorbachev explained the Soviet approach 
to GATT in an interview in L'Uniici, published in May 1987 thus: "it is one of those 
international mechanisms which can and, we believe, must be used to unite the efforts 
o f all countries in the task of improving world economic relations. Hence our interest in 
GATT and the multilateral trade talks being held within its framework."71 Thus, after 
decades o f self-isolation the Soviet Union set a consistent course for the integration of 
its economy into the world economy. Gorbachev was convinced that this was an 
important way of getting the Soviet Union accepted as a 'normal' member of the 
international community. Economic motives were equally or more important. Doing 
business, Soviet leaders hoped, would help them to modernize the Soviet Union.
67. Hoffman, 'Gorbachev and the Western Alliance: Reassessing the Anticoalition Strategy' in R. F. Laird &
S. L. Clark, eds., The USSR and the Western Alliance (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), pp. 75-76.
68. Ed. A. Hewett with Clifford G. Gaddy, Open for Business: Russia's Return to the Global Economy 
(Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 33.
69. A. Aslund, "The New Soviet Policy towards International Economic Organizations," in The World Today, 
vol. 44 (January-December, 1988), p. 27.
70. On the USSR and International Organizations, see Leonard Geron, Soviet Foreign Economic Policy under 
Perestroika (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), pp. 54-64: Hewett with Gaddy, Open for Business, pp. 33-54.
71. Pravda, 20 May 1987, p. 4.
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Furthermore, international influence would increasingly depend on how the country 
performed economically by world standards. These elements and, indeed, the entire 
nexus o f resource issues, thus provided an ever more important and complex linkage 
connecting the domestic and international dimensions of perestroika.72
The movement of the Soviet Union to an open economy was to be regarded as an 
integral part of the general, common policy exercised by the USSR, the leading 
Western countries, international economic organizations and financial centres. For the 
Soviet Union this would provide the acceleration of the transfer to a market-oriented 
and mixed economy, of overcoming economic crisis while acquiring an opportunity to 
receive Western assistance.
After six years o f failed economic reform with one still-born plan following 
another, the Soviet Union turned to the West for large-scale help. In a remarkable 
series o f statements, signals and acts, Gorbachev warned that his nation must become 
part of the world economy or face catastrophe.
Policy Thinking
Amendments to the programme for internal perestroika prompted us 
to deal more extensively with questions of international cooperation in 
science, technology, economics, and environmental problems, and we 
reacted to the emergence of new priorities with rapid innovations in our 
internal structure.73
As Shevardnadze said above, the scope and depth of the connection between the 
domestic and international dimensions of perestroika emerges more clearly when we 
turn to the area o f policy thinking.
Gorbachev made 'new political thinking' the centerpiece of his foreign policy (see 
chapter 3). As it was adopted in a series of resolutions during the 27th CPSU Congress 
in 1986, 'new political thinking' provided the intellectual framework for a series of
72. Hasegawa and Pravda, Perestroika: Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policies, p. 10.
73. Shevardnadze, Moi Vybor v Zashchitu Demokratii i Svobody, p. 44.
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Soviet initiatives that transformed the international environment. As time passed, it 
acquired an increasingly pragmatic tone regarding the emphasis of economic and 
diplomatic factors in determining Soviet international interests. Gorbachev's 
restructuring foreign policy drew a broad response and gained recognition all over the 
world, and brought about a considerable improvement in the international political 
climate. Precisely this policy met internal requirements, strengthened the international 
position of the Soviet state, raised its prestige, favoured the forming of civilised 
relationships all over the world, and brought mankind closer to a peaceful era in its 
development.74
One of the reasons for the emergence of'new thinking' was the rise to influence 
o f three specialist groups who advised and wrote on both domestic and international 
issues.75 The first group consisted of a new generation which had recently emerged on 
the political arena - both practitioners and academics, mostly in their 30s and 40s - who 
had the opportunity to serve or travel abroad and possessed not only a broader general 
education and better linguistic skills, but also a familiarity with Western writings in the 
social sciences and international relations, as well as different methodologies of 
research and styles of argument and debate. For the moment it remains a hypothesis, 
and no more, that their collective role was decisive in effectively advancing - in 
conversations and in memoranda to their superiors - many of the ideas that came to be 
identified with the 'new political thinking.' Second, a more senior group close to the 
new leadership advised the decisionmakers in the same vein. This group included 
political scientists who were all products of the Khrushchev era, like Georgii 
Shakhnazarov, Evgenii Primakov and Fyodor Burlatsky, who shared key formative 
political experiences with many of their reformist colleagues in either the international 
or the domestic spheres. Finally, some key policy makers such as Eduard Shevardnadze
74. Pravda, 6 February 1990, p. 2.
75. See Alexander Dallin, New Thinking in Soviet Foreign Policy, in Archie Brown, ed., New Thinking in 
Soviet Politics (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 79-80.
36
and Aleksandr Yakovlev had to be prepared to listen and accept new formulae and 
approaches. The new political thinking was basically corroborated by these original 
allies o f the Soviet president. Over the years (1985-1990), Shevardnadze's flexibility 
and pragmatic approach eased the negotiation of major East-West arms agreements. He 
retained a strong interest in domestic policy as he spent his entire previous career in 
that area, and he continued to play an important role at home. In the West, he was 
respected and made friends for his candid style and his achievements in translating 'new 
political thinking' into the liberation of East Europe, the winding down of the Cold War 
and a host of disarmament agreements. Yakovlev also played a key role in internal and 
external affairs, being both one of Gorbachev's closest associates in the general area of 
ideology and head of the new International Affairs Commission of the Central 
Committee, thus effectively in charge of coordinating foreign policy strategy. He had 
been praised as the main driving force behind glasnost: promoting free speech and 
openness after 70 years of Communist oppression.
The coincidence of these three groups made the appearance of the 'new political 
thinking' in foreign policy relatively smooth and simple, compared to the more bitterly 
contested questions like economic reform or the future of the Soviet Union. External 
and domestic factors were essential components of adequate explanations of Soviet 
international behaviour and derived their importance from their effect on elite attitudes, 
which in turn shaped the priorities of Soviet leaders.
Gorbachev wanted to escape from the old pattern o f arms races, and to deal with 
the threatening international situation by political rather than by military means. He 
stressed the need for a stable and peaceful international environment in order to 
concentrate on domestic reforms, and put forward 'new political thinking' as a 
conceptual framework to guide Soviet foreign policy in a new direction.76
76. David Holloway, 'State, Society, and the Military’, in Dallin & Ladipus, The Soviet System in Crisis 
(Boulder: Westview, 1991), p. 619.
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Whereas 'new political thinking' on foreign policy issues clearly owed its 
ascendancy to the change in the domestic climate, influence flowed predominantly from 
the international to the internal sphere. This was due to the fact that new thinking was 
easier to formulate and deploy successfully in the international arena than on the less 
tractable domestic front. Success gave 'new thinking' and associated policies 
considerable impact on domestic development.77 Although this is one example of the 
unintended stimulation of domestic change by foreign policy innovation, Gorbachev on 
occasion deliberately sought to use the international success of'new political thinking' 
to boost the domestic fortunes of perestroika,78 Efforts of this kind to reinforce the 
linkage between international and domestic policy thinking contribute to the general 
strengthening o f connections between international issues and domestic politics.79 In 
the following chapters, I will attempt a comprehensive analysis of this connection.
Domestic Politics
On 25 December 1991, immediately after President Gorbachev's resignation, the 
red hammer-and-sickle flag of the USSR was pulled down from the flagstaff on the roof 
of the Kremlin to be replaced by the Russia's white, red and blue banner. The political 
changes in the former Soviet Union have taken a rapid turn: the revolutionary 
transformation o f a totalitarian dictatorship into a more liberated society.
Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and he made many moves over the following 
period: perestroika, democracy and political and economy reforms, and glasnost.
These policies were formulated at the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central 
Committee; the subsequent 27th Congress of the Party in 1986; the January and June 
plemums o f the Central Committee in 1987; at the 19th Party Conference, 
developments in the economy, restructuring o f the Party and constitutional reforms in
77. Hasegawa and Pravda, Perestroika: Soviet Domestic and Foreigtt Policies, pp. 15-16.
78. See, for instance, his speech to the Supreme Soviet, Pravda, 2 August 1989, pp. 1-2.
79. Hasegawa and Pravda, Perestroika: Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policies, p. 16.
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1988; and the campaign for and elections to the Congress of People's Deputies in 1989; 
elimination o f Article Six of the Soviet Consititution in the plenary session of the CPSU 
Central Committee in February 1990; and at the 28th Party Congress in 1990.
Glasnost' was perhaps the most significant of the changes that was introduced 
into Soviet domestic affairs.80 The principle o f glasnost' was increasingly applied to 
foreign as well as domestic policy. The policy of openness produced a change in the 
Soviet approach to verification of international agreements, especially in the area of 
arms control, and led to proposals for measures that cannot help but increase 
confidence and trust.81 Greater freedom of speech was intended to expose the misdeeds 
of a "Brezhnevite" bureaucracy and thereby mobilize the support of the people. To 
justify perestroika, it was necessary to tell the truth about the country's desperate 
condition.82 Gorbachev began the policy of glasnost' through the press and the other 
mass media and with the active participation of citizens. He said, we need glasnost' as 
we need oxygen.83 Especially, a free press was one of the most powerful weapons 
against Communist Party hardliners who sought a return to total centralized control by 
the Kremlin. A mass movement could not exist without an influential newspaper, 
without direct contacts between the ideologists of that movement and each of its 
participants. There could be no influential public movement without an influential 
newspaper. Lenin was quite right when he spoke about a newspaper as a collective 
organizer.84 Gorbachev initially started glasnost' as a weapon rather than a principle. It
80. Stephen White, Gorbachev and After, Third Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 
258.
81. Yuri Davydov, 'Old Problems, New Thinking', in Abraham Brumberg, ed., Chronicle o f  a Revolution: A 
Western-Soviet Inquiry into Perestroika (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990), p. 229.
82. Peter Cipkowski, Revolution in Eastern Europe (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1991), p. 155.
83. Gorbachev, Perestroika i Novoe Myshlenie dlya Nashei Strany i dlya vshego Mira, p. 75.
84. New Times, no. 28 (16-22 July 1991), p. 14; Lenin argued this in IVhat is to be Done? (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1978), pp . 149-174.
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was his tool for exposing the mistakes of his predecessors and the conservatives who 
surrounded him. By 1988 it had become a way of life. Press and public were eagerly 
discussing their past and present as they had never done for the previous 70 years.
Therefore, we cannot overestimate the role of the mass media in the process of 
change in Soviet society. The main role at the last stage o f perestroika was played by 
the masses. The change of the people's consciousness caused the regime to collapse. 
The change of the people's consciousness itself was caused by glasnost policy and the 
mass media. Therefore, we can say it was Gorbachev's glasnost' policy and the activities 
o f the mass media that ended the communist totalitarian regime.85
After the January 1987 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the 
Soviet Union entered a period o f bold and far-reaching reforms. It was the June 1987 
Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, for example, which adopted 
"Fundamentals of Radical Restructuring of Economic Management."86 At that time, 
Gorbachev contended that this was the most important and most radical programme for 
economic reform in the Soviet Union since Lenin introduced NEP in 1921.87
A series of resolutions calling for the further democratisation of Soviet society 
and for the reform of the political system were adopted at the Nineteenth All-Union 
Party Conference, held from 28 June 1988 to 1 July 1988. Gorbachev introduced 
multicandidate elections and created a full-time parliament, cutting across significant 
lines o f Communist party authority. An entirely new electoral law, for instance, 
approved in December 1988,broke new ground in providing for a choice of candidate
85. Fumio Uda, 'What Mass Media Did in the Past and What It Can Do in the Present and Future1, in Osamu 
Ieda, ed., New Order in Post-Communist Eurasia (Sapporo, Japan: Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido 
University, 1993), p. 36.
86. See, Pravda, 27 June 1987, pp. 2-3.
87. Gorbachev, Perestroika i Novoe Myshlenie dlya Nashei Strany i dlya vshego Mira, p. 29.
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at elections to local and national-level authorities.88 In March 1989, Soviet citizens 
voted for the first time in multiparty elections. In the first elections for the Congress of 
People's Deputies, the supreme body of the state, many powerful old Communist 
deputies were defeated, further weakening the old guard. This parliament actively 
debated and even opposed government programs. For example, on 12 December 1989 
forty percent (a vote of 1,138 to 839 with 56 abstentions) of the deputies at the Second 
Congress voted in favour o f immediate discussions on 'Article Six' o f the Soviet 
Constitution, the clause which layed down that the Communist Party must have a 
'leading role' in society.
The lesson of 1989 in Eastern Europe was that the Communist party could rule 
no more. The Soviet leader decided that he had to remove the party from the centre of 
the stage as gracefully but as firmly as he could. In January 1990, Gorbachev tried to 
transfer political authority from the Party to the government - a delicate exercise that 
involved reducing the Party's day-to-day administrative role. It also required ending the 
ban on competing political parties, and establishing a strong presidency. In theory, a 
complete transition would mean that his real power would be derived from his position 
as president rather than as general secretary.89 On 5-7 February 1990, the plenary 
session o f the CPSU Central Committee became a climax in the efforts taken by the 
Soviet leaders and aimed at overcoming the economic, social and political dogmas, 
obsolete stereotypes in domestic policy and obsolete views upon global revolutionary 
process and global development as a whole. The experiences of perestroika and 
glasnost in the Soviet Union proved that a broad public in the Soviet Union abandoned 
everything that brought the USSR into isolation from the global stream in the 
development o f productive forces and the remarkable achievements of the civilization
88. Stephen White, 'Towards a Post-Soviet Politics?', in White, Pravda and Gitelman, eds., Developments in 
Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics, Second Edition (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 11.
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of the 20th century.90 In this plenary session, the Communist Party leadership also 
repudiated Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, which guaranted the leading role o f the 
Communist Party.91 This fundamental change permited the rise of a multiparty system. 
Gorbachev realized that it was difficult for a government to govern without free 
elections that provide feedback as to the success of its policies.92
On 25 July 1991 the Communist Party's policymaking Central Committee 
considered a proposed new platform, a reformist programme preparing the party to 
compete in a pluralist, parliamentary democracy and support a mixed, market-oriented 
economy.93 The platform's adoption had fundamental significance for the Soviet Union 
since, at that time, the Communist Party remained the strongest political force in the 
country. No longer would the party claim, as it did in the platform adopted in 1986, to 
be preparing for "the planned and all-round perfection of socialism, for Soviet society's 
further advance to communism through the country's accelerated socio-economic 
development." The party's draft programme, the first since a 1960s version forecast the 
"victory of Communism" within 20 years, stressed social democratic values that 
embraced free enterprise and private property.
On 25 July 1991, in an opening speech o f a Central Committee session, 
Gorbachev declared 'we should abandon claims to be "the backbone of the state" and 
adopt as its ideology "all the riches of Soviet as well as world socialist and democratic 
thought", rather than just Marxism-Leninism'.94 This sort of broad-church party was 
central to his concept o f the Soviet Union as an integral part of world civilisation.
90. Vladilen B. Vorontsov, 'Developments in the USSR and the ROK: Impact upon Soviet-South Korean
Relations' in the third Korean-Soviet Conference in Seoul, Korea (16-17 April 1990), p. 2.
91. Izvestiya, 6 February 1990, pp. 1-2.
92. The Gorbachev Revolution: End o f  Empire, The Guardian Collection, no. 5 (1991), p. 18.
93. Izvestiya, 26 July 1991, pp. 1-2.
94. Izvestiya, 26 July 1991, p. 2.
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Indeed, he boasted that at the London G-7 Meeting (July 15-17, 1991), 'a start was 
made to the organic integration of the USSR into the world economy' - which his 
hardline critics called a sell-out to capitalism.95 The most prominent issue was the 
question of Western financial aid to the Soviet Union. The G-7 leaders virtually agreed 
that giving large-scale financial aid to the Soviet Union was premature. Instead, they 
formed a basic agreement to incrementally expand support in accordance with the pace 
o f Soviet economic reform. But the attitudes of each of the G-7 countries toward the 
Soviet Union differed. Problems also existed on the Soviet side. One question was 'Can 
the Soviet Union really develop effective economic reform plans on its own?'
The Congress of People's Deputies passed a law suspending sections of the 
Soviet Constitution and created a three-part interim structure: a State Council 
comprising Gorbachev and the leaders of participating republics, and an Inter-republic 
Economic Committee. Gorbachev said that the treaty would help ensure the 
continuance of the USSR as a world power. He stressed that the USSR's continuing 
obligations to other states was important not only for the USSR, but for the world 
community "which highly values our country's contribution to the shaping of new 
international relations." Because the republics were now free, within the framework o f 
a common foreign policy, to enjoy their own diplomatic, trade, cultural and other 
contacts with foreign states, there were new opportunities for mastering world 
experience and the USSR's integration into the world economy.96
After the abortive coup in August 1991, Gorbachev suspended the party, 
dismissed his cabinet, purged the KGB, created a new power-sharing State Council, 
recognized the Baltic states, and gave up the party leadership. He seemed to be moving 
toward a new union treaty, with a new lease on life for himself, as disoriented republic
95. The Gorbachev Revolution: End of Empire, p. 58.
96. Soviet Weekly, no. 2579 (8 August 1991), p. 3.
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presidents huddled around the Kremlin, alarmed at the prospect o f chaotic 
disintegration.
In fact Gorbachev's fate was sealed when on 8 December 1991, the three most 
powerful republics - Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia - signed an agreement on the 
establishment of the Commonwealth of Sovereign States behind his back. It would have 
no part of any new Moscow-based federation or agreement, and when its residents 
voted overwhelmingly for independence at the beginning of December 1991, the union 
was finished. On 25 December 1991, the 'Gorbachev era' ended when Gorbachev, the 
last leader of the Soviet Union, ceded place to Yeltsin, the first ruler of the new Russia. 
On 1 January 1992 the Soviet Union was formally disbanded and replaced by a 
Commonwealth of Independent States composed of 11 former Soviet republics.
As the twentieth century entered its final decade,one thing was clear: Gorbachev's 
attempt to conduct a reform from above had stirred up a revolution from below. The 
reverberations o f this revolution shook virtually every aspect of Soviet domestic and 
foreign policy. Processes of reform that were initially aimed at stimulating the Soviet 
economy and reviving the population's involvement in the country's political life had led 
to a dramatic turnabout in Moscow's relations with the West and to the transformation 
o f the postwar political order.97
As mentioned above, internal developments were intimately connected with 
foreign policy. Gorbachev and his chief supporters announced at the outset that the 
restructuring of the Soviet domestic system would be accompanied by parallel efforts to 
effect a perestroika in international relations.98 Soviet internal changes of policy made 
possible a dramatic change in Soviet foreign policy for nearly seven years o f 
Gorbachev's perestroika. They contributed to the changing climate in international 
affairs. Particularly, these developments brought major changes in Soviet's relations
97. Michael J. Sodaro, Moscow, Germany, and West: From Khrushchev to Gorbachev (London: I. B. Tauris, 
1991), p. 382.
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with U.S., Eastern and Western Europe, and Asia-Pacific area. The following chapters 
will deal with the major changes in Soviet foreign policy in this area in more detail.
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C hapter  3. New Thinking and Soviet Foreign Relations
3.1 Background of New Political Thinking
The CPSU will pursue a vigorous international policy stemming from 
the realities of the world we live in.1
Revolutionary internal change in the Soviet Union made it imperative that Soviet 
foreign policy, too, be renewed rather than simply improved. Foreign-policy priorities 
are dictated by international priorities: foreign policy must adequately reflect the 
requirements of the internal development of a state as well as its social system, rather 
than merely ensure the best possible conditions for achieving its internal goals.2 That is 
why as early as April 1985 Gorbachev asked himself what foreign policies perestroika 
must pursue.3
There are two roots of the 'new thinking'(or 'new political thinking'). The first is 
the domestic changes that have taken place in Soviet society and its political system in 
the post-Brezhnev era. The realities of Soviet society have undergone tremendous 
changes in the past thirty years, and now, in Gorbachev's view, it faced grave problems. 
It is no longer necessary to prove that the command, extensive and bureaucratic 
economy and the authoritarian, bureaucratic and overcentralised political system that 
went hand in hand with it had exhausted their capabilities by the early 1980s and 
required cardinal change.4 After the legacy of Brezhnev's "zastoi (stagnation)" 
Gorbachev's foreign-policy changes were designed to cope with Soviet domestic
1. Pravda, 26 February 1986, p. 2.
2. Oleg A. Grinevsky, East-West: Problems of Security, Confidence and Disarmament, in Armand Clesse and 
Thomas C. Schelling, eds., The Western Community and The Gorbachev Challenge (Baden and Baden: 
Nomos Publishing Company, 1989), p. 304.
3. See Pravda, 24 April 1985, pp. 1-2.
4. Konstantin Nikolayev, The New Political Thinking: Its Origins, Potential and Prospects (Moscow:
Novosti Press Agency, 1990), p. 48.
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difficulties; the means to solve them was by increasing access to Western technology, 
expanding trade, and relieving some of the burden of military expenditure.
As mentioned above, the principal points of departure for Gorbachev's foreign- 
policy thinking were domestic changes. The democratization of political life in the 
Soviet Union provided the basis for democratization in the area of international 
relations as well. The development of pluralism in the Soviet Union made it possible to 
view the political structures and decisionmaking processes in other countries with far 
greater objectivity.3 It was thus perestroika and internal renewal that gave an impetus 
to the ideas of new thinking and promoted its wide acceptance in international 
relations.6 For this, Gorbachev's foreign policy effort was directed toward contributing 
to the creation of favourable conditions for perestroika, for political, economic and 
social reforms meeting the interests of all Soviet people.7
Secondly, Gorbachev's new foreign policy was also formulated in the light of the 
realities of rapidly changing world. At the 27th Party Congress of February 1986, 
Gorbachev said:
The changes in current world developments are so deep-going and 
significant that they require a reassessment and a comprehensive analysis of 
all factors. The situation created by the nuclear confrontation calls for new 
approaches, methods, and forms of relations between the different social 
systems, states and regions.8
In his speech on the Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions, 'A call for a policy of 
realism,' Gorbachev said:
The present-day world is complicated, diverse and controversial. At 
the same time, it is becoming, objectively, ever more interdependent and 
integral.... The aggravation of global problems is also characteristic of
5. Yuri Davydov, Old Problems, New Thinking, in Abraham Brumberg(ed.), Chronicle o f  a Revolution: a 
Western-Soviet Inquiry into Perestroika (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990), pp. 228-229.
6. Oleg A. Grinevsky, 'East-West: Problems of Security, Confidence and Disarmament', p. 305.
7. The Foreign policy and Diplomatic Activity of the USSR (November 1989 - December 1990) A survey 
prepared by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Affairs (Moscow), April 1991, p. 5.
8. Pravda, 26 February 1986, p. 8.
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today's world. But they cannot be resolved without pooling the efforts of all 
states and peoples.... Many new world processes have thus been tied into a 
tight knot.... Soviet foreign policy is based on an understanding of the 
profound changes occuring in the world.9
In his speech on progress in implementing the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress 
and the tasks of promoting perestroika, Gorbachev, from the standpoint of the world 
with its mounting nuclear menace, said:
...while concentrating enormous funds and attention on the military 
aspect of countering imperialism, we did not always make use of the 
political opportunities opened up by the fundamental changes in the world 
in our efforts to assure the security of our state, to scale down tensions, and 
promote mutual understanding between nations. As a result, we allowed 
ourselves to be drawn into an arms race, which could not but affect the 
country's socio-economic development and its international standing.10
Thus Gorbachev's new political thinking rested squarely on the premise that we 
live in an interconnected and interdependent world. The global problems affecting all 
mankind reqire a common effort to solve them. The prospect of a nuclear holocaust 
was depicted as a crucial danger that had to be faced and overcome. This is also true 
for ecology no less than for the search for security. The imperative that the challenge of 
global problems had to be met could equally be understood to imply that the Soviet 
Union give up antagonism against the West in order to allow for joint efforts against 
common challenges, such as modern war and constantly growing environmental 
destruction.11
The idea of world harmony has produced a new vision of the entire range of the 
East-West relations. It is not only that the East and the West can and must coexist. The 
fundamentally new idea was that the two socio-economic systems were in a way useful 
and even necessary to each other. The change toward more tolerance put a new
9. Pravda, 19 August 1986, p. 1.
10. Pravda, 29 June 1988, p. 3.
11. Gerhard Wettig, 'Basic concepts of Gorbachev's new security thinking', in Jyrki Livonen, ed., The 
Changing Soviet Union in the New Europe (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1991), p. 88.
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perspective on the problem of a nation's right to choose its own social and economic 
forms of life. The more complicated world becomes with its advancing economies, 
social forms and relations, the more these interact with one another, and the more 
alternatives open up before civilisation, society and man. General human values should 
constitute the criterion of any action and initiative in international politics. These 
fundamental ideas lead new political thinking to a broader understanding of security.12
In sum, in an official review of foreign policy prepared by the Soviet Foreign 
Ministry, the following factors were held to influence the evolving concept of'new 
political thinking':
- The rapid development of science and technology, especially in the 
areas o f electronics and information; - The mounting trend towards an 
interpenetration of economic mechanisms at regional and global level; - 
Changes in the political sphere where ideas o f freedom and democracy, the 
supremacy of law and order, and freedom of choice are increasingly taking 
hold of people's thinking; - Change in the very concept of national security, 
with the stress less on military factors than economic, technological and 
monetary factors; and - Unity and interdependence of the world... and the 
supremacy of universal interests.13
Therefore, the rethinking of the realities of international development found its 
conceptual expression in the set of policy guidelines known as new political thinking, 
which is not a sudden revelation but rather a logical result of the development of 
philosophic as well as political thought and of the moral and ethical rules o f the second 
half o f the twentieth century.14
3.2 Principles o f  New Political Thinking
'New political thinking' is widely used to describe the distinctive approach to 
international affairs by Soviet officials and academics in the second half o f the 1980s.
12. Nikolayev, The New Political Thinking: Its Origins, Potential and Prospects, pp. 18-19.
13. The Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Actibity of the USSR (April 1985 - October 1989) A Survey Prepared 
by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs,1 International Affairs (Moscow), January 1990, pp. 8-10.
14. Grinevsky, 'East-West: Problems of Security, Confidence and Disarmament1, p. 305.
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This new image of the world can be found in its various stages of evolution in 
Gorbachev's speeches and reports, and in the speeches of his advisers and supporters. 
On 25 February 1986, the idea of the world as being integral and interdependent was 
officially formulated for the first time, in the Political Report of the CPSU Central 
Committee to the 27th Party Congress. At this Congress Gorbachev introduced the 
new political thinking as a comprehensive part o f the basic framework of Soviet foreign 
policy:
The situation has reached a turning point not only in internal but also 
in external affairs. Changes in current world development are so profound 
and so significant that they require rethinking and complex analysis of all 
factors. The situation o f nuclear confrontation calls for new approaches, 
methods, and forms of relations between the different social systems, states, 
and regions.15
New thinking flowed directly from this concern. In his speech at the UN, 
Gorbachev said o f the new thinking:
...the concept of comprehensive international security is based on the 
principles of the UN Charter and the assumption that international law is 
binding on all states. While championing demilitarization of international 
relations, we would like political and legal methods to reign supreme in all 
attempts to solve the arising problems. Our ideal is a world community of 
states with political systems and foreign policies based on law. This could 
be achieved with the help o f an accord within the framework of the UN on 
a uniform understanding of the principles and norms of international law; 
their codification with new conditions taken into consideration; and the 
elaboration of legislation for new areas of cooperation. In the nuclear era, 
the effectiveness of international law must be based on norms reflecting a 
balance of interests of states, rather than on coercion....International ties 
will fully reflect the real interests of the peoples and reliably serve the cause 
of their overall security only when man and his concerns, rights and 
freedoms are in the centre o f things.16
In his speech at a special session of the National Assembly of Cuba in April 1989,
15. M. Gorbachev, 'Politicheskii doklad Tsentralnogo Komiteta DPSS XXVII s"ezdu Kommunisticheskoi 
Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza,' Materialy XXVII s"ezda Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (Moscow: 
Politizdat, 1986), p. 4.
16. Izvestiya, 8 December 1988, p. 2.
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Gorbachev explained that the concept of new political thinking had
developed as a result of an ever more in-depth analysis of the 
international situation and through a generalisation of our experience in 
foreign policy. On the one hand, it has shown how difficult it is to secure 
concerted action when there is a great diversity of forces acting in the 
international arena. Each of them, whether we speak of social systems or 
states, mass movements or political parties, above all pursues its own aims, 
which in some ways coincide and in some ways clash. Nobody can ever 
stop the ideological and political struggle stemming from the pluralism of 
interests and convictions. On the other hand, the experience of recent times 
has demonstrated that, despite the contradictions and disagreements 
existing in the world, it has been possible to move the barometer's needle 
noticeably closer to "clear". This means that the area of common, 
concurrent interests is wide enough to enable it to serve as the basis for 
joint action on a global scale.17
In his speech on major directions of the USSR's domestic and foreign policy on 
May 30, 1989, Gorbachev emphasized the principles of the Soviet foreign policy course 
as follows:
The country's security should be ensured primarily through political 
means, as a component of universal and equal security, in a process of 
demilitarization, democratization and humanization in international 
relations, with a reliance on the prestige and resources o f the United 
Nations Organization; -Nuclear weapons should be eliminated in the course 
of the negotiating process which should be oriented towards disarment and 
reduction of countries' defence potential to the point of resonable 
sufficiency; -The use of force or threat of force to attain any political, 
economic or other ends are inadmissible; a respect for sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity in relations with other countries are 
indispensable; -Dialogue and negotiations to achieve a balance of interests, 
and not confrontation, should become the only means of resolving 
international issues and settling conflicts; -We are in favour of making the 
Soviet economy part o f the world economy on a mutually beneficial and 
equitable basis, and in favour o f active participation in the formulation and 
observance of the rules o f the present international division of labour, 
scientific and technological exchages, trade, and cooperation with all those 
who are prepared for it.18
Under such conditions, Gorbachev opted for a very intelligent and courageous
17. Pravda, 6 April 1989, p. 2.
18. Pravda, 31 May 1989, p. 3.
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approach: according to his assessment, a paradigm shift in world politics was inevitable. 
By this, the traditional pattern of hegemony-oriented power politics would be 
superseded by new, global challenges, such as ecological issues, North-South relations, 
etc., which could be solved only by reaching international cooperation. Since coming to 
power, Gorbachev has tried to gain a leading role for the Soviet Union in this paradigm 
shift, thus maintaining or regaining international reputation and sympathy, allies and 
impact.19
On the basis of the new political thinking, those principles in its foreign policy 
can be summarized as follows:
Principles of equality and reciprocity
In February 1989, in Kiev, Gorbachev maintained that Soviet relations with the 
socialist states should be based on "unconditional independence, full equality, and strict 
non-intervention in internal affairs."20 This had profound implications for Soviet policy 
towards Eastern Europe, the West, and the Third World.
In the past, peaceful coexistence served from the time of its emergence and for a 
long historical period as a principle governing the state-to-state relations of socialism 
and capitalism. Today, however, according to Gorbachev, it was interpreted as a 
supreme, universal principle o f mutual relations among all the world's states, without 
exception.21 Having embraced the idea of a single world, Gorbachev argued, one 
realizes sooner or later that it is impossible to ensure national interests unless they are 
placed in the context of'universal human values' rather than class interests. Ensuring 
the survival of humanity, delivering it from the risk o f nuclear war, ecological disaster, 
hunger and whatever may pose a threat of annihilation o f paramount importance.
19. Albrecht A.C. von Muller, 'Conventional Stability 2000: How NATO Could Regain the Initiative’, in 
Clesse and Schelling, eds., The Western Community and The Gorbachev Challenge, p. 332.
20. Pravda, 24 February 1989, p. 3.
21. See, Oleg Nikolayevich Bykov, 'The Concept of Peaceful Coexistence in Light of the New Thinking', in 
Steve Hirsch, ed.,MEMO 2: Soviets Examine Foreign Policy for a New Decade (Washington: The Bureau of 
National Affairs, 1991), pp. 183-200.
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Universal human priorities prevail over differences in social systems, world outlooks, 
ways o f life and traditions.22 The new trends led to the vital principles of a 'state based 
on law' and 'respect for the individual.' Then came the notions of'dialogue' and 'solving 
political conflicts by political means.'
Therefore, the creative development and enrichment of the concept of peaceful 
coexistence is an important component of the new political thinking and new approach 
to solving urgent current problems.23 
Freedom of choice
According to traditional Soviet thinking, progress from capitalism to socialism is 
historically inevitable. So the choice of the socialist system was predetermined. On the 
contrary, the secession from socialism runs counter to progress according to Marx's 
interpretation of history. Thus the old ideology did not in fact recognize 'freedom of 
choice.'
A basic idea in the new thinking is the concept of'freedom of choice.' This 
concept stems from the unprecedented and mounting diversity of the world. In his 
book Perestroika, Gorbachev emphasized the principle of the 'freedom of choice.'
Every nation is entitled to choose its own way of development, to 
dispose of its fate, its territory, and its human and natural resources. 
International relations cannot be normalized if this is not understood in all 
countries. For ideological and social differences, and differences in political 
systems are the result o f the choice made by the people.24
At the 43 rd Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1988, 
Shevardnadze emphasised the freedom of choice as the key element in new political 
thinking as follows:
Probably nowhere is the role of law so important as in ensuring 
freedom of choice, which is the key element in new political thinking. For
22. Grinevsky, 'East-West: Problems of Security, Confidence and Disarmament', p. 306.
23. Bykov, The Concept of Peaceful Coexistence in Light of the New Thinking', p. 190.
24. Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika i Novoe Myshlenie dlya nashey Strany i dlya vsego Mira (Moscow: 
Politizdat, 1988), p. 184.
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there can be no freedom to choose one's own way as long as international 
law is being constantly violated, as it is in Southern Africa, the Middle East, 
Central America, and elsewhere. Freedom of choice defies restrictions 
within ideological borders or geographical zones. It cannot be stopped by 
crusades; it can only be recognized. It is absolute, and equally absolute is 
our respect for it, regardless of what a particular country's orientation is.... 
we hope to use this key to open many doors that until now have been 
tightly locked.25
Gorbachev also noted in his UN speech in December 1988 that socialist pluralism 
dictated the principle of'freedom of choice' for all countries. On the notion of'freedom 
o f choice' Gorbachev stated:
We also clearly see that the principle of freedom of choice is a must. 
Refusal to recognize this principle will have serious consequences for world 
peace. To deny a nation the freedom of choice, regardless of the pretext or 
the verbal guise in which it is cloaked, is to upset the unstable balance that 
has been achieved at this point. Freedom of choice is a universal principle 
to which there should be no exceptions.26
In July 1989, in his speech to the Council o f Europe, Gorbachev reiterated the 
Soviet Union's adherence to a policy of non-interference in the affairs of other 
countries. He stressed:
Social and political orders in one or another country changed in the 
past and may change in the future. But this change is the exclusive affair of 
the people of that country and is their choice. Any interference in domestic 
affairs and any attempts to restrict the sovereignty o f states, both friends, 
allies or any others are inadmissible.27
This principle which every nation is free to choose the ways and means of its 
own developments, gave tremendous help to the forces o f change in the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe including the demolition of the Berlin Wall in November 
1989. This principle was 'a fundamental precondition for building up a new type of
25. Pravda, 28 September 1988, p. 2.
26. Izvestiya, 8 December 1988, p. 1.




Gorbachev's regime introduced new political thinking in its military policy which 
was completely different from the previous one. The new principle was that the use or 
threat o f force could no longer be an instrument o f foreign policy. Without 
disarmament, reduction of military expenditure, conversion of military industries, it 
would be very difficult to manage increasingly problems both with perestroika and with 
global affairs. So, Gorbachev radically altered the Soviet concept of national security.29
The Gorbachev period witnessed a spate of unprecedented foreign policy 
initiatives, particularly in the sphere of arms control. When we analyze Gorbachev's 
series of arms control proposals, we can find some new concepts in his military 
strategy. First, a new security view -'nonmilitarization' - appeared. The economic and 
technological development of a country was becoming a key factor of its security, while 
the significance of the military factor diminished. The relations among nations 
influenced each other more through economic and technological means than through 
military power. Second, mutual security theories which did not threaten the security of 
other countries emerged. Third, the Soviet Union's military doctrine was converted 
from "parity" doctrine to a defence doctrine based on "the principle of reasonable 
suficiency", particularly to free the country from the excessive cost o f the arms race and 
confrontation and to channel the resources thus released toward peaceful activities and 
perestroika. Gorbachev first introduced this notion at the 27th Party Congress in
28. Pravda, 3 July 1990, p. 3.
29. On the Concept of National Security, see the Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Activity of the USSR (April 
1989 - October 1990) A Survey prepared by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. cit., pp. 9-10.
55
1986.30 Fourth, Gorbachev's new security view inevitably broke with Brezhnev's theory 
o f nuclear deterrence. Finally, the Soviet Union had 'the denial of violence' as its object 
in revolutionary support towards the Third World.31
As mentioned above, the attitude of new military strategy reflected the change in 
the international revolutionary strategy of the Soviet Union. This attitude was also 
relevant to their less hostile approach towards the West. Gorbachev's "mutual 
dependence" and "mutual security" basically changed the West's foreign and military 
policy which was previously based upon the assumptions of a "the Soviet's threat" and 
"deterrance" after the Second World War.
Balance of interests
In the past, differences often acted as barriers; today they can develop 
into factors of rapprochement and mutual enrichment, specific interests 
underlie all differences between social systems, ways of life, and value 
preferences. There's no getting away from this fact. But then,there's also no 
getting away from the necessity to balance these interests on the 
international level. Their balance is a vital condition o f survival and 
progress.32
As Gorbachev announced in the above UN speech, ideology could no longer play 
a dominant role in relations among nations. As Gorbachev emphasised, balance of 
interests fronted the foundation on which interstate relations in the present-day world
30. Gorbachev said as follows: renunciation by the nuclear powers of war - both nuclear and conventional - 
against each other or against third countries; Prevention of an arms race in outer space, cessation of all 
nuclear weapons tests and the total destruction of such weapons, a ban on and the destruction of chemical 
weapons, and renunciation of the development of other means of mass annihilation; a strictly controlled 
lowering of the levels of military capabilities of countries to limits of reasonable adequacy; disbandment of 
military alliances, and as a stage towards this - renunciation of their enlargement and of the formation of new 
ones; balanced and proportionate reduction of military budgets. Pravda, 26 February 1986, p. 8.
31. For discussions on the military rethinking, see Stephen M. Meyer, The Sources and Prospects of 
Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security', in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller and Stephen Van 
Evera, eds., Soviet Military Policy (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989), pp. 110-149; Gerard Holden, "Soviet 
"New Thinking' in Security Policy", in Mary Kaldor, Gerard Holden and Richard Falk, eds., The New Detente: 
Rethinking East-West Relations (London: Verso, 1989), pp. 235-250; Michael MccGnire, Perestroika and 
Soviet National Security (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1990); Gerard Holden, Soviet Military 
Reform: Conventional Disarmament and the Crisis o f Militarised Socialism (London: Pluto Press, 1991).
32. Izvestiya, 8 December 1988, p. 1.
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should be built.33 The Soviet Union attached greater importance to its policy of national 
interest than to ideological approaches. As an important element of the new political 
thinking Gorbachev said of'balance of interest' at the 19th All-Union conference o f the 
CPSU:
As we analysed the contemporary world, we realised more clearly 
that international relations, without losing their class character, are 
increasingly coming to be precisely relations between nations. We noted the 
enhanced role in world affairs of peoples, nations, and emerging new 
national entities. This implies that there is no ignoring the diversity of 
interests in international affairs.34
Shevardnadze also elaborated on this theme in his book:
We did this so that governments could learn to cooperate with each 
other and respect each other's interests despite differences in ideology, and 
to look for points in common instead of subjecting their foreign policies to 
ideological tenets which are often at odds, and are the product of only some 
part of humanity, be it small or large.35
As mentioned above, balance of interests formed the foundation on which 
interstate relations in the present-day world should be built. So, this principle o f the 
new thinking was based on an analysis o f the entire history of the East-West relations 
and the relations among all nations. Deideologising relations among countries has 
brought down many prejudices, biased attitudes and suspicions and has cleared and 
improved the international atmosphere.
Now that an interrelated and interdependent world is shaping up the recognition 
o f the primacy of'common' is the pivot of balance of interests. The problem of survival 
o f humankind cannot be resolved beyond this combination.36
An integral part of the world economy
The country's economic invigoration can be promoted by
33. Pravda, 22 September 1988, p. 4.
34. Pravda, 29 June 1988, p. 3.
35. Eduard Shevardnadze,M oi Vibor v Zashitu Demokratii i Svobody (Moscow: Novosti, 1991), pp. 118-119.
36. Pravda, 22 September 1988, p. 4.
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implementing one of the main principles underlying the new political 
thinking - the Soviet economy's integration into the world economic 
system.37
A major foreign policy instrument meant to support economic perestroika was 
the deepening integration of the Soviet Union into the world economy. International 
economic ties were crucial to Gorbachev's efforts to modernize the Soviet economy. 
The rapid decline in the Soviet economic situation necessitated concerted efforts to 
eliminate the economic isolation of the USSR from the rest of the global economy. 
Improving international economic cooperation with the west was one goal of 
Gorbachev's new foreign-policy, especially in terms of gaining access to foreign high 
technology, investment and managerial expertise in order to reverse this process of 
decline.
From the very beginning o f his term in office Gorbachev planned far-reaching 
expansion in the sphere of Soviet foreign economic relations, as he revealed in a speech 
o f 23 April 1985:
The Soviet Union is advocating fruitful and all-round economic, 
scientific and technological co-operation built on the principles of mutual 
benefit and excluding any sort of discrimination; it is prepared to continue 
to expand and develop trade relations on the mutual interests of both 
sides.38
Gorbachev was keenly sensitive to the interconnections between the domestic and 
international components of perestroika. He viewed arms control, diplomatic, cultural, 
and commercial ties between the East and the West as prerequisites for his country's 
socio-economic transformation.39 Regarding the link between internal reforms and 
foreign trade policy, his report on the guidelines for the economic and social 
development o f the USSR for 1986-1990 and for the period ending in 2000 stated the
37. Shevardnadze, The world has become a safer place (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1989), p. 23.
38. Pravda, 24 April 1985, p. 2.
39. Erik P. Hoffman, 'Perestroika and the new international economy', in Marie Lavigne, ed., The Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe in the Global Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 182.
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following:
We hold that in the modern world, active development of economic, 
scientific and technical ties and participation in the international division o f 
labour are vitally necessary. We consider this an important means of 
maintaining and strengthening peaceful, good-neighbourly relations among 
states, and of rendering mutual assistance in resolving national economic 
problems.40
On the basis of the new political thinking, Gorbachev indicated the following 
principle in his foreign policy at the Congress of People's Deputies o f the USSR in June 
9, 1989:
The Soviet economy must become an integral part of the world 
economy on the basis of equality and mutual advantage, must actively 
participate in the shaping and observance of the rules of the contemporary 
international division of labour, scientific and technological exchange, and 
trade.41
As mentioned above, the Soviet Union sought an international trading position 
equal to its economic potential and political status. World economy is interconnected 
and interdependent as a result o f rapidly expanding economic, scientific-technological, 
cultural and information exchanges.
All these principles imparted a dynamism to Soviet foreign policy and made it 
possible to come forward with a whole series of major initiatives.
3.3 Practices of New Political Thinking
Gorbachev's fall from power cannot diminish the fact that he changed the world 
more than any leader since the second world war. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, his 
foreign minister, transformed Moscow's view of the world and the world's view of 
Moscow. They co-managed a transformation in Soviet foreign policy from cold War 
rivalry to co-operation in all areas, from arms control to the freer flow of information
40. Izvestiya, 4 March 1986, p. 4.
41. Izvestiya, 10 June 1989, p. 1.
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and people.
The Soviet Union pursued two objectives in implementing the principles o f their 
new foreign policy. In his speech at the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 
the results o f the summit with the President of the USA and the outcome of the meeting 
o f the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states, 
Gorbachev said,
the first objective is to create the necessary favourable external 
environment to enable us to tackle both domestic tasks and the overall 
problem now facing mankind - how to ensure its survival. The second is 
that we want to ease the burden on our economy. The Soviet Union 
intended to take radical measures to attain both objectives.42
There are two ways to assess the importance of new political thinking in the 
Soviet Union. First, there is its foreign dimension, which created the possibility of 
breaking some o f the major deadlocks in international relations. Second, there is its 
domestic role, for the new political thinking can be regarded as a function of the 
general change in the Soviet Union.43 Gorbachev's priority was to set his own house in 
order by focusing on the internal requirements of economic growth and political 
change. These demanding domestic tasks requried a more placid external environment 
and a long-term reduction in military spending.44
Soviet-U.S Relations
Foreign policy, based on the new thinking, yielded positive results between the 
Soviet Union and the United States. Signs of the changing times were quick to surface 
in foreign policy. In November 1985, Gorbachev and Reagan met in Geneva, and 
embarked on a journey which led to an end of the cold war. Moscow made the first in
42. Izvestiya, 13 June 1990, p. 2.
43. Victor A. Fremenyuk, 'Soviet New Thinking on Superpower Rivalry' in John F. Weeks, ed., Beyond 
Superpower Rivalry: Latin America and the Third World (New York: New York University Press, 1991), p. 
2 1 .
44. Michael J. Sodaro, Moscow, Germany, and the West: From Khrushchev to Gorbachev (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 1991), p. 319.
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a series o f shifts in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty(START) negotiations that 
signalled a move in the Soviet position towards the American proposal for 'deep cuts' in 
strategic missiles.
On January 15, 1986, the Soviet Union carried out a number of important 
practical measures in the large-scale disarmament programme. Gorbachev announced a 
new initiative for phased arms reduction and the elimination of all nuclear arms by the 
year 2000. The Soviet Union discontinued nuclear tests and called upon the United 
States to follow suit.45 The importance of this qualified concession was enhanced in 
February 1986 at the Twenty Seventh Party Congress when Gorbachev affirmed 
Moscow's willingness "to stop nuclear tests and to resolve the question of medium- 
range missiles in the European zone - with no direct connection to the problems of 
strategic arms and space."46 At the Reykjavik summit on 11 October 1986, Gorbachev 
almost charmed President Reagan into scrapping the world's strategic nuclear weapons. 
They outlined a broad agreement to reduce long-range missiles and bombers by half in 
five years and totally by 1996, and to eliminate all but 100 medium-range missiles on 
each side, including those deployed in Europe, half in the first five-year phase and the 
balance by 1996. But in the end the meeting foundered on the US refusal to limit SDI, 
and the Soviet side reversed its previous offer to conclude a separate agreement on 
INF.
1987 was a pivotal year in Moscow's evolving detente policy. After a Central 
Committee plenum in January heard Gorbachev call for "truly revolutionary and 
comprehensive transformations in society," the Soviet leader declared on 28 February 
1987 that Moscow was now prepared to negotiate an INF accord with the United 
States without insisting that the Americans renounce SDI.47
After the December 1987 Washington summit relations between the two
45. Shevardnadze, The future belongs to freedom , p. 49.
46. Pravda, 26 February 1986, p. 8.
47. Sodaro, Moscow, Germany, and the West: From Khrushchev to Gorbachev, p. 324.
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countries began to change. Gorbachev succeeded in his new policy of concessions and 
more flexible diplomacy through the signing of a treaty on intermediate-range nuclear 
force (INF) missiles, which eliminated an agreement on SDI as a precondition to other 
agreements. The Soviet leader's programme for a stage-by-stage moved to a world free 
of nuclear weapons. While the superpowers raced towards fresh arms-cutting accords, 
Gorbachev moved unilaterally to trim back the hugely expensive Soviet military.
U.S-Soviet detente increased further after the signing of the INF treaty in March
1988. This landmark achievement in arms control provided clear evidence that the 
formative phase in Gorbachev's efforts to build a reformist coalition was largely over. 
The INF treaty also ushered in a new phase in East-West relations. In the Soviet Union, 
the INF accord opened the gates to the most critical and comprehensive reappraisal of 
Soviet foreign policy to be conducted in open forums since the 1920s.48
In December 1988, Gorbachev's visit to the United Nations to address the UN 
General Assembly aroused memories of an event of almost thirty years ago when 
another Soviet leader, Khrushchev, spent almost a month in New York, from 19 
September to 13 October 1960. In Gorbachev's speech to the United Nations, he issued 
a breathtaking blueprint for world peace and an end to the "missionary" rivalry between 
the two superpowers. He matched his words with a dramatic unilateral cutback in the 
Soviet Union's conventional forces. It certainly appeared to offer real hope of fresh 
progress in East-West arms control.
Finally, Gorbachev and U.S President Bush pronounced the cold war dead and 
both countries have ceased to regard each other as enemies in December 1989.49 The 
Malta summit marked the end of the bipolar world. In the process o f amazing changes 
in Eastern Europe, Bush and Gorbachev discussed a wide range of issues at their first 
summit at Malta. They outlined a vision of cooperation between East and West as the
48. Sodaro, Moscow, Germany, and the West, p. 324.
49. See Arnold L. Horelick, 'U.S.-Soviet Relations: Threshold of a New Era', Foreign Affairs, vol. 69, no. 1 
(1989/1990), pp. 51-58.
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world moved away from Cold War into a new era of prolonged peace. The two leaders 
declared that they had opened a new era of cooperation - rather than competition - 
between the two superpowers, and stressed that they had established a good working 
relationship.
Gorbachev got a "surprise present" from Bush at Malta in December 1989: 
explicit U.S. support for observer status for the Soviet Union at GATT. Thus Moscow 
virtually obtained a passport to the West's most important trade body. The U.S. pledge 
o f support for Soviet entry into GATT was an indication that the Cold War structure 
was beginning to collapse. It was also a demonstration of the United States willingness 
to cooperate in Gorbachev's perestroika experiments, and that success in these market- 
oriented reforms would serve the interests of the West as well.
The outcome of the Soviet-US summit talks in Washington in early June 1990 
was confined to achievements in the area of arms reduction. But a number of 
'breakthrough' agreements were signed on other topics, of which the agreement on 
trade was foremost. This testified to the stable development of Soviet-American 
relations not only in terms of removing the military threat but also now in other areas of 
'normal partner' relations.50
In July 1991, Gorbachev and Bush met in Moscow to sign a treaty cutting 
strategic nuclear stockpiles. The reciprocal U.S. and Soviet tactical/theatre 
"denuclearization" initiatives of September and October 1991 altered in a fundamental 
sense our conceptions of what constitutes military security at this stage in history. On 
September 27, 1991, President Bush announced the most dramatic reduction of U.S. 
nuclear weapons since the Cold War started the arms race, scaling back U.S. military 
power around the world because of the death of Soviet communism. In response to 
Bush's unilateral arms reduction, Gorbachev declared radical arms cuts including 
abolition o f Soviet short-range nuclear weapons, matching U.S. initiatives and setting
50. Yevgenii Primakov, 'Perestroika in the USSR and World Development Now', in Abel Aganbegyan, ed., 
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the world on a new path of disarmament. Gorbachev said he would scrap 1,000 
strategic warheads beyond mutual cuts already agreed and examine cooperation in 
space-based defence systems: something Moscow had mockingly rejected for nearly a 
decade. Gorbachev, who also announced a one-year moratorium on nuclear tests, 
desperately needed to cut military spending to feed his population and support market 
reforms. He stated that strategic warheads would be cut to 5,000 rather than the 6,000 
agreed under one-third cuts with the U.S. in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START).51
In making concessions our arms cuts, Gorbachev sought to recast the traditional 
relationship between Soviet domestic politics and external policy. His predecessors 
tended instinctively to link the pursuit of external security with internal regimentation. 
In contrast, Gorbachev was attempting to moderate Western military behavior by 
capitalizing on the dramatic new programme of internal political liberalization that he 
first unveiled before the Central Committee in January 1987.52
During the Gorbachev era, the Soviet-U.S. summit was a major event in the 
process o f profound positive changes in Europe and the rest of the world. Mutual 
understanding and cooperation between the two great states led to a number of 
practical steps. The atmosphere, content and nature of the Soviet-U.S. summit 
confirmed the vitality of the policy of new thinking. The new stage of Soviet-American 
relations based on cooperation and partnership was beneficial for both nations and the 
world community as a whole.53
The above events made it even more evident that Gorbachev wanted to de- 
Stalinize and demilitarize Soviet society, reduce the burdens of empire, and integrate
51. Izvestiya, 7 October 1991, p. 1.
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the Soviet Union more effectively into the world trading system.54 These intentions 
'changed the entire world situation for the better and launched a movement towards an 
unprecedentedly peaceful period in the life of humanity.'55
Soviet-W estern Europe Relations
In Gorbachev's era he possessed an active policy toward Western Europe, 
seeking to undo much of the harm done in the late Brezhnev era and under his two 
immediate predecessors. His policy toward Western Europe was much more active than 
that toward Eastern Europe and, as it became more flexible, demonstrated his learning 
process at work.
The Soviet Union started shaping the concept of her relations with European 
states, envisaging the deepening of the Helsinki principles, at the April 1985 plenary 
meeting. Priority on Gorbachev's foreign policy agenda was given to the improvement 
o f Soviet-West European relations and Moscow's hope to be accepted into the 
European house. This hope was a powerful factor in Gorbachev's decision to abandon 
Soviet control o f Eastern Europe and allow German unification.56
His distintive style of diplomacy - including numerous trips to West European 
capitals - received a favorable response from West European leaders. In July 1985, 
shortly after his appointment as foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze began to argue 
that more attention should be paid to expanding pan-European economic, scientific and 
technological and ecological cooperation-filling the neglected second 'basket' o f the 
Helsinki agreement.57 During his first visit to a Western country, to France in October 
1985, Gorbachev outlined the agenda of Soviet policy vis-a-vis Western Europe. He
54. Sodaro, Moscow, Germany, and the West: From Khrushchev to Gorbachev, p. 319.
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mentioned the necessity o f the expansion of goodneighbourliness and cooperation with 
Western Europe to improve the international climate.58
During Gorbachev's first two years in power, some seeds of change in Soviet- 
West European relations were sown. But the main emphasis in foreign policy continued 
to be on the more important superpower relationship. Policy towards Western Europe 
was conceived of as a way of moderating the relationship with the United States.59
However, 1987 was christened 'the year of Europe' in Soviet diplomacy. It would 
be more accurate to say that 1987 was the starting date in a campaign o f active 
European diplomacy. In April 1987, Gorbachev proposed the dismatling of his entire 
short-range missile armoury in Europe.
In early 1988, the visit by Federal Chancellor Kohl, who went to Moscow with a 
large delegation o f officials and businessmen was regarded as the significant 
development of Soviet-Western European relations. The event was claimed by the 
German Chancellor to have 'broken the ice' in Soviet-West German relations.60
The pan-European meeting in Vienna, which concluded in January 1989, was a 
watershed. The Vienna agreements were a major step in the development of the 
common European process, raising the continent to a new level of security and 
cooperation. There were three main achievements of the Vienna meeting. Firstly, it 
became possible to make the disarmament aspect of the Helsinki process more 
meaningful. The CSCE structure for-the first time had a disarmament foundation. The 
second achievement o f the Vienna meeting was a genuine breakthrough in the 
humanitarian and legal field. Finally, an unprecedented programme of activities aimed at 
furthering European co-operation for the next three years.61 These initiatives were the 
key to changing the Western image of the Soviet Union, a change that would ensure a
58. Izvestiya, 4 October 1985, p. 2.
59. Neil Malcolm, 'The 'Common European Home' and Soviet European Policy", p. 663.
60. International Herald Tribune, 28 October 1988.
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calm international environment as the Soviets embarked on the perilous course of 
engaging the energies of their people through political democratization. A change that 
would make it more likely that the West would be willing to assist actively in the 
daunting process of restructuring the Soviet political economy.62 The implementation 
of the Vienna accords was bound to have a beneficial effect on Soviet domestic affairs. 
The Vienna meeting was also a comprehensive approach to international affairs in the 
spirit of new political thinking.
After the Vienna meeting, there were a number of multilateral meetings devoted 
to various aspects o f cooperation in Europe. In the spring and summer of 1989, 
Gorbachev embarked on a series of visits to the capitals of Western Europe, the first 
since his trip to Paris in 1985. He made the fullest statement of the new European 
policy at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 6 July
1989. These all fit into the concept of a common European home, developing into a 
structure with a clear outline, one resting on trust and expanding ties between states at 
all levels and in all areas.63
The Soviet idea of the 'common European home' was much used in Gorbachev's 
diplomacy towards Western Europe.64 When Gorbachev used the common European 
home idea in 1985, it was in a context similar to that in which Brezhnev first used it in 
1981 during a visit to Bonn,65 when it was conceived of as an element in the well-worn 
Soviet tactic of playing up discord inside NATO at times of superpower tension in the 
hope o f exerting a moderating influence on American policy.66 In his address to the
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Council o f Europe, Gorbachev explained the "common European home" as follows:
The philosophy of the common European home concept rules out the 
probability of an armed clash and the very possibility of the use of force or 
threat o f force - alliance against alliance, inside the alliances, wherever. This 
philosophy suggests that a doctrine of restraint should take the place of the 
doctrine of deterrence. This is not just a play on words but the logic of 
European development prompted by life itself.67
This idea was connected with Soviet's domestic policy of reintegrating Russia and 
Eastern Europe back into European civilization and the world economy and with the 
foreign and military policies that were necessary to achieve it.68
In sum, the major successes of Gorbachev's policy toward Western Europe were 
as follows: First, the conclusion of the treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear 
forces in December 1987, in which the Soviet Union, in order to achieve an agreement 
with the West, made major compromises on questions of verification, decoupling INF 
from the question of strategic defense, and the inclusion of British and French nuclear 
forces, hitherto viewed as non-negotiable issues. Because of the concessions made in 
the INF treaty, the Soviet Union's image as a country sincerely dedicated to defusing 
tensions in Europe and pursuing arms control was enhanced. Second, as the situation 
in Eastern Europe deteriorated, Gorbachev became more actively involved in the search 
for closer economic ties with Western Europe. The steady progress in EC-CMEA 
negotiations finally produced an agreement between the two bodies in June 1988. 
Shevardnadze signed a ten year trade and cooperation agreement with the European 
Community on 18 December 1989 that fully reversed the thirty-year-old Soviet 
disregard o f the Community and demonstrated how seriously Gorbachev took the 
process o f European integration - a fact underscored by his appearance at the Council 
o f Europe in July 1989.69
67. Pravda, 7 July 1989, p. 2.
68. Jerry F. Hough, Gorbachev's Politics, Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, no. 5 (Winter 1989/90), p. 33.
69. Angela Stent, 'Gorbachev and Europe: An Accelerated Learning Curve', in Harley D. Balzer, ed., Five 
Years That Shook the World: Gorbachev's Unfinished Revolution (London: Westview Press, 1991), p. 145.
68
What caused this change in the Soviet Union's approach? It seems to me that 
Europe was the most suitable region of the world for this, since it is Europe where 
particularly favorable conditions exist for the realization of new political thinking and 
which has called for an expansion of constructive cooperation. Conditions also exist 
there for creative interaction of cultures and systems and for joint efforts in developing 
initiatives built upon the priority o f common human values and freedom of choice.70
The Soviet Union insisted that it should be based on interaction between 
countries in the political, military, humanitarian, economic, ecological and other spheres 
in order to build a fundamentally new security model in Europe. In the context of the 
Soviets' new political thinking about international relations, Gorbachev had a genuine 
interest in peace at this period, since a benign and tranquil international environment 
would be important to the success of domestic perestroika.
S o v ie t - E a s t  E u r o p e a n  R e la t io n s
The most traumatic transformation was the process of rethinking Soviet relations 
with Eastern Europe.71 In the new international political situation evolving in the late 
1980s and the early 1990s the Soviet Union relinguished its dominant role over Eastern 
Europe. Two changes guided policy towards its allies. First, the old notion of "socialist 
internationalism," for decades a euphemism for Soviet tutelage, was replaced by 
something far closer to laissez-faire. In his book Perestroika, Gorbachev elaborated on 
this point thus:
...the entire framework of political relations between the socialist 
countries must be strictly based on absolute independence. This is a view 
held by the leaders of all fraternal countries. The independence of each 
Party, its soveriegn right to decide the issues facing its country and its
70. Vitaly Zhurkin, The European Dimension of Soviet Foreign Policy, in Clesse and Schelling, eds., The 
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responsibility to its nation are the unquestionable principles.72
Second, the Brezhnev Doctrine no longer set the same limits to change. In 
accordance with the principle of freedom of choice, the Soviet Union adopted a policy 
o f non-interference in the process of radical change of regimes in Central and East 
European countries.
Eastern Europe became Communist under Soviet influence73 after the Second 
World War( 1939-1945). Stalin used the Soviet army's control over Eastern Europe to 
set up Communist governments. Following Stalin's death, Soviet troops were sent into 
Hungary(1956) to crush an uprising and Czechoslovakia(1968) to suppress a reform 
movement. Popular unrest, which began with the Solidarity trade union in the 1970s in 
Poland, culminated in late 1989 with the collapse of Communist rule in Poland, 
Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. The mellowing of 
the Soviet Union in the process of perestroika gave all those liberal democratic forces 
an impetus to follow suit and to change the regimes in their respective countries in a 
popular, democratic way.74
Soviet policy slowly began to change around the time of the 27th Congress of the 
Soviet Communist Party(CPSU) in 1986. Gorbachev's lengthy speech before the 
Congress barely touched on Soviet-East European relations, but his extensive 
comments about the failings of the Soviet economy and the need for "radical reform" 
were a promising sign to those in Eastern Europe who hoped to move in a reformist 
direction themselves. Even Gorbachev's brief comments about Eastern Europe, modest 
though they were, seemed to offer greater leeway for internal experimentation.75 In
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fact, Gorbachev emerged as a reformer who supported domestic political liberalization 
in Eastern Europe.
The radical nature of Gorbachev's pronouncements from the beginning of 1987 
naturally led to much speculation about the impact o f his policy on Eastern Europe. 
More relaxation, democratization, and decentralization within the Soviet Union led to 
more leeway for the countries concerned in the pursuit of their own internal affairs.
Gorbachev formulated the main lines of his Central-European policy on the 
occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1987. At this 
Anniversary, Gorbachev announced de-Brezhnevisation of doctrine through a 
"declaration of nonintervention policy towards socialist allies." Toward the end o f the 
speech Gorbachev said:
All parties are fully and irreversibly independent. We said that as long 
ago as the 20th Congress. True, it took time to free ourselves from old 
habits. Now, however, this is an immutable reality.76
Such a statement showed that the Kremlin increasingly distanced itself from the 
"Brezhnev doctrine" as proclaimed in 1968, on the right of the USSR to intervene in 
the affairs of neighbours in order to protect the interests of socialism. It was 
increasingly clear that the Soviet Union had no intention of interfering with or trying to 
influence the changes taking place in Eastern Europe.
On 14 March 1988 Gorbachev arrived in Belgrade on the first visit to Yugoslavia 
by a Soviet party leader since 1976. At the talk between Gorbachev and Yugoslav 
president Lazar Mojsov, the two sides accepted in principle the text of a new 
declaration on Soviet-Yugoslav relations. They agreed that "nobody could claim a 
monopoly on models for building socialism." And that they "prohibit any threat and use 
o f force and interference in the internal affairs of other states under any pretext 
whatsoever."77 Next day, in a speech at a dinner in Belgrade, Gorbachev said the
76. Pravda, 3 November 1987, p. 5.
77. Pravda, 19 March 1988, p. 1.
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declaration on state and party relations reaffirmed "all the basic premises" of documents 
signed by Khrushchev and Tito in the 1950s on Yugoslavia's nonaligned status.78 
Gorbachev's "new Belgrade declaration" amounted to a change of policy toward 
Eastern Europe. In addition, Gorbachev expressed 'nonideology' in his General 
Assembly address of December 1988. After that, Eastern Europe began changing 
rapidly.
The first step in the radicalization of Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe was 
taken in connection with the negotiations on the establishment of a Solidarity-led Polish 
government.79 Gorbachev has denied applying any presure on the Polish authorities:
Perestroika was born out of our conditions, and we need it....But we 
will not impose our methods of development on anyone else. I believe the 
Polish people themselves must decide what to do for the development of 
Poland.80
When the Polish Communists were wavering about whether to allow a non- 
Communist prime minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, to take over the reins of government, 
Gorbachev personally telephoned the Polish Party leader to tell him to accept.81 Shortly 
thereafter, prime minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski declared that he would seek 
"partnerlike cooperation" with Solidarity, a communist party(PZPR) press official 
praised Solidarity for its "realistic approach," and the outgoing Communist prime 
minister, Stanislaw Kiszczak, lauded Mazowiecki as "an outstanding personality" and 
"a wise man."82
Gorbachev promoted the principle of freedom of choice for all nations within the
78. Pravda, 17 March 1988, p. 2.
79. Mette Skak, The Changing Soviet-East European Relationship', in R. Kanet, D. Miner, and T. Resler, 
eds., Soviet Foreign Policy in Transition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 31.
80. Pravda, 23 May 1988, p. 2.
81. FBIS-EEU-%9-\62, August 23, 1989, pp. 40-41.
82. Ibid., p.40, cited in Mark Kramer, Beyond the Brezhnev Doctrine: A New Era in Soviet-East European 
Relations?, p. 49.
72
arena of Europe itself. In a speech to the Council of Europe in July 1989, Gorbachev 
asserted 'respect for each people's sovereign right to choose a social system as it sees fit 
represents a most important precondition for a normal European process'. He also 
stressed that 'any interference in internal affairs of whatever kind, any attempts to limit 
the sovereignty of states, both of friends and allies, no matter whose it is, is 
impermissible'.83
In October 1989, Gorbachev's visit to Helsinki was the first time a Soviet leader 
had visited there since that of Khrushchev 32 years before. During talks with Finnish 
President Koivisto, the Soviet leader spelled out more graphically than ever the demise 
o f the so-called "Brezhnev doctrine" which was used to justify armed intervention in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968: what was happening in Eastern Europe was the sole concern 
o f the countries involved. Reporting what Gorbachev had told the Finnish President, 
Gennady Gerasimov the Soviet spokesman said "we have no moral or political right to 
interfere, and we assume that others accept they have none either."84 They were set out 
in the communique issued after Gorbachev-Egon Krenz, then the new GDR Communist 
Party leader, meeting on 1 November 1989 as:'Respect for the principles of 
sovereignty, the inviolability of borders and the territorial integrity of all states and of 
non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries...'85
The pace of change ushering in the new era was symbolized most graphically by 
the destruction o f the Berlin Wall in November 1989. The Berlin Wall, erected in 1961 
to isolate East Germany from the West and a symbol of the division of Europe between 
socialist and nonsocialist countries, was dismantled, and free passage between East 
Germany and West Germany was permitted for the first time since 1948.86 The
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destruction of the wall resulted in a massive movement of ideas, commodities, capital, 
technology, and people. These changes, along with the election of noncommunist 
governments in virtually every regime in Eastern and Central Europe, increasingly close 
ties between Eastern and Western Europe, and the swift rise to continental ascendancy 
o f a united Germany, are fundamentally redefining the identity of Europe.87
Gorbachev, at a post-Malta summit meeting of the Warsaw Pact in Moscow on 4 
December 1989, officially denounced the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw 
Pact troops.88 It was the first time Moscow had formally changed its attitude to the 
crushing of the "Prague Spring". In late 1989, Gorbachev apparently made clear to the 
other Eastern European leaders that he would not allow Soviet troops to support 
suppression of indigenous democratic movements. In rapid succession, the communist 
regimes in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Czechoslovakia, Romania, and 
Bulgaria confronted broad-based popular opposition in the form of massive 
demonstrations and rallies.
At the beginning of 1990, the Soviet Union faced a fundamentally transformed 
political situation in Eastern Europe. The institutional framework of Soviet influence 
and control was being rendered illegitimate and irrelevant. East Germany, Moscow's 
important "strategic ally," was disintegrating as a socialist state. In Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, Moscow's other two strategic allies in the "northern tier," the main 
noncommunist opposition movements, Solidarity and Civic Forum, had become the 
dominant political forces in their respective countries and governments. Hungary had 
declared itself an independent, democratic state based on democracy, pluralism, the rule 
of law, and a market economy. In Romania, the Ceausescu regime had been 
overthrown, and in Bulgaria, the communist party was engaged in a fundamental
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revision of its principles and policies.89
Gorbachev's leadership pursued a non-interventionist East European policy. The 
draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress spoke 
approvingly of the revolutions in Eastern Europe and declared Soviet willingness to 
cooperate with virtually all political parties in the region.90
Since its inception in 1955, the Warsaw Pact had been a means for the Soviet 
Union to effectively dominate Eastern Europe. As the Eastern European communist 
governments were falling, a widely expressed idea was that the Warsaw Pact needed to 
be demilitarized, deideologized, and depoliticized. In February 1991 it was announced 
that on April 1 the military structures of the Warsaw Treaty Organization(WTO) would 
be dissolved and on July 1, 1991, at a quiet ceremony in Prague, the Warsaw Pact was 
officially disbanded.91
Soviet behavior during late 1989 and 1990 marked the shift to a new policy in 
Eastern Europe based upon laissez-faire and the pursuit o f a deideologized Soviet 
nationalist interest.92 The turbulent processes in Eastern Europe were a direct result o f 
perestroika. When one examines Soviet-East European relations in the closing years of 
the 1980s, one is tempted to attribute the tumultuous changes that occurred during 
these years to the personality and policies of Gorbachev. The Soviet Union's relations 
with six Eastern European allied countries based on the principles of full equality and 
freedom of choice. With the relaxation of Soviet control over the nations o f Eastern 
Europe, they have become freer to develop in more pluralistic and diverse ways. For 
the peoples of Eastern Europe Gorbachev was the second Soviet liberator in half a 
century. He made it possible for them to regain their identity and sovereignty, without
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having to replay the bloody street fighting of Berlin, Budapest, Warsaw and Prague 
which rose hopelessly against a Red Army. Gorbachev led his country out of more than 
70 years o f paralysis and suppression. He made possible the free development of the 
peoples of central, east and southern Europe, and strengthened their right to choose 
their own path o f development.
The rapidity of these developments stunned observers in both East and West. 
Combined with Soviet concessions in arms reductions, they created an even stronger 
groundswell of popular support for Gorbachev's reform efforts among the Western 
public. Particularly in sanctioning the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, Gorbachev 
provided tangible evidence of his commitment to a more open, democratic approach. 
Gorbachev's Eastern European policy bolstered domestic demands for self- 
determination and free emigration rights in the Soviet Union itself. Whereas previously 
Gorbachev's perestroika was at the vanguard of political reform in the Soviet bloc, by 
the beginning o f 1990, the USSR was already lagging behind several o f its Eastern 
European allies in the process of democratization and economic transformation.93
All the above changes on the basis of new political thinking were related to a 
profound conceptual revolution in foreign affairs. The urgency o f the domestic 
economic, social, and political crisis demanded a more stable and predictable 
international environment and a sharp reduction of the enormous military burden that 
traditional Soviet policies entailed. At the same time, the new political thinking was the 
centerpiece of the effort to normalize the Soviet approach to the international system. 
With its stress on interdependence, on shared human values, on the search for political 
rather than military solutions to international problems, and the renunciation of the use 
of force in the pursuit o f political objectives, the new political thinking radically broke 
with the traditional Soviet outlook. All the main accomplishments o f Soviet foreign
93. Joan Debardebelen, The USSR: Gorbachev and Perestroika: From Glasnost to Crisis', in Kesselman and 
Krieger, eds., European Politics in Transition, p. 585.
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policy during the Gorbachev period were a consequence and a product of perestroika.94
94. Shevardnadze, The World has become a safer place, p. 3.
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Chapter 4. The Soviet Union and the Pacific Area
Russia is not only in Europe, it is also in Asia; and a Russian is not 
only a European, but also an Asiatic. Moreover, there is more hope for 
Russia in Asia than in Europe. Perhaps Asia is the best outlet for us in the 
future.1
For the future history of the world, the conquest of Siberia will be 
more important than most of the modern history of European Russia.2
The Soviet Union had put less on the table in Asia than in Europe. In part, this 
may be because the Soviet leadership was so deeply preoccupied domestically and had 
concentrated its foreign policy energies on more pressing matters in Europe.3 The 
impact of historical realities and 'Eurocentrism' had relegated Soviet Asia-Pacific policy 
to the sidelines for a long period of time; it also had a negative influence on the 
economic and social development of Siberia and the Soviet Far East.
Many countries of the Asia-Pacific region had a mixed, even negative perception 
of the role of the Soviet Union in Asia. It was often seen as a competitive superpower, 
the Soviets were accused of expansionism, and there were certain grounds for that 
charge. The situation changed dramatically under Gorbachev. The revolutionary 
renovation of all the aspects of Soviet society and the drastic changes in Soviet foreign 
policy destroyed the image of an 'aggressive' country. In particular, the Soviet Union 
realized that it would suffer inevitable damage if it stayed aloof from the dynamic 
political and economic changes which had been taking place in the Pacific region. That 
was why, when perestroika began, Gorbachev was able to help promote the 
development o f new political thinking and new approaches to the Soviet foreign policy
1. Dostoevsky, The Diary o f  a Writer, January 1881.
2. Vladimir(1899), 'Russia on the Pacific,' cited by Mairin Mitchell, The Maritime History o f  Russia: 848- 
1948 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1949), p. 30.
3. Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II (New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1981), p. 130.
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in the Asia-Pacific region.
In the Asia-Pacific region, Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev was largely 
shaped by its security and geopolitical interests and its drive for economic development. 
The important objectives that motivated Soviet foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific 
included: to maintain and strengthen relations with friends and allies; to expedite 
political rapprochement with China; to expand bilateral relations with the non-socialist 
countries of the region; to downplay the use of force and enhance economic-diplomatic 
activities for the economic development of Siberia and the Soviet Far East; and, finally, 
to challenge and possibly undermine the United States' preeminence in the region.4
4.1 Soviet Asia-Pacific Policy since Stalin
...the Pacific Ocean is the Mediterranean of the future. In that future 
the part played by Siberia, the land that lies between the Ocean, Southern 
Asia, and Russia, will be extremely important.5
From the October Revolution to the outbreak of the Second World War the 
Soviets' main problems were with the West, not with the East. The situation did not 
change after 1945. There was no doubt that the Cold War began in Europe. In 
attempting to gain security the Soviets concentrated on relations with the USA and its 
European allies. The Cold War also compelled the Soviets to adopt Western proposals 
about the rules of the game, which included vigorous military competition.
In the years immediately following the October Revolution, Soviet foreign policy 
seemed to centre on Europe. Lenin and his followers were preoccupied with 
consolidating their hold on power and with establishing a functioning economic system 
in Russia. The confused Soviet activity of this period reflected multiple approaches to
4. Nogee, 'The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures', in Robert H. Donaldson, ed., The 
Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes m d  Failures (London: Westview Press, 1981), p. 445; Lau Teik 
Soon and Bilveer Singh, eds., The Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific Region (Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 
1989), p. 199.
5. Alexander Herzen, My Past and Thoughts, vol. 1, translated by Constance Garnett (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1968), p. 243.
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the outside world. Lenin supported nationalists in their anticolonial struggle, while 
maintaining relations with ruling governments where appropriate. The Soviet Union of 
the 1920s, lacking the economic and military capabilities associated with the Moscow 
of the 1980s, could hardly expect to play a more major role in the Third World.6
In the complicated international situation of the 1930s the Soviet Union 
considered it expedient to conclude non-aggression pacts 'with all countries, and above 
all with neighbouring ones'. It attempted to settle the Japanese-Chinese conflict (1894- 
95). Soviet diplomacy put forward the idea of creating a system o f security at the 
regional level in the Pacific area in the 1930s. Soviet hopes for a class-orientation 
policy were especially high. The help rendered to Mongolia and China in their conflicts 
with Japan made it possible to guarantee the relative security of Soviet borders.7
Stalin's primary approach to the problem of security had followed the long­
standing Russian policy of expansion and consolidation of control over regions adjacent 
to Soviet territory. But limited capabilities, the eventual reaction o f the West, and the 
internal demands of the Soviet system itself prevented the Soviet Union from expanding 
its zone o f control beyond those territories occupied by the Red Army at the conclusion 
o f the Second World War, although the communist victory in China in 1949 appeared 
to extend Soviet influence over the largest country in Asia. China, with India, had 
increasingly become the priority of Soviet foreign policy in Asia. In the years 
immediately following the war the Soviets focused their efforts mainly on consolidating 
their position in Eastern Europe.8
Due to the victory of the anti-fascist coalition in the Far East, favourable 
conditions for strengthening cooperation among states with different social systems
6. Carol R. Saivetz and Sylvia Woodby, Soviet-Third World Relations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 7.
7. Nina G. Golovyatenko and Artem Yu. Rudnitsky, 'In Search of Soviet Policy in the Pacific1, The Pacific 
Review, vol. 3, no. 3 (1990), p. 201.
8. Roger E. Kanet, 'The Evolution of Soviet Policy toward the Developing World from Stalin to Brezhnev*, in 
Edward A. Kolodziej and Roger E. Kanet, eds., The Limits o f Soviet Power in the Developing World: 
Thermidor in the Revolutionary Struggle (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 42.
80
were created, as they were in Europe. That opportunity was not seized and the Cold 
War brought a return to a state of confrontation. A bipolar structure of international 
relations sprang up.9
On the whole, that was convenient for Soviet foreign policy in East Asia, even 
taking into account such undesirable events as the Korean war or the crises of Taiwan. 
The unprecedented growth of the influence of socialism in Asia-Pacific, the successful 
people's revolutions in China and Indonesia, the formation of people's democratic 
governments in the north of Vietnam and of Korea, and the rapid development of 
national liberation movements in Southeast Asia accompanied by the fierce guerilla 
warfare waged by communist parties-all promised quick victory for the 'class union of 
socialism and peoples of the Orient'. The 1950s were considered 'the golden age' for the 
Soviet Union in Asia.10 National liberation movements and newly independent states 
were considered 'natural allies' favouring the solution of problems in the interests of 
socialism.11 Yet, other trends began to be clearly seen in regional affairs from the mid- 
1960s. Hopes that socialism would quickly create a society of social justice and stable 
economic success turned out to be unrealistic.12
Under Khrushchev, the instruments of Soviet policy in the Third World were the 
traditional ones used by great powers in their relations with lesser powers: economic 
and military aid, technical assistance, trade, diplomacy, propaganda and, in a few rare 
instances, the use of military force. Of these, economic and military assistance were 
particularly important. Soviet use of aid programmes to influence the Third World 
began in the post-Stalin period. The construction of large, 'showy' projects in the
9. Golovyatenko and Rudnitsky, 'In Search of Soviet Policy in the Pacific', pp. 201-202.
10. Donald Zagoria, ed., Soviet Policy in East Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 61.
11. By the mid-1950s, many Third World elites, having rejected "capitalism" as the Godfather of colonialism, 
looked to "socialism" - and for a time the Soviet Union - for an alternative model of development and nation- 
buiding. See Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Moscow's Third World Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1988), pp. 18-19.
12. Golovyatenko and Rudnitsky, 'In Search of Soviet Policy in the Pacific', p. 202.
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underdeveloped countries was the hallmark of Khrushchev's foreign policy.
At the 20th Soviet Party Congress on 14 February 1956, Khrushchev proclaimed 
his priority in foreign policy of "peaceful coexistence" between differing social-political 
systems. He also endorsed the idea that the newly independent states, together with the 
socialist countries, formed a vast "zone of peace".13 At the 21st congress of the CPSU, 
in Khrushchev declared that "a zone of peace, above all an atom-free zone, can and 
must be created in the Far East and the entire Pacific basin".14 Khrushchev was an 
active diplomat and became personally associated with attempts to win new friends and 
allies in the Third World.15 Asian states were important objects o f Soviet attention in 
this period. The new Soviet effort to cultivate friendly relations with Third World 
governments was dramatically and vividly demonstrated in Asia.16
The Soviet European-oriented attitude began to change in the 1960s, with a 
number of developments that compelled the Soviet Union to pay more attention to 
Asia. Foremost among them was the dispute with China and that country's development 
o f nuclear weapons, Japan's emergence as a major economic power and, of course, the 
Vietnam War.
The year 1965 can be considered a watershed in the development o f the Pacific 
region. The crushing of the communist party of Indonesia became one of the main 
events in a chain of pessimism concerning the success of revolution in the Third World. 
In the mid-1960s a young national capitalism was becoming stronger as an 
'intermediate' force, which was disturbing the bipolar structure o f international relations 
in the region. The middle powers, including the NICs, members of ASEAN, Australia
13. Pravda, 15 February 1956, p. 3; Recognizing the danger of a nuclear war with the United States, 
Khrushchev needed to establish an ideological basis for the existence of a long-term relationship between 
communism and capitalism that would not lead to war. He recognized that nuclear weapons had . 
fundamentally altered the character of international politics. See Nogee and Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy 
Since World War 77, p. 27.
14. Pravda, 28 January 1959, p. 7.
15. Saivetz and Woodby, Soviet-Third World Relations, p. 31.
16. Ibid., p. 36.
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and New Zealand, developed a policy of regionalism, which envisaged the 
consolidation of independence and a less ideological approach. The formation of the 
young regional capitalism meant not only the import of foreign capital and technology, 
but also the preservation of a degree of national control. Yet, the Soviet Union failed to 
an appreciate the new conditions. The formation of regionalism did not fit their black- 
and-white scheme of international development, which left no place for existing 
'intermediate' forces. Inevitably, the attitude of the Soviet Union to the setting up of 
ASEAN in 1967 was negative.17 The importance of the region to Moscow increased as 
a result o f the 1979 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the open conflicts between 
China and Vietnam.18 The anti-communism of the ruling circles of the Southeast Asian 
countries, the participation o f Thailand and the Philippines in the Vietnam war and the 
coup d'etat in Indonesia overshadowed the objective place of the ASEAN Association 
in the whole system of international relations in the Pacific. The development o f ties 
between the Soviet Union and ASEAN nations took place in the 1970s and 1980s,19 
but their scale was insignificant and they were not used to draw the Soviet Union into 
processes o f regional integration.20
Brezhnev's policy towards Asia aimed at promoting normal, good-neighbour by 
relations with all the Asian countries. Particularly, he attached great importance to the 
achievements of extensive and diversified cooperation on the basis of mutual benefit 
with China, India and Japan.
17. Singh, Soviet Relations with ASEAN, 1967-88, p. 45. When ASEAN was founded in 1967, Moscow had 
diplomatic relations only with Indonesia and Thailand. By 1977 all the ASEAN countries had successfully 
established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the last of them being the Philippines in 1976.
18. Joseph L. Nogee, 'The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures', in Donaldson, ed., The 
Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures, p. 446.
19. On the Soviet policies towards ASEAN, see Bilveer Singh, Soviet Relations with ASEAN, 1967-88 
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1989), pp. 29-54; also on Gorbachev's policy towards ASEAN, see 
Ibid., pp. 115-132; Singh, 'The Soviet Union and ASEAN: Policies, Problems and Prospects', in Lau Teik 
Soon and Bilveer Singh, eds., The Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region (Singapore: Heinemann Asia,
1989), pp. 135-167; Sukhumbhand Paribatra, 'The Soviet Factor in ASEAN's Diplomacy since 1975:
Bridging the Unbridgeable', Ibid., pp. 167-198.
20. Golovyatenko and Rudnitsky, 'In Search of Soviet Policy in the Pacific', p. 202.
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In the late 1960s and the early 1970s Asia also provided a golden opportunity for 
Soviet expansion as the West showed signs of withdrawing from the region. Britain 
announced that most of its forces would leave areas east of Suez, especially the Indian 
Ocean region, by the end of 1971. In June 1969, President Nixon set about reducing 
the over-commitment of US forces around the world, particularly in Asia. The Nixon 
Doctrine created a climate of uncertainty in the region. The international changes that 
occurred since the late 1960s had a tremendous impact on Southeast Asia, as well as on 
the great powers, and this elicited a slight modification in Soviet attitude towards 
ASEAN.21 The Kremlin apparently decided that the power vacuum created by the 
withdrawal o f the West should be filled by the Soviet Union - or it might be filled by 
China and Japan instead.
Realization of the idea of'collective security in Asia', which Leonid Brezhnev 
once again announced in 1969,22 became one of the important strategies devised to 
oppose capitalist-type regional integration. But the widely advertised Brezhnev's 
initiative, which contained a number of reasonable components, was not implemented. 
The Soviet Union's collective security proposal was that Moscow's power emplacement 
in Asia, especially military power, was expanding rapidly, yet politically and 
diplomatically, it was isolated in the region. By 1970, the Soviet Union only had three 
'friendly states' (North Vietnam, North Korea and Mongolia) in Asia.23 In the 
conditions of the late 1960s and the early 1970s, as well as in the context of Soviet 
Pacific policy o f that time, it was perceived as an attempt to unite Soviet allies for more 
successful confrontation against 'their enemies' and in creating an alterantive military 
bloc.24
21. Singh, Soviet Relations with ASEAN, 1967-88, p. 39.
22. That idea was put forward earlier at the 20th CPSU Congress. See Pravda, 15 February 1956, p. 3.
23. Bilveer Singh, The Soviet Asian Collective Security System: from Brezhnev to Gorbachev', Sino-Soviet 
Affairs (Seoul), vol. 12, no. 2 (1988), p. 174.
24. Golovyatenko and Rudnitsky, 'In Search of Soviet Policy in the Pacific', p. 203.
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The main objective pursued by the Soviet Union in Asia since the mid-1960s was 
to exert greater influence on the region's political, military, and economic 
developments. This was pursued chiefly with the intention of becoming an Asia-Pacific 
power fully competitive with the United States and of scoring advantages in the global 
dispute with them.
Brezhnev’s Asian Collective Security25
On 7 June 1969 at the International Conference of Communist and workers' 
parties in Moscow, Brezhnev made the following bold proposal of an Asian collective 
security system:
For us, the burning problems of the present international situation do 
not push into the background more long range tasks, especially the creation 
of a system of collective security in those parts of the globe where the 
threat of outbreak of a new world war and a threat of armed conflicts is 
centered. Such a system is the best substitute for the existing military- 
political groupings.... We think that the course of events also placies on the 
agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia.26
Three years later he expressed similar thoughts to the 15th Congress of Soviet 
Trade Unions in March 1972 as follows:
The idea of ensuring Asian security on a collective basis has aroused 
growing interest in many Asian countries. It is becoming increasingly clear 
that the road to security in Asia is not one of military blocs and groupings, 
not one of setting the countries against each other, but one of good- 
neighbourly cooperation among all the states interested in such 
cooperation....Collective Security in Asia should be based on such 
principles as renunciation of the use of force in relations between states, 
respect for sovereignty and inviolability of borders, non-interference in 
domestic affairs and extensive development of economic and other 
cooperation on the basis of complete equality and mutual advantage. We 
have advocated the establishment of such collective security in Asia and
25. On Brezhnev's Asian collective security system: see V. Pavlovsky, Azii-Kollektivnuyu bezopasnost', 
Kommunist, no. 15 (October 1973), pp. 55-66; 1.1. Kovalenko, Sovetsky Soyuz v bor'be za mir i 
kollektivnuyu bezopasnos' v Azii (Moskva: Nauka, 1976); E. M. Zhukov, M. I. Sladkovsky, G.V. Astafyev 
and M.S. Kapitsa, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya na Dal'nym Vostoke v poslevoennye gody(l958-1976 
gody), tom 2 (Moskva: Mysl', 1978), p. 239-258; Kapitsa, D.V. Petrov, B.N. Sravinsky, V.D. Tikhmirov, F.L. 
Shabshna and V.K. Pak, Istoria mezhunarodnykh otnoslienia na Dal'nym Vostoke 1945-1977 (Khabarovskoe 
Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1978), pp. 540-548.
26. Pravda, 8 June 1969, p. 4.
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will continue to do so; we are ready to cooperate with all countries for the 
sake of carrying out this idea.27
On 15 August 1973 Brezhnev, speaking in Alma Ata, indicated that the Soviet 
Union was firmly convinced that collective security was a realistic way to achieve 'the 
laws of peace' in Asia:
Why do we advocate collective security in Asia? Because we want to 
eliminate wars, armed conflicts and imperialist aggression on the Asian 
continent, because we want every country and every people to have 
guarantees of free development and national rebirth, because we want a 
spirit of confidence and mutual understanding to prevail in relations 
between Asian countries.28
On 21 May 1973, Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme 
Soviet, spoke of the creation o f a reliable security system on the Asian continent as an 
urgent task as follows:
...the key elements of the collective security system should envisage 
the renunciation of the use of force in relations between states, respect for 
sovereignty, invariability of frontiers, non-interference in internal affairs, 
and broad kinds of cooperation. This system would fully conform with the 
requirements of the UN Charter and would not be directed against any 
states.29
At the 25 th congress o f the CPSU in 1976, Brezhnev highlighted the importance 
of reinforcement for collective security campaign in Asia:
The Soviet Union intends to continue to participate actively in 
searches for ways to strengthen peace and security on the Asian continent 
and to develop equal cooperation there. We shall work along these lines 
both in the framework of bilateral contacts and on a multilateral basis. We 
have several times set forth our views on this score and emphasized our 
readiness to pay every attention to all proposals dictated by concern for 
tasting peace and security in Asia and for ensuring these conditions by 
collective efforts.30
27. Pravda, 21 March 1972, p. 2.
28. Pravda, 16 August 1973, p. 2.
29. Pravda, 22 May 1973, p. 2.
30. Pravda, 25 February 1976, p. 3.
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The concept was, however, received cooly in Asia from the outset and after ten 
years was still far from materialization. China was bitterly hostile to it, calling it an 
attempt to encircle China by organizing something like the old American-led 
SEATO(the military bloc for Southeast Asia). Japan, potentially the most important 
member o f the proposed organization, showed no interest at all. The Soviet Union, 
therefore, gave up hope of achieving this aim directly and chose to seek its gradual 
realization through bilateral treaties with individual Asian nations.31 The collective 
security was reviewed by Gorbachev.
Thus the situation which had formed by the mid-1980s demanded urgent action 
to restore the authority of the Soviet Union in the Pacific basin, and to guarantee the 
real security of the country's far eastern borders. Foreign policy had to be brought into 
line with the objective laws of regional development.32
4.2 Gorbachev's New Political Thinking in the Asia-Pacific Region
Here the Soviet Union comes into contact with states and nations of 
the Asian continent, which is also essential. So in terms of foreign policy, 
Siberia and the Far East are of crucial importance.33
During the Gorbachev era, the Asia-Pacific region, which represents the largest 
single land area of the world, was characterized by an immense variety o f countries 
with different stages of economic and political development and cooperation. For 
example, there are among them: highly developed capitalist countries (the United 
States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand); the socialist contries (the Soviet 
Union, China, North Korea, Vietnam and Cambodia); the new industrialized countries 
(NICs: South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) which have achieved a high 
level o f capitalist development; and representatives o f the 'second wave' o f the new
31. Asian Security 1981 (Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace and Security, 1981), p. 39.
32. Golovyatenko and Rudnitsky, 'In Search of Soviet Policy in the Pacific', p. 203.
33. Izvestiya, 18 September 1988, p. 1.
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industrialized countries (ASEAN: Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Brunei), which have together turned Asia-Pacific into the most dynamic 
region o f the world.
Under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union's interest in Asia was emphasized far more 
vigorously than at any other previous time and conspicuously extended towards the 
Pacific region.34 Gorbachev's main goals in the Asia-Pacific region were improving 
interaction with the United States, better relations with Canada and Mexico, lowering 
military tensions, normalizing relations with Japan and continuing improvement of 
relations with China, strengthening connections with the ASEAN countries, Australia 
and New Zealand, retaining its traditional ties with the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea and the countries of Indochina and the development of mutually beneficial 
relations with the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. The goal of promoting peace and 
better understanding among the countries of the region was the prime goal of Soviet 
policy in the Asia-Pacific.35
The necessity to change Soviet policy in the Asia-Pacific region came from 
domestic circumstances and certain international factors in this region. In particular, the 
Soviets wanted Chinese, Japanese and South Korean participation in Siberian 
development projects. This would contribute to the easing of tensions in the Soviet Far 
East, and enable the Soviet Union to carry out its development plans in the region: 
critical to the Soviet Union's national interests and its badly slumping economy.
The Soviet Union under Gorbachev showed an interest in pursuing relationships 
at a secondary level with all countries in the region. Not only was the military factor
34. On Soviets' particular importance to the Asia-Pacific region, see Richard H. Solomon and Masataka 
Kosaka, eds., The Soviet Far East Nuclear Buildup: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security (London: Croom 
Helm, 1986); Ni Xiaoquan, 'Gorbachev's Policy Toward the Asia-Pacific Region', in Pushpa Thambipillar and 
Daniel C. Matuszewski, eds., The Soviet Union and the Asia-Pacific Region: Views from the Region 
(London: Praeger, 1989), pp. 14-18; Rajan M. Menon, 'New Thinking and Northeast Asian Security', 
Problems o f  Communism (March-June 1989), pp. 1-29.
35. Henry Trofimenko, 'Goals and Roles of U.S., U.S.S.R., PRC and Japan in the Next Ten-Fifteen Years, 
Asian Perspective, A Journal o f Regional and International Affairs, vol. 15, no. 1 (Spring-Summer 1991), 
pp.69-97.
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judged to be counterproductive, but the new approach of building links through non­
military means matched the demands of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. It 
coincided with Gorbachev's domestic agenda, which laid a heavy emphasis on economic 
efficiency. It also gave the impression of a Soviet Union trying to translate its growing 
military strength in the region into political, diplomatic and economic capital. The 
various dimensions added by Gorbachev in his Asia-Pacific initative were seen as 
something new and novel.
In his principal speeches in Vladivostok (1986) and Krasnoyarsk (1988), 
Gorbachev began to look at the foreign and Soviet Far East as interconnected, 
understanding that the development of Soviet Far East would have gone much faster if 
the area had participated in the broader regional division of labour. The outcome of this 
analysis was the notion of integrating the development of the Soviet Far Eastern 
economic and social structures with the growth of international economic cooperation 
in the region through Soviet foreign policy. This became official Soviet strategy in the 
middle of the 1980s. Gorbachev understood that it would be impossible to implement 
the global objectives of his foreign policy and to create the most favourable external 
conditions for reinforcing his country's economic and socio-political development 
without promoting genuine security: maintained not only by military means, but solidly 
based in political, economic, ecological, and humanitarian considerations.
4 .2 .1  G o r b a c h e v ' s  p o s i t i v e  in i t i a t iv e s  tow ard  th is  reg ion
One o f the most important achievements of the new political thinking was a 
revision o f Soviet Pacific policy. Gorbachev considered this to be as important as 
relations with Europe or with the United States. The basic elements o f the Soviet 
approach to the problems o f the Asia-Pacific region in the spirit of the new political 
thinking were set out in a series of Gorbachev's speeches as well as a number o f other 
documents. In all his speeches, Gorbachev stressed the Asia-Pacific credentials o f the 
Soviet Union, called for peaceful coexistence in the region, initiated policies to reduce 
military conflicts, called for arms control and disarmament measures and for political
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dialogue with all countries in the region irrespective of political, economic and social 
systems.
He spoke of the importance of the Asia-Pacific region during the 27th CPSU 
Congress in 1986 as follows:
The significance of the Asian and Pacific direction is growing. In that 
vast region there are many tangled knots of contradictions and, besides, the 
political situation in some places is unstable. Here it is necessary, without 
postponement, to find the relevant solutions and paths. Evidently, this has 
to begin with the coordination and then the pooling of efforts in the 
interests of a political settlement, of painful problems so as, in parallel, on 
that basis to at least take the edge off the military confrontation in various 
parts of Asia and stabilise the situation there.36
In his Vladivostok speech of 28 July 1986, Gorbachev addressed a broad range of 
regional issues and reasserted the Soviet Union's keen interest in the Asia-Pacific 
region, as well as a desire for better relations with many of the countries within it as 
follows:
The Soviet Union is also an Asian and Pacific country. It is very much 
aware o f the complex problems facing this vast region. They concern it 
directly. This is what determines its balanced comprehensive view with 
regard to this huge part of the world where a large number o f different 
nations and peoples are concentrated. Our approach to it is based on a 
recognition and understanding of the existing realities in the region.... We 
are in favour of building together new, fair relations in Asia and the 
Pacific.37
In his Krasnoyarsk speech of 16 September 1988, Gorbachev indicated his 
country's willingness to carry out the Vladivostok initiative in the region:
The chance of using the collossal potential o f Asia and the basin o f 
two great oceans for general progress and world peace will be missed if we 
don't get down seriously to dealing with the entire tangle o f the complex 
problems in the vast region....Our Vladivostok initiatives have evoked a 
wide response among the states of the region.38
36. Pravda, 26 February 1986, p. 8.
37. Izvestiya, 29 July 1986, p. 2.
38. Izvestiya, 18 September 1988, p. 2.
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In his speech on the major directions of USSR domestic and foreign policy on 30 
May 1989, Gorbachev said:
We shall continue to pursue the Vladivostok policy in the Asia-Pacific 
region. The diversity of tasks in this area is still greater. Both an 'agenda' 
and the tone of relations with many countries have been determined: well- 
wishing, constructive and respectful. Like everywhere, there are countries 
in the region the relations with which will continue to draw our special 
attention.39
In his speech at Stanford University on 5 June 1990, Gorbachev said:
The Pacific Ocean is the Mediterranean of the future....The Pacific 
Ocean was for a long time a force field of confrontation and the arms 
race....But different winds have begun to blow in Asia. Asia is developing 
rapidly according to its own logic, and offers striking examples of economic 
efficiency and international collaboration. The Japanese, the Chinese, the 
Koreans, and other Asian peoples have lessons to teach the whole world. 
And in order to avoid being left on the sidelines in the Pacific, it is 
necessary to consider how we can most rapidly abandon military-political 
rivalry.40
In a policy statement of the 28th Congress of the CPSU (13 July 1990), the party 
advocated the following as foreign policy guidelines:
...the consolidation in all areas of positive trends in relations with the 
People's Republic of China; active policies in the Asia-Pacific Region, with 
the aim of turning it into a zone of peace and cooperation; participation 
with the non-aligned movement and cooperation with the developing 
states.41
Gorbachev thus suggested the construction of a new order for peace and 
mutually beneficial broad cooperation instead of a cold war system in the Asia-Pacific 
region. In a series o f declarations the Soviet Union had emphasised its Asia-Pacific 
credentials. Gorbachev's initiative was to establish a durable and all-embracing structure 
o f stable and interdependent cooperation among countries and peoples, linking the
39. Izvestiya, 31 May 1989, p. 3.
40. Pravda, 6 June 1990, p. 1.
41. Pravda, 15 July 1990, p. 4.
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military, political and economic interests of each and every participant.
4 .2 .2  N ew  P o l i t ica l  T h i n k i n g ' s  im pacts  in this  reg ion
By putting the principles o f new political thinking in foreign policy into practice 
the Soviet Union was able to achieve progress, improving relations with most o f the 
countries of the Asia-Pacific region.42 As a result, bilateral and multilateral relations 
with all these countries underwent considerable change. The Soviet Union normalized 
relations with China in May 1989 after more than 20 years' conflict between two 
biggest socialist countries. The normalization was clearly the outstanding success of 
Soviet Asia policy. The Soviet Union had achieved a comprehensive dialogue and 
growing all-round cooperation with China. Border trade expanded and the old projects 
for development of the Amur Waterway and air rail links were revived. Both countries 
were the first in Asia to take practical steps towards the mutual reduction of armed 
forces, as well as confidence-building measures on the border (see section 4.3.1).
As a result of Soviet-Chinese normalization, the outlines of a settlement in South- 
East Asia became more visible. Vietnamese troops pulled out o f Cambodia. A peace 
accord was signed on 23 October 1991 to end the civil war in Cambodia, where a 
general election was to be held in May 1993. The formal resumption of diplomatic 
relations between China and Indonesia after a break of 23 years took place in Jakarta 
on 7 August 1990. China and Vietnam put 13 years of hostility and venom behind 
them, sealing the normalization o f bilateral relations in November 1991. From 1986 
onwards the Soviet Union actively pursued diplomatic and trade activities with ASEAN 
countries. There were more promising developments in trade and economic relations 
with ASEAN countries.
Japan was the only major "adversary" power with which the Soviet Union did not 
substantially improve relations in the Gorbachev era. However, even though they had
42. A. V. Vorontsov, « T re u g o l'n ik »  USA. Japan. South Korea: M if ili realnost' (Moskva: Nauka, 1991), 
p. 173.
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territorial disputes which prevented radical improvements on any level: political, 
commercial and diplomatic, the resumption of constructive dialogue between the Soviet 
Union and Japan contributed to the peace, stability and development in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Sino-Japanese relations reached a new high with the exchange of high-level 
visits along with normalizing diplomatic ties between the two countries. South Korea 
established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in September 1990. Japan and 
North Korea started preparatory talks on the normalization of bilateral ties in 
November 1990. Normalization talks began in January 1991. In talks on normalizing 
relations between the DPRK and Japan, Tokyo set the acceptance by the DPRK of 
international inspection as a precondition, thwarting progress in the talks. Although the 
United States was offically still implacably hostile to North Korea, she tried to ease 
tensions on the divided Korean peninsula. North Korea-US high-level talks were held 
several times and were important for the improvement o f bilateral relations, but the 
improvement has just started. The United States announced it would reduce its military 
presence in Asia and the Pacific.43 The two Korean states began an active peaceful 
dialogue, developed economic ties and gained membership of the United Nations in 
1992. Although there were some moves towards national reconciliation and relaxation 
of tension on the Korean peninsula, the situation in the area remained complicated and 
uncertain. Economic relations between South Korea and China expanded quickly 
through the exchange of trade offices in Seoul and Beijing in January 1991. South 
Korea gained full diplomatic relations with China in August 1992 which helped stability 
in Northeast Asia ( On the Korean peninsula, see chapters 5, 6, 7).
The United States and the Soviet Union had a 'honeymoon' relationship under 
Gorbachev. Improved Soviet-American relations made it possible to begin direct ties 
between the Soviet Far East, the Chukchi Peninsula, Kamchatka and Sakhalin, and 
Alaska and the West Coast o f the United States. Soviet-Canadian ties made
43. U.S. News & World Report, 13 January 1992, p. 37. The Pentagon has announced plans to withdraw only 
5,000 to 6,000 of its 50,000 troops from Japan and 7,000 of its 44,000 from South Korea; Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 26 November 1992, p. 18, The US left finally Subic Bay on 24 November 1992.
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considerable progress. There were obvious changes for the better in relations with 
Australia and New Zealand.44 The Soviet Union also developed relations with a number 
of island nations in the South Pacific, such as Kiribati, Vanuatu, and Fiji. This interest 
aroused attention since this area is near the transpacific shipping lanes between the 
United States and the western Pacific rim.45
The Soviet Union took unilateral steps to considerably reduce its armed forces in 
the Asian part o f Soviet territory. But the Soviet Union still retained massive offensive 
military forces in the region. The Soviet Union proposed to begin discussions on the 
limitation and reduction of naval forces and activities in the Pacific area. (See section
4.4.3 in this chapter.)
Thus there were many improvements in the general political atmosphere, the 
outlines of settlement of regional conflicts and the higher level of culture and economic 
ties in bilateral relations. However, the 'cold war' in Asia has not yet ended. Today, 
rather contradictory processes are going on the Asia-Pacific international relations.
After the end o f the cold war in Europe, Asia's peace is only relative. The last land 
frontier o f the cold war still divides the Korean peninsula. There is no assurance in 
Cambodia that the presence of UN peace-keepers means that the civil war is really 
over. There is still no security mecanism to deal with the military situation and military 
issues in the Asia-Pacific region.
Although the Soviet threat to.capitalist Asia has to all practical purposes 
evaporated, plenty of uncertainties remain in the Asia-Pacific region.
4.3 The Soviet Union and the Pacific Economy
In line with the concept o f our country's accelerated social and 
economic growth, we pay special attention to the territories east o f the
44. Richard A. Herr, 'The Soviet Union in the South Pacific', in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, eds., 
The Soviet Union as an Asian Pacific Power (London: Westview press, 1987), pp. 135-151; David Hegarty, 
'The Soviet Union in the South Pacific in the 1990s', in Ross Babbage, ed., The Soviets in the Pacific in the 
1990s (Australia: Brassey's Australia, 1989), pp. 113-127.
45. Ni Xiaoquan, 'Gorbachev's policy toward.the Asia-Pacific region', p. 20.
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Urals whose economic potential is several times that o f the European part 
o f the USSR. We believe that joint firms and ventures set up in 
collaboration with the business circles of Asia-Pacific countries could take 
part in tapping the wealth of these areas.46
As Gorbachev indicated above, in accomplishing large-scale tasks o f accelerating 
social and economic development the Soviet Union devoted paramount attention to 
Siberia and the Far East, which are part of the Asia-Pacific region (APR).47 Siberia 
(West and East) has a combined area of 6,550,000 square kilometres, some 29.3 per 
cent o f the territory of the then USSR. The Soviet Far East is a vast area over 
6,215,900 square kilometres accounting for 27.7 percent of Soviet territory 48 A large 
part o f Soviet natural resources are concentrated in Siberia and the Far East. Yet, it is 
weak in agriculture, light industries and labour resources.49
After a long period of economic isolationism the Soviet Union was profoundly 
interested in active economic interaction with the states of the Asia Pacific area to 
secure competitive conditions and a fair share of the market for profitable deals.
With the Soviet economy in a downward spiral, inflation mounting, the consumer 
market failing, the rouble virtually worthless and the budget deficit expanding, the 
Soviet government saw Asia as the home of nations growing richer in capital and 
technology. For its own economic salvation, the Kremlin cultivated greater economic
46. Gorbachev, Perestroika i Novoe Myshlenie, p. 191.
47. Izvestiya, 24 April 1986, p. 1.
48. Kapitsa, Petrov, Slavinsky, Tikhmirov, Shabshina and Pak, Istoriya Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii na 
Dar'nem Vostoke 1945-1977, p. 520. Far Eastern Economic region in USSR as follows: Khabarovsk, 
Primorski Krai, Amur, Kamshatka, Sakhalin, Magadan Oblast and Yakutia. The territory of this region is a 
unique economic and geographic position in Russia and the Asian-Pacific Region.
49. On the Siberia and the Far East economic region, see, Paul Cydolph, Geography o f the USSR, Third 
Edition (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1977), pp. 336-467; Denis Shaw, 'Siberia: Geographical 
Background1, in Alan Wood, ed., Siberia: Problems and Prospects fo r Regional Development (London: 
Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 9-34; Aleksandr G. Gramberg, 'The Economy of Siberia-Tasks of Structrual Policy', 
Kommunist, no. 2 (1987), pp. 31-40; Theodore Shabad, The Gorbachev Economic Policy: Is the USSR 
Turning Away from Siberian Development?' in Alan Wood and R. Anthony French, eds., The Development 
o f Siberia: People and Resources (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 256-260; Aleksandr G. Granberg, "The 
Restructuring of the Soviet Economy and Prospects for Siberia's Development", International Regional 
Science Review, vol. 12, no. 3 (1989), pp. 291-304; Leslie Dienes, 'Siberia: Perestroika and Economic 
Development', Soviet Geography, vol. 32, no. 7 (1991), pp. 445-457.
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ties with the Asia-Pacific countries - solicited trade, credits, investment, economic 
assistance, technology and joint ventures regardless of ideological lineage. Therefore, 
an important element of Soviet policy in the region aimed at strengthening trade and 
economic as well as scientific and technological cooperation with the countries of the 
Asia-Pacific region.
From the beginning of his term in office, Gorbachev took the view that the Soviet 
Union had a 'Pacific destiny'. Nobody favoured the development of Soviet-Pacific basin 
relations more strongly than Gorbachev, who chose Vladivostok, or "conquering the 
East", as the site of his first major foreign policy address on 28 July 1986. The 
Vladivostok speech envisaged a close interrelation between tackling domestic economic 
problems and a much more active Soviet participation in the system of division of 
labour emerging in the Asia-Pacific, with enough potential to become a future 'system 
of Pacific economic cooperation'.
In a reply to a question put by the Indonesian newspaper Merdekci on 21 July 
1987, Gorbachev said:
The best and the only solid basis for international affairs is equality, 
mutual respect, non-interference, mutual benefit. These very objectives will 
be served by the Soveit Committee for Asian and Pacific Economic 
Cooperation which is being set up in this country.50
In Ausust 1987 the Central Committee of the CPSU in conjunction with the 
Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union adopted a new long-term programme for the 
economic and social development of the Soviet Far East and the adjacent regions till 
the year 2000.51 The programme stipulated capital investments into the region's 
economy 2.4 times greater than that of the Soviet Far East, the opening of special
50. Izvestiya, 23 July 1987, p. 2.
51. Leslie Dienes, 'A comment on the new development programme for the Far East Economic Region', Soviet 
Geograghy, vol. 31, no. 4 (1988), pp. 420-422.
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territorial zones for joint ventures, and preferential treatment for foreign investors.52
In his Krasnoyarsk speech of September 1988, Gorbachev indicated his country's 
willingness to take the initiative in the region. He noted:
We followed with interest the activity of the conference on Asia- 
Pacific economic cooperation, greeted its recent session in Osaka, and are 
ready to join the work of that international organization in any form which 
its members will deem acceptable.53
He also indicated that the Soviet Union was thinking about the creation of'special 
zones for joint ventures' in the Far East. These zones could become an important form 
for developing Soviet export potential and a motive force for the intensification of their 
commercial and economic relations with the Asia-Pacific region.
In his book, M oi vybor (My choice), Edward Shevardnadze emphasized a link 
between the economy of the Far East and Siberia with the Asian Pacific economic 
complex:
I realize that much remains to be done so that the economic presence 
of the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific will reach a level commensurate 
with its economic possibilities. Here active economic diplomacy and new 
forms o f incorporation into the economic life of the region are needed on 
our part. That will require internal measures to speed the development of 
the economy and the market in the Asian part of the Soviet Union and the 
Soviet Far East, and measures to create a favourable political and legal 
environment for investment.54
On 18 April 1991, in his Tokyo speech, Gorbachev indicated the importance of 
the Asia-Pacific region as a zone of potential openness, cooperation and prosperity as 
follows:
The time has come for a practical approach to the idea o f creating a 
cooperation zone in the Sea of Japan. It could become a useful testing 
ground for economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. We are 
interested in linking the economy of the Far East and Siberia to the
52. S. Dykov, 'Vozmozhnosti delovovo sotrudnichestva so stranami ATR', Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 12/1990, 
p. 34.
53. Izvestiya, 18 September 1988, p. 2.
54. Shevardnadze, Moi Vybor v Zashchitu Demokratii i Svobody (Moskva: Novosti, 1991), pp. 278-279.
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economic complex taking shape in the Asia-Pacific region. While being 
aware of the difficulties involved, we also see enormous opportunities in 
this.55
In order to boost the economy and develop the social infrastructure material and 
financial resources were allocated. All these efforts created favourable conditions for 
the intensification of foreign economic relations. The Gorbachev government no longer 
criticized economic organizations in this region - e.g. the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Conference (PECC) of 1980, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC)56 o f 1989 - but sought to take active participate. In 1991, the Soviet Union's 
total exports to APEC-member countries(except Brunei) reached 9,538 million roubles 
compared to 9,228 million roubles in 1990. Soviet imports from APEC-member 
countries (except Brunei) totalled 18,319 million roubles in 1991 compared to 20,605 
million roubles in 1990.57 The trade of the Soviet Union with this region recorded 
about 19 billion roubles, but USSR's share did not exceed 1 per cent of the whole 
foreign trade volume of Asia-Pacific countries.58 The APR's share in the Soviet Union's 
trade turnover changed notably over Gorbachev's years, increasing from 8.0 percent in
55. Izvestiya, 17 April 1991, p. 5.
56. APEC, created in November 1989, forum encompasses Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Brunei, Japan, South Korea, Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, China, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. APEC's aim has been the integration of a dozen mostly booming, individualistic Asian 
economics into a massive free-trade zone stretching from the United States to Japan and Australia and 
includeing, since mid-November, China, Tiwan and Hong Kong. It accounts for nearly 50 percent of global 
output of goods and services and one-third of the world's trade. APEC comprises a diverse multi-cultural 
population of well over 1.6 billion consumers and includes the two economic superpoers America and Japan 
(The economies of the United States and Japan are inextricably bound together and add up to 40 per cent of 
the world's GNP. International Herald Tribune, 28 January 1992, p. 4.) and, potentially, the world's biggest 
consumer market, the People's Republic of China. International Herald Tribune,21 November 1991, p. 9. As 
noted above, the Asia-Pacific region is the most dynamic part of world placed new centre of international 
economic relations. To promote trade and economic cooperation in Asia, Russian President Yeltsin put 
forward the idea of forming a regional economic cooperation body, while hoping to participate in the 15- 
nation forum of APEC. See The Korea Herald, 20 November 1992, p. 2.
57. Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 4-5/1992, pp. 48-51.
58. A. Rodionov, 'SSSR i Aziatsko-Tikhokeanskoe Ekonomicheskoe Sotrudnichestvo', Vneshnyaya 
Torgovlya, August 1991, p. 15.
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1986 to 18.0 percent in 1991.59
On 22 May 1991, the Soviet Union reafirmed its intention to become a full 
economic partner in Asia, presenting itself as a vital bridge between the region and 
Europe. Vladimir Kamentsev, chairman of the USSR National Committee for Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation, made the following remarks on the closing day of 
PECC: 'I would like to emphasize our intention to become a comprehensively involved 
participant of economic processes in Asia and the Pacific, to widen the scope of our 
cooperation'.60
In September 1991, RSFSR president Yeltsin decreed that the Far Eastern port 
city of Vladivostok would be opened to foreigners as of January 1, 1992, for the first 
time in 40 years. The Soviet military, which vetoed an initial attempt in spring 1991 to 
open the city, citing security requirements, agreed this time, and sensitive military 
communications and security operations are being moved out.61
Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union was forced to seek improvement in 
practical relations in the Asia-Pacific region, especially Far East Asia, for the purposes 
of gaining investment, hightechnology, and skilled manpower in the development of 
Siberia and the Far East. Integrating Siberia and the Far East with the regional 
economy was a priority. Given the dynamics of the international economy, the Soviet 
Union's position in relation to the nations of the Asia-Pacific region was the most 
promising source of stimulus for change.62
59. There were more than 1150 branch and representative offices of foreign firms in Russia in 1991; nearby all 
of them - in Moscow and 81 percent of them - from Europe. The share of the North Pacific countries was 9.5 
percent, including Japanese share of 6.1 percent, Republic of Korea's - 0.4 percent, the U.S. A - 2.9 percent 
and Canada's 0.1 percent. The one-sided European priority in the international economic policy contradicts 
the long-term interests of Russia. Alexander B. Parkansky, 'The Disintegration Trends in the Eastern Russia 
and the Russian Economic Opportunities int he Northern Pacific Area', in Osamu Ieda, ed., New Order in 
Post-Communist Eurasia (Sapporo, Japan: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 1993), pp. 131- 
132.
60. The Korea Herald, 24 May 1991, p. 7.
61. International Herald Tribune, 28 November 1991, p. 7.
62. Daniel C. Matuszewski, 'Soviet Reforms and the Asia-Pacific Challenge', in Thambipillai and 
Matuszewski, eds., The Soviet Union and the Asia-Pacific Region: Views from the Region, p. 6.
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4.3 .1  T r a d e  w i th  C h in a
Trade between the Soviet Union and China was unique because of the 
combination of three main features. First, the two countries are neighbours. Second, 
China and the Soviet Union can be seen as complementary economies. Third, China and 
the Soviet Union had some similarities in their ideology and system of government.63
During the 1950s' honeymoon, Soviet-Chinese trade reached remarkable levels.
In 1959 Soviet trade with China reached 1,849.4 million roubles, a significant rise from
1,252.7 million roubles in 1955. Because of ideological and political differences from 
the early 1960s to 1970s, Soviet foreign trade turnover with China dropped sharply.
For example, total trade with China was 41.9 million roubles in 1970.64
The recovery of Sino-Soviet economic relations in the early 1980s was one o f the 
earliest products of communist detente. Economic ties play a major role in Sino-Soviet 
relations. One result o f rapprochement between the two countries was that Sino-Soviet 
trade increased rapidly: from 488.2 million roubles in 1983, 1,614.9 million roubles in 
1985, 1,850.1 million roubles in 1988, to 2,412.0 million roubles in 1989 and 5,668.1 
million roubles in 1990.65 Trade volume between the two countries soared to more than
5,930.3 million roubles in 1991, surpassing the previous Soviet-Chinese record. Sino- 
Soviet trade, however, still accounted for only 3-4 percent of China's foreign trade66 
and about 1.5 percent of the Soviet Union's. In 1991 Soviet-Chinese trade (5930.3
63. Gerald Segal, The Soviet Union and the Pacific (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. 140. The Russian and 
Chinese economies are much similar in quality, structure, the culture of consumption and the technological 
level of industry. Hundreds of the Chinese factories are still using the Soviet equipment, which needs 
renewing. See Parkansky, 'The Disintegration Trends...', p. 133.
64. Moscow Mews, no. 4, 1989, p. 6.
65. In July, 1990, the governments of China and the Soviet Union signed the agreement of investment 
protection and the Agreement for Avoidance of Double Taxation. In August, the inter-govemmental 
agreement of labour service cooperation was signed. These agreements laid the juristical foundation for the 
further development of economic and trade relations between the two countries. See Almanac o f  China's 
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 1991/92 (Beizing, China: The Editorial Board of the Almanac of 
China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, 1992), p. 382.
66. Beijing Review, 23-29 April 1990, p. 9.
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million roubles) was less than Soviet-Japanese (7950.5 million roubles) and Soviet-US 
(7874.6 million roubles).67 By the end of 1980s, it was clearly shown that bi-lateral 
trade volume increased almost 14 times during the last ten years.68 In 1992, total trade 
volume between China and various countries of the former Soviet Union was 5.23 
billion dollars, of which China's exports were 2.58 billion dollars and its imports were 
2.65 billion dollars.69
Table 4.1 Soviet Trade with China 
(Million Roubles)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Turnover 1,614,9 1,822,0 1,474,9 1,850,1 2,412,0 5,668,1 5,930,3
Export 780,4 910,3 724,3 1,005,2 1,328,5 2,390,6 2,882,7
Import 834,5 911,7 750,6 844,9 1,083,5 3,277,5 3,047,6
Sources: Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 3, 1985-1990; ibid., 4-5, 1992.
Border trade
Sino-Soviet border trade also grew significantly in a variety of forms. It 
particularly increased in Heilongjing province, Inner Mongolia and the Xinjiang Uygur 
autonomous region. It was in 1983 that China and the Soviet Union restored border 
trade. In the following five years, border trade reached a total of 100 million Swiss 
francs, while the 1990 border trade reached 720 million Swiss francs. In 1991 it rose to 
1.6 billion Swiss francs.70 In 1989 border trade between the two countries exceeded
67. Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 4-5, 1992, pp. 49-51.
68. M. Bureev, 'Sovetsko-Kitaiskaya Torgovlya ot Kliringa k SKV', Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 10, 1990, p. 11; 
Among them: Russia trade with China (export 1,912.76 million US dollars/ import 1,327.86 million US 
dollars). Source: China's Customs Statistics.
69. China Daily, 4 March 1993, p. 2.
70. China Daily, 5 June 1992, p. 1.
500 million roubles, more ten times that of 1987.71 At present barter is the major 
pattern in Russian-Chinese border trade. China sells its foodstuffs, textiles and other 
consumer products to Russia. In turn, it gets heavy machinery and raw materials.72
According to the Heilongjiang mayor Xu Furu, Soviet barter trade is set to 
increase steadily. The local and border trade between the two countries were developed 
continuously in 1990. According to statistics, the total value of the local and border 
trade was 1 billion US dollars.73 By the end of May 1991, the two nations had signed 
contracts worth 692 million Swiss Francs with an actual export and import volume of 
254 million Swiss Francs, six times the total volume from 1957 to October 1966.74 
While steadily maintaining barter trade, Chinese workers in the Heilongjiang entered 
the Soviet labour market to make up for a shortage of labour on the Soviet side. Over 
the past three years, the city has signed 25 co-operative projects. The 22 projects which 
are already under way have resulted in the sending overseas of 2,920 workers. Labour 
co-operation has spread from construction and timber felling to agriculture, hydraulic 
engineering, medical care and catering services.75
When bilateral governmental trade dropped slightly, the local and border trade 
between the two countries developed continuously in 1991, reaching 1.797 billion US 
dollars, up 79.7 percent over that of the previous year.76 According to Russian 
embassador Igor Rogachev, non-governmental border trade accounted for 60-80 per 
cent o f trade volume in 1992. Much of this trade was carried on by freelance peddlars,
71. V. Andreev, D. Borusov, 'SSSR-Kitai: Svyazi Rasshiryayutsya', Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 8, 1990, pp. 12- 
13.
72. China Daily Business Weekly, 4-10 July 1993, p. 4.
73. Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 1992/93, p. 433.
74. Beijing Review, 30 December 1991-5 January 1992, p. 19.
75. Ibid., p. 20.
76. Almanac o f China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 1992/93, p. 433.
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business tourists and exchange students from the two countries.77 On 16 March 1992 a 
Sino-Russian border agreement boosted the exchange along the border region that 
stretches from the Japan sea around Heilongjian and ends in East Siberia.78 
Joint Ventures
After the signing of an agreement for joint ventures in mid-1988, operating joint 
ventures between the two countries soon emerged. The Sino-Soviet venture Jian Libao 
drink factory set up in the Soviet Union in June 1990 is one example. The contract had 
a total investment of 9 million Swiss franks with 40 per cent coming from China and 60 
per cent from the Soviet Union.79 About 15,000 Chinese labourers are currently 
working inside the Soviet Far East on various construction projects. Since 1988, 
migrant Chinese farm workers started to cultivate the Novosibirsk area.80 In 1990, 6 
projects o f Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures with Soviet investment in China were 
approved, the contract value of foreign investment was 8.35 million US dollars. 25 joint 
ventures setting up in the Soviet Union were approved with the Chinese investment of 
18.93 million US dollars.81 In 1991, There were 409 contracts of project contracting 
and labour service cooperation in the Soviet Union with the contractual value of 820 
million US dollars. There were 65 joint ventures setting up in the Soviet Union 
approved with the investment by the Chinese side valuing at 22 million US dollars.82 On 
12 July 1991 the Sino-Soviet joint venture, for example, the Kamaz Automobile 
Maintenance Co. Ltd. was established in Hailar City, capital of Hulun Buir League, 
Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. Of the total investment of 3.54 million Swiss 
Francs, China contributed 53.25 per cent, with the remainder coming from the Soviet
77. Far Eastern Economic Review, 24-31 December 1992, p. 10.
78. China Daily, 31 March 1992, p. 1.
79. Beijing Review, 23-29 July 1990, p. 29.
80. Financial Times, 12 March 1990.
81. Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 1991/92, p. 383.
82. Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 1992/93, p. 433.
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Union.83 A rail link between Urumchi and Alma Ata was scheduled to be opened on 1 
July 1992.84 The construction of the railway is of great importance to economic 
transactions in Sino-Soviet border areas. More steamer routes along the Amur River 
link Soviet and Chinese cities were open. Direct flights between Khabarovsk and 
Harbin, and between Moscow and Shanghai began.85 In 1992 China signed 613 
contracts on construction projects and labour services with CIS countries worth 1.04 
billion dollars. The actual business volume same year was 180 million dollars, and 
nearly 30,000 people were sent to work in the CIS. China has set up 96 joint venture 
firms in the CIS with contract investment of 100 million dollars, 43.7 percent from the 
Chinese side.86
Thus, Sino-Soviet relations in terms of volume of trade and economic 
cooperation developed rapidly in recent years. Bilateral trade was based on equality and 
mutual benefits. Looking to the future, border and regional co-operation will play an 
increasingly bigger role. In addition, similarity in their economic structures makes both 
countries interested in expanding trade and developing co-operation.
However, obstacles and problems in both trade relations and economic co­
operation between China and the Soviet Union remain. First, the low-level trade 
structure hinders the expansion of economic and trade relations. Second, there are 
many defects in settlement-on-account trade, which affects the development of 
economic co-operation between the two countries. Third, transportation has become a 
major problem.87 These should have resolved by the joint efforts of both countries so 
that trade relations and economic co-operation can develop smoothly.
83. Beijing Review, 12-18 August 1991, p. 29.
84. Asahi Shimbun, 21 October 1989.
85. Financial Times, 12 March 1990.
86. China Daily Business Weekly, 30 May - 5 June 1993, p. 8.
87. Beijing Review, 23-29 July 1990, pp. 10-11.
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4 .3 .2  T r a d e  w ith  J a p a n
Japan restored diplomatic relations with Moscow in 1956, and by the late 1970s 
had become one of the Soviet Union's leading trading partners in the West. Soviet- 
Japanese economic relations developed gradually after a trade agreement was signed on 
6 December 1957. Since 1966 trade between the two nations has been regulated by five 
year agreements, the first of which covered the period 1966-70. Until the middle 1970s 
the value of trade doubled almost every five years: in 1961-65, 1,300 million roubles; 
1966-70, 2,600 million; 1971-75, 6,100 million roubles. The barter in the process o f 
implementation of trade agreement of the second five year(1971-1975) increased an 
average by 26.6 per cent, rising from 652.3 million roubles in 1970 to 1983 million 
roubles in 1974. During 1974 alone bi-trade increased by 69 per cent with increase o f 
Soviet export by 46 per cent and import - more than twice by 108 per cent.88 Japan 
standing in first place in Soviet trade with capitalist countries had moved into second 
place in 1977.89
During the years 1976-1980, the trade volume of both countries increased almost 
1.9 times in comparison with the previous five years' trade volume.90 The volume o f 
Soviet-Japanese trade in 1979 reached about 2,605,4 million roubles. Among them 
Soviet exports to Japan amounted to 944,4 million roubles, and import to 1,661,0 
million roubles. During five years (1976-1980), trade between the Soviet Union and 
Japan amounted to 12 billion roubles, or double that o f the previous five years.91
Total trade rose from 128.8 billion roubles in 1987 to 132.1 billion roubles in 
1988. Japan stood in sixth place in terms of exports (4.6 per cent), and fourth place in
88. Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka, no. 1, 1976, pp. 95-96.
89. L. N. Kutakov, Moskva-Tokio: Ocherki Diplomaticheskikh Otnoshenii 1956-1986 (Moscow: 
Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1988), p. 153.
90. Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 12, 1990, p. 8.
91. SSSR-Yaponiya: Problemy Torgovo-Ekonomicheskikh Otnoshenii (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye 
Otnosheniya, 1984), p. 82.
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terms of imports (5.3 per cent) in Soviet trade with capitalist countries in 1990.92 Trade 
in 1990 totalled just 10,033.1 million roubles, only 1.3 percent of Japan's total, and 
7950.5 thousand roubles in 1991, accounting for only one percent of Japan's trade.93
Table 4.2 Soviet-Japanese trade 
(Million Roubles)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Turnover 3,214,9 3,185,3 2,600,7 3,135, 1 3,481,0 10,033,1 7,950,5
Export 928,9 979,9 972,5 1,184,2 1,343,0 4,071,8 3,734,3
Import 2,286,9 2,205,4 1,628,2 1,950,9 2,138,0 5,961,3 4,216,2
Sources: Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 3, 1985-1990; ibid., 4-5, 1992.
By the end of September 1990, Japanese investment in the Soviet Union totalled 
$233 million - only 0.1 percent of its total overseas investments (see table 4.2.1).
Table 4.2.1 Japanese Inventments in the Former Soviet Union (1951-Sep,90) 
(Unit of Projects, Million Dollars)
51-80 81-85 86 87 88 89 90 Total
Project 6 0 1 1 8 12 9 37
Amount 193 0 1 1 9 19 10 233
* Source: Korea Ministry of Trade and Industry
Throughout 1988-1990, the Soviet Union continued to show enthusiasm for a 
quick and sharp expansion in economic relations, calling for participation by Japan in 
Siberian and Far Eastern development in the form of joint ventures. But bilaternal trade 
actually fell in 1991, dropping from 10,033.1 million roubles to 7,950.5 million roubles 
as shown in Table 4.2. Due to the Kuril Islands issue, there was to be no dynamic 
development o f economic relations. Overall, the economic relationship showed more
92. Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 2, 1992, p. 40.




promise than the political one despite the absence of any overall agreements during the 
Gorbachev era.
4 .3 .3  T r a d e  w ith  I n d o c h i n a
Vietnam's trade with the Soviet Union grew along with increasing political ties.
As the Vietnam War intensified in and after 1967 the trade rapidly grew, but slowed 
down slightly with the peace negotiations. As Sino-Vietnamese relations began to 
deteriorate in 1978 (Vietnam became a CMEA member in 1978), Soviet-Vietnamese 
trade expanded, reaching in 1979 593.8 million roubles, having gone up about 6.3 times 
since 1965 and about 3.2 times since 1969(see table 4.3).
The level of economic assistance to Vietnam over the period 1981-1985 was 
estimated to be $1.1 billion anually.94 Soviet bloc economic aid to Vietnam was 
increased after Gorbachev came to power. Increased Soviet economic aid to Vietnam 
was announced when Le Duan visited Moscow in June-July 1985 as part of a long-term 
economic and technical cooperation agreement.95
By the end of 1987, the Soviet Union was Vietnam's main trading partner: the 
USSR accounted for 64 per cent of Vietnamese total foreign trade (48 per cent of 
Vietnam's exports went to the Soviet Union and 68 per cent of her imports came from 
the Soviet Union).96 Delivery o f goods from the Soviet Union played a crucial role in 
the Vietnamese economy. For example, 100 per cent of oilproducts, 90.9 per cent o f 
lorries, 81.2 per cent of ferrous metals and 68.0 per cent of chemical fertilizer imported 
by Vietnam came from the Soviet Union.97
Laos and Cambodia are the poorest and the most isolated from the economic
94. International Herald Tribune, 25-26 October 1986, cited in Lau Teik Soon and Bilveer Singh, eds., The 
Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region, p. 121.
95. Izvestiya, 1 July 1985, p. 1.
96. A. Yampol'sky, 'SSSR-Vietnam: Zadachi sovershenstvovaniya torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii', 
Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 5, 1988, p. 6.
97. Ibid.
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growth and new pattern of international relations in the Pacific. Though military and 
economic aid to the Indochina had previously been channeled through Vietnam, in 1981 
the Soviet Union began to provide this directly to Laos98 and Cambodia.
There were some signs in the late 1980s of a future increase in Soviet trade with 
both states as the Soviet Union sought new influence in Indochina. In January 1976, 
between the Soviet Union and Laos signed a document on deliveries of Soviet goods to 
Loas." During 1976-1986 bilateral trade volume rose from 10,6 million roubles to 67,3 
million roubles, i.e., more than by 6.3 times.100 In 1990, Soviet-Cambodia trade reached
311.7 million roubles in comparison with 55.7 million roubles in 1982 and with 1.8 
million roubles in 1967 (see appendix 7). The Soviet Union was by far Cambodia's main 
trade partner.
As a result o f economic reform, the Soviet Union drastically cut assistance to its 
socialist Asian allies. This put pressure on Indochina to look to the West for help in 
developing a market economy.101
Table 4.3 Soviet trade with Indochina 
(Million Roubles)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Cambodia
Export 91,1 114,0 112,0 117,3 128,5 271,0 13,7
Import 9,1 8,7 11,2 13,1 12,3 40,7 8,3
Laos
Export 85,5 62,2 78,2 74,6 73,7 55,6 9,7
Import 2,3 5,1 9,4 11,4 15,6 16,4 4,7
98. On Soviet-Laos economic relations, see V. Timofeev, 'SSSR-Laos: Desyat let plodotvomykh torgovo- 
ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii', Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 1, 1986, pp. 18-21; Ustinov, Feonova and Nikolaev, 
eds, Edonomika i Vneshne-Edonomicheskie Svyszi SSSR, pp. 200-201.
9 9 .1. N. Ustinov, L. A. Feonova and D. S. Nikolaev, eds., Ekonom'ika i Vneshne-Ekonomicheskie Svyazi 
SSSR (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1989, p. 200.
100. Ustinov, Feonova and Mikolaev, eds., Ekonomika i Vneshne-Ekonomicheskie Svyazi SSSR, p. 200.
101. The Nikkei Weekly (Tokyo), 9 November 1991, p. 18.
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Vietnam
Export 1165,3 1318,4 1454,5 1393,6 1390,9 1307,1 444,8 
Import 280,8 294,3 318,9 388,6 519,7 703,5 406,0
Sources: Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 3, 1985-1990; ibid., 4-5, 1992.
4 .3 .4  T r a d e  w i th  A S E A N ,  NICs and o th e r  c o u n tr ie s
The Soviet Union's policy toward these nations was in line with its general policy 
designed to promote the relations of good neighbourliness and cooperation, the 
principles of equality, mutual benefit and non-interference in internal affairs. The USSR 
recognised ASEAN as a group working to promote economic, social and cultural 
development and declared itself ready to cooperate with it. Economic ties with these 
countries had to be developed from a low starting-point. A negative balance of Soviet 
trade with ASEAN members for 10 years had reached about 3.9 billion roubles. The 
rate of Soviet export-import to and from ASEAN was for one of seven. Such 
imbalances prevented a stable and dynamic development of Soviet foreign trade in the 
region.102 The USSR mainly imported raw materials and food products from ASEAN: 
rubber from Malaysia and Indonesia, palm and coconut oil copra from the Philippines 
and Malaysia, tin from Malaysia and Singapore, raw sugar from the Philippines, maize 
and rice from Thailand.103
Table 4.4 Soviet Trade with ASEAN States 
(Million Roubles)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Indonesia
Export 3,7 3,1 11,2 16,1 26,3 24,1 53,9
Import 90,5 42,3 56,6 24,3 68,2 152,8 52,1
Malaysia
Export 10,8 7,6 11,0 17,7 12,9 65,6 58,9
Import 180,4 96,6 104,8 81,4 152,7 265,0 184,5
102. A. Mikhailov, 'Puti Sotrudnichestva so Stranami ASEAN', Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 6, 1989, p. 25.
103. Far Eastern Affairs, 4 November 1988, p. 66.
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Philippines
Export 10,9 7,4 11,3 13,3 5,5 34,3 41,3
Import 28,8 10,0 15,8 1 1,3 16,1 32,6 15,1
Singapore
Export 10,7 26,7 37,2 25,6 58,4 162,0 246,8
Import 79,6 35,9 48,1 35,9 100,2 590,7 334,5
Thailand
Export 13,4 10,2 24,0 24,2 35,9 164,3 334,4
Import 54,5 80,7 30,8 40,2 220,7 192,0 155,3
Sources: Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 3, 1985-1990; ibid., 4-5, 1992.
The Soviet Union knew that trade and economic ties with ASEAN states was 
inadequate, and that opportunities for their growth existed. The Soviet government 
delegation led by Yakov Ryabov, the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of 
Ministers, which went to Indonesia and Malaysia late in 1985 emphasised the need to 
identify new areas and to apply progressive forms of economic cooperation.104 There 
was a growing opinion in ASEAN favouring wider trade and economic contacts with 
the Soviet Union. These positive trends were confirmed during the USSR Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Indonesia and Thailand in 1987 and the visits to the 
USSR by the Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia, the Foreign Minister o f 
Thailand Siddhi Savetsial and the Foreign Minister of Indonesia Mochtar 
Kusumuatmadja.105 In 1986-1987 a joint Soviet-Indonesian commission on trade and 
economic cooperation was set up, then the Soviet-Thailand intergovernmental 
commission on trade; an agreement on cooperation between the USSR chamber of 
Commerce and Industry and its counterpart in Malaysia was signed, as well as an 
agreement on the avoidance of doubletaxation with Malaysia.106 At the 24th ASEAN 
meeting in 20 July 1991, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov attended the
104. Soviet News (Singapore), 22 January 1987, pp. 1-3.
105. Far Eastern Affairs, 4 November 1988, p. 6 6 .
106. Ibid., p. 71.
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meeting for the first time as guest of the Malaysian government and held separate 
private talks with their ASEAN counterparts.107 The Soviet Union tried to increase 
economic cooperation with ASEAN, but trade volume was very low (see table 4.4).
The new focus on richer states, and the recognition of the new structural features 
o f the developing world, were both particularly visible in the Soviet Union's relations 
with the NICs.108 The Soviet Union had problems with the fact that the Newly 
Industrialized Countries are rarely countries in the full sense of the term. Only 
Singapore had full independence. Hong Kong and Taiwan were both claimed by China, 
and the Soviet ally, North Korea, insisted its friends maintain a solid front in not 
recognizing South Korea. It was only a pragmatic Soviet leadership that put aside these 
diplomatic problems in order to get on with business.109
In 1981 Soviet-Singapore trade relations, which were established in April 1966, 
reached 117,2 million roubles, increased more than 46 times in comparision with the 
trade volume of 1966.110 But bilateral trade decreased in the following years. In 1986 
total trade amounted to 62,6 million roubles, which was 4.3 times of trade volume in 
1975.111 In 1991, the trade volume of both countries increased almost 6.5 times in 
comparison with that of 1985 (see table 4.4).
Total Hong Kong exports to the former Soviet Union surged by 74 per cent in 
1991 to over 1.5 billion HK dollars (192 million dollars) and a further 6 per cent 
growth was recorded for the January-April period in 1992. The Hong Kong Trade 
Development Council(TDC) organized a delegation of 10 companies to participate in
107. Beijing Review, 5-11 August 1991, p. 12.
108. In the early 1992, companies coming from NICs invested about 300 million dollars (more than half of it 
comes from South Korean companies) in the former Soviet Union. Delovie Lyudi, June 1992, p. 43.
109. Segal, The Soviet Union and the Pacific, p. 165.
110. Ustinov, Feonova, Nikolaev, eds., Ekonomika i Vneshne-Ekonomicheskie Svyazi SSSR, pp. 282-283.
111. Ibid., p. 283.
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the first Pan-Pacific Consumexpo in Vladivostok in September 1991.112
The new Soviet interest in the NICs focused on the untapped potential of 
relations with Taiwan and South Korea (We will discuss economic ties between the 
Soviet Union and South Korea in chapter 7.). Taiwan is, in many ways, more sensitive, 
because of the importance of Sino-Soviet detente. Yet China's own trade contacts with 
Taiwan have also increased in the 1980s and therefore it has become easier for other 
states, including the Soviet Union, to explore relations with this so-called province of 
China.113
Taiwan sought to expand economic ties with the Soviet Union from the late 
1980s, after more than 30 years of antagonism.114 Taiwan benefited from the collapse 
o f communism in Eastern Europe, with a steady stream of visitors. Taiwan banned 
contact with the Soviet Union until the late 1980s, when political tensions began to 
ease. Most of the Soviet officials and economists visiting Taiwan have been those 
associated with Yeltsin. In cooperation with the Russian republic, Taipei opened a trade 
office in Moscow at the end of 1991.115 Taiwan began delivery of 100,000 tons of rice, 
worth about 20 million dollars, to Russia as part of a programme of emergency aid to 
former Soviet republics in March 1992.116
Trade in 1989 was reportedly worth 127 million dollars (nearly 4 times the 1988
112. China Daily, 1 August 1992, p. 2. Hong Kong traders interested in tapping the newly opened market of 
the former Soviet Union may take advantage of the flourishing Sino-Russian border trade. To be able to sell 
more effectively to the market, Hong Kong companies may consider dealing through border trade companies 
in Heilongjiang.
113. Segal, the Soviet Union and the Pacific, p. 165.
114. In his press conference in Beijing on 17 May 1989, Gorbachev said on the trade between the Soviet 
Union and Taiwan as follows: 'As for trade with the Asian region, not only are we in favour of this in 
principle, but we are also doing a lot towards developing positive processes in that direction. We've recently 
been looking very optimistically at the prospects of trade and economic exchanges with Asian countries. This 
will not mean any explosion or disruption of the economic links existing there. I think that it will be an 
organic and natural process. We can see that our goods are needed there; and we'll find a use for the products 
of those states, too'. Pravda, 20 May 1989, p. 2.
115. Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 September 1991, p. 5.
116. The Japan Times, 16 March 1992, p. 7.
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figure), although total Taiwanese trade with Eastern Europe was valued at 350 million 
dollars. Soviet trade with Taiwan climbed from 700 million dollars in 1987 to 1.8 
billion dollars in 1991.117 Taiwan was clearly interested in buying Soviet fuel, raw 
materials and participating in the development of Siberia and the Far East. When the 
Soviets announced changes in joint venture laws in 1988, cooperation between the 
Soviet Union and Taiwan became increasingly possible.
Table 4.5 Soviet trade with other countries 
(Million Roubles)














































































Sources: Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 3, 1985-1990; ibid., 4-5, 1992.
Soviet trade with the fully developed capitalist economies such as Australia, New 
Zealand, USA and Canada was overwhelmingly unbalanced and based on commodity
117. Guacang Huan, 'The New Relationship with the Former Soviet Union', Current History, vol. 91, no. 566 
(August 1992), pp. 95-96.
exports to the Soviet Union. These countries showed interest in joint implementation of 
projects on the processing of natural resources in the Far East.
On 1 December 1987, when the Australian prime minister visited Moscow, a 
development programme of trade-economic cooperation between USSR and Australia 
for 1988-1995 was signed.118 A three year contract( 1989-1991) of bilateral trade of 
about 600-700 million roubles was also agreed. Most of Australian's export goods to 
the Soviet Union were agricultural products (about 92 per cent).119
New Zealand's prime minister visited Moscow in November 1988. The visit gave 
a new impulse to the progress of Soviet-New Zealand economic and scientific- 
technologic relations. The Soviet Union imports from New Zealand mutton, wool, milk 
products, and exports to New Zealand machinery, fish and sea-products, mineral 
fertilizers and chemicals.120 Soviet-New Zealand economic relations developed 
gradually after a trade agreement of 1988. The trade volume of the two countries in 
1990 reached 418.3 million roubles in comparison with 1988 figure of 111.8 million 
roubles.
The imbalance o f Soviet trade with the industrial West is shown in table 4.5. 
During the period 1985-1990 the USSR accumulated a negative trade balance with the 
Western countries. In some cases this was particularly high: with the US (-4,534.3 
million roubles), Canada (-1,727.4 million roubles), Australia (-591.3 million roubles) 
and New Zealand (-346.7 million roubles) in 1990. The most significant gap in the trade 
imbalance was registered in trade with the United States.
4.4 The issues of  Military Security
High on the list of  priorities is the problem of  Asian security. It 
affects in a direct way the future of  the entire world. Therefore the Soviet
118. Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 5, 1988, p. 52-53.
119. Yu. Chumakov, 'Sovetsko-Avstralskie Torgovo-Ekonomicheskie Svyazi na Novom Etape', Vneshnyaya 
Torgovlya, 1, 1990, p. 14.
120. Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 10, 1989, p. 32.
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leadership is so persistently seeking to contribute to the start of serious and 
specific discussions of the problems of Asia-Pacific region.121
The rapid growth of economies in the Asia-Pacific region led to the recognition 
that economic development is impossible without peace and security. Gorbachev's 
approach towards this region had the long-term objective of attaining Asian security. 
Although Gorbachev referred to the possibility of an all-Asian forum which would bring 
together all Asian countries in order to improve relations and deal with issues of 
common concern, he was ultimately aiming at a collective security system for balancing 
and checking the influence of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region.
What was Gorbachev's conception of an all-Asian collective security system? On 
21 May 1985, he revived the 1969 Brezhnev proposal for an Asian collective security 
system. In his speech at a dinner in honour of the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, 
Gorbachev proposed an 'All Asian Forum' as a collective security concept for Asia:
In Asia, the problems of peace and security are today no less and, in 
some areas, even more acute and painful than in Europe. It is 
understandable, therefore, that a number o f new important and constructive 
initiatives on some aspects of the security o f the Asian continent and its 
individual regions have been put forward in recent years....Now the 
question arises: Is it not advisable, considering all these initiatives and, in 
some measure, Europe's experience, to think of a common, comprehensive 
approach to the problem of security in Asia and of a possible pooling o f 
efforts by Asian states in this direction? Of course, the way to this is 
complicated. But the road to Helsinki was not smooth or even either. Here 
various methods are evidently possible-bilateral talks and multilateral 
consultations-up to holding an all-Asian forum for an exchange of opinions 
and as joint search for constructive solution at some point in the future.122
After this speech Gorbachev repeatedly referred to the idea of a common and 
comprehensive approach to Asian security. The Soviet government statement on the 
Asia-Pacific Region of 23 April 1986 indicated:
The Soviet Union proposes, through bilateral and multilateral 
consultations, to work for the resolution o f disputed issues, for better
121. Pravda, 28 September 1988, p. 2.
122. Izvestiya, 22 May 1985, p. 2.
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mutual understanding and for building confidence, and thereby to create 
prerequisites for the holding of an all-Asian forum to conduct joint searches 
for constructive solutions.123
On 27 July 1986, Gorbachev set out the Soviet Union's ideas and specific 
proposals concerning a workable process for building up international security and 
peaceful cooperation in the Asian and Pacific region in his Vladivostok speech:
Our views about security in the Asia-Pacific region did not come out 
o f thin air....Nowadays, we have witnessed the efforts o f a number of states 
to solve in practice common economic problems and the attempts somehow 
to regulate conflicts. In the activities of the ASEAN and in bilateral ties 
many positive steps have been taken. After the plan for a 'Pacific 
community' had been rejected, discussions began on the idea of a 'Pacific 
economic cooperation'....For an objective, however, we would like to 
propose a conference, in the model of the Helsinki conference, to be 
attended by all countries gravitating towards the Ocean....In summary, I 
would like to emphasize that we stand for integrating the Asia-Pacific 
region into the general process of establishing a comprehensive system of 
international security proposed at the 27th Congress of the CPSU.124
The major objective of this policy was to obtain peace, cooperation and security 
in the Asia-Pacific region. These ideas were reiterated by Gorbachev in his interview 
Wtfh M erdeka125, an Indonesian newspaper in July 1987 and later in his book 
Perestroika:
New relations in our complex world, and in such an intricate region 
as Asia and the Pacific, can be built only along the road of cooperation 
where the interests of all states are brought together....There was much 
comment when it was suggested that there be in the foreseeable future a 
Pacific conference attended by all countries gravitating towards the ocean. 
This idea was put forward as a kind of a working hypothesis as an 
invitation to discussion....It does not mean, however, that the European 
'model' can be transplanted to Asia-Pacific soil. But in our time any 
international experiment has some general, global traits.126
123. Izvestiya, 24 April 1986, p. 1.
124. Izvestiya, 29 July 1986, p. 2.
125. Izvestiya, 22 July 1987, p. 2.
126. Gorbachev, Perestroika i Novoe Myshlenie dlya Nashei Strany i dlya vsevoMira (Moscow: Politizdat, 
1988), p. 191.
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In his Krasnoyarsk speech on 16 September 1988, Gorbachev suggested a new 
package of ideas and proposals aimed at the reduction of political and military 
confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region, the development of confidence and good- 
neighbourly relations and the transformation of the region into zone of peace and 
cooperation.127
In his Beijing speech on 16 May 1989, Gorbachev said:
The region of Asia and the Pacific has not yet produced established 
negotiating structures or a mechanism for regular multilateral consultations. 
Therefore the question arises: is it not time for all interested states, acting 
with the assistance and support of the United Nations, to give an impetus to 
what could be called an all-Asian process?...But, in our view, such a task of 
cardinal importance both for Asia and for the entire world can much more 
easily be accomplished precisely through collective efforts....The Pacific is 
no longer a barrier separating Asia from America; rather, it serves as a type 
o f link. Consequently, the problem of security in Asia is an integral part o f 
universal, global security.128
Here Gorbachev meant that there would be no military role for organizations 
such as NATO and WTO in the Asia-Pacific area. In this region, all countries had to 
construct a mechanism for an all-Asian security.
Shevardnadze delivered a major policy speech on Asia in Vladivostok on 4 
September 1990. He said the Soviet Union wanted to become a bridge of'security and 
stability' between Asia and Europe, and called for the creation of regional structures to 
deal with the problems of the Asia-Pacific region.129 He proposed that the foreign 
ministers o f all Asia-Pacific countries should meet in a regional security conference by 
1993 which could lead to a 'pan-Asian summit meeting'.130 Shevardnadze's proposal for 
the idea of'all Asian formum' was regarded as an attempt to realize Gorbachev's
127. Izvestiya, 18 September 1988, pp. 1-3.
128. Pravda, 17 May 1989, p. 2.
129. Shevardnadze, The Asia-Pacific Region - Dialogue, Peace, Cooperation', International Affairs 
(Moscow), November 1990, p. 127.
130. Ibid., p. 133.
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approach (expressed in the idea of a 'Helsinki-type all Asian Security conference' in his 
Vladivostok address of July 1986, an all-Asian security and cooperation conference 
proposed in the Krasyanorsk address of September 1988 and an 'all-Asian process' 
suggested in the Beijing address of May 1989) in a more flexible manner.
On 4 April 1991, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor A. Rogachev (now 
Russian embassador in China) stressed the 'urgent need' for establishing a 'viable 
negotiating mechanism' to discuss a new system of security relations among countries in 
Asia and the Pacific. At the 47th session of the U.N. Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia and the Pacific(ESCAP), he said that the Soviet Union was prepared to search 
for and try specific 'Asian' or 'Pacific' methods of dealing with security issues. Rogachev 
said that 'building upon the Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk platform, as well as on 
Mikhail Gorbachev's idea that in the future it would be logical for Europe, Asia and the 
Pacific to come together to form a single Eurasian space o f security and cooperation, 
proposals have been advanced for adopting confidence-building measures in the military 
field, establishing a regional conflict prevention centre, convening a conference of states 
possessing large military potentials, holding a meeting o f the foreign ministers of the 
countries o f Asia and the Pacific, and some others.'131
In April 1991, in his the Japanese parliament speech, Gorbachev proposed 'a 
five-sided conference' for consultations, joint identification and discussion of common 
problems in the Asia-Pacific region:
In this sense we are talking about the expediency of beginning a five­
sided conference involving the USSR, the United States, the PRC, India 
and Japan. It is precisely this meaning that we attach to our proposal to 
hold a meeting o f foreign ministers o f all countries of the Asia-Pacific 
region in 1993.132
Gorbachev also suggested a new relationship with Japan and a trilateral 
conference with Japan and the United States to 'remove suspicions and build confidence
131. The Korea Herald, 5 April 1991, p. 2.
132. Izvestiya, 17 April 1991, p. 5.
118
through concrete agreement'. He put forward the idea of a Soviet-Japanese security 
conference and a zone of co-operation in northeast Asia around the Japan Sea.133
It is clear from the above that Gorbachev proposed a series of security initiatives, 
such as an Asian version of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) and controls on superpower naval forces, to solve many of the outstanding 
Asian issues that had remained after Brezhnev's earlier proposal. This comprehensive 
international security system marked a new stage in the evolution of the concept of 
security achieved through 'the new political thinking.' The Soviet proposals showed that 
the Soviet government was devoted to enhancing peace and better understanding in the 
region. The Soviet Union believed that while there were no politico-military alliances in 
the APR, there was a need to think how to ensure - by the combined efforts of all the 
states located there - regional security as part of the comprehensive system of
133. On 19 November 1992, while addressing the Korean National Assembly for the first time as Russia's 
head of state, the Russian president Yeltsin proposed multilateral security consulations among countries in 
Northeast Asia as a preliminary step for formation of a regional security consultative body in Asia and the 
Pacific. He also called for creation of a body for mediating international military disputes and a centre for 
regional strategic research in the region. The Korea Herald, 20 November 1992, p. 2.
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international security.134 But it was widely dismissed as having little relevance to very 
different Asian conditions.
4 .4 .1  S i n o - S o v i e t  R e l a t i o n s 135
Boundary disputes
The Gorbachev leadership enjoyed more success in its policy toward China. Both 
sides had boundary problems. With regard to the long-standing dispute over the 
demarcation of the Sino-Soviet border along the Amur and Ussuri rivers, Gorbachev 
acknowledged for the first time in his Vladivostok speech that the official boundary 
would be 'the main channel of the river.'136 This approach was based on the mutual 
acceptability of the balance of interests, and was manifested by the Soviet Union in the
134. M oscow  News, no. 4, 1989, p. 6; on the view of the United States about a collective security system in 
Asia. The United States sees no need for a multilateral security structure in Asia given the lack of a major 
security threat and America's continued military presence in the region. Richard Solomon, then the assistant 
secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, said the United States felt there was no "impulse" or 
"rationale" for Asian nations to establish a multi-lateral security system similar to the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe. "The only reason you had successful security structures in Europe was that there 
was a very clearly defined threat," Solomon said. "You have not had that kind of a situation in the Asia- 
Pacific region." See Korea Herald, 17 April 1992, p. 2.; Asian collective security was anathema to the 
cautious Bush administration, but the Clinton hands have proved more receptive. Winston Lord, new U.S. 
assitant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said at a confirmation hearing before the East 
Asia-Pacific panel of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "Asia is not Europe. We do not envisage a 
formal structure for the region like the CSCE. We will heed the ideas of others, such as Japan, Australia and 
ASEAN, which have been particularly fertile in this domain. Together we can explore new Asia-Pacific paths 
toward security." See, Winston Lord, 'It is time for America to help build a new Pacific Community', 
International Herald Tribune, 9 April 1993, p. 6. They have already endorsed the regional security 
discussions held under the auspices of the six-member Association of South East Asian Nations. Japan, South 
Korea, Australia, New Zealand and the United States are formal ASEAN "dialogue partners." But that still 
leaves East Asian military powers like Russsia, China, Vietnam and Taiwan excluded. China's flouting of 
proliferation rules and Taiwan's peculiar diplomatic status might argue for proceeding without them, at least 
initially. But Russia surely belongs in any post-Cold War Asian security system, as its role in the Korean 
crisis demonstrates. And now that it is cooperating with its neighbours over Cambodia, so might Vietnam.
See International Herald Tribune, 20-21 March 1993, p. 4; Kissinger said 'Once America has redesigned its 
relations with China and Japan, it will be able to go beyond a set of bilateral relationships and enable the 
nations of Asia to communicate with each other in some larger framework. In the long run, an Asian Security 
Conference including Russia and the United States could be an important first step in that direction'. See 
Henry Kissinger, 'America in Asia: Don't Disengage and Do Consult’, International Herald Tribune, 14 June 
1993, p. 5.
135. For detailed on Sino-Soviet Relationship( 1945-1990), see M. L. Titarenko, ed., 40 Let KNR (Moscow: 
Nauka, 1989), pp. 110-124; Lowell Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications, 
1945-1990 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992).
136. Izvestiya, 29 July 1986, p. 2.
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course of border negotiations with China. When Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met 
the then PRC Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian in New York on 25 September 1986, they 
agreed to resume Sino-Soviet border talks at the vice foreign minister level. With this 
shift, the PRC at last became engaged once more with the Soviet Union in bilateral 
negotiations affecting a concrete security issue.137
After an interruption of more than eight years, China and the Soviet Union 
resumed border talks in February 1987. The talks were initially conducted in Moscow 
by the vice foreign ministers. When the talks began, the then Chinese Vice Foreign 
Minister Qian Qichen made a public statement calling for a comprehensive and 
equitable overall settlement, but conspicuously omitted two demands: first, that the 
Soviets acknowledge that much of their holdings in the Far East were acquired through 
'unjust treaties' imposed on China by the Tsars;138 and second that prior to a new 
adjudication of the border, the Soviet Union agree to a preliminary withdrawal o f the 
armed forces of both sides from all those regions which China chose to identify as being 
in dispute. The jettisoning of these propaganda demands,139 which Mao had known 
would never be accepted by the Soviet Union, was a reflection of the new Chinese 
belief that a deal with Gorbachev over the border was not only possible but also 
desirable.
A second round of Sino-Soviet talks held in August 1987 in Beijing resulted in an 
agreement to set up a working group of experts to consider where the border would
137. Izvestiya, 26 September 1986, p. 5.
138. Since 1969, the Chinese have always made it clear that they do not claim any of the territory gained by 
the USSR through these 'unjust treaties', but only those additional areas which they say were illegally 
occupied by Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union in violation of the treaties. Nevertheless, the tradetional 
Chinese demand that the Soviet Union acknowledge that the treaties were in fact unjust — as an added 
prerequisite for any border settlement — had imposed a political precondition which effectively blocked 
movement toward a settlement.
139. The PRC had evidently been preparing for this change in negotiating position for some time. In the last 
previous official Chinese statement regarding the border dispute both of these demands were omitted by Zhao. 
Ever since then, the Chinese had avoided discussing the subject publicly.
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run throughout the length of the eastern part.140 The study groups met three times in 
1988, alternating between the two capitals, and were able to reach agreement on most 
of the eastern part during their third meeting, in October 1988 in Moscow.141
By late 1988, the Chinese attitude regarding the future of the border talks was 
conditioned by newly accumulating evidence that Gorbachev had indeed begun to 
retreat from some of the military deployments around the Soviet periphery undertaken 
by Brezhnev and long objected to by the Soviet Union's neighbours. In May 1989, in a 
Sino-Soviet joint communique, both sides agreed to solve the remaining border issues 
between the Soviet Union and China fairly and rationally, on the basis of the treaties on 
the present Sino-Soviet border. They agreed to intensify their efforts to work out 
mutually acceptable solutions regarding the eastern and western parts o f the border 
simultaneously.142 Most significant, both sides showed a 'willingness to make progress'. 
Gorbachev also exthibited political flexibility.
On 13 February the Russian Supreme Soviet ratified the agreement between the 
USSR and China concerning the eastern section of the two states border that had been 
signed in May 1991. The debate focused on the fate of islands in the waterways along 
the border, a matter of considerable historical importance to both countries. Russian 
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev said that of the 1,845 islands, more than half (in terms 
of both number and area) belonged to Russia. He noted that two islands in the region of 
Khabaroskaya and Argun were still a matter of dispute, ITAR-TASS reported on 13 
February 1992.143
Delegation from China and the Russian Federation spent a full four weeks in talks
140. Izvestiya, 22 August 1987, p. 4.
141. China Daily, 1 November 1988.
142. Izvestiya, 19 May 1989, p. 1.
143. RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 9, 28 February 1992, pp. 76-77.
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aimed at a reduction of military forces on the border and an increase in mutual trust.144 
The talks were held from 21 March to 16 April 1992 in Beijing. It was the sixth time 
the two sides had met.145 In 1991 a treaty was negotiated and signed before the 
breakup of the Soviet Union. It affected portions of the border now part o f Russia. 
Rogachev, the newly appointed Russian Ambassador, disclosed that a Sino-Soviet 
agreement on the east section of the borders, except for one place near Boli 
(Khabarovsk) and another on the Ergune River, has been reached and approved by the 
Chinese National People's Congress and the Russian congress. He said that the west 
section of the former Sino-Soviet boundary is now shared by China and three more 
republics of Kazakhstan, Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan, in addition to Russia. Rogachev 
believes that it will be more convenient for the four republics to talk in concert with the 
Chinese side.146
In June 1993, the 10th round of talks to reduce the military presence on borders 
between China and Kazakhstan, Kirghistan, the Russian federation and Tadzhikistan 
was held in Beijing. They discussed ways to increase understanding in the military area. 
They continued exchanging views on issues concerned and the talks made some new 
progress. Both sides agreed that the next round of talks would be held in Moscow, 
according to Chinese Foreign Ministry sources.147
Yeltsin and his Chinese counterpart Yang Shangkun signed the joint declaration 
on the basic principles governing bilateral relations in Beijing on 18 December 1992.
On the issue o f the boundaries, the two sides agreed that negotiations needed to be 
continued for a fair and reasonable solution to the unsettled boundary disputes between
144. On 3 March 1992, Radio Moscow reported that Russia had agreed to withdraw 4,000 tanks and artillery 
pieces from the Chinese-Russian border region. RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 11, 13 March 1992, p.
51.
145. China Daily, 17 April 1992, p. 1.
146. Beijing Review, 20-26 April 1992, p. 8.
147. China Daily, 12 June 1993, p. 1.
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the two countries.148 Questions over the ownership of the Heixiazi islands and some 
other territories remain unsettled, but the two sides have agreed to carry on 
negotiations on these subjects.149
Proceeding from the results of the former Sino-Soviet border talks, China 
continued such talks with Russia on the mutual reduction of armed forces in border 
areas. Borders between China and Russia in most sectors have already been determined
by boundary agreements. The border negotiations with China are still in progress.
4 .4 .2  T h e  S o u t h e r n  K u r i le s  I ssue  with  Jap an
The Southern Kuriles dispute150 stems from the Yalta Agreement which assigned 
'the Kuril Islands' to the Soviet Union. The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty 
renounced all claims to 'the Kurils' without precisely defining their geography.151 In 
1956 in a Japanese-Soviet joint statement152 on the occupied islands it was agreed that 
'Habomai' and 'Shikotan' should be handed over to Japan on the conclusion of a Japan- 
Soviet peace treaty.
However, the Soviet Union maintained that Japan renounced her claims to all 
four islands in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which was based on the Yalta 
Agreement. Japan countered that the Soviet Union was not entitled to quote the San 
Francisco Treaty, which it had not signed. In 1956, instead of a formal peace treaty, the
148. China Daily, 19 December 1992, p. 1.
149. China Daily, 18 December 1992, p. 1.
150. For details about the Kurils' dispute, see David Rees, The Soviet Seizure o f the Kurils' (New York: 
Praeger, 1985); George Ginsburgs, 'The Territorial Question between the USSR and Japan: The Soviet Case 
and a Western Apercu', Korea and World Affairs, vol. no. (Summer 1991), pp. 259-278; for further detailed 
tenritorial issues during Gorbachev and Yeltsin governments, see Vladimir Eremin, Rossiya-Yaponiya 
TerritoriaTnaya Problema: Poisk Resheniya (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Respublika", 1992); on policy changes 
after Yeltsin, see Hiroshi Kimura, 'Japanese-Russian Relations: Issues and Future Perspectives', in Trevor 
Taylor, ed., The Collapse o f the Soviet Empire: Managing the Regional Fall-out (London: Antony Rowe for 
Royal Institure of International Affairs, 1992), pp. 79-89.
151. A full discussion of the historical background, see Izvestiya, 12 May 1992, p. 6.
152. See, John J. Stephan, The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1974), p. 247.
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two countries finally exchanged diplomatic recognition. Since that time the Japanese 
government has held that only the territorial issue stands in the way of a peace treaty.
Soviet leaders had always been sensitive to the border question and made 
recognition of their existing post-war borders a condition of the 1975 Helsinki 
agreement. In the past, the Soviet side insisted that the territorial issue did not exist. 
This was the usual language of any formal Soviet response to Japan's reference to the 
territorial issue, although it sometimes alternated with the more conciliatory stance that 
some 'difficult problems' remained between the two nations. Under Gorbachev, the 
change in the Soviet approach was total: 'the territorial issue exists' and 'the issue must 
be settled.'
Under Gorbachev the discussion of the territorial issue came to the surface within 
Soviet political circles. Discussions raised such possibilities as the development o f joint 
enterprises on the Kuril Islands, the creation of joint sovereignty or joint administration 
over them, and the return of two or even of all four of the islands.
In September 1989, Georgii Arbatov, the director of Institute of USA and 
Canada, pursued a conservative approach in Japan. He argued that the two states 
should emphasize economic ties and temporarily shelve the territorial issue, pending 
progress. He explicitly recognized the problem that any compromise on these territories 
could be invoked in the case of other disputed borders.153
In October 1989, historian Yury Afanasyev speaking in Japan, said in Japan that 
the Soviet government had an unconstructive approach in not wanting to improve 
Japanese-Soviet relations. He advocated the return of the islands in exchange for 
generous Japanese investment and government credits.154
Mikhail Titarenko, director of the Institute for Far Eastern Affairs at the Soviet 
Academy of Science, met Takahiro Yolomichi, Governor of Hokkaido, in Moscow on 
6 June 1990. He spoke of the 'third way', outlined in Aleksandr Yakovlev's speech, i.e.,
153. Susan L. Clark, Moscow's Opening to Japan, Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, 10 January 1990, p. 10.
154. Pravda, 20 October 1989, p. 7.
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a multi-stage solution. He suggested four stages. First, Japan should withdraw its 
demand of the return of all four islands. Second, the Soviet Union should quickly 
withdraw its division of troops and military installations stationed in the four northern 
islands. Third, the declaration which included a promise to hand over Habomai and 
Shikotan to Japan should be reconsidered. Finally, both sides should enact 
comprehensive measures to create mutual confidence and ease tension with each other: 
for example, arms reductions, joint exploitation of the rich marine resources 
surrounding the islands etc.155
When he visited Japan in February 1990, Boris Yeltsin put forward a private 
proposal of a long-term programme which consisted of five stages for returning the 
northern territory to Japan. According to this programme, the Soviet government 
would, first, formally declare the existence of the northern territories issue and educate 
Soviet citizens about this problem. Second, the islands should be gradually established 
as a zone of free enterprise with the recognition of Japan's special interests and free 
access to Japanese citizens over the next three to four years. Third, the islands should 
be demilitarized within another five to seven years. Fourth, both sides should conclude 
a peace treaty. Finally, the Soviet-Japanese territorial dispute should be settled by 
future generations of leaders in both countries in a changed world political climate. At 
this stage, Yeltsin said that issues surrounding the islands' status could be solved in one 
o f the following ways: joint Soviet-Japanese control; declaring the Kuriles a neutral 
zone; or transfer of the islands to Japan.156 However, Yeltsin's offer did not raise much 
interest in Japan, some rejecting it as 'insufficiently radical'. Vitalii Gulii, a progressive 
member o f the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, advocated another possible 
solution, 'a concept for joint sovereignty of the four islands'.157
155. Mainichi Shimbun, 18 June 1990; On Yakovlev's 'third way', see Tokyo Shimbun, 14 November 1989, p. 
\,Mainichi Shimbun, 3 January 1990, p. 2.
156. Tokyo Shimbun, 17 January 1990; see also Moscow News, no. 17, 21-26 September 1990, p. 4.
157. Radio Moscow, 11 November 1989, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: 
Soviet Union(FBIS-Sov), 219/89, 14 November 1989, p. 18.
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A proposal of U.N. trusteeship for the Northern Islands was made in Pravda by 
Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, a leading Moscow commentator, 'Why... not transfer the 
islands... under U.N. trusteeship by proclaiming them a special economic zone jointly 
owned by the Soviet Union and Japan?' he asked. Ovchinnikov said the 45 year 
deadlock over the islands of Etorofii, Kunashiri, Habomai and Shikotan could only be 
solved by compromise.158 This was the first sign of Soviet flexibility over the southern 
Kurile islands.
On 18 April 1991, a joint Soviet-Japanese declaration in Tokyo dealt with the 
issue o f the islands. The Soviets proposed a reduction o f the Soviet military 
presence,159 the start o f mutually profitable economic exchanges in the islands, no visa 
requirements for Japanese nationals visiting the islands and increasing exchanges 
between the Soviet residents of the islands and Japanese nationals.160
Both sides moved toward adjusting the bilateral relationship to the post-Cold 
War international environment through resolving the territorial issue. During his 
meeting with the Japanese foreign minister, Nakayama, on 14 October 1991, Soviet 
President Gorbachev indicated Moscow's policy of basing its approach to the territorial 
question on the 1956 Soviet-Japanese joint declaration in which the Soviet Union 
promised to return to Japan two of the four Soviet-held islands off Hokkaido. Russian 
Federation President Yeltsin also told Mr Nakayama that he favoured accelerating 
negotiations to conclude a peace treaty between the two nations by settling the 
territorial dispute "within this century."161 
Negative position on the issue
The territorial problem was closely linked with the internal political struggle and,
158. Pravda, 1 July 1990, p. 7.
159. As a followup to an earlier pledge by ex-Soviet President Gorbachev in April 1991, the number of 
Russian troops deployed on the four islands has already been cut by 30 percent to roughly 7,000. See, The 
Japan Times, 22 March 1992, p. 1.
160. Izvestiya, 19 April 1991, p. 1.
161. The Japan Times, 21 October 1991, p. 24.
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what is more important, with relations between Moscow and the Russian Far East.162 
Unpredictable political developments in the Soviet Union could make null and void the 
statements and commitments made by Gorbachev or by Yeltsin. There was the ever 
baffling question of who, Gorbachev or Yeltsin, or which, the Soviet centre or the 
Russian Republic, would be the final authority in handling the territorial issue.
Gorbachev was under strong pressure at home to keep the islands. First, the 
Soviet military considered a possible return of the Southern Kurils as detrimental to 
Soviet security interests.163 In April 1991, General Viktor Novozhilov, commander of 
forces in the Soviet Far East, said that the Soviet Union could no longer be defined as a 
great power if it returned the islands to Japan. Loss of the islands 'would quite simply 
mean that the Soviet fleet would be immobilized', the general said. 'We could no longer 
call ourselves a great power'.164 Second, There was strong feeling among the Russian 
population against returning the islands. In September 1991, authorities on the island of 
Sakhalin stated their opposition to any attempt to return the Kuriles to Japan.165 A 
TASS report quoted Valentin Fedorov, head of the Sakhalin Oblast Soviet Executive 
Committee, as declaring " the motherland is not sold. People must be sure of the future, 
to live without anxiety in the future."166 Sergei Baburin and Nikolai Pavlov, deputies of 
the RSFSR supreme Soviet said that "we must set out one front for territorial integrity 
of Russia", TASS reported.167 According to an opinion poll made by Sluzhba in 
November 1991, 71 per cent of Russians opposed returning the Kuril Islands to Japan,
162. New Times, no. 31, August 1992, p. 3.
163. Gennady Chufrin, 'The USSR and Asia in 1991: Domestic Priorities Prevail', Asian Survey, vol. xxxii, 
no. 1 (January 1992), p. 14.
164. International Herald Tribune, 18 April 1991, p. 1, p. 5.
165. See Stephen Foye, "The Struggle over Russia's Kuril Islands Policy", RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, 
no. 36, 11 September 1992, pp. 34-40; Kathryn Brown, "Sakhalin's Valentin Fedorov makes Nationalist 
Allies". RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 38, 25 September 1992, pp. 33-38.
166. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 12 October 1991, p. 5.
167. Ibid.
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only 14 per cent agreed them.168
Under Yeltsin it is evident that this dispute cannot be solved in a quick and 
elegant manner because of domestic political considerations.169 Yeltsin cancelled a 
planned trip to Tokyo on 13-16 September 1992. It was doomed to failure because of 
differences over a decades-old territorial dispute. Yeltsin was under heavy pressure 
from conservatives at home to resist Japanese demands to hand back the northern 
islands. Politically Yeltsin is constrained by the vested interests of the 15,000 Russian 
civilians who now live on the islands and by the views o f the armed forces, who regard 
the islands as strategically important.170 Many parliament members criticized the 
Russian Foreign Ministry for insisting on its own plan on the territorial issue, while 
giving no consideration to the others. Oleg Rumyantsev, executive secretary of 
parliament's constitution committee, said the issue was not simply a diplomatic 
question. It concerned the interests of all nationalities, he said, adding Russia should 
not make a deal on the issue.171 Russian nationalists and some lawmakers have since 
been pressuring Yeltsin not to give the islands away. Such an action, they say, would 
deprive Russia o f an important radar post and rich fishing grounds (10 per cent of 
Russia's annual fish catch). Returning the islands also would wound national pride and 
could encourage claims on Russian territory by China and the Baltic states.172 
When Prime Minister Viktor S. Chrnomyrdin visited to Iturup Island on 17
168. Sluzhba, no. 10 (November 1992), p. 1; in a same survey in August 1992, 76 per cent of Russians voted 
against the return of the four islands to Japan, 13 per cent of Russians voted for them. Ibid.; According to a 
Moscow telephone poll, only 18 per cent prepared to accept Japanese conditions on the Kuriles on the Kuriles, 
58 per cent rejected them. Izvestiya, 12 May 1992, p. 3.
169. Sergie Solodovnik, 'Stability in Asia: A priority for Russia', International Affairs (Moscow), February 
1992, p. 66.
170. Artyom Ustinov, 'Stalemate over Japan's northern territories must end', Moscow News, no. 23, 1992.
171. China Daily, 30 July 1992, p. 8.
172. At a meeting of the scholars on Japan at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, 
the possible losses were determined very precisely and far-sightedly: the loss of resources from the seas 
around the "northern territories," a shift in the military-strategic balance, and claims by other states on 
Russia's territory. See Vladimir Yeremin, 'Moscow won't have to make concessions', New Times, no. 23,
1992, p. 25.
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August 1993, he said that Russia would "never" return the four main Kuril islands to 
Japan and asserted that the dispute over them was not an issue, the Interfax news 
agency reported.173
Thus, Russia and Japan can not find a reasonable compromise on the basis o f a 
balance o f bilateral interests. For this, both sides will, to begin with, have to dismiss 
previous proposals - to return or not to return two or four islands.
4 . 4 .3  A r m s  C o n tr o l  and D is a r m a m e n t
The Soviet Union focused its efforts in the Asia-Pacific region on reducing 
military confrontation, promoting the disarmament process in Asia and political 
solutions to conflicts. Many practical steps were taken during the Gorbachev era.
In a 15 January 1986 statement Gorbachev set out a plan for ridding the world of 
nuclear weapons by the year 2000: "We see our programme as a contribution to a 
search, together with all the Asian countries, for an overall comprehensive approach to 
establishing a system of secure and lasting peace on this continent".174
On 28 July 1986, in Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech, he outlined Soviet policy in 
Asia and the Pacific for years ahead. He said that the USSR would work to scale down 
military confrontation, to reduce the risk of nuclear war, and to limit naval forces, and 
that it would promote the . settlement of regional conflicts and cooperation on an equal 
footing, regardless of affiliation to different alliances. Gorbachev favoured the 
establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the South Pacific, Southeast Asia and 
the Korean Peninisula.175
As a result o f reflections and an additional analysis and striving to further the 
cause o f all-Asian security, Gorbachev made a 7-point proposal during his Krasnoyarsk 
speech: the freezing of the number of nuclear weapons in North Asia; the holding o f a
173. International Herald Tribune, 18 August 1993, p. 2.
174. Izvestiya, 16 January 1986, p. 1.
175. Pravda, 29 July 1986, p. 2.
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conference with invitations to all naval powers in the region to discuss a freeze on the 
expansion of naval forces; the holding of multilateral negotiations among concerned 
nations on lessening military confrontations in North East Asia; the withdrawal of 
Soviet forces from Cam Ranh Bay but on the condition that the U.S. naval based be 
removed from the Philippines; the discussion of effective measures to prevent 
accidental incidents from taking place on the high seas and in the airspace in the region; 
the convening of an international conference to eastablish a peace zone in the Indian 
Ocean; the establishment of a cooperative body to discuss the above and other related 
questions.176 Gorbachev's proposal was aimed at diminishing U.S. influence in the Asia- 
Pacific region and the same time at preventing the expansion of Japan-U.S. military 
cooperation.177
In a his speech at the Sino-Soviet summit, Gorbachev detailed how the 200,000 
reduction of troops in Soviet Asia was to be accomplished: the ground forces in the Far 
East to be reduced by 12 divisions, 11 air regiments to be disbanded, and sixteen large 
warships to be withdrawn from the Soviet Pacific Fleet.178 Soviet troops were 
withdrawn from the Mongolian People's Republic on 27 September 1992. In 1992 the 
removal of material was completed which signified an end to 25 years of Soviet military 
presence in Mongolia.179 They also reduced the use of Vietnamese Cam Ranh Bay by 
the Soviet Navy, including the withdrawal of MIG-23 fighters and TU-16 bombers
176. Izvestiya, 18 September 1988, p. 2.
177. See Donald S. Zagoria, 'Soviet Policy in East Asia, A New Beginning?', Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, no. 1 
(1988/89), pp. 120-138.
178. Pravda, 18 May 1989, p. 1.
179. On 19 October 1992, after the sign of an agreement on bilateral relations and cooperation in Moscow, the 
Mongolian foreign and cooperation in Moscow, the Mongolian foreign minister said that the withdrawal of 
Russian troops from Mongolia did not signify an end to military cooperation with Moscow and called for 
these relations to be expanded. See RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 43 (October 1992), pp. 60-61; But 
Mongolia is refusing to allow Russia to retain any of the former Soviet Union's military bases in its territory. 
See Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 December 1992, p. 8.
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from Cam Ranh Bay which used to overfly the DPRK air space on their missions.180
Since the implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Arms Reduction 
Treaty in 1990, more than 16,000 tanks, 16,000 armoured fighting vehicles and 25,000 
artillery pieces have been transferred east of the Urals. Russian officials say 50 per cent 
of the armour, mostly modern T72 and T80 tanks, was used to re-equip military units 
in central Asia and the Far East, while the last has been mothballed.181
Nothing that Soviet military capabilities in the Far East and the Western Pacific 
have been upgraded - not reduced - over the past decade, Japan's military establishment 
argued strenuously that the strategic change from 'confrontation to cooperation' 
between East and West was a phenomenon primarily limited to Central Europe and that 
the Soviet Union under Gorbachev remained a serious military threat.182 Furthermore 
the strategic environment here did not fundamentally change during the Gorbachev 
era.183
AJthough the Asian military deployments inherited from the past had not been 
significantly altered, it was clear that there was, as never before in the postwar era, an 
opportunity for a general reduction of the armed confrontation between the Soviet 
Union and the U.S. alliance system in Northeast Asia. However, arms reduction and 
control have just started in the Asia-Pacific region.184 The two major military powers
180. Gennady Chufrin, 'Soviet policy on peace and security in Asia Pacific', a paper presented to the 1st 
Conference on Korean and Soviet Studies in the Soviet Union and Korea, Seoul, 13-14 May 1991, p. 2.
181. Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 November 1992, p. 28.
182. The Soviet military forces in the Far East introduced modem equipment, such as the Kiev-class air- 
carrier, Backfire bombers, Delta-III-class nuclear-powered strategic submarines, Ivan Logov-class 
amphibious ships, and SS-20 missiles (subsequently destroyed under the INF Treaty). Previously, such 
equipment had never been seen in the Far East theatre. Also, for the first time in its history, the Soviet Union 
established a headquarters for the command and control of all its units in the Far East. The last Soviet build­
up was right at the start of the 1990s. Since then, Moscow has scrapped some equipment (most of which was 
obsolete) but continued to deploy more modem equipment in the Far East, though Russian activities overall 
have been relatively low-key. See Satoshi Morimoto, 'Security Implications for Asia and Japan', in Taylor, ed., 
The Collapse o f  the Soviet Empire: Managing the Regional Fall-Out, p. 142.
183. Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 August 1991, p. 12.
184. On Russian military deployment in Asia, see Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 November 1992, pp. 26-
28.
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still possess nuclear weapons and sophisticated conventional arms. They have 
maintained a strong military presence in the Asia-Pacific region.185
After the end of Cold War, although politically restructured and economically 
weakened, the former Soviet Union, or even Russia alone, is still a military superpower 
with security goals. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War reduced but did not 
eliminate the role of military force.186 For example, military spending and the arms trade 
are booming in the Asia-Pacific region.187 Now Asia is facing a new era of uncertainty 
and the build-up of armies.
185. In August 1992, Japan estimated Russian troop strength east of Lake Baikal in Siberia at about 320,000. 
In the annual Foreign Ministry Diplomatic Blue Book released in Tokyo in April 1993, Japan said the 
continued presence of powerful Russian armed forces in East Asia were "a factor of instability concerning the 
security of the region." International Herald Tribune, 15 April 1993, p. 6.
186. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Chcmging Nature o f American Power (New York: Basic Books, 
1991), p. xiv.
187. East Asian nations made 35 percent of all major weapons purchases in 1991. See International Herald 
Tribune, 19 March 1993, p. 6. On recent Asia's arms race, see Far Eastern Economic Review, 24-31 
December 1992, p. 20; The Economist, 20 Feburary 1993, pp. 21-24; Leslie H. Gelb, 'Arms: East Asia's 
Colossal Shopping Spree', International Herald Tribune, 19 March 1993, p. 6; Michael Richardson, 'Arms 
Race Feared in East Asia if U.S. Leaves Too Quickly', International Herald Tribune, 10-11 April 1993, p. 5; 
Michael T. Klare, The Next Great Arms Race', Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 136-152.
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Chapter  5. The Soviet  Union and The Korean Peninsula
5.1 Russia-Korean Relations (1860-1917)
Russia was to be mistress of China, owner of Manchuria, dictator of 
Korea and patron of Japan.1
5 .1 .1  R u s s i a - K o r e a n  R e la t io n s  ( 1 8 6 0 -1 9 1 7 )
Russia's policies regarding the Korean peninsula were based on expansionism. 
Russia aimed at colonializing the region. At that time the Korean monarch lacked the 
capability to cope effectively with the threat from outside and the people there were not 
yet equipped with a nationalist consciousness. Russia's intention to dominate the 
peninsula was confronted by a similar intention by the Japanese imperialists who later 
became the rulers of the peninsula.
When China was weak in the mid-19th century, Russia annexed a large section of 
Chinese territory on the Pacific coast as far south as the border with Korea, near to 
which it built its main Pacific naval base and the port at Vladivostok. Subsequently, 
Russia's Far East policy concentrated on obtaining ice-free ports in the south, that is, 
the Korean peninsula. In 1865, an armada of Russian warships was spotted ofFNorth 
Hamgyong. The Russian sailors surveyed the Korean topography and demanded trade 
with the Choson Kingdom. The Far East Asian region at the time was an arena of 
multinational confrontation involving Great Britain, France and the United States. In 
the early 1870s, greater forces were making for the opening o f the country. The Korean 
Government was seriously alarmed by the advance of Russia to the north, and by the 
fact that General Ignatieff s brilliant statesmanship had secured the Usuri provinces for
1. F. A. Mckenzie, The Tragedy o f Korea (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1908), p. 89.
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Russia.2
In the 1880s a new international crisis was developing in Korea out of the rivalry 
for influence among various Korean factions within Korea and between China and 
Japan from outside.3
In Seoul, formal diplomatic relations and a Korean-Russian treaty of commerce 
were concluded on 7 July 1884.4 This was in part the product of a German maneuver to 
induce Russia to come out of its shell and into the Far East region, and in part the result 
o f the Korean monarch's policy favouring the presence of Russia on the peninsula as a 
deterrent to Chinese expansion.5
In an effort to lessen Chinese intervention, the Korean monarch made a vigorous 
approach to Russia which in August 1888 resulted in the conclusion of a "treaty for 
land route trade" between the two countries. The conclusion of the treaty did not 
necessarily result in the development of economic relations between the two countries.6 
It was virtually aimed at enhancing Russian prestige on the peninsula, thus enabling the 
Russians to expand their role in eliminating the Chinese influence. However, the 
Russians lacked the capabilities to respond positively to the requests of the Korean 
monarch. Tsarist Russia was not in a position to get deeply involved in Far Eastern 
politics in the 1870s and 1880s. Moreover, Russia was too handicapped by the 
underdeveloped condition of Siberia, above all by the poor transportation system, to 
undertake an expansionist policy in the Far East, where serious resistance was
2. F. A. McKenzie, The Tragedy o f Korea, p. 11.
3. James William Morley, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy 1868-1941: A Research Guide (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1974), p.350.
4. See B. D. Pak, Rossiya i Koreya (Moscow, 1979), pp. 58-60.
5. Mun-hyong Choi, 'The Background and Process of South Korea-Russian Diplomatic Relations,' in 100 
Year History o f South Korean-Russian Relations (Seoul: Koreans History Research Association, 1984), p. 
67.
6. Kye-sun Im, 'A Secret Agreement Between Korea and Russia (1884-1894)', ibid., p. 118.
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envisaged.7
Then, Russia came more and more to the front in Korea. Russia was making her 
way eastwards. The Trans-Siberian Railway was pushed forward to the Pacific. From 
the moment that the decision to develop the Trans-Siberian Railway was taken, Russian 
statesmen convinced themselves of the possibility of territorial domination on the 
Pacific Coast.8 Russian agents were most active in every Asian Court. In Seoul, in 
particular, the Russians adopted a bold and aggressive policy.9
The Russian Minister, M. Waeber, intervened. On 9 February 1886, his Legation 
guard was increased to 160 men. Two days later the Europeans in Seoul were aroused 
by the intelligence that the Korean King Kojong had escaped from his gaolers at the 
palace on 11 February 1896, and had taken refuge with the Russians. The King and his 
son arrived at the Russian Legation very much agitated. They were expected, and were 
at once admitted.10 During the period between February 11, 1896 and February 21,
1897, when Kojong resided at the Russian legation, Russia's influence grew rapidly as
the conservatives gained strength.11 The Korean government sought close ties with 
Russia. A Russian-language school was opened by the Korean Government in April 
1896, mining and timber concessions were granted to Russians, Colonel Potiata and a 
number of Russian officers and men were employed to reorganise and drill the Korean 
troops, and Russia's financial and political influence was supreme.12
A cordial relationship,between Korea and Russia, and Korean dependence on 
Russian advice and assistance, was carefully cultivated by the able diplomat Waeber, 
and such a relationship lasted even after the king left the Russian legation and moved to
7. Morley, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy 1868-1941, p. 349.
8. McKenzie, The Tragedy o f Korea, p. 89.
9. McKenzie, The Tragedy o f  Korea, p. 55.
10. McKenzie, The Tragedy o f  Korea, pp. 77-78.
11. Andrew C. Nahm, Korea: Tradition & Transformation (Seoul: Hollym, 1989), pp. 185-186.
12. McKenzie, The Tragedy o f Korea, p. 92.
136
the Kyong-un Palace.13 The action of Waeber in giving shelter to the King was in 
keeping with the new aggressive policy of the Russian Government in the Far East.14
The ascendance of Russian influence in Korea that followed King Kojong's flight 
to the Russian legation led the Japanese to seek an understanding with the Russians.15 
Japan turned to diplomacy. In the summer of 1896 two remarkable agreements were 
drawn up between the respective Governments: the first signed by M. Waeber and 
Baron Komura at Seoul on 14 May 1896, and the second by Marshal Yamagata and 
Russian Foreign Minister Lobanov at St Petersburg on 9 June 1896. Under the first of 
these, the powers mutually consented to advise the Korean Emperor to return to his 
own palace, and Japan promised to take effective measures for the control of Japanese 
guards, although three companies then stationed in Korea were to remain for a time in 
order to protect o f the Japanese telegraph line from Pusan to Seoul. The Russian 
guards were not to be more numerous than those of Japan.16 In the Lobanof-Yamagata 
agreement Japan and Russia promised to afford their assistance to Korea, if necessary, 
for foreign loans; to leave to the native Government, as soon as possible, the formation 
and upkeep o f a national army and police sufficient to maintain internal peace; and to 
retain the telegraph lines in Japanese hands. Russia reserved the right to build a 
telegraph line from Seoul to her own frontier.17 This agreement left unsettled the 
question o f military instructors for training a Korean army as well as the question o f the 
Korean government's employment of foreign advisers.18
Unfortunately for Russia, the prudent and statesmanlike policy o f M. Waeber did
13. Nahm, Korea: Tradition & Transformation, p. 190.
14. MaKenzie, The Tragedy o f Korea, p. 89.
15. Nahm, Korea: Tradition & Transformation, p. 186.
16. C. I. Eugene Kim and Han-Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics o f Imperialism 1876-1910 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1967), p. 90.
17. McKenzie, The Tragedy o f  Korea, pp. 91-92; Eugene Kim and Kim, Korea and the Politics o f  
Imperialism 1876-1910, p. 91.
18. Nahm, Korea: Tradition & Transformation, p. 188.
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not meet with the approval of his official superiors, and in September 1897, M. de 
Speyer succeeded him as Charge d'Affaires. The change was received with universal 
regret by all foreigners in Korea. M. Waeber had done splendidly. He had been a real 
influence for good throughout the country and, even from an exclusively Russian point 
of view, his cautious policy had gained for his Government more credit and influence 
than any other course o f action could have done. Speyer plainly had orders to quicken 
the pace, and did so. He assumed a most aggressive and unpleasant attitude towards 
other foreigners, and this quickly brought matters to a crisis, and caused his downfall.
A Russian Financial Adviser, Mr. Kerr Alexieff, agent of the Russian Finance 
Minister, arrived in Seoul on 5 October 1897. On the 25th of the same month, the 
Department of Foreign Affairs appointed him as successor to Mr. McLeavy Brown, an 
experienced member of the Chinese Customs, who was delegated to manage the 
Korean service.19
In 1898, the leasing by China to Russia of the Liaotung Peninsula was 
announced. This step ended all hopes of a Japanese-Russian alliance, and it made it no 
longer necessary for Russia to maintain such a hold on Korea. About the same time that 
Russia secured Port Arthur, she entered into a fresh treaty with Japan about Korea. She 
could afford to be generous, and she was. Both Powers pledged themselves to 
recognize the entire independence o f Korea, and both agreed not to take any steps for 
the nomination of military instructors or financial advisers without having come 
previously to a mutual agreement. Russia recognised the supremacy of Japanese 
enterprise in Korea, and promised not to impede the development of Japanese 
commercial and industrial policy there.20 On 15 January 1898 the Russian Minister to
Japan, Roman R. Rosen, met the Japanese Foreign Minister, Nishi Tokujiro, and told
him that Russia was prepared to assist Japan, as far as possible, in her commercial and 
industrial interests in Korea. Nishi remarked that it was difficult to reach a satisfactory
19. McKenzie, The Tragedy o f Korea, p. 94.
20. McKenzie, The Tragedy o f Korea, p. 95.
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understanding with Russia "unless Russia was ready to abandon her position on the 
subject o f the drilling of the army and the engagement of a Financial Adviser" in Korea. 
It was at this time that Nishi proposed Russia's recognition of the "preponderance" o f 
Japanese interests in Korea, and introduced a scheme to exchange Korea for Manchuria 
- or the so-called Mankan kokan idea in which Russia recongnized Korea as within the 
Japanese sphere of influence in return for Japan's recognition of Manchuria as falling 
within the Russian sphere of influence. Nishi did not succeed in establishing the 
Mankan kokan ("Manchuria for Korea") understanding, but recognizing the recent 
attitudes o f the Russian government, i.e., the "desire to conciliate us in order to make 
an enemy less," he carried out negotiations, and brought about the Nishi-Rosen 
Protocol o f April 25, 1898.21
The news of this agreement and the fact that the Russian military instructors and 
financial adviser were withdrawn from Seoul came as an overwhelming surprise to 
Europe. "The Convention simply registers the victory of Japan in the long diplomatic 
duel she has been fighting with Russia over Korea since the peace with China," 
proclaimed the Times.22 The Russian Official Messenger tried to put the best face it 
could on the matter, but it was not very successful.23 By this time, Russia's influence in 
Korea dwindled conspicuously. Japan and Russia managed to maintain an uneasy 
"peaceful coexistence" in Korea until the end of the 19th century.
After occupying Manchuria in January 1901, Russia proposed to Japan "a scheme 
for the neutralization of Korea under the joint guarantee o f the Powers". The official
21. Nahm, Korea: Tradition & Transformation, pp. 194-195. In it, it was agreed that: 1) both Japan and 
Russia "definitively recognize the sovereignty and entire independence of Korea, and mutually engage to 
refrain from all direct interference in the internal affairs of that country"; 2) desiring to avoid every possible 
cause of misundrstanding in the future, the governments of Russia and Japan would not "take any measure in 
the nomination of military instructors and financial advisers, without having previously come to a mutual 
agreement on the subject"; and 3) Russia would "not impede the development of the commercial and 
industrial relations between Japan and Korea". It is significant to note that such an understanding was 
established only after the withdrawal from Korea of Russian military instructors and a financial adviser and 
only after Russian leased the Liaotung peninsula on 27 March 1898.
22. McKenzie, The Tragedy o f  Korea, p. 95.
23. McKenzie, The Tragedy o f  Korea, p. 95.
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Russian position was that Russia could not renounce its interest in Korea altogether and 
that Manchuria could not be considered as a quid pro quo for Korea. 24 Japan turned 
down the proposal because from her point of view, the Russian occupation of 
Manchuria made Korean independence illusory just as Japan's leasing o f the Liaotung 
peninsula in 1895 had been regarded by the Russians as a threat to Korea. The Japanese 
continued to seek a free hand in Korea and to secure Russian recognition of their 
"preponderant" position in the peninsula. Thus the plan to exchange "Manchuria for 
Korea", the so-called Mankan kokan idea, was reintroduced.25
As time went on it became more and more clear that the struggle between Russia 
and Japan over Korea had not yet ended. From 1896 to 1897, Russia pursued an active 
policy toward Korea and she gained an advantage over Japan. However, in the early 
part o f 1898, Russia began to yield to Japan in order to placate Japan over Russia's 
lease o f the Liaotung peninsula. Thus, in 1902, the Russian Minister told the Foreign 
Office that as Korea had granted Japan the right to lay telegraph cables along her 
shores, Russia would expect to receive permission to connect the Korean telegraphs in 
the north with the Siberian system at Vladivostock. Russia obtained a timber 
concession on the River Yalu, and laid telegraph wires and built up a Russian station at 
Masampo on the Korean side o f the river. This station was practically a cavalry depot, 
and was occupied, despite protests, by Russian troops.26
The year 1903 found Korea at the centre of a very interesting situation. Russia 
had aroused serious alarm, especially among British and American people, by her 
determined policy in the Far East. She had practically seized Manchuria, although she 
did not attempt, outside the Liaotung Peninsula, to interfere with local administration. 
Her forces were steadily, and apparently irretrievably, advancing upon Korea itself, and
24. Eugene Kim and Han-kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics o f Imperialism 1876-1910, p. 99.
25. Nahm, Korea: Tradition & Transformation, pp. 201-202.
26. McKenzie, The Tragedy o f Korea, p. 103.
140
it seemed only a matter of time before at least Northern Korea must become Russian.27
Russia was for exclusive trading privileges in Korea. The Koreans of the north, at 
least, were well aware that they could obtain in the Russian Usuri provinces easy 
conditions of living, fair administration, and justice. The condition of the Koreans in 
Eastern Siberia, prosperous, peaceful, and contented, was an amazing contrast to that 
of those under Japanese rule in Korea itself.28
Russia remained inactive up until 1894. In the meantime, Japanese influence had 
been steadily expanding, especially after the Korean government became heavily 
dependent on the Japanese military forces for surpressing a civil rebellion triggered by 
farmers in 1894. The expansion of Japanese influence was a threat to both Russia and 
China. The Russians began taking active measures to deter the growth o f Japanese 
power, but she only succeeded in establishing through a diplomatic channel a joint 
consultative system involving three countries - Japan, Russia and China - to deal with 
the Korean question. Russia's intention was to establish a buffer zone on the Korean 
peninsula in order to prevent Manchuria from becoming the target of a Japanese 
invasion.29 The rival relations between Russia and Japan over spheres o f influence in 
Manchuria and on the Korean peninsula resulted in the outbreak of the Russia-Japanese 
War( 1904-5).30 The war ended in a Russian defeat. Henceforth, the Russians lost their 
foothold on the Korean peninsula. Previously, Russian policies were based on an 
intention to colonize, whereas the Korean monarch had been desperately struggling to 
protect his country's sovereignty through a maintenance of a balance of forces among 
the world powers.
27. McKenzie, The Tragedy o f Korea, pp. 103-104.
28. McKenzie, The Tragedy o f Korea, p. 152.
29. Won-su Kim, "Sino-Japanese War, Intervention by three countries and Russian policy toward Korea," 
ibid., p. 157.
30. The military victory of Japan over Russia changed the structure of power politics in the Far East and 
marked the start of new relations between the two countries. Morley, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy 1868-1941, 
p. 372.
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During the critical period 1900-1904, the Korean government failed to take steps 
either to establish a strong tie with Russia against Japan, or to form a concrete 
understanding with Japan to preserve Korean sovereignty and independence. Instead, it 
put its trust in, or relied on non-existent, American good will for Korea's national 
security. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was disastrous for Korea, to say the 
least. During the war, the Japanese forced the Korean government to conclude a series 
o f agreements favouruable to their aggressive designs.31 On 23 February 1904, for 
example, Korea was forced by the Japanese to sign a protocol effectively making Korea 
an ally of Japan.32 When the War was concluded by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 
September 1905, it became clear that Japan was free to do as it wished in Korea. The 
fragile independence of the country balancing between the two empires could be 
secured no longer, and Korea was swallowed up by Japan in November 1905. This 
signalled the end of Russia's first involvement in Korean affairs. The Russian Prime 
Minister, Sergey Yn. Witte, mentions in his memoirs that even before the conclusion of 
the Treaty of Portsmouth, there was an understanding in St. Petersburg that Korea had 
been lost.33
A treaty was also signed on 30 July 1907. It stipulated mutual recognition o f each 
other's spheres o f interest in Manchuria, Russian recognition of Japan's control over 
Korea, and Japanese recognition of Russia's special status in Outer Mongolia.34 In 
1910, the annexation of Korea by Japan forced the Russian Legation to withdraw from
31. Nahm, Korea: Tradition & Transformation, p. 201; In 1904, existing treaties between Korea and Russia 
were abrogated as a result of a protocol compelled by Japan.
32. The desire to control Korea was especially strong, as the Japanese have long viewed Korea as the bridge to 
Asia and also as a "danger pointed at the heart of Japan". It should be noted that during the early period of 
Japanese expantion Germany, Russia, Great Britain, and France were also helping themselves to concessions 
in the Far East and the United States became a colonial power in the Pacific with its acquisition of the 
Philippines in 1898. Robert B. Hall, Jr., Japan: Industrial Power o f Asia (New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1963), 
pp. 19-20.
33. S. Yn. Witte, Vospominaniya, vol. 2 (Moskva, 1956), p. 397, cited in Constantine V. Pleshakov, Republic 
of Korea-USSR Relations: Psychological Choices and Political Challenges, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 14, 
no. 4 (Winter, 1990), p. 691.
34. Morley, Japan's Foreign Policy 1868-1894, pp. 373-374.
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Korea and instead a Russian Consulate opened. Under the Japanese colonial rule for 35 
years, Russia and the Soviet Union began supporting the nation liberation movement in 
Korea and Korean nationalists accepted gladly such support from the Socialist 
government.
5.2 Soviet-Two Korean Ties( 1945-1985)
The territorial division of the Korean peninsula into following the end World 
War Two in 1945 converted the region into an arena of Cold War confrontation 
between the West and the East led by the United States and the USSR, respectively. An 
arms race between South Korea and North Korea stimulated by the United States and 
the USSR started and it eventually led to the outbreak o f the Korean War (1950-53). 
After the truce, the two Korean sides engaged in a continuous military buildup in order 
to maintain superiority over the other. The Korean peninsula is a strategic location, the 
interests o f four powers, i.e., China, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States 
were interesting. So, Korea became the scapegoat of the Cold War confrontation.
5 .2 .1  T h e  S o v ie t  U n io n  and North  Korea
The height o f Soviet influence in North Korea began and ended with Stalin. Apart 
from Lenin, no other leader received the acclaim that Stalin did in North Korea.35 On 
12 October 1948, the USSR became the first country to establish diplomatic relations 
with the DPRK. The primacy of Soviet influence, which was evident in the pattern of 
DPRK diplomacy, was due to adroit Soviet planning and execution.36
While the precise extent of initial Soviet control remained to be revealed, it seems 
clear that Soviet control was effected by Soviet officers and advisers placed at almost
35. Wayne S. Kiyosaki, North Korea's Foreign Relations: The Politics o f Accommodation, 1945-75 (New 
York: Praeger, 1976), p. 33.
36. Ibid., p. 34.
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all levels of North Korean governmental and economic structure.37 The agreement 
reached in March 1949 between Stalin and Kim Il-sung, for example, included all the 
"features of satellite treaties."38
The first salvos fired on the morning of 25 June 1950 in Korea started the 
bloodiest war o f the second half of the 20th century. Yet only 40 years later were we 
able to uncover the story about who started the Korean War.39 Only in 1990 did some 
serious Soviet publications acknowledge that it was the North that unleashed the war.40
In his a book, Khrushchev said "For many years we insisted that the initative for 
starting the Korean War came from South Korea. Some say there is no need to correct 
this version of events because it would be of advantage only to our enemies. I am 
telling the truth now for the sake of history: it was the initiative of Comrade Kim Il- 
sung, and it was supported by Stalin and many others - in fact, by everybody".41
According to Li Sang-cho, who was Pyongyang's deputy Chief o f General Staff 
at that time, Kim Il-sung was the actual mastermind behind the war of'national 
liberation' and he indeed consulted Stalin about it. Kim did his best to convince Stalin of 
the plan's guaranteed success and received the latter's go-ahead despite Stalin's concern
37. George M. McCune and Arthur L. Grey, Jr., Korea Today (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950),
p. 180.
38. The North Korean Communists were required to observe the following unwritten but implicit "articles of 
faith": 1) acceptance of the Soviet Union as a superior country and the fountainhead of wisdom; 2) acceptance 
of Soviet political and economic forms as the only means of achieving human progress; and 3) the grant to the 
Soviet Union of a monopolistic hold over the foreign intercourse of the country, to the exclusion of all 
influence considered inimical to the Soviet Union. See U.S., Department of State, North Korea: A Case Study 
in the Techniques o f  Takeover, Department of State Publication 7119, Far Eastern Series no. 103 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 103; cited in Chin-o. Chung, Pyongyang 
between Peking and Moscow: North Korea's Involvement in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958-1975 (Alabama: 
The University of Alabama Press, 1978), p. 11.
39. See Song-kil Syn and Sam-son Sin, who started the Korean War, Korea and World Affairs, vol. xiv, no. 2 
(Summer 1990), pp. 241-257.
40. See, for example, Moscow News, no. 5 (29 June-5 July 1990), p. 12; ibid, no. 6 (6-12 July 1990), p. 13; 
Jerrold L. Schecter and Vyacheslav V. Luchkov, trans. and eds., Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost 
Tapes (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), pp. 144-147.
41. Schecter and Luchkov, eds., Khrushchev Remembers, p. 144.
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about the possibility of Washington getting involved.42
For most people these 'revelations' revealed nothing new - unlike in the Soviet 
Union, where the Korean war was a taboo subject until very recently. There was a 
controversy over Stalin's part in the war; some say he issued the order to start the war, 
in order to spread the communist dictatorship throughout the peninsula and weaken the 
US's strategic position in the Far East.43
Until 1953, however, Soviet influence was greater than Chinese influence because 
o f Soviet power and because of Stalin. It was Stalin who put Kim in power and it was 
Stalin to whom the North Koreans went for help in paying their bills and obtaining 
military assistance. Moreover, Stalin was both a mentor and model for Kim. Kim's link 
to Stalin was far too personal to be transferred to Khrushchev automatically.44
The period ranging from 1953 to 1957 was called "the period of building the 
bases of socialism" in North Korea. It was a period devoted to the rehabilitation of the 
devastated DPRK economy.45
North Korea's economic and military dependence upon the Soviet Union 
disappeared after the Korean Conflict, and China clearly emerged as the Soviet Union's 
principal rival in influencing North Korea.46 However, the primacy of Soviet influence 
in North Korea seems to have been maintained until Pyongyang's growing emulation of 
Chinese policies began in the summer of 1958.47 Soviet influence was particularly 
evident in the North Korean army, which ironically had only Soviet advisers even after
42. Moscow News, no. 6 (6-12 July 1990), p. 13.
43 .Moscow News, no. 5 (29 June-5 July 1990), p. 12.
44. Kiyosaki, North Korea's Foreign Relations: The Politics o f Accommodation, 1945-75, p. 44.
45. Ibid., p. 49.
46. See John Bradbury, 'Sino-Soviet Competition in North Korea', The China Quarterly, no. 6 (1961), pp. 15-
28.
47. Chung, Pyongyarig between Peking and Moscow, p. 24.
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the Korean Conflict.48
Pyongyang's initial response, from 1956 to 1961, was to straddle the fence. 
Although it clearly sympathized with Beijing on major issues - such as de-Stalinization, 
the cult o f the individual, and the policy toward imperialism - it nontheless paid lip 
service to the new lines emanating from Moscow. At the same time, Pyongyang 
continued to stregthen its ties with Beijing.49
The abrupt cancellation of Premier Nikita Khrushchev's plan to visit North Korea 
in 1960 suggested that all was not well in Pyongyang-Moscow relations. First Deputy 
Premier Alexei Kosygin, however, did visit Pyongyang in May 1961. In July of the 
same year, Kim Il-sung flew to both Moscow and Beijing to conclude mutual defence 
treaties.
By late 1962, however, North Korea found itself solidly allied with the PRC; 
Pyongyang unequivocally supported Beijing in the Sino-Indian border clash of October
1962, and indirectly criticized Moscow for backing down in the Cuban missile crisis in 
the same month.50
In 1962 Khrushchev cut off all economic aid to Pyongyang in an effort to 
blackmail North Korea into supporting Moscow against Beijing in the early days of the 
Sino-Soviet conflict.51 Relations with Moscow steadily deteriorated, and by September
1963, Nodong Sinmun was openly criticizing the Soviet Union, accusing the latter of 
having exploited North Korea economically and of practicing "big power chauvinism" 
and "xenophobia".52 North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union ebbed to their
48. Glenn D . Paige and D o n g -ju n  Lee, "The Post-War Politics of Communist Korea," in Robert A. Scalapino, 
ed., North Korea Today (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 25.
49. Byung-chul Koh, The Foreign Policy systems o f North arid South Korea (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), p. 205.
50. Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems o f  North and South Korea, p. 206.
51. Donald S. Zagoria, 'North Korea: Between Moscow and Beijing', in Robert A. Scalapino and Jun-yop 
Kim, North Korea Today: Strategic and Domestic Issues (Berkeley: University of California, 1983), p. 352.
52. Nodong Sinmun, 30 January 1963; cited in Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems o f  North and South Korea,
p. 206.
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lowest point at the end o f the Khrushchev era in 1964.53
The situation was dramatically reversed after October 1964 when Khrushchev 
was succeeded by Brezhnev and Kosygin as, respectively, first secretary and chairman 
of the USSR Council of Ministers. This marked the beginning of a move to improve the 
badly deteriorated relationship between the Soviet Union and North Korea. The new 
leadership in Moscow provided an opportunity for the Pyongyang leadership to 
reestablish closer economic, political and cultural ties with Moscow.
A change in Soviet-North Korean relations was signalled by the visit of a high- 
level Soviet delegation led by Premier Kosygin to Pyongyang. On 12 February 1965, 
Kosygin met Kim Il-sung in Pyongyang and promised economic and military assistance. 
During his visit, Kosygin soon emphasized that his purpose was to seek to strengthen 
the relationship between the two countries through "an exchange of opinions on the 
question o f the international situation and other problems of concern to our Parties and 
our countries."54 Soviet-North Korean relations were exacerbated during Khrushchev's 
era when Party differences spilled over into state differences. The Kosygin visit, by 
restoring the distinction between party and state relations, allowed state relations 
between Moscow and Pyongyang to improve. Up until then, North Korea's military and 
economic development programmes had been retarded by Moscow's decision to curtail 
Soviet military and economic assistance to the DPRK. The Soviet decision was in 
retribution for Pyongyang's decision to side with Peking our ideological issues.55
53. The growing cleavage between Moscow and Beijing erupted into the open in 1960. Although Pyongyang 
was ideologically closer to Beijing than to Moscow, North Korea adopted a cautious neutral stance toward the 
Sino-Soviet dispute. Because North Korea desperately needed economic and military assistance from both 
Moscow and Beijing. At the same time, North Korea utilized the opportunity given by the Sino-Soviet rift.
The decline of Soviet influence during the Khrushchev era was also influenced by the circumstances that 
forced the North Koreans to make a choice between Soviet-style or Chinese-style socialism during the early 
stages of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Pyongyang's choice was a Korean-style socialism. Wayne S. Kiyosaki,
North Korea's Foreign Relations: The Politics o f Accommodation, 1945-75 (New York: Praeger, 1976), p. 5; 
On Soviet Politics in the 1960s, see Joung-won, A. Kim, 'Soviet Politics in the North Korea', World Politics, 
vol. 22 (1970), pp. 237-254.
54. Izvestiya, 13 February 1965, p. 1.
55. Kiyosaki, North Korea's Foreign Relations, pp. 68-69.
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Possibly as a reward for the noticeably changed attitudes of the Pyongyang 
regime toward the Soviet Union, a Soviet-North Korean military agreement was signed 
in Moscow on 31 May 1965, whereby the Soviet Union promised to bring a fresh flow 
of military hardware into North Korea.56 By the end of September 1965, Brezhnev, in 
his speech at the CPSU Central Committee plenum, was able to claim that "interstate 
and interparty contacts and ties" between the Soviet Union and North Korea had been 
considerably strengthened.57 Brezhnev, in his report to the Twenty-third Congress, 
declared that the CPSU and the Soviet people "fully support the fraternal Korean 
people, who are struggling against American imperialism for the unification of 
Korea".58 Throughout 1966, the Soviet party organs carried an increasing number of 
friendly articles on North Korea.59
In the years following 1967 the Soviet Union played an important role in the 
development of North Korean heavy industrial enterprises. The two countries 
coordinated their wide-ranging functional ties by establishing, in October 1967, the 
intergovernmental Economic and Scientific Technical Consultative Commission, a 
ministerial body meeting annually.60 By the time of the Pueblo incident in January 
1968,61 the North Korean armed forces were being completely reequipped with the 
latest Soviet military hardware, including submarines, T-54 and T-55 tanks, Komar 
missile ships, radar and ground-to-air missiles, and MIG-21 jet fighters. The Russians 
more than doubled the number of surface-to-airmissile sites in North Korea from 14 to 
35, representing a total o f 210 launchers. At the same time, Moscow resumed vigorous
56. Pravda, 1 June 1965, p. 3; also see The Economist, vol. xxxvii, no. 6376 (6 November 1965), p. 600; 
Henry S. Chang, "Plans and Starts," Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 55, no. 3 (19 January 1967), p. 94.
57. Pravda, 30 September 1965, p. 2.
58. Pravda, 30 March 1966, p. 2.
59. For example, see Izvestiya, 17 March 1966, p. 2.
60. Izvestiya, 24 October 1967, p. 4.
61. Izvestiya, 26 January 1968, p. 2.
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support of North Korea's diplomatic campaigns against South Korea.62 Despite the 
improvement of North Korea-Soviet relations in the late sixties and early seventies, 
however, there were clear signs of strain. The Russians were appalled at Kim's seizure 
o f the Pueblo and his shooting down of an American reconnaissance plane in April 
1969. These incidents came immediately after the Soviets had delivered its latest 
military equipment to North Korea, including the ground-to-air missiles and advanced 
electronic equipment that North Korea used in two provocative military acts against the 
United States.63
By the early 1970s Soviet-North Korean relations reached a point at which the 
Soviets refused to ship to Pyongyang modern air and air-defence weapons that they 
were routinely delivering to their Arab clients - Egypt, Libya, Iraq, and Syria. On 5 July 
1971 on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the 1961 treaty, however, the two 
countries in Pyongyang recalled with satisfaction that they had achieved many 
successes in strengthening bilateral cooperation "in all spheres o f life."64 The treaty was 
renewed to 1976.65
But in the mid-1970s, there were again serious signs of strain in the North 
Korean-Soviet relationship. The most dramatic evidence o f this strain was Kim Il-sung's 
failure to visit Moscow in the spring and summer of 1975 after a tour that took him to 
China, Eastern Europe, and North Africa. It was Kim's first trip outside Korea in ten 
years.66
Between 1978 and 1981 there were new indications of a North Korean desire to
62. See Donald S. Zagoria and Young-kun Kim, "North Korea and the Major Powers," in William J. Bames, 
ed., North Korea and the Major Powers (New York: New York University Press, 1976).
63. The detailed analysis of Soviet-North Korean relations during the Pueblo and EC-121 crisis in Donald S.
Zagoria and Janet Zagoria, "Crisis in the Korean Peninsula," in Stephen Kaplan, e d Mailed Fist, Velvet
Glove: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982).
64. Pravda, 6 July 1971, p. 4.
65. Pravda, 6 July 1976, p. 1.
66. Zagoria, North Korea: Between Moscow and Beijing,' p. 351.
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improve relations with Moscow. In January 1978 Pyongyang welcomed to North 
Korea a Soviet Politburo member, D. A. Kunayev, the first time in five years that such 
a high-ranking Soviet official had been in Pyongyang. On 12 October 1978, a Pravda 
editorial, celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the U.S.S.R. and North Korea, came close to endorsing for the first 
time North Korea's claim to be the sole sovereign state on the Korean peninsula.67 This 
is a claim that the Chinese, but not the Russians, had endorsed earlier. Pravda assailed 
Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo for promoting a policy of "two Koreas," which, it said, 
"symbolizes the bright future of the Korean people."68
On 7 May 1980 Kim Il-sung met Brezhnev at Tito's funeral in Yugoslavia. 
Nodong Sinmun called the meeting a "historic event of weighty significance".69 On 9 
October 1980 a Soviet politburo member, V. V. Grishin, attended the North Korean 
party congress. Pyongyang treated Soviet and Chinese delegations at their sixth 
congress even handedly, if not identically.70
A fresh impetus to this process was given by the talks between the Soviet and 
Korean leaderships during the May 1984 visit to the USSR of a DPRJK party and 
government delegation headed by General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea 
(WPK) Central Committee, President of the DPRK, Kim Il-sung. The agreements 
reached by the two countries in the course of the visit made it possible to radically 
expand cooperation in political, economic, cultural and other fields.71
As far as could be ascertained in the mid-1970s, the Soviet leadership appeared to 
take a pragmatic attitude toward Kim II Sung's seemingly unyielding stand on
67. Pravda, 12 October 1978, p. 4.
68. Ibid.
69. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS): Daily Report\Soviet Union, 16 July 1980, p. 10.
70. Zagoria, 1401111 Korea: Between Moscow and Beijing', p. 364.
71. V. Andreyev and V. Osipov, 'Friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the USSR and the 
DPRK,' Far Eastern Affairs (4, 1986), p. 170.
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unification. Peace and stability in the Korean peninsula were the continuing themes in 
Soviet foreign policy pronouncements. The Soviet Union perhaps did not intend to 
identify closely with the militant stance of Kim Il-sung at a time when the Americans 
were in a very tense mood and also when the tension on the Korean peninsula reached 
its peak after American setbacks in Indochina.72
The power structure in East Asia underwent a fundamental change from a bipolar 
confrontation to a new Asian power balance among the United States, the Soviet 
Union, China, and Japan.73 The new four-power arrangement was a complex one, 
characterized by overlapping patterns of quadrilateral, as well as bilateral and 
triangular, relationships among the powers involved in the region.74
5 .2 .2  T h e  S o v ie t  U n io n  and South  Korea
The new detente in the international arena that surfaced in the 1970s had a great 
impact on Seoul-Moscow relations. The Foreign Affairs Minister of South Korea made 
public in August 1971 that South Korea was willing to open diplomatic ties with the 
Soviet Union. Responding favourably to South Korea's expressed interest in relations 
with "nonhostile" Communist states, the Soviet Union reportedly signalled an interest in 
establishing cultural relations with South Korea. In September 1971, the Soviet coach 
of the Iranian national soccer team came to Seoul with his players to hold goodwill 
games with South Korea much to North Korea's chagrin. The first and only visit made 
by a soviet citizen to Seoul since Korea was divided was interpreted by one Japanese 
news agency as Moscow's willingness to ''establish a contact with South Korean
72. Chung, Pyongyang between Peking and Moscow, p. 149.
73. In the 1970s, the U.S.-PRC rapprochement, Soviet-American detente, the conclusion of a Soviet-West 
German Treaty-which dealt a blow against the DPRK formula for Korean unification—the improvement of 
Soviet-Japanese relations, and informal Soviet contacts with Taiwan and South Korea, all caused 
aggravations in Pyongyang.
74. Chung, Pyongyang Between Peking arid Moscow, PP. 149-150.
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authorities".75 The Soviet Union began to adopt an "open South Korea policy" in 
response to Seoul's overture to develop relations with Moscow.76 In June 1973, a 
Korean dramatist, who participated in the Congress of the International Theater 
Association in Moscow, was the first South Korean to enter the Soviet Union with a 
Korean passport since World War II. Pyongyang was obviously annoyed and expressed 
its displeasure by boycotting the Universiad (World University Games) in Moscow in 
August 1973 because a South Korean team was invited and participated in the 
Games.77
An intention by the South Korean government was reaffirmed in a special 
announcement of a foreign policy statement by President Park Chung-hee on 23 June 
1973. He declared that the operational direction purported to open Seoul's door to "all 
the nations of the world on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and equality".78 
Park's statement was an expression of South Korea's intention that it was ready to 
abandon the Holstein Doctrine and was willing to open diplomatic ties with even those 
countries which maintained relations with North Korea.
In November 1973, South Korean Ambassador to Washington Kim Tong-cho 
and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin met together to discuss the Korean question. 
In the meeting which took place at a suburban villa near Washington, D.C., Dobrynin 
was reported to have suggested 'the desirability of a basic arrangement to be concluded 
between Seoul and Pyongyang similar to that of East and West Germany'.79
75. Dong-A Ilbo, 14 September 1971; cited in Hak Joon Kim, The Soviet Union's New Attitude Towards 
South Korea in the 1970's: Its Motivation and Limits', Hak-joon Kim, Korea's Relations with Her Neighbors 
in a Changing World (Seoul: Hollym, 1993), p. 304.
76. Youn-soo Kim, 'Towards the Opening ofNew Relations between Korea and East European Countries:
The Soviet Union as the Key Actor', Korea & World Affairs, vol. 1, no. 2 (Summer 1977), p. 181; cited in 
Hak-joon Kim, 'The Soviet Union's New Attitude Towards South Korea in the 1970's', p. 306.
77. Peking Review, vol. 16, no. 34 (24 August 1973), p. 20.
78. Byung-chul Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems o f North and South Korea (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), p. 203.
79. The Korea Herald, 12 November 1973 ; cited in Kim, The Soviet Union's New Attitude Towards South 
Korea in the 1970's', p. 307.
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Soviet policies toward South Korea appeared to be improving. In September 
1975, the Soviet Union granted entry visas to South Korean sportsmen.80 At the United 
Nations, ROK correspondents reportedly revealed that there had been increased 
"amicability on the part of Russian correspondents toward South Koreans".81 On 28 
August 1974, Soviet diplomats at the U.N. hinted that diplomatic relations could be 
established between Seoul and Moscow if U.N. forces in Korea were dissolved.82 The 
Soviet diplomats also indicated that Moscow would not be concerned about the 
American military presence in Korea because the matter should be settled by an 
agreement between the United States and the ROK. A Soviet diplomatic source, 
however, subsequently denied in part the earlier report.83 Responding to a South 
Korean initiative, the Lenin National Library expressed its desire to establish a regular 
exchange o f materials with the Library of the ROK National Assembly.84
Any sign o f Moscow's interest in establishing informal contacts with South Korea 
created an air o f apprehension in Pyongyang, and Peking also promptly seized on the 
issue in criticizing Moscow. This strong reaction from North Korea evidently 
discouraged the Soviet Union, for Pravda denied the existence o f a "political 
rapprochement between Seoul and Moscow" and "Soviet-South Korean contacts and 
rapprochement in trade and other areas," which was previously reported by a West 
German correspondent.85
In April 1978, Moscow showed a comparatively amicable attitude toward Seoul 
when a Korean Air Lines(KAL) plane made an emergency landing in Murmansk. In
80. Donald S. Zagoria and Young-kun Kim, "North Korea and the Major Powers," Asian Survey, vol. XV 
(December 1975), p. 1031.
81. Far Eastern Economic Review, v o l. 81, no. 32 (13 August 1973), p. 5.
82. Dong-A Ilbo, 29 August 1974, cited in Chung, Pyongyang between Peking and Moscow, p. 152.
83. Dong-A Ilbo, 31 August, and 11 September 1974, cited in Chung, Pyongyang between Peking and 
Moscow, p. 152.
84. Dong-A Ilbo, 26 July 1974, cited in Chung, Pyongyang between Peking and Moscow, p. 152.
85. Pravda, 24 November 1974, p. 5.
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June 1978, the passengers, but not the aircraft, its captain and navigator, were 
repatriated.86 In September 1978, Korean Health-Social Affairs Minister Shin Hyon- 
hwack attended a World Health Organization(WHO) conference in Alma-Ata, 
widening unofficial contacts between the two countries.87 In April 1979, a Seoul- 
Moscow telephone line was opened.88
A Soviet parliamentarian visited Seoul to make preparations for the 70th general 
assembly o f the International Parliamentarians Union(IPU) in July 1982.89 In August 
1984, two South Korean representatives attended an international geological meeting in 
Moscow.90
South Korea's efforts in the 1980s to approach China had a negative effect on the 
improvement of relations between Seoul and Moscow: South Korea's possible joining 
in the anti-Soviet triangle apparatus involving the United States, Japan and China 
remained a stumbling block in the improvement of Seoul-Moscow relations.
After Korea was liberated from Japan at the end 35 years of colonial South and 
North Korea, South Korea and the Soviet Union had limited non-political contacts until 
Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985.
5.3 Gorbachev and Korea
5.3 .1  T h e  S o v ie t  a p p r o a c h  to the  K orean  is sue
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union sought a two-Korea policy by beginning
86. Hak-joon Kim, South Korean Perceptions of the Soviet Union, in Pushpa Thambipillai and Daniel C. 
Matuszewski, eds., The Soviet Union and The Asia-Pacific Region: Views from the Region (New York: 
Praeger, 1989), p. 43.
87. The Korea Herald, 18 November 1992, p. 2.
88. The Korea Herald, 2 October 1990, p. 2.
89. Ibid.
90. Chae-jin Lee, South Korea in 1984: Seeking Peace and Prosperity, Asian Survey, vol. 25, no. 1 (January 
1985), p. 85.
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to decouple the Korean issue from its global rivalry with the U.S. and South Korea 
from its traditional relations with North Korea.91 Officially Moscow supported any of 
Pyongyang's proposals on Korea and reacted negatively to Seoul's international activity.
Under his domestic reforms, Gorbachev's Vladivostok (July 1986) and 
Krasnoyarsk (September 1988) initiatives proclaimed new philosophic principles 
regarding the Korean regional conflict. In the summit between the Soviet Union and 
China in May 1989, both sides confirmed that tension and military confrontation in the 
Korean peninsula needed to be decreased.92 It was obvious that a similarity in Soviet 
and Chinese stances created better prospects for the peaceful solution of the Korean 
problem. In his press conference in Beijing, Gorbachev also emphasized that 'it would 
be better to have broad South-North Korea dialogue and to create the conditions for 
the normalization of relations between North Korea and the United States and Japan'.93
As shown in section 3.3, Gorbachev's new political thinking had clear 
implications for Soviet relations with the Korean peninsula. These were spelled out in 
an article by F. Shabshina, a leading Soviet specialist on the latest and modem problems 
of Korea, who argued in favour of the recognition of South Korea as follows:
Finally, it is necessary to consider our national interests. For a very 
long period of time they were not taken into account in the Korean politics 
of the USSR. In fact, we lacked such policies. We only supported 
automatically the policy of our ally - KPDR and even in questions which 
exceeded the limits o f purely internal affairs of Korea. We, for example, for 
long periods persistently rejected economic contacts with South Korea, 
which would have been advantageous for the Soviet Union. At the same 
time, some other socialist countries, while considering their own national 
interests, acted independently and for a long time maintained such contacts 
(even if they were indirect). Now, while we start to have economic ties with 
South Korea, we, for some reasons, do not go further ahead, we do not 
establish with the South's connections in all directions, which could expand 
and strenthen the possibility of economic cooperation and promote the
91. For details about the Soviet basic policies toward the Korean peninsula, see Oleg Davidov, 'Soviet Policy 
towards the Korean peninsula in the 1990s', The Korean Journal of International Relations, vol. 30, no. 2 
(1990), pp. 424-425.
92. Pravda, 18 May 1989, p. 2.
93. Izvestiya, 20 May 1989, p. 2.
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relaxation of tension on our Far Eastern borders. The recognition of the 
South could enhance our international prestige and our new political 
thinking.94
Soviet policy towards Korea turned towards pragmatism and rationalism in 1990. 
The Soviet-South Korean diplomatic relations was a result o f the logic o f Soviet 
perestroika and of Soviets' new political thinking in international affairs. The lack of 
normal relations with the ROK was inconsistent with the new image which the Soviet 
Union sought to project. The Soviet Union established wide-ranging ties with the ROK 
while preserving traditional good-neighbourly relations with the DPRK which enabled 
the Soviet Union to pursue a double-track approach to Korea.95
The development of relations between Moscow and Seoul resulted in a sharp 
deterioration of Soviet-North Korean relations. But there were good reasons for the 
diplomatic recognition of South Korea: the processes of reforms in the Soviet Union 
resulted in the dismantling of the old military, administrative and economic basis of the 
ties between the Soviet Union and North Korea. New political thinking freed Soviet 
foreign policy, including the relations with socialist allies, from ideological restraints. 
When the establishment of normal conditions of mutual cooperation and reciprocity 
was benificial to the Soviet Union, this policy was pursued in accordance with political 
realities, and confirmed the faithfulness of Soviet intentions.
Changes in the international climate also removed the idea of a strenthening of 
military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang in order to form an anti-
94 . F. Shabshina, "Mozhno Li Rasputat' «Koreisky U zel»: Mnenie Sovetskovo Uchenovo", Izvestiya, 1 
September 1989, p. 5.
95. Sergey S. Razov, 'Some Aspects of the Soviet Foreign Policy in the Asian Pacific Region and the Situation 
on the Korean Peninsula', A paper presented at an international Conference in Seoul, 4-5 November 1991, p. 
10.
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imperialistic front.96 Although both countries maintained cooperation in the military 
sphere, the Soviet Union did not export offensive weapons to the North and military 
shipments were substantially reduced. In this sphere the Soviet Union consistently 
observed the principle o f reasonable defence sufficiency. The transition to market 
relations blocked to a considerable degree the administrative and economic channels of 
Soviet-North Korean cooperation. Soviet enterprises all the more applied the criterion 
o f market effectiveness in cooperation with North Korean companies, who did not 
merely obey the administrative orders.
In an article in Izvestiya, Shevardnadze, commenting on the Soviet Union's new 
approach towards the Korean peninsula, said: 'The solution of the old and very 
complicated Korean problem would greatly promote the cause of peace and genuine 
neighbourliness in the region. This task is a key element of the Soviet Asian policy.'
'Our policy in the Asia-Pacific region, aimed at strengthening peace and stability and at 
broad international cooperation, is based on comprehensive consideration of the 
political realities which have shaped up there. It was precisely the existing realities that 
prompted the decision to fully normalize relations with South Korea. And these realities 
are as follows: There are two independent Korean states, the DPRK and ROK, on the 
peninsula. O f course, we took into consideration the fact that South Korea has now 
become a weighty political, economic and even military factor in Asian affairs. It would 
have been unnatural to ignore it'. 'The Soviet Union also carefully studied public 
opinion in our country. Numerous meetings with the people's deputies of the USSR and
96. The basic principles of Soviet Korean policy proceeded in the context of East-West political and military 
confrontation in East Asia were as follow: 1. To avoid the renewal of military hostilities in Korea. 2. Not to 
allow the U.S. to establish control over the whole Korean peninsula and exclude possibility of extension of 
capitalist system to the Northern part of Korea. 3. To contribute to consolidation of socialist system in the 
DPRK in order to create more favourable condition for peaceful reunification between South and North Korea.
4. To maintain military balance between the DPRK and South Korea in order to keep equilibrium of forces on 
the Korean peninsula as well as strategic parity in the Far East. See Alexander Z. Zhebin, Senior Researcher, 
The Institute of Far Eastern Studies, 'Russian-North Korean Relations: Present and Future' the paper 
presented at the fifth Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, Hanyang University and Institute of Far Eastern 
Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Seoul, 13-14 October 1992, p. 18; also see Vasily V. Mikheev, 'A 
Korea Settlement: New Political Thinking vs. Old Ambitions', Korea and World Affairs, vol. 13, no. 4 
(Winter 1989), p. 681; Oleg Davydov, 'Soviet Policy towards the Korean peninsula in the 1990s', pp. 424- 
425.
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Russian federation from our Far Eastern regions took place and the views of 
researchers and specialists were heard out. The conclusion was unequivocal: the USSR 
and the ROK should build their relations as independent civilized states on the basis of 
the generally recognized norms of international law, in conformity with the UN charter. 
It will not be an exaggeration to say that a sufficiently broad public trend in favour of 
normalization of relations with the ROK shaped up in the USSR'.97
The establishment of diplomatic ties with Seoul met that the Soviet Union 
officially recognized the reality that existed two sovereign states, South and North 
Korea, on the Korean peninusla. The Soviet Union came to recognize Seoul's 
traditional position that inter-Korean problems should be solved on the basis of the 
recognition of the reality of territorial division. Therefore, new political thinking in 
Soviet foreign policy made it impossible for Gorbachev's government to ignore the 
existence of two independent states on the Korean peninsula.
5 .3 .2  N ew  P o l i t i c a l  T h in k in g  tow ard s  the K o r e a n  P e n in s u la
....It is evident that some supplementary levers are needed to turn the 
idea into reality. One of them can be seen in the establishment of diplomatic 
relations of the USSR and other socialist countries with South Korea 
(Cross recognition is not an exception: we recognize South Korea; USA 
and its allies recognize the KPDR). We will endeavour to weigh the pro and 
cons of such theses, approaching them from positions of some new political 
thinking.98
Since the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union had been reviewing its foreign policy 
principles as noted in chapter 3. In line with them, it has made serious changes in its Far 
Eastern policy. The Soviet policy in Korea began at last to acquire the features and the 
orientation which were previously barred by strong bureaucratic opposition to common
97. Eduard Shevardnadze, 'Dinamika Pozitivnykh Peremen: Prizvana Razrushin' Konfrontatsiyu v Aziatsko- 
Tikhookeanskom Regione', Izvestiya, 2 October 1990, p. 7. This article explained why the Soviet Union 
entered into full diplomatic relations with South Korea.
98. Izvestiya, 1 September 1989, p. 5.
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sense in Soviet foreign-policy organizations. The inevitable, though rather protracted 
destruction of stereotypes, led to the September 30 1990 decision on the establishment 
o f diplomatic relations with the ROK."
Most importantly, Soviet foreign policy experts and leading analysts quickly 
changed over from irreconcilable opposition to the South Korean regime to advocacy 
of better relations with the ROK. This fact showed that even the most orthodox Soviet 
ideologists had realized the need to resolutely change the Soviet Union's Korean policy 
in favor o f a more pragmatic approach.
New Political Thinking was an important force in the Soviet decision to change 
its Korean policy. Previously, the Soviet Union gave nearly unconditional support to a 
North Korean government committed to the forciable reunification of the Korean 
peninsula, even at the risk of triggering a nuclear war. Gorbachev's initial review of 
Soviet Asia policy must have made clear to him that one o f the world's major potential 
nuclear flashpoints existed partially as the result of Soviet involvement.
Soon after the Soviet Union chose to attend the 1988 Olympics in Seoul, Soviet- 
South Korea trade relations began to grow at a high rate. The Soviet policymakers had 
become more realistic in assessing the whole Korean question. In his interviews with 
local journalists on 11 September 1989 in Seoul, Georgi Arbatov, the head of the 
Institute of the US and Canada in Moscow, admitted that among policymakers in 
Moscow, some were strongly in favour of opening up relations with Seoul soon.100 By 
1990, this idealistic concern was being overtaken by a Soviet relization of the 
possibilities that Korean trade,investment, technology, and managerial know-how had 
for revitalizing the increasingly troubled Soviet economy. The two motivations, of 
course, were not incompatible. As one Soviet commentator noted:
Practical experience has shown that the removal of ideological fetters 
from our foreign policy is by no means at variance with our national
99. Vasily Mikheev, 'The USSR-Korea: gains or losses?', a paper presented at a seminar in Seoul, 1990; 
recited in special report on Gorbachev-Roh summit of The Korea Herald, 21 December 1990, p. 4.
100. Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 September 1989, p. 36.
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interests and does not mean that we are forgetting the interests of third 
countries. This approach is in line with common sense and with the entire 
course of world development.101
The three meetings between Gorbachev and his South Korean counterpart Roh 
symbolized the two faces of the New Political Thinking. The important lesson one 
carries away from this review of the effect of the New Political Thinking on Soviet- 
Korean relations is that Soviet establishment of diplomatic ties and growing commercial 
relations with South Korea marked a dramatic departure in its regional policy. For the 
first time since its involvement in this area began, the Soviet Union was committed to 
maintaining stability through close ties with both Korean governments.
101. S. Maksimov, "Has the Diplomats' hour come?," Komsoinolskaya Pravda, 2 June 1990, p. 3.
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Chapter 6. Gorbachev and North Korea
6.1 Soviet-North Korean Relations
Soviet policy towards North Korea basically revolved around its attitude towards 
China, based on mutual interest. After Gorbachev came to power, he, more or less, 
succeeded in reversing the traditional tilt towards China.
Events o f 1989-1990 drastically changed the situation, as seen in chapters 2 and 
3. The direction o f developments within the Soviet Union, towards a gradual 
renouncing of socialist dogma, ultimately reshaped Soviet policy towards North Korea. 
Firstly, reality was recognized and diplomatic relations with South Korea were 
established. Secondly, Soviet-North Korean economic difficulties in the USSR reduced 
Soviet-North Korean cooperation and dismantled the old basis of these links, providing 
greater freedom for those analysts who claim to be unbiased to speak out. Thirdly, the 
Soviet social and psychological environment itself changed. Ideas of democracy, 
freedom of speech, and a nervously critical attitude towards any manifestation of 
totalitarianism produced a new kind of intolerance - nonetheless with old roots - 
towards those who, unlike the Soviet Union, did not want to dismantle state socialism, 
its administrative system and command economy.1
On the basis o f the treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance 
signed on 6 July 1961, the Soviet Union and North Korea were steadily developing 
bilateral relations. The USSR and the DPRK actively exchanged high-level delegations, 
signed and began to realize major agreements on economic, military and cutural 
cooperation before the Seoul Olympic games of 1988.
On 18 April 1985, Kim Yong-nam, Member of the CC WPK Politburo, Deputy 
Premier o f the Administrative Council and Foreign Minister of the DPRK met the
1. Vasily V. Mikheev, New Soviet Approaches to North Korea: A Problem of Morality in Foreign Policy', 
Korea and World Affairs, vol. 15, no. 3 (Fall 1991), pp. 444-445.
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Soviet General Secretary M. Gorbachev in the Kremlin. He delivered Kim Il-sung's 
personal message to Gorbachev.2 From 1-30 August 1985, "a month of North Korea- 
Soviet friendship", held in North Korea to mark the 40th anniversary of Korea's 
liberation from Japanese colonial rule, was a vivid demonstration of Soviet-North 
Korean friendship. On this occasion, a party and government delegation led by Geidar 
A. Aliyev, a Member o f the CC CPSU Politburo, First Deputy Chairman o f the USSR 
Council o f Ministers, a military delegation led by Marshal of the Soviet Union, First 
Deputy Minister o f Defence V. I. Petrov and envoys from ministries, departments and 
other organisations having contact with Korean colleagues, took part in the 
celebrations.3
On 21 January 1986, on the invitation of the CC WPK and the DPRK 
government, Eduard Shevardnadze, Member of the CC CPSU Politburo and Minister 
of Foreign Affairs o f the USSR, went to Pyongyang. During the talk with Kim Il-sung 
there was an exchange of views on a wide range of problems concerning Soviet-Korean 
relations and international affairs which showed an absolute consensus on all matters 
under discussion.4 On 22 January 1986, North Korea and the Soviet Union concluded 
two agreements in Pyongyang, one on boundaries of economic sea zones and 
continental shelves, and another on procedures concerning civilian travel between the 
two countries.5
North Korea demonstrated its solidarity with the Soviet initiative concerning a 
unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests with its subsequent prolongation. The WPK 
showed a profound understanding of Soviet peace proposals set forth in the January 15,
2. Pravda, 19 April 1985, p. 1.
3. Pravda, 15 August 1985, p. 4.
4. Pravda, 22 January 1986, p. 4; V. Andreyev and V. Osipov, Treiendship and cooperation between the 
peoples of the USSR and the DPRK,' Far Eastern Affairs, no. 4 (1986), pp. 170-171.
5. Pravda, 23 January 1986, p. 4.
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1986 Statement by General Secretary of the CC CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev.6 "In the 
Statement issued on January 15, 1986", stressed comrade Kim Il-sung, "the General 
Secreatry of the CC CPSU, Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev, came out with a new peace 
initiative aimed at achieving the complete elimination of nuclear armaments".7
On 22-26 October 1986, Gorbachev and Kim exchanged views on questions 
concerning the development o f Soviet-Korean relations in Kremlin. They expressed 
their satisfaction with these relations, dynamic developments in the Party, political, 
economic and cultural spheres and noted that there were possibilities for the further 
deepening of bilateral ties in all spheres of cooperation.8 They also emphasized the 
important significance of the Soviet-Korean treaty in 1961.9 Military, techno-scientific, 
economic and cutural cooperation between the two countries was stepped up.
In April 1987, on the occasion of 75 th jubilee of Kim Il-sung, he was decorated 
with the highest Soviet award - the second Order of Lenin; his collected works were 
published in the Soviet Union, and the DPRK reciprocated with the publication of 
Gorbachev's collected works.10
Military contacts reached unprecedented levels and scale. The DPRK hosted 
visits by the First Deputy-Ministers of Defence V. Petrov and P. Lushev; Commander 
o f the Soviet Navy B. Chemavin; Chief of the Main Political Department o f the Soviet 
Arme and Navy A. Lizichev, Chief of the Civil Defence V. Golikov, as well as high- 
ranking representatives of the Main Intelligence Directorate, the KGB, and the defence 
industry o f the USSR.11 The USSR in turn hosted visits by the DPRK Minister of
6. Pravda, 16 January 1986, pp. 1-2.
7. Nodong Sinmun, 12 March 1986.
8. Pravda, 25 October 1986, p. 1.
9. Izvestiya, 25 October 1986, p. 1.
10. Alexander Z. Zhebin, 'Russian-North Korean Relations: Present and Future1, this paper presented at the 
fifth Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, Hanyang University and Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian 
Academy of Sciences Joint Conference, Seoul, 13-14 October 1992, p. 6.
11. Zhevin, 'Russian-North Korean Relations: Present and Future', p. 6.
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People's Armed Forces Oh Zin-wu, the commanders of various services of the Korean 
Peoples' Army, and other high-ranking military commanders.
1985-1986 saw three exchanges of visits by naval ships and military aircraft 
between the two countries. Several joint Soviet-DPRK naval exercises were carried out 
in the Sea of Japan, and Soviet military aircraft, while undertaking certain missions, 
could use the airforce airfields in the DPRK. A large group of officers was sent from 
the DPRK to study in Soviet military institutions. The DPRK began to modernize some 
systems of weapons with Soviet military supplies (mainly anti-air defence) equipment: 
interceptor-fighters MIG-23, MIG-27, SU-25, anti-aircraft artillery and anti-aircraft 
missiles.12
Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to these stands in Moscow, when 
General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev on 4 May 1988 
met with Kim Yong-nam, member of the Politburo of the WPK Central Committee, 
vice-premier of the Administrative Council and DPRK foreign minister, who paid an 
offical friendly visit to the USSR.13 The Soviet-Korean talks evinced the unity of the 
CPSU and the WPK, the USSR and the DPRK in major areas of their bilateral relations 
and as regards the international situation, their reciprocal intention in an effort to 
consolidate peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the entire Asian Pacific 
region.14
After the Seoul Olympic Games
The Soviets' change in attitude towards North Korea began to be conspicuous by 
1988. In the greetings sent to the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of North Korea's 
foundation on 9 September 1988, the Soviet government used words such as 'national 
reconciliation' and 'balance o f interests' in the name of new political thinking. This 
meant that the Soviet Union, in its policy towards the Korean peninsula, would no
12. Ibid.
13. Izvestiya, 6 May 1988, p. 1.
14. Izvestiya, 6 May 1988, p. 1; Far Eastern Affairs, no. 5, 1988, p. 79.
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longer adhere to a pro-North Korea policy only. In addition, in his Krasnoyarsk speech 
delivered just after the Seoul Olympics, Gorbachev indicated that the Soviet Union 
wanted economic relations with South Korea.15 After this speech, economic ties with 
South Korea were steadily increased (see section 7.4).
In fact, for a very long period of time, the Soviet Union automatically supported 
only the policy of their ally - DPRK, even in questions which exceeded the limits of 
Korea's internal affairs. The Soviet government, for example, for long periods 
persistently rejected economic contacts with South Korea, which would have been 
advantageous for the Soviet Union.
However, the Soviet Union did not fundamentally change its policy towards 
North Korea. The Soviet Union was still careful not to imply that political 
normalization might follow economic developments.16 For example, when 
Shevardnadze met North Korean leaders between 22-24 December 1988 in Pyongyang, 
he said, 'the Soviet Union will neither recognize South Korea officially nor have 
political and diplomatic ties with the Seoul government.'17 As in the past, the Soviet 
Union showed its basic posture once more. As mentioned above, the Soviets' posture 
towards North Korea, based on class principles, was still an obstacle to normalizing 
relations with South Korea.18 However, the dismantling of socialism in the USSR has 
destroyed the traditional basis of its friendship with the DPRK. The patrocratic basis of
15. At the same time the DPRK reacted rather passively to the initiatives set forth in Gorbachev’s Krasnoyarsk 
speech. Suffice is to say that the brief resume of the speech was published in North Korean mass media only 
five days later, on 21 September 1988, after the persistents requests of the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang. The 
resume skipped all Soviet proposals that mentioned South Korea. See Zhebin, 'Russian-North Korean 
Relations: Present and Future', p. 14.
16. Pravda, 18 September 1988; also see Ziegler, Foreign Policy and East Asia, p. 117.
17. Izvestiya, 25 December 1988, p. 4.
18. Vasily V. Mikheev, 'New Soviet Approaches to North Korea: A Problem of Morality in Foreign Policy', 
Korea and World Affairs, vol. 15, no. 3 (Fall 1991), p. 446; Back in the beginning of 1989 nobody believed 
the Soviet government to be absolutely free from its old indeological convictions. Hence, the gradual approach 
seemed to be the best possible proposal. George F. Kunadze, 'USSR-ROK: Agenda for the Future', Korea and 
World Affairs, vol. 15, no. 2 (Summer 1991), p. 201.
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the Soviets' links has disappeared.19
After the Soviet-South Korea summit in San Francisco, relations between 
Moscow and Pyongyang clearly cooled.20 For example, Soviet and North Korean 
ambassadors assigned to each other's countries were absent from their assignments for 
a long time. The Soviet Union suspended aid for constructing nuclear power stations in 
North Korea and said it would continue this stance until North Korea signed an 
agreement on nuclear safeguards. North Korea signed the nuclear non-proliferation 
treaty in 1985 but had since turned down requests for on-site inspection by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA)(see section 6.2.1). Under an agreement 
with North Korea in 1985, the Soviet Union obliged itself to offer aid in building a 
nuclear power station that would be equipped with four reactors.21 Valentin Falin, in 
charge of the foreign affairs section of the Communist Party's policy-making Central 
Committee, said at a news conference that both sides are entitled to express their points 
o f view. He said " We can either agree or disagree. Recently, we've been disagreeing 
more often". "A lot is changing on the Korean Peninsula. We believe this will bring 
about new changes", Falin said.22 According to Sankei Shimbun, a Japanese newspaper, 
the Soviet Union looked set to slow arms sales to North Korea. This paper also quoted 
Falin as saying of Moscow's relationship with North Korea: 'we are going to reduce 
arms exports.'23 He confirmed that the Soviet Union had been cutting back oil exports 
to North Korea, though he said this was due to economic, not political, 
considerations.24
19. Mikheev, 'New Soviet Approaches to North Korea: A Problem of Morality in Foreign Policy', p. 447.
20. The dismantling of socialism in the USSR had destroyed the traditional basis of its friendship with the 
DPRK. The patrocratic basis of Soviets' links had disappeared. Mikheev, 'New Soviet Approaches to North 
Korea: A Problem of Morality in Foreign Policy', p. 447.
21. The Korea Herald, 22 July 1990.
22. Japan Times, 8 July 1990, p. 4.
23. Sankei Shimbun, 31 July 1990.
24. Ibid.
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When Shevardnadze visited Pyongyang on 2-3 September 1990, he 
unprecedentedly did not meet Kim Il-sung. This illustrated North Korean dissatisfaction 
about the establishment of Soviet-South Korea diplomatic ties. When Shevardnadze 
met his counterpart Kim Young-nam in Pyongyang, he should have explained the 
Soviet government's position about full ties with South Korea. On 11 September 1990, 
Kim Il-sung secretly visited 'Shenyang' in China for talks with top Chinese leaders on 
issues related with changing political situations around the Korean Peninsula. In his 
meeting with Jiang Zemin they discussed political joint steps to cope with improving 
relations between Seoul and Moscow.25
Basically, there was no change on the Soviet relationship with North Korea. At a 
joint conference, Shevardnadze said 'Nothing is changing. I think that more favourable 
conditions are being established to develop and expand our relationship with North 
Korea and all other countries within the region'.26 In his article in Izvestiya, 'Dynamics 
o f Positive Changes: Urge to demolish the confrontation in Asian-Pacific region', 
Shevardnadze said 'It must be stressed that the Soviet Union intends to continue 
developing the traditional friendly and good-neighbourly relations with the DPRK, to 
cooperate with it in the international arena and to contribute in every possible way to 
the accomplishment of the task of peaceful reunification o f Korea'.27
Asked about Moscow's view on North Korea's refusal to sign the nuclear 
safeguards agreement under the IAEA, Gorbachev noted, "The Soviet's position is that 
nuclear weapons should never be allowed to proliferate".28 In effect, his remark was an 
indirect expression of Moscow's position that Pyongyang should join the IAEA's pact. 
Gorbachev reiterated his country's stance on the military questions on the Korean 
peninsula, saying, "The USSR holds the view that if an accord is reached to turn the
25. Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 September 1990, p. 11; ibid., 4 October 1990, p. 26;
26. The Korea Herald, 2 October 1990, p. 1.
27. Izvestiya, 2 October 1990, p. 7.
28. The Korea Times, 15 December 1990, p. 1.
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Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, all problems will be settled".29 In a press 
conference in Tokyo on 19 April 1991, Gorbachev said 'we are maintaining and 
developing relations with the DPRK. This is important for making a positive 
contribution to the establishment of constructive dialogue in the name of finding ways 
to settle problems on the peninsula in the interests of the Korean people. On the other 
hand, this will be important also for our cooperation in the region'.30 As indicated by 
Gorbachev, the Soviet Union still saw the Kim Il-sung regime as an important ally and 
good-neighbour.
As soon as Pyongyang's positions became a real hindrance for the new Asian- 
Pacific policy o f the Soviet Union, normalization of relations with all states in the 
region, the apparent peace in Soviet-North Korean ties was broken. In fact, there 
started the disintegration of the old structure of connections between the two 
totalitarian regimes had rested upon the similarity of interests o f both sides. Although 
the Moscow-Pyongyang relationship had had its ups and downs, North Korea had been 
and remained a critical factor in the Korean situation. Under Gorbachev, the traditional 
relationship between Pyongyang and Moscow started a new era of close cooperation 
and partnership based upon just established formal diplomatic relations.
6.2 North Korea's responses to a new international environment created by 
Gorbachev's new political thinking
North Korea knew that it could no longer stick to old policies in the midst of the 
rapidly changing world situation. Pyongyang also proved itself capable o f adopting 
pragmatic stances and flexibility vis-a-vis the external environment. North Korea badly 
needed foreign capital and know-how, for which opening its door was a must; joining 
the world body (UN membership) was a significant step in this regard.
29. The Korea Times, 15 December 1990, p. 1.
30. Izvestiya, 20 April 1991, p. 4.
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President Kim's new year messages in 199031 and 199132 were particularly 
revealing in terms of ascertaining the extent to which North Korea was prepared to 
cope with the external disturbances resulting from 'new political thinking' and 
'perestroika'.
The Soviet Union and East European countries, under changing internal and 
external circumstances, were not so much interested in North Korea as before, either as 
a diplomatic ally or as trade partner. North Korea's diplomacy, therefore, had a serious 
setback in its relations with the Soviet Union and East European countries. The 
diplomatic normalization between South Korea and the Soviet Union on 30 September 
1990, for instance, was a serious blow to North Korea.
During his visit to Pyongyang on 2-3 September 1990, Shevardnadze conveyed 
Moscow's intention to establish diplomatic relations with Seoul and asked his 
counterpart Kim Young-nam why such a move would constitute an obstacle to Korea's 
unification, as Pyongyang insisted. At this meeting Kim strongly protested against 
Soviet policy and handed over to Shevardnadze a memorandum expounding 
Pyongyang's objections.33 The tone of this memorandum obviously reflected 
Pyongyang's displeasure over Gorbachev's new policy toward the Korean peninsula. In 
this memorandum, the hint at having their own nuclear weapons was a serious and
31. See The Pyongyang Times, 1 January 1990, pp. 1,3.
32. See The Pyongyang Times, 1 January 1991, p. 3.
33. Pyongyang's objection to the Soviet policy, as contained in its six-point memorandum, was as follows: 1) 
If the Soviet Union establishes diplomatic relations with South Korea, it will result in the recognition and 
legitimation of the existence of two Koreas on the peninsula thus perpetuating the division; 2) Soviet 
recognition of South Korea is fundamentally different from the case of other countries because the Soviet 
Union, together with the United States, is responsible for the division of Korea as the sole legitimate 
government on the peninsula; 3) Moscow's normalization of relations with Seoul will help South Korea 
materialize its nordpolitik, which, in essence, is designed to isolate North Korea internationally; 4) It will 
mean the formation of a tripartite alliance with the Soviet Union joining the United States and South Korea in 
a conspiracy to subvert the socialist system in North Korea; 5) If Moscow establishes diplomatic ties with 
Seoul, then the North Korean-USSR Alliance Treaty will automatically be reduced to a dead letter and it will 
leave North Korea no other choice but to seek independent measures to procure weapons by itself, and 6) it 
will result in pouring cold water on the desires of the Korean people, especially of the South Korean people, 
for reunification. See, Minju Chosun 19 September 1990, as reprinted in Korea & World Affairs, vol. 14, no. 
4 (Winter 1990), p. 784.
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concern-raising fact, especially if we bear in mind the anxiety of the world community 
about the development of nuclear capability in Pyongyang. But the development of 
atomic weapons was related not so much to Soviet-South Korean relations but rather 
to the realization of DPRK's own military doctrine. Besides, nuclear ambitions would 
not contribute to the improvement of the DPRK's position in the world community. So, 
it does not become very clear how North Korea was going to combine its nuclear 
policy and the search for new partners in the West under conditions of more loose 
economic and political ties with the Soviet Union.34
On 5 October 1990, the Korean Communist Party newspaper Rodong Sinnmn 
carried a commentary entitled "Diplomatic Relations Bargained for Dollars."35 In this 
harsh and acrimonious statement Pyongyang criticized Moscow's establishment of 
diplomatic relations with Seoul as an act of "betrayal," stating that "the Soviet Union 
sold off the dignity and honour of a socialist power and the interests and faith of an ally 
for 3 billion dollars."36 In addition, the statement, isssued by the offical news agency in 
the name of the Pyongyang-based South Korean National Democratic 
Front(Hanminjon), said "this dirty mendicant diplomacy is a grave act o f national 
division which fosters antagonism and confrontation by antagonising the North. "37 The 
bitterness of Pyongyang's reaction was clearly shown in the charge, in the same article, 
that "the Soviet Union, making a complete about-turn in its stand, decided to establish 
diplomatic ties with South Korea."38 This fact, the article continued, "belongs to the 
category" o f "incidents marred by scandals and stains" rather than "shining with 
reputation and honour" in the chapters of human history. It went on to characterize the 
Soviet decision coming "at a time when the Soviet Union is going downhill to ruin,
34. The Korea Herald, 21 December 1990, supplement, p. 4.
35. Rodong Shinmun, 5 October 1990, as reprinted in The Pyongyang Times, 6  October 1991, p. 12.
36. Rodong Shinmun, 5 October 1990, as reprinted in The Pyongyang Times, 6  October 1991, p. 12.
37. The Korea Herald, 23 April 1991.
38. Ibid.
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floundering in chaos and confusion in the vortex of perestroika".39 Soviet responses to 
these charges and to other attacks in the North Korean press were firm. Shevardnadze 
sharply stated that the "Soviet Union is a sovereign state that can decide, on its own, 
which countries it wants to have relations with."40
Pyongyang downgraded its diplomatic relations with Moscow. When 
Shevardnadze was on a two-day visit to Pyongyang, Kim Il-sung refused to meet him. 
This reflected the extent to which Pyongyang would go to express its displeasure with 
Gorbachev's new policy of perestroika. While Pyongyang was criticizing the Soviet 
policy of diplomatic normalization with Seoul, North Korea endeavored to normalize 
its relations with Japan, the United States and Asian countries.
Soviet domestic change and the collapse of the Stalinist regimes in Eastern 
Europe greatly changed the political and psychological environment for Pyongyang, but 
the basic geopolitical elements of the regional situation were still in place. Moreover, 
the North Korean leadership-partly because of its inflexibility in the past-could further 
broaden its room for manoeuvre by opening-up to Japan, another major power in the 
region.41
For North Korea, which had been opposed to 'crossrecognition', normalization 
between the Soviet Union and South Korea was surely an outrage, perpetuating the 
division o f the Korean peninsula and deepening Pyongyang's feeling o f isolation. On the 
other hand, Soviet-South Korean normalization indirectly gave momentum to North 
Korea to actively improve and extend its relations with China, Japan, U.S. and Asian 
countries.
6 .2 .1  C h i n a  an d  N orth  K o r e a
39. Ibid.
40. "Ties Said to Pose No Danger," Radio Moscow broadcast of 29 September 1990, as transcribed in FBIS 
Daily Report: Soviet Union, FBIS-SOV-90-191 (2 October 1990), p. 18.
41. Igor E. Malashenko, 'The geopolitical consequences of domestic change in the Soviet Union,' in Yu-nam 
Kim, ed., Korea, America, and the Soviet Union in the 1990s: Problems and Policies fo r  a Time o f  
Transitions (Seoul: Dankook University Press, 1991), p. 59.
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North Korea began to tilt more toward China, away from its reliance on the 
Soviet Union.42 The sudden decrease in the Soviet military capability implied that the 
importance of China dramatically increased for North Korea. China could exert more 
leverage on North Korea than previously. However, China, like the Soviet Union, 
seeked most o f all to ensure peace on the Korean peninsula.
Kim Il-sung unofficially visited China between 5-7 November 1989. During the 
meetings with Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, both sides exchanged views on 
furthering the friendly relations between the two parties and two countries. They also 
expressed their determination to persist in Party leadership and the socialist road.43
Premier Yon Hyong-r.muk's visit to China on 23-28 November 1990, for instance, 
was part of Pyongyang's desperate effort to lessen its diplomatic isolation as well as to 
induce Chinese economic and military assistance in place of the Soviet's. China's biggest 
diplomatic worry was North Korea. Like South Korea and Japan, China had little 
interest in seeing Kim Il-sung's shabby regime get its hands on the bomb. But neither 
could China bring itself to publicly condemn North Korea's blatant flouting of NPT 
obligations. The foreign minister, Qian Qichen, gave a clear warning that China would 
veto attempts to use force against North Korea.44
On 23 March 1993, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen told a news conference that 
the dispute should be settled by patient consultation. "If the question is referred to the 
Security Council it will only complicate the matter", he said. "We are opposed to the 
application o f sanctions".45 On 30 March 1993, China again rejected a U.S. proposal to 
impose sanctions against North Korea. The Chinese Foreign Ministry said, "The 
problem between the DPRK and the IAEA should be properly settled through patient
42. Dan C. Sanford, 'ROK's Nordpolitik: Revisited", The Journal o f East Asian Affairs, vol. vii, no. 1 
(Winter/Spring 1993), p. 12.
43. Beijing Review, vol. 32, no. 48 (27 November-3 December 1989), p. 8.
44. International Herald Tribune, 7 April 1993, p. 6.
45. Oman Daily Observer, 30 March 1993, p. 5.
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consultations. Exerting pressure and imposing sanctions will only complicate the 
matter".46
Top Chinese leaders advised Kim Il-sung to introduce reforms and to become 
more realistic in his foreign policy, when he visited China between 4-13 October 1991. 
Beijing suggested that North Korea follow the "Chinese model": targeted economic 
reform while maintaining authoritarian political control.47
6 .2 .2  J a p a n  and N orth  K orea
Realizing that times had changed in the post-Cold War era, North Korea, the only 
country in the world with which Japan has no diplomatic ties, appeared to be 
considering a more flexible foreign policy. What underlied the diplomatic moves on 
North Korea's approach to Japan was serious economic difficulty and crisis. In order to 
revitalize its stagnant economy North Korea was desperately in need of foreign credit 
and new technology from abroad. With the decline in its trade relations with the Soviet 
Union and Eastern European countries, Pyongyang had to find a new outlet for its 
foreign economic relations.48
On 4 June 1990 Foreign Minister Nakayama said that Japan was willing to open 
diplomatic relations with North Korea and would take other steps to improve ties with 
the hard-line communist regime.49 Then a message from Japanese Prime Minister Kaifii, 
which called for talks aimed at improving bilaternal relations, was delivered to a high- 
ranking North Korean official by a Japan Socialist Party (JSP) delegation visiting 
Pyongyang on 21 July 1990. Pyongyang told the visiting Japan Socialist Party 
delegation that it would welcome a visit by a delegation o f Japan's ruling Liberal
46. International Herald Tribune, 31 March 1993, p. 6.
47. Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 154, no. 42 (1991), p. 15.
48. Hong-nack Kim, 'The Normalization of North Korean-Japanese Diplomatic Relations: Problems and 
Prospects', Korea and World Affairs, vol. xiv, no. 4 (Winter 1990), pp. 655-656.
49. The Korean Times, 6 June 1990.
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Democratic Party's (LDP) politicians. On 24 September 1990 the LDP sent a mission to 
North Korea for a five-day visit, a move intended to lead to a thaw in the ice-cold 
relations between the two countries.50 In his meeting with Kanemaru Shin, a powerful 
leader of the ruling LDP on 27 September 1990, Kim Il-sung revealed his willingness to 
undertake diplomatic negotiations with Japan for the normalization of Pyongyang- 
Tokyo relations.51
Its willingness to negotiate with Japan, as announced on 28 September 1990,52 
was a complete turnaround from Pyongyang's previous stance. Prior to this point North 
Korea had steadfastly refused to open formal talks with Japan, its sworn enemy and a 
former colonial power, on the grounds that diplomatic ties with Japan would recognize 
and perpetuate the status quo, i.e., the existence of two Koreas on the Korean 
peninsula. The ongoing normalization talks between Japan and North Korea reached a 
major turning point. On 18-20 November 1991, a change in atmosphere was evident 
following the fifth round of talks in Beijing. Both sides expressed satisfaction with the 
progress made in the talks.53
Pyongyang's approach to Tokyo was economically motivated.54 North Korea 
demanded that Japan, and Japan agreed in principle, pay compensation for Japanese 
colonial rule o f Korea for 35 years prior to the end of World War II. The amount o f 
compensation quoted by various sources ranges from 500 million to 5 billion dollars.55 
North-South Korean membership of the United Nations eliminated an obstacle to the
50. Financial Times, 24 September 1990.
51. Japan Times, 28 September 1990.
52. On 28 September 1990, a Joint Declaration issued by the LDP, the Japan Socialist Party and the Korean 
Workers' Party in Pyongyang. The Japan Times, 29 September 1990.
53. The Nikkei Weekly, 7 December 1991, p. 6.
54. The two-way trade volume between North Korea and Japan came to  240 million dollars in the first half of 
1991, accounting for a mere 1.5 percent of the 16,420 million dollars traded between South Korea and Japan 
in the same period. The Korea Herald, 21 April 1992, p. 8.
55. The Economist, 29 September 1990, pp. 35-36.
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on-going negotiation with Japan towards a normalization of relations. But the 
International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) safeguard issue was one of the conditions 
that Japan insisted North Korea must accept before progress could be made in the 
negotiations.56
On DPRK-Japanese relations, Kim Il-sung said the lack o f progress in the 
normalization talks was due to the fact that the two sides did not reach a common 
understanding of the significance of the improvements in bilateral ties and of the 
principles concerned. Kim also said he hoped that the normalization issue would be 
satisfactorily resolved.57
6 .2 .3  T h e  U n i t e d  S ta te s  and North  Korea
Pyongyang was also interested in impressing the United States in its desire to 
establish normal relations. Since 1988 US and North Korean diplomats below 
ambassadorial level met in Beijing to discuss the general situation on the Korean 
peninsula, but these talks made little progress.58 By joining the United Nations 
Pyongyang wished to contribute to improving relations with the United Sates and to 
talks on the pullout of the 43,000 U.S. troops based in South Korea. Although the 
United States was officially still implacably hostile to Kim Il-sung's strict communist 
regime, the State Department tried to ease tensions on the divided Korean peninsula. In 
prepared testmony before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs on 25 
July 1990, then Deputy Assistant Secretary Desaix Anderson told "four unilateral 
actions" towards North Korea: 1) Broadening American diplomatic contact with North 
Korean counterparts. 2) Encouraging North Korean private citizens to visit the U.S. 3) 
Facilitating travel to the North by Americans. 4) Allowing limited export of American
56. Pravda, 27 May 1991, p. 6 .
57. China Daily, 4 April 1992, p. 8.
58. Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 May 1990, pp. 24-25.
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food and medical products to North Korea which "meet basic human needs".59 High- 
level talks were held with North Korean officials in New York in 1990, and less direct 
contacts have been continuing ever since.
There has been a subtle change between the U.S. and North Korea, especially 
following the latter's return of the alleged remains of American servicemen killed in the 
Korean War on 28 May 1990.60 This was a positive step in bilateral relations. North 
Korea proposed direct talks with the United States as a precondition to accepting on­
site nuclear inspections by IAEA.61 During a keynote speech to the South-North Prime 
Minister's talks, North Korea prime minister Yon Hyong-muk proposed a peace treaty 
between North Korea and the United States.62
On 22 January 1992, North Korea's highest-level contacts with the U.S. since the 
Korean War ended in 1953 were declared satisfactory and held in an "open-minded" 
atmosphere. The two sides discussed the issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean 
peninsula in their meeting in New York. They also discussed improved ties between 
Pyongyang and Washington and other matters of common concern. The meeting was 
between the U.S. under then secretary of state for political affairs, Arnold Kanter, and 
the assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs, Richard Solomon, and a 
delegation led by Mr Kim Yong-sun, the ruling Communist party's secretary for 
international relations.63
Kim Il-sung said that his country hoped for better ties with the United States, 
Rodong Simun, the official newspaper of the DPRK reported on 3 April 1992. In an
59. Daryl M. Plunk, 'Recent Changes on the Korean Peninsula and US Policy Toward Pyongyang', The 
Journal o f  East Asian Affairs, vol. v, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 1991), pp. 18-19.
60. Ibid.
61. The Japan Times, 22 July 1990; On 17 March 1993, diplomats from the United States and North Korea 
began "back channel" diplomatic talks in Beijing seeking to resolve the crisis resulting from North Korea's 
withdrawal from the global nuclear inspection agreement. International Herald Tribune, 18 March 1993, p.
1.
62. The Korea Herald, 6 September 1990.
63. Financial Times, 24 January 1992, p. 4.
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interview with the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun in April 1992, Kim said the U.S 
held direct responsibility for the Korean issue, and Korean unification was related to 
U.S. policy on the peninsula.64 He added that the DPRK was concerned about DPRK- 
U.S. relations and had always been trying to improve them. He said the recently held 
DPRK-U.S. high-level talks were important for the improvement of bilateral relations, 
but the improvement had just started, and he called for a bold change in U.S. policy on 
the DPRK.65 President Kim Il-sung's interview with the Washington Times on 14 April 
1992 was the first time in years he had granted a U.S. publication an interview. In his 
interview, Kim Il-sung said 'there is spring between the people o f our country and the 
people o f the United States; spring begins', Kim was quoted as saying 'my wish is to 
establish (a U.S. embassy) as quickly as possible. We are ready'.66 As indicated in Kim 
Il-sung's statements, North Korea was willing to normalize its relation with the United 
States.
6 .2 .4  A s ia n  C o u n t r i e s  and N orth  Korea
After losing its diplomatic tug-of-war with arch-rival South Korea in Eastern 
Europe, Pyongyang's diplomatic focus was shifting from a concentration on its 
traditional hardline communist allies and the Third World to Asian-Pacific Region 
countries. It also attached considerable importance to contacts with the ASEAN states. 
Relations with the latter were re-activated in the mid-1980s by the visits o f DPRK 
Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam to Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, of Vice- 
President Li Jong Ok to Indonesia, and of WPK CC Politiburo member Kim Hwan to 
Thailand. Discussed during the visits were matters related to cooperation between the
DPRK and ASEAN countries.67 The shift was ordered by Kim Il-sung. Kim said in his
64. China Daily, 4 April 1992, p. 8.
65. China Daily, 4 April 1992, p. 8.
66. The Korea Herald, 16 April 1992, p. 1.
67. V. Mikheyev, The DPRK's Regional Economic Relations', Far Eastern Affairs, no. 2 (1989), p. 68.
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1991 new year's address that 'the government of the republic will actively develop 
relations o f friendship and cooperation with the peoples o f many Asian countries.'
North Korean Premier Yon Hyong-muk toured three Southeast Asian nations - 
Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia - from 29 January to 7 February 1991, making some 
progress in strengthening diplomatic and economic links. North Korea's new, 
southward diplomacy was aimed at restoring a balance and compensating for the loss of 
east European allies to Seoul's own "Northern diplomacy" of the late 1980s.
As mentioned above, a significant improvement in ties would provide new 
evidence that, with the apparent end of the Cold War, Pyongyang was preparing to end 
its isolation from the non-communist world. Pyongyang's more flexible attitudes vis-a- 
vis Japan, the United States and Asian countries (including South Korea) were clear 
evidence o f the change.68 North Korea adopted competitive diplomacy in response to 
South Korea's success an improving relations with both Moscow and Beijing.
However, for domestic political reasons involving a rigid control over the population at 
home, North Korea defended its foreign relations and diplomacy abroad in terms of the 
principle of independence and self-reliance in the conduct o f foreign relations.
Conventional wisdom holds that neither Moscow nor Beijing had much influence 
over internal North Korean affairs since the Korean war. But the leverage that 
Pyonygang once had by playing Moscow against Beijing had faded.
In a long term prospect, North Korea will gradually shift toward Chinese-style 
pragmatism and accept peacefull coexistence with the South. North-South relations will 
progress one step forward and precede one or two steps backward depending upon 
changes in the internal and external situation around the Korean peninsula.
68. On 5 November 1992, North Korea had appealed to the European Community(EC) for economic 
cooperation. In a luncheon with Oliviero Rossi, the Italian ambassador to China, in Pyongyang, Kim Il-sung 
spoke frankly of the dire economic straits of his countiy and almost pleaded for EC investment. The Korea 
Herald, 17 November 1992, p. 2.
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6.3 North Korea's A-bomb Potential69
The Korean peninsula is at the centre of the world's most complicated 
concentration of big-power interests and firepower. Three nuclear powers, America, 
Russia and China, have military forces in or near the peninsula. Each has strong 
connections with one or other of the Koreas, as does the second economic superpower, 
Japan. Nuclear instability in this setting is not fun to contemplate.70
North Korea is withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
On 12 March 1993, First Vice-Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju said that in February 
1993, the resolution adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) to 
impose a special inspection of nuclear sites violated DPRK's sovereign rights and 
interfered in its internal affairs, aiming to strangle the cause of socialism there. Under 
such circumstances, the DPRK could in no way continue to fulfill its obligations under 
the treaty and had to withdraw from it to defend its supreme interests, Kang said, 
reading a government statement at a press conference.71 On 12 March 1993, North 
Korea warned that it would adopt a "strong defensive countermeasure" if Western 
countries imposed sanctions following its announcement earlier in the day that it was 
withdrawing from the NPT.72 The Korean Workers' Party paper, Rodong Sinrnun, also 
urged North Koreans to prepare militarily to crush "any provocative plot by hostile 
forces".73 The move has further strenghtened suspicions that the secretive state is well 
on the way to developing nuclear weapons. The decision caused consternation among 
its Asian neighbours and in the West.
69. For detailed on DPRK's Nuclear Policy, see Byung-ki Kim, "North Korea's nuclear policy in the year 
2000: sources, strategy and implications for the Korean peninsula", The Journal o f East Asian Affairs, vol. 
vii, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 1993), pp. 32-57.
70. Economist, 9 November 1991, p. 67.
71. China Daily, 13 May 1993, p. 1.
72. International Herald Tribune, 13-14 March 1993, p. 1.
73. The Independent, 15 March 1993, p. 12.
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A spread of nuclear weapons around the world is going to be one of the chief 
dangers of the next few years, because both the demand for these murderous weapons 
and their potential supply have simultaneously increased. North Korea now has the 
capacity to produce a small, crude nuclear bomb. The main objective of its nuclear 
programme continues to be the production of nuclear weapons.
North Korea is believed to have started its nuclear research project in the mid- 
1960s as part of the juche (self-reliance) ideology of President Kim Il-sung to create an 
independent defence capability. The North Korean leader worried that he could no 
longer rely on Soviet military backing, after the fiasco of the 1962 Cuban missile 
crisis74, if a second Korean war broke out.75
DPRK joined the Nonproliferation Treaty in December 1985 when it hoped the 
former Soviet Union would help it build nuclear reactors. The Soviet Union had 
decided to stop supplying materials and technology for the construction of atomic 
power stations in North Korea until it accepts the international demands for on-site 
inspections of nuclear facilities.76 But it only opened its facilities to international 
inspection last year, after traces of plutonium production had apparently been covered 
up. They concluded an agreement on the safeguards protocol at the beginning of last 
year, which was ratified in April.77 They provided an inventory o f all facilities on 4 May 
1992. The IAEA has performed six inspections of North Korean facilities since then.78 
But it rejected a February 25 request from the IAEA giving it one month to accept a
74. Khrushchev's withdrawal of missiles from Cuba marked a turning point in North Korean foreign policy. 
The North Korea took a strong and militant position on the Cuban crisis. They indirectly criticized 
Khrushchev's policy on Cuba as appeasement of "American imperialism," and urged "all friends of peace and 
socialism to stand firm and to force the American imperialists to take their...hands off Cuba at once. See 
Nodong Shumnun, 29 October 1962. North Korea leaders might have begun to question the Soviet Union as a 
reliable ally in case of emergency as shown in section 6.2.
75. Financial Times, 13-14 March 1993, p. 3.
76. The Korea Herald, 20 October 1990, p. 1.
77. Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 April 1993, p. 12.
78. The Independent, 14 March 1993, p. 16.
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special inspection o f two sites in Yongbyon, north of Pyongyang. No other nation has 
withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which has 154 other nations as 
signatories. The treaty, drawn up in 1968, bars nations from facilitating the spread of 
atomic weapons. Pyongyang's decision to withdraw from the treaty could become 
effective June 12, 90 days after it was announced. However, Pyongyang decided to 
reverse its decision to withdraw from the treaty on 12 June 1993.
Some Hypotheses
Why has North Korea delayed the IAEA inspection for so long? Why does North 
Korea not sign the agreement? What does it intend to achieve by not doing so? Why is 
North Korea withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty? What are the 
North's objectives, if North Korea is seen to gain some advantage by withdrawing from 
the NPT? Several hypotheses are conceivable. First, Pyongyang might be serious in 
developing nuclear weapons. In view of its international isolation and the widening 
economic gap with South Korea, North Korea may well attempt to drastically change 
the strategic environment on the Korean peninsula by acquiring nuclear weapons. If this 
should be the case, the game North Korea has been playing with the international 
community over an IAEA safeguards agreement would turn out to be just camouflage 
to buy time for nuclear development.
Second, North Korea might intend to draw maximum political and security 
concessions from the U.S. and South Korea by using the nuclear card.79 In this case,
79. In fact, North Korea got concessions from them. The decision of U.S. President Goerge Bush to scrap 
tactical nuclear arms, as announced on 27 Setpember 1991, has completely removed any precondition that 
North Korea has put forward for refusing to sign a safeguard accord. On 8 November 1991, President Roh 
Tae-woo declared that his nation would renounce the manufacture, possetion or use of nuclear and chemical 
weapons and called on North Korea to make the same pledge. Roh's declaration followed Bush's decision to 
withdraw all U.S. nuclear arms from South Korea. Key points of Roh's declaration: 1) The ROK will use 
nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes, and will not manufacture, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear 
weapons. 2) The ROK will continue to submit to comprehensive international inspection all nuclear-related 
facilities and materials on its territory in compliance with the NPT and with the nuclear safeguards agreement 
it has concluded with the IAEA under the treaty, and will not possess nuclear fuel reprocessing and 
enrichement facilities. 3) The ROK aspires for a world of peace free of nuclear weapons as well as all 
weapons of mass destruction, and we will actively participate in international efforts toward the total 
elimination of chemical-bilological weapons and observe all international agreements. The Korea Times, 9 
November 1991, p. 1.
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Pyongyang's main objective would be to make the best use of such a possibility as a 
bargaining chip.80 The conditions which North Korea attaches to accepting safeguards, 
namely the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons allegedly stored in South Korea and the 
assurance that nuclear weapons will not be used against North Korea, suggests this 
possibility. In addition, proponents of this second hypothesis maintain that Pyongyang 
cannot afford to develop nuclear weapons economically and technologically. If so, 
there would be some room for diplomatic efforts.81
Third, Pyongyang may have persuasive strategic and political reasons for going 
nuclear. Certainly, the North has been taken more seriously since the nuclear issue 
arose. A bomb in Pyongyang's hands could offset the perceived threat o f U.S. nuclear 
weapons, compensate for the loss of Moscow as a reliable ally in the post-cold war 
period, and give the North a low-cost strategic equalizer to the conventional military 
strength o f the South.82 If North Korea wants one, a deal might involve the cancelling
80. Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo suggested drawing up a package of potential benefits for Pyongyang if it 
complies with international inspections and changes its mind about leaving the treaty. Among the 
possibilities for such a package, he said, would be extending nuclear inspections to South Korean military 
installations as well as those in the north; Downgrading the annual U.S.-South Korean military exercise by 
changing its name, location or size; providing security guarantees against attacks on North Korea; increasing 
trade possibilities; and offering the prospect of improved ties between Pyongyang and Washington,
Pyongyang and Tokyo. International Herald Tribune, 31 March 1993, p. 6.
81. On 21 April 1993, high-level talks between Washington and Pyongyang would end the deadlock over the 
nuclear issue, Ho Jong, North Korea's ambassador to the United Nations, said in an interview published in 
Japan's Mainichi Shimbun. Mr. Ho said North Korea would return to the treaty if U.S.-South Korean joint 
military drills were cancelled and U.S. military bases in South Korea were inspected. He added that 
Pyongyang also would ask that the U.S. pledge not to make nuclear attacks and to respect North Korean 
socialism. International Herald Tribune, 22 April 1993, p. 3.
82. Andrew Mack, 'Seoul might prefer to live with a Pyongyang bomb', International Herald Tribune, 13 
May 1992, p. 6; Andrew Mack, "North Korea and the Bomb," Foreign Policy, no. 83(Summber 1991), pp. 
90-91. Then CIA Director Robert Gates said on 27 March 1992 at the House Armed Services Committee as 
follows: North Korea could become more determined to develop nuclear weapons to make up for its outdated 
conventional forces, with dire consequences for stability in Northeast Asia. Pyongyang's military advantage 
will erode throughout this decade, die largely to decreasing support from its traditional allies and North 
Korea's continuing economic problems. The North's defense industry is based on 1960s technology and beset 
by quality problems. Pyongyang lacks the hard currency to purchase more advanced technology. We have 
seen no deliveries of major weapons from the Soviet Union or its successors since 1989. China cannot provide 
the types of weapons, such as modem aircraft or surface-to-air missile systems, that the Soviet supplied. The 
Korea Herald, 29 March 1992, p. 2.
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of future military exercises.83 If North Korea is ready to return to the NPT fold,
America is prepared to be flexible. Team Spirit might be scaled down, even scrapped, if 
tension eases between the North and the South.
Fourth, North Korea is trying to improve its (nuclear weapons) negotiating 
leverage with South Korea and its allies, the U.S. and Japan. Now the North Koreans 
want to talk to the United States to resolve differences. Talks between Washington and 
Pyongyang could break the impasse and cool off the hotheads in both Koreas.84 
Opening up the entire peninsula to nuclear inspections could reassure all Koreans and 
their neighbours that the nuclear nightmare has vanished, opening the way to wider 
political and economic ties with Pyongyang.85 Pyongyang realised its nuclear weapons 
programme was proving to be counterproductive as its economy deteriorated. Its need 
for foreign investment from South Korea, the U.S. and Japan to revive the economy led 
it to make apparent concessions on the nuclear issue to reduce suspicions blocking ties 
with these countries.
Finally, there are other explanations for North Korea's apparently rash response. 
One is that the nuclear programme has become a key issue in a power struggle between 
hard-liners and reformers in Pyongyang. While the reformers were in the ascendant last 
year and successfully pushed for nuclear concessions in return for foreign investment,
83. On 14 November 1992, North Korean Ambassador to Russia Son Sung-pil said on the controversial issue 
of North Korea's nuclear development programme that 'If the United States and South Korea accept 
inspections on U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities in South Korea in a sincere manner, then the 
matter of inter-Korean inspections for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula could naturally be solved'.
The Korea Herald, 17 November 1992, p. 2.
84. On 5 May 1993, U.S. and North Korean officials met in Washington to lay the groundwork for high-level 
talks to dufuse tension over the nuclear programme. But several U.S. and Japanese officials said they doubted 
that diplomacy would lead the North to back down. International Herald Tribune, 7 May 1993, p. 4.
85. International Herald Tribune, 13-14 March 1993, p. 4.
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the hardliners might be gaining power now.86 Another explanation is that officials fear 
public discontent as the economy collapses and are creating a crisis atmosphere about a 
U.S. threat, in the form of the Team Spirit as one reason for its abandonment of the 
inspection accord.87 Kim Il-sung is seeking to distract the North Korean public and the 
military from their many miseries - a critical shortage of food and fuel and a bankrupt 
economy.88
Which hypothesis is right has yet to be proved. Certainly, they are not all 
mutually exclusive. The nuclear issue is one of the few cards North Korea possesses in 
its bargaining with the U.S. and South Korea. Pyongyang, therefore, will not give up 
this card easily. If North Korea were allowed to become a nuclear power, the 
consequences would be global, not only regional, and herald an extremely unstable new 
world disorder. Successful development of an atomic weapon would almost certainly 
provoke an Asian nuclear arms race involving South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and two 
unofficial members of the nuclear club, India and Pakistan. North Korea has missiles 
capable o f carrying one far enough to menace not just South Korea, but also China,
86. Growing of the Junior Kim to succeed his father Kim Il-sung as the nation's leader began in 1973 when he 
was elected a party secretary. In an interview in the Washington Times on 14 April 1992, Kim Il-sung said 
'his son Kim Jong-il is already taking full responsibility for our country. In fact, all affairs of our country are 
run by him'. The Korea Herald, 16 April 1992, p. 1. On 9 April 1993, the North's government said that Kim 
Jong-il, the son and heir apparent of the nation's founder, had been appointed chairman of the country's 
National Defence Committee, one of the three highest posts in the nation. The move strengthened the 
Mr.Kim's authority over the North Korean military and removed most doubts over whether he would actually 
succeed his father, Kim Il-sung, as president. The move indicates the transfer of power in a communist nation 
is nearing completion. Elder Kim remains president and general secretary of the Korean Workers' Party. Kim 
Jong-il is now formally in control of the military. He is believed to be in charge of the country's arms 
programme, including its suspected nuclear weapons project and its efforts to develop a new missile - 
believed to be capable of carrying nuclear and chemical weapons - that American officials believe will be 
completed this Year. International Herald Tribune, 10-11 April 1993, p. 5; The junior Kim, who can boast of 
no genuine 'revolutonary accomplishments' of his own, will likely attempt to solidify his power base by 
pushing more vigorously far an adventurist scheme beyond the North's borders. This may lead to acts which 
run counter to the peaceful and reconciliatory mood shaping the world today.
87. Financial Times, 13-14 March 1993, p. 3.
88. North Korea, according to reports in Seoul from Russian observers living in Pyongyang, wants to isolate 
itself as much as possible from the outside world during the dangerous period when President Kim Il-sung 
will be transfering power to his son Kim Jong-il. In fact, the regime may be glad to point to an outside enemy, 
whether it be the U.S. or U.N., in order to rally support. Oman Daily Observer, 10 April 1993, p. 9.
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Russia and Japan.89
If Pyongyang was trying to use the nuclear card to extract concessions from the 
West on foreign investment and the establishment of diplomatic relations, it should be 
shown that this course will be counterproductive. The Clinton administration should 
publicly re-emphasize U.S. support for South Korea. Therefore, Pyongyang's choice to 
return is clear: they don't want to deepen their diplomatic and economic isolation.
6.4 Economic Relations
6 .4 .1  S o v i e t - N o r t h  K or ean  E c o n o m ic  Ties
Table 6.1 Soviet trade with North Korea (by five-year period)
(Million Roubles)
1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90
Turnover 319 276 522 753 1245 1871 2071 3563 7317.3
Export 186 138 264 371 720 1187 1046 1855 4609.6
Import 133 138 258 382 525 684 1025 1708 2708.5
Sources: Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR in 1945-1990, various issues; N. Zhukov, 'SSSR-KNDR: Kurs 
na Uglublenie Vzaimodeistviya,' Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR, no. 11, 1986, p. 12.
In developing their economy, the North Korean Communists undoubtedly sought 
assistance from Moscow, to which the Soviet Union responded with material and 
technical aid. A formal agreement on mutual economic and cultural cooperation was
89. The new missile, called the Rodong No. l(Scud D), has a 1,000-kilometer(600-mile) range and is capable 
of striking the cities of Osaka, Kyoto, Hiroshima, Fukuoka and Kagoshima, according to a Japanese military 
source. The missile is thought to be capable of carrying a nuclear payload with a destructive power half that of 
the atomic bomb dropped by the United States on Hiroshima in August 1945. See Yomiuri Shimbun, 4 
January 1992, p. 3 ; International Herald Tribune, 11 March 1992, p. 5; According to the annual White Paper 
of the Japanese Defense Agency, Japan was seriously concerned by the missile, which can carry a nuclear 
payload. The paper said 'a combination of nuclear arms development and the Rodong-1 development would 
pose extreme danger'. The outgoing foreign minister, Kabun Muto, has said that Japan must be ready to 
consider developing atomic weapons should North Korea acquire nuclear arms. International Herald 
Tribune, 31 July - 1 August 1993, p. 4.
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signed in Moscow on March 17, 1949.90 The agreement called for the development of 
trade and provided for reciprocal most-favoured-nation treatment for the exchange of 
technical specialists and for information on agriculture and industry.91 In the field of 
trade, volume between the Soviet Union and North Korea increased from 74 million 
roubles in 1946 to 265 million roubles in 1948. In 1946-1949, North Korean foreign 
trade with USSR increased 19.2 times,92 about 90 percent of total North Korean 
foreign trade.93 From 1946 to 1949, Korean exports to the USSR went up more than 
10-fold, while overall trade turnover between the two countries increased 24-fold.94 
Trade with the Soviet Union in 1950 to expanded over 750 million roubles. This figure 
represented more than three-quarters of North Korea's total foreign trade.
Changes in North Korea's trade pattern showed the decline of Soviet 
preponderance and the rising importance of trade with Communist China.95 But, as of 
1957, the Soviets managed to stay well ahead in the game. In 1957, for example, the 
Soviet Union accounted for 57 percent of North Korea's total trade, while China's share 
was about 27 percent. On 17 March 1959, an agreement was signed between the Soviet 
Union and North Korea.96 The agreement provided for technical assistance by the 
Soviet Union to North Korea in the construction of "a thermopower station with a
90. I. D. Svsyanii, E. Yu. Bogush and O. B. Borisov, eds., Beneshnyaya Politika Sovetskogo Soyiiza 
(Moscow: Politizdat, 1978), p. 97.
91. Pravda, 21 March 1949, p. 1.
92. N. Samsonov, 'Podyem Ekonomiki i Razvitie Vneshneekonomicheskikh Svyazei KNDR', Vneshnyaya 
Torgovlya, no. 9 (1958), p. 8.
93. F. I. Shbshina, G. F. Kim, B.V. Sinitsin, G. D. Tyagai and V. I. Shipaev, Koreya: Sever i Yug (Moskva: 
Nauka, 1965), p. 68.
94. M. Meshcheryakov, 'Soviet-Korean Relations: Thirty years,' Far Eastern Affairs, no. 4 (1975), p. 48.
95. China gave big help to North Korea in the reconstruction of national economy. On 23 November 1953, 
both countries signed the agreement of economic and cutural cooperation in Beijing. At the same time, 
Chinese government decided to give a grent 8 billion Yuan( Chinese Monetary Unit) to North Korea in a 
period of four years( 1954-1957). See G. Kim, 'Ekonomicheskoe razvitie Koreiskoi Narodno- 
Demokraticheskoi Respubliki', Voprosy Ekonomiki, August 1955, p. 116.
96. Pravda, 18 March 1959, p. 1.
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generating capacity of 200,000 kilowatts, ammonium and chloride-vinyl factories, and 
flax spinning and woolen textile mills." By an agreement signed between the Soviet 
Union and North Korea on 7 September 1959, the Soviet Union was to provide 
technical assistance to North Korea "in constructing an atomic research reactor, a 
nuclear physics laboratory, an isotope laboratory, a betatron and a cobalt installation", 
in training North Korean cadres, and in other forms of technical cooperation in the 
"peaceful use" of atomic energy.97 It was significant that this agreement came after 
Moscow unilaterally abrogated, in June 1959, the Sino-Soviet atomic agreement of 
October 1957, and refused to supply the Chinese with a sample of an atomic bomb and 
technical data concerning its manufacture.98 North Korea hailed the Soviet offer,99 and 
this certainly strengthened the Soviet-North Korean relationship.
A Soviet-North Korean trade protocol on mutual delivery of goods for 1958 was 
signed on 9 January 1958, on the basis of "the spirit of equality, mutual benefit, 
friendship and cooperation".100 An extended trade agreement and protocol on mutual 
delivery o f goods for 1959 between Pyongyang and Moscow was signed on 30 
December 1958.101 The conclusion of a trade agreement between the Soviet Union and 
North Korea opened new broad perspectives for the development of economic 
cooperation. Total trade volume in 1959 exceeded that of 1946 by more than 13 times 
and made up over half-billion roubles.102 Total trade volume between the two countries 
in 1958(420 million roubles) was less than that in 1957 (490 million roubles), mainly 
because of a decline in North Korea's exports to the Soviet Union, as shown in 
Appendix 5.
97. Pravda, 8 September 1959, p. 3.
98. The New York Times, 14 September 1963, pp. 1 and 6-9.
99. Nodong Shinmun, 8 September 1959.
100. Pravda, 10 January 1958, p. 5.
101. Pravda, 31 December 1958, p. 5.
102. L. Karshinov, 'V interesakh KNDR i Sovetskovo Soyuza', Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, no. 10 (1960), p. 14.
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The 1960 Trade and Navigation Treaty103 and the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance104 between the the two countries were major 
landmarks in their growing friendship, trade and economic cooperation, ushering in a 
new stage in their fraternal relations. The treaties laid down the major terms of trade 
and other forms of economic ties between the two states, and postulated one of the 
most important foreign-trade principles, that of the most favoured nation. On 24 
December 1960, the two countries signed their first long-term trade agreement for a 
period o f five years (1961-1965), which had been drawn up to take into account 
Korea's tasks under the 7-year economic development plan (1961-1967), providing for 
the reconstruction and enlargement of old enterprises and the building of big new ones 
to be fitted out with modern equipment.105 The first trade agreement was considerably 
overfulfilled. Over the five years, trade increased 1.6-fold, while the share of machinery 
and equipment in the Soviet Union's deliveries to Korea grew three-fold. The second 
long-term trade agreement (for 1966-1970) was also successfully fulfilled.106
The scale of economic and scientific exchanges between the Soviet Union and 
North Korea was not increased in 1962. The only exception was in the field of trade 
between the two countries. North Korean imports from the Soviet Union increased 
from 69 million roubles in 1961 to 73 million in 1962,and its exports to the Soviet 
Union also increased from 71 million roubles to 79 million during the same period.107 
During 1962, five minor treaties or protocols were signed between Moscow and 
Pyongyang, while there were eight agreements between Moscow and Pyongyang. A 
protocol on the exchange of commodities for 1962 between Moscow and Pyongyang
103. Pravda, 24 June 1960, p. 6.
104. Pravda, 7 July 1961, p. 1.
105. Pravda, 25 December 1960, p. 5.
106. M. Meshcheryakov, 'Soviet-Korean Relations...1 p. 49.
107. V. Wolpert, 'Turns in North Korea Trade', Far Eastern Economic Review, no. 143, 13 February 1964, p. 
386.
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was signed on 26 February 1962.108 Soviet trade volume with North Korea increased 
from 94.5 million roubles in 1956 to 152 million roubles in 1962. This amounted to an 
average annual increase in the trade volume of about 10 million roubles. The increase o f 
the trade volume between 1962 and 1963 was only 1.2 million roubles (see Appendix 
4). In 1963, compared with 1955, North Korea's trade turnover with the Soviet Union 
increased almost doubled, imports (1,9 times) and exports (2.2 times).109 Trade volume 
from 1963-1964, for the first time since the Soviet-North Korean economic relations 
began in 1945, dropped about 6 million to +2 million roubles in favour of the Soviet 
Union (see Appendix 4). Soviet exports to North Korea, which needed Soviet industrial 
equipment and goods for economic development, declined considerably.
Several trade agreements signed in 1965110 between Moscow and Pyongyang 
reportedly provided an increase in the trade volume over 1964. The basic form of 
Soviet-North Korean economic cooperation was foreign trade. In 1966, the commodity 
circulation of both sides increased almost 20 times in comparison with that o f 1946, in 
which Soviet exports to North Korea rose more than 15 times and imports from North 
Korea 23 times.111
During 1961-1973, the Soviet Union's exports to North Korea increased 6.3 
times, imports from North Korea - doubled.112 During 1965-1973, the USSR supplied 
536.7 million roubles' worth of machines and equipment to North Korea.113 North 
Korea's trade turnover with the USSR in 1970 exceeded more than 2.5 times that of
108. Pravda, 27 February 1962, p. 3.
109. Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR za 1955-1959 (Moskva, 1961), p. 13; Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR za 
1963 (Moskva, 1964), p. 14.
110. Pravda, 15 February 1965, p. 1.
111. M. Meshcheiyakov, 'Sovetsko-Koreiskie Torgovo-Ekonomicheskie Svyazi', Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, no. 9 
(1967), p. 41.
112. E. A. Konovalov, M. E. Trigubenko and Ya. B. Shmeral', eds., Koreiskaya Narodno-Demokraticheskaya 
(Moskva: Nauka, 1975), p. 128.
113. Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR in  1960, Statistics survey. Also see Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya (1961), 
p. 172, 175; ibid. 1973, p. 245, 248.
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1961.114 Machinery and equipment had a prominent part in the USSR's deliveries: in 
1973, these made up more than 36 percent of the total.115 In the early 1970s, CMEA 
countries in overall DPRK foreign trade had about 55 percent and the Soviet Union 
alone - more than 40 percent.116 In the early 1970s, North Korea was the Soviet 
Union's second largest trading partner in the Pacific, providing 10 percent of Soviet 
Pacific imports and taking 23 percent of Soviet Pacific exports in 1972. But both 
figures fell by nearly half as the North Korean economy stagnated.117
Many forms of cooperation related to various industries and transport were 
developed in border areas of the USSR and the DPRK. One of the initial forms of 
cooperation between the USSR and the DPRK in the Soviet Far East was logging in 
the Amur Region and the Khabarovsk Territory carried out by Korean workers on a 
shared basis. The success of this cooperation, begun in 1967, and the accumulated 
experience, prompted a decision to expand its scale. In January 1975, the Soviet Union 
and the DPRK agreed to expand the volume of logging on Soviet territory by Korean 
workers.118
Table 6.2 Soviet-North Korean Trade 
(Million Roubles)
Years Total Export Import Balance
1985 1051.2 648.4 402.8 +245.6
1986 1207.1 757.2 450.7 +306.5
1987 1232.1 800.2 431.9 +368,3
1988 1601,7 1062,2 539.5 +532.7
114. Problemy Dal'nevo Vostoka, no. 4 (1972), p. 35.
115. M. Meshcheryakov, 'Soviet-Korean Relations...1, p. 50.
116. Kapitsa, Petrov, eds., IstoriyaMezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii na Dal'nem Vostoke 1945-1977 
(Khabarovskoe Knizhnoe Izdatelstvo, 1978), p. 401.
117. Gerald Segal, The Soviet Union and the Pacific (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. 157.
118. N. Shlyk, 'Economic ties between the USSR and the DPRK,' Far Eastern Affairs, no. 2 (1986), p. 137; 
Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, no. 33 (1980), p. 20.
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1989 1502.0 940.5 561.5 +379.0
1990* 1774.4 1049.5 724.9 +324.6
1991* 606.3 307.6 298.7 +8.9
Sources: Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 3, 1985-1990 ; * Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 4-5, 
1992, p. 49.
During the Gorbachev period, the Soviet Union was North Korea's primary 
trading partner, with close to 50 percent of its total foreign trade, although Soviet trade 
with North Korea accounted for only 1 percent of its total foreign trade. According to 
figures compiled by the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO), the Soviet Union 
accounted for about 58 percent of the North's foreign trade, while China accounts for 
about 13 percent.119 Therefore, Pyongyang needed Moscow as a trade partner more 
than Moscow needed Pyongyang. Moreover, the Soviet Union had been the source of 
technological assistance and material supply. Major goods of North Korea's exports to 
the Soviet Union: Magnesia clinker (approximately 20 percent o f total exports), rolled 
black metal (about 20 percent), textile goods, rice, metal-cutting lathes. The Soviet 
Union exports to North Korea: oil and oil products (about 30 percent of imports), 
machinery and equipment (over 20 percent), cotton, solid fuel, wheat.120 North Korea 
received crude oil and petroleum products, coal, metals, machinery, grain and light- 
industrial products from the Soviet Union and China, mostly through barter-trade 
agreemetns.121
By the mid-1980s, North Korea had slipped to fifth place among Soviet Pacific 
trade partners. By 1988 North Korea was back to fourth place, taking 17.2 percent o f 
Soviet exports to the Pacific and providing 8 percent o f Soviet imports from the region. 
However, Moscow's trade-related aid to North Korea dropped from 260 million dollars
119. Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 August 1990, p. 54.
120. A. T. Irgebaev and A. A. Timonin, Koreiskaya Narodno-Demokraticheskaya Respublika: Spravochnik 
(Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1988), p. 42.
121. Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 August 1990, p. 54.
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Iin 1981 to 95 million dollars in 1986.122
In December 1985 Kang Song-san, Member of the CC WPK Politburo and 
Premier of the DPRK Administrative Council, paid an official friendly visit to Moscow. 
After the talks, a series of intergovernmental agreements were signed, namely those on 
economic and technical cooperation, on economic and technical cooperation in the 
development of the Korean power industry, and the protocol on the results of talks 
between the two countries' planning bodies concerning the development of trade and 
economic cooperation between the USSR and the DPRK for the 1986-1990 period.123
In 1985, trade turnover between the two partners increased by almost 50 percent 
as compared with the previous year, reaching 1,051.2 million roubles.124 In overall 
volume, Soviet exports accounted for 648.4 million roubles and imports-for 402.8 
million roubles (see table 6.2). Comparing January to September 1990, with the same 
period in 1991 exports decreased by 47 percent (630.4/295.6), imports decreased by 50 
percent(540.8/269.5) from the Soviet Union. On the other hand, South Korea's exports 
increased by 139 percent (270.0/375.4), import increased 83 percent (440.4/367.2) to 
the Soviet Union.125 Affected by Soviet policy under perestroika, two-way trade 
volume dropped sharply to 606.3 million roubles during Gorbachev's last year against 
the 1774.4 million roubles registered in 1990.126
As shown in Table 6.1, even though, from 1961 to 1965, bilateral trade between 
the two countries accounted for 753 million roubles, it reached 3563 million roubles 
during the period (1981-1985), that is, increased 4.7 times.127 Between 1986 and 1990
122. Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 April 1989, p. 33; also see Segal, The Soviet Union and the Pacific, 
p. 157.
123. Pravda, 27 December 1985, p. 1, 4.
124. Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, no. 3, 1986.
125. Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, no. 1, 1992, p. 25.
126. Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, no. 4-5, 1992, p. 49.
127. Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, no. 7, 1986, p. 17.
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the volume of trade between the USSR and the DPRK was more than double that of 
the previous five-year-plan period, reaching as much as 7.3 billion roubles.
The Soviet Union continued to render techno-economic assistance in the 
construction of several major industries. The USSR assisted the DPRK in the 
construction of 70 industrial facilities which account for over one-fourth of its industrial 
output, including 63 percent o f the generated electricity, 50 percent of the country's 
coal, 50 percent of its petroleum products and 33 percent of steel.128 The DPRK's 
largest Pukchan power station's capacity was increased up to 1.6 million Kilowatt and 
industrial capacity of Kim Chak metallurgy plant in Chonjin was increased to 2.4 
million tons per year. The Soviet Union also helped to build the Chonjin power station 
and the plants producing aluminium, micro-electric engines, ball-bearings, car 
accumulators, and enamel wire.129
According to Naewoe Press, which specializes in North Korean and Communist 
world news, the agreement on trade and economic cooperation for 1991 which was 
signed between North Korea and the Soviet Union envisaged a transition to payments 
in convertible currency at world prices.130 The USSR agreed to provide loans to North 
Korea and cooperate in the construction of the East Pyongyang termal power plant. A 
list o f commodities delivered to the USSR in return for the cancellation of North 
Korea's debts to the Soviet Union.131 As of early 1992, North Korea's total debt to the 
former Soviet Union amounted to 3.3 billion roubles.132
There developed new forms of cooperation: the two sides started to set up joint 
ventures in the machine-building industry, and to cooperate in consumer goods
128. Far Eastern Affairs, no. 4, 1985, p. 55; ibid., no. 2, 1989, p. 68.
129. Zhebin, 'Russian-North Korean Relations: Present and Future', p. 7.
130. The Korea Herald, 2 May 1991. The Soviet-North Korean agreement on the new mechanism of 
economic ties between the two countries (2 November 1990).
131 . Radio Liberty: the Soviet Union no. 21 (1991), pp. 33-34.
132 . Zhebin, Russian-North Korean Relations: Present and Future, p. 16.
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production: fabrics were sent to the DPRK and clothes were supplied back to the 
Soviet Union. Vadim A. Medvedev proposed that Moscow and Beijing establish a free 
economic zone with North Korea to increase regional economic cooperation among the 
three countries. South Korea is trying to join this project.133 North Korea was eager to 
turn the river region into a special economic zone to attract foreign investment. 
Pyongyang has proposed a new economic free zone in an effort to attract Asian capital 
for its sagging economy. Foreigners will be given tax exemption to set up businesses in 
an area o f the North Hamgyong province near the Soviet border.134 The economic 
sphere appears the most realistic instrument for involving the DPRK in the projects for 
regional economic cooperation in Northeast Asia (Tumenjiang, a gas-pipe from Russia 
through North and South Korea to Japan, international system of radio-navigation, and 
others).133 Such involvement on the part of the DPRK would react positively on 
domestic political processes in North Korea and its policy towards the Korean issue.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)136 brought together 
China, Japan, the Soviet Union, Mongolia, North Korea and South Korea for 
discussions about establishing a special economic zone along the Tumen River, which 
covers a 10,000-square kilometer (4,000-square-mile) coastal area that includes parts 
o f China, North Korea and the Russian port of Vladivostok. A UNDP report estimates 
that 30 billion dollars137 will be required to develop the Tumen River basin into a
133. International Herald Tribune, 18 September 1991, p. 7.
134. The Guardian, 3 January 1992, p. 5.
135. Izvestiya, 9 September 1992, p. 2.
136. Eui-kon Kim, 'Development of the Tumen River Delta Axea: A Litmus Test For Northeast Asian 
Regional Cooperation', in Bum-joon Lee, Sugn-chul Yang, eds., The Changing World Order Prospects fo r  
Korea in the Asia Pacific Era (Seoul: The Korean Association of the International Studies, 1992), pp. 232- 
237.
137. The estimated expenses (30 billion dollars) as follows: ports and terminals (4 billion dollars), inland port 
(1 billion dollars), airport (2 billion dollars), railroads (2 billion dollars), roads (2 billion dollars), community 
development (8 billion dollars), power plants (2 billion dollars), telecoms (1 billion dollars), potable water (1 
billion dollars), waster disposal (1 billion dollars), education (1 billion dollars), contingencies (5 billion 
dollars). Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 January 1992, p. 17.
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special economic zone over the next 20 years and to build more than 10 ports, cities 
and related facilities.138
The North was eager to develop the river region into a special economic zone to 
attract foreign investment. North Korea attended United Nations-backed talks on the 
development of the Tuman River area in Seoul on 27 February 1992. It was the first 
North Korean government delegation to visit South Korea for an international meeting. 
Pyongyang hosted another international gathering aimed at spurring its stagnant 
economy on 2-3 May 1992. Some 130 experts from North and South Korea, China, 
Russia, Japan and the United States discussed capital investment and technological 
cooperation in developing the Tumen River delta as a 'second Rotterdam'.139 The 
Pyongyang meeting was a follow-up to the first inter-governmental consultations held 
in Ulan Bator in early July 1991, which was the first practical measure taken to 
facilitate technical and economic cooperation. The meeting agreed to focus on four 
priority areas for a new sub-regional programme in Northeast Asia, trade and 
investment promotion in the development of the Tumen River basin; efficient coal 
utilization and air pollution control; expansion of temperate zone food crops; and the 
development of alternative and renewable sources of energy.140
The strategic location of the Tumen River delta area in terms of global trading 
patterns has enormous potential. It is an area situated within easy access to major 
markets in the industrialized Chinese provinces of Jilin and Heilongjiang, and to 
favourable supply factors such as labour and natural resources from Russia, North 
Korea and Mongolia. The Tumen River area has the additional advantage of proximity 
to Japan and South Korea and of providing access to Europe. The intention in setting 
up the zones is to accelerate North Korea's economic development and boost economic 
and trade relations with other countries.
138. International Herald Tribune, 21 November 1991, p. 11.
139. The Korea Herald, 23 April 1992, p. 9, Beijing Review, vol. 35, no. 16 (20-26 April 1992), pp. 5-6.
140. The Korea Herald, 27 February 1992, p. 6.
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C hapter 7. Gorbachev and South Korea
7.1 South Korea's Northern policy
7 .1 .1  B a c k g r o u n d
The ROK first expressed interest in establishing relations with "nonhostile" 
Communist states, including the Soviet Union, in January 1971. In his Independence 
Day message to the Korean people, then President Park Chung-hee declared:
I will encourage relations of cooperation and reciprocal benefit in as 
many fields as possible between our Republic and any nation that respects 
our national integrity and does not engage in acts of hostility against us, 
irrespective of political system and ideology.1
This became an important cornerstone for the northern policy of South Korea. 
South Korea's motivations appeared to be to counterbalance North Korea's diplomatic 
expansion into non-Communist countries, to enhance South Korea's diplomatic 
flexibility vis-s-vis "nonhostile" Communist states, to help ensure against possible 
Chinese domination in the aftermath of American military withdrawal from Asia, and to 
adjust to the new multipolar power balance.2
Nearly ten years later, President Park's idea paved the way for the declaration o f 
Korea's northen policy during the Chun Doo-hwan administration by then Foreign 
Minister Lee Bum-seuk in his speech on 29 June 1983.3 However, there was no real 
progress because of the South's situation at that time and due to the policies of North
1. Dong-A Ilbo, 15 August 1971.
2. Chin-o Chung, Pyongyang between Peking and Moscow (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1978), 
p. 151.
3. Dal-joong Kim, The Concept, Goals and Background of the Northern Policy', Journal o f International 
Politics (in Korean), vol. 29, no. 2, p. 42, cited in In-joung Whang, "Korea's Northern Policy: a response to a 
changing world order", Il-yung Chung, ed., Korea in a Turbulent World: Challenges o f  the New 




After Chun Doo-hwan's retirement from the political scene, South Korea 
changed. Roh Tae-woo was democratically elected president. Positive changes began 
to be implemented in internal and external policies.4 In his inauguration speech, 
President Roh promised to pursue a vigorous policy towards socialist countries. In his 
view, 'improved relations with countries with ideologies and social systems different 
from ours will contribute to stability, peace and common prosperity in East Asia'.5 
Following this speech, 7 July 1988, Roh announced 'A Special Declaration in the 
Interest o f National Self-Esteem, Unification and Prosperity'. Declaring that 'today, the 
world is entering an age of reconciliation and cooperation transcending ideologies and 
political systems', he promised to 'continue to seek improved relations with the Soviet 
Union, China and other socialist countries' to help speed the attainment o f unification.6
President Roh's '7th July Declaration' was well received by the Soviet authorities. 
A Soviet Korean specialist called it 'Seoul's switch of its policy to a more thoroughly 
considered course'.7 Roh's Northern Policy was further developed in a speech delivered 
on 18 October 1988 at the 43rd session of the United Nations General Assembly. In a 
positive speech, Roh stressed that his government was 'also taking positive steps to 
improve its relations with countries such as the PRC, the USSR and many East 
European nations'.8 At the same time, he called for the holding o f a consultative 
conference for peace in Northeast Asia. South Korea would no longer seek to isolate 
North Korea internationally but would pursue changes with it in nonmilitary fields. He
4. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 8 July 1989, p. 5.
5. The Presidential Secretariat, the Republic of Korea, Korea, A Nation Transformed: Selected Speeches o f  
President Roh Tae-woo (Seoul: The Presidential Secretariat, The Republic of Korea, 1990), p. 62.
6. Ibid., p. 67.
7. Oleg Davidov, 'Soviet Policy toward the Korean Peninsula in the 1990s', a paper presented at the 10th 
International Conference on 'new Changes in International Order and the Roles of South and North Korea' by 
the Korean Association of International Relations, Seoul, 18 August 1990, p. 6.
8. The Presidential Secretariat, the Republic of Korea, Korea, A nation Transformed: Selected Speeches o f  
President Roh Tae-woo, p. 9.
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also made clear the South's willingness to cooperate with Pyongyang to improve ties 
with the United States and Japan. In parallel, he would seek improved ties with the 
Soviet Union and China.
In sum, Korea's northern policy involved three steps, each of the first two acting 
as a catalyst for the next. The first step was to expand economic ties with those 
countries which had traditionally befriended North Korea and to open a trade window 
between North and South Korea. The second step was to exploit newly created 
economic interdependence between South Korea and Communist nations to elicit 
diplomatic relations with Seoul. The third step was to create a condition of complete 
international cross-recognition of North and South Korea (including United Nations 
membership by both countries and superpower recognition of both). This third step, 
combined with increasing South Korean and western communication and trade with 
North Korea, would present the optimum climate for reunification of the Korean 
peninsula under terms favourable to the South.9
7 .1 .2  Its a c h e i v e m e n t s
Korea's Northern Policy stipulated the development o f many-sided relations with 
socialist countries up to the establishment of diplomatic relations10, despite initial 
hesitation in improving relations with South Korea for fear of damaging the ties which 
they had built up with North Korea in the past. As mentioned above, the northern 
policy indicated a set o f policy actions and measures designed to improve relations not 
only with other socialist countries but also with North Korea. Such policy initiatives 
indicated South Korea's intention to preserve its stability and security and to reduce 
tensions on the Korean peninsula through cooperation with China and the Soviet 
Union.
9. Hak-joon Kim, "The Republic of Korea's Policy to Bring Peace to the Korean Peninsula", The Journal o f  
East Asian Affairs, vol. 6, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 1992), p. 3 ; cited in Dan C. Sanford, "ROK's Nordpolitik: 
Revisited", The Journal o f  East Asian Affairs, vol. vii, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 1993), pp. 2-3.
10. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 8 July 1989, p. 5.
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Fortunately for the ROK, the implementation of the Northern Policy coincided 
with highly favourable developments in the world community. These included the 
introduction of a far-reaching foreign policy by the Soviet Union, reflecting the new 
thinking o f the Soviet leader, Gorbachev; the wave of reform and openness in East 
Europe; and the Seoul Olympic Games, a great festival for global peace which was held 
in Korea for the first time.
The northern policy, named after German stateman Willy Brandt's 'Ostpolitik', 
bore considerable fruit, riding the waves of sweeping reforms and changes in the 
Soviet-bloc countries. The northern diplomacy made remarkable progress in a short 
time in part because of the rapidly changing situation in the Communsit bloc.
Starting with Hungary in February 1989, South Korea set up diplomatic relations 
with all the East European countries: Poland (November 1989)11, Yogoslavia 
(December 1989) Czechoslovakia (March 1990), Bulgaria (March 1990), Rumania 
(March 1990), the Soviet Union (September 1990), and Albania (August 1991). Full 
diplomatic relations with the socialist nations in Asia were also set up: first Mongolia 
(March 1990), China (August 1992) and Vietnam (December 1992), proving the same 
diplomatic success in the Asian region. Socialist states and South Korea established 
economic ties, cultural, science, sport exchanges and conducted exhibitions, fairs and 
seminars.12
As a result, South Korea expanded her role in the international community, was 
admitted to the United Nations with North Korea unwillingly following, and enhanced 
stability in inter-Korean relations including economic ties and established normal 
diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union and China, as well as brightening the prospect for 
national unification.
11. The representative of embassy KPDR in Beijing said that he was «extremely unsatisfied», indicating 
about the establishment of fully diplomatic ties between Poland and South Korea. «South  Korea is under the 
occupation of the United States. This is an American colony. There is no legal government here. Thus, they 
have no a right to have the diplomatic t ie s .» , the diplomat added. Izvestiya, 1 November 1989, p. 5.
12. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 8 July 1989, p. 5.
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The improvements in relations between South and North Korea became 
increasingly obvious. On the one hand, South Korea, taking advantage o f the changed 
international situation, mainly the collapse of the USSR the major former ally of 
Pyongyang, actively sought normalization of relations with KPDR. On the other hand, - 
at an economic and political deadlock, North Korea showed signs to a way out of 
isolation.13
UN M em bership: its impact
On 17 September 1991 the two Korean states were admitted to the United 
Nations as full members; the two entities on the Korean peninsula were recognized 
worldwide.
North Korea's flexibility on dual U.N. membership for the two Koreas was the 
inevitable consequence of the revolutionary changes that had swept the communist 
world since Gorbachev came to power in 1985. The changes inclued the dramatic 
relaxation of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States on the one hand, 
and between the Soviet Union and China on the other. There had also been the 
revolutionary impact of the Soviet withdrawal from East Central Europe, which had 
resulted in the overthrow or the substantial dilution of all the Stalinist regimes both 
inside and outside the now defunct Warsaw Pact. Finally, there was the establishment 
o f diplomatic relations between Moscow and Seoul.
On 18 October 1990, Russian vice-foreign Minister George Kunadze, then 
general director o f the Korea-Japan Political Affairs Department o f the USSR Institute 
of World Economy and International Relations(IMEMO), said in Tokyo 'Since my 
country maintains normal diplomatic relations with South Korea, it is almost certain we 
won't exercise our veto power at the U.N. Security Council if Seoul applies for U.N. 
membership'.14 At the third Seoul-Moscow summit, held on Cheju in April 1991, the 
Soviet Union made it clear that it was fully prepared to contribute to reconciliation and
13. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21 February 1992, p. 2.
14. Korea Daily, 20 October 1990, p. 1.
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stability on the Korean peninsula. In Cheju, Gorbachev said that the entry of the ROK 
into the United Nations would not obstruct Korean unification and that Moscow 
understood the necessity for the ROK to be admitted to the U.N..13 Having officially 
recognized South Korea, the Soviet Union no longer set a veto on the issue of its 
membership of this organization.
The establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Seoul and the 
expected diplomatic recognition of South Korea by China made possible the entry of 
both North and South into the United Nations Organization. Futhermore, during the 
visit o f Chinese Premier Li Peng to Pyongyang on 3 May 1991, Beijing expressed its 
public support for a solution to the U.N. deadlock that was satisfactory to both North 
and South Korea. This marked the official end of China's support for Pyongyang's 
"single seat for all Korea" policy. China was playing an important role in both the 
economic, security and the political fields and changes in the Korean peninsula. On 27 
May 1991, Pyongyang announced that it would seek separate U.N. membership, 
thereby reversing its policy of seeking joint membership with South Korea as a 
sovereign state. Pyongyang was now prepared to abandon its self-imposed isolation and 
join the international community as a responsible member.16
Regarding the impact of U.N. admission on inter-Korean relations for the future, 
the new development may bring about a situation conducive to peace in the Korean 
peninsula. U.N. membership per se will not bring about a drastic change in North-South 
Korean relations. This is because peace in Korea will depend, more than anything else, 
on the respective Korean attitudes and behaviour that enhances the sense of mutual 
trust and confidence. U.N. membership, however, gave North Korea less 
maneuverability vis-a-vis South Korea as it neutralizes its self-righteous, rigid and 
bellicose stance. It will, in short, de-ideologize and make North Korea more pragmatic. 
It will give both sides an environment advantageous to the reunification o f the Korean
15. Izvestiya, 23 April 1991, p. 1.
16. Pravda, 30 May 1991, p. 4.
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peninsula.
North-South Korean Economic Ties
The improvement in North-South Korean political and economic relations came 
largely from the sudden sweeping reforms in the former USSR and most Eastern 
European countries. The world has changed greatly and the end of the Cold War could 
not but influence the relationship between North and South Korea.
Direct and legitimate economic relations between North and South Korea did not 
exist until recently. In July 1988, then President Roh proposed opening trade between 
North and South and regarding North-South trade as intra-country trade. The Koreas 
had no direct transport or communication links but conducted indirect trade. Trade 
between the two economies had been minimal, and had generally been carried out 
through third countries such as China, Japan and Singapore. The Economic Planning 
Board (EPB) in Seoul indicated that South Korea received mostly nonferrous minerals, 
gold, silver and coal while sending chemicals, textiles and home appliances to North 
Korea.17
As the result of this porposal, there occurred overheated competition among 
South Korean private companies to bring North Korean goods into the South. As of 
January 1989, private companies requested import permits from the government for 
North Korean commodities, and the amount reached 40 million dollars.18 The chairman 
of Hyundai Group visited North Korea in early 1989 and discussed joint ventures in 
manufacturing railway cars, participating in Siberian development and joint 
development o f the Kum Kang Mountain. In February 1989, Hyosung Company 
received coal directly from Nampo to Inchon and Hyundai Co. did the first barter trade 
with North Korea.19 Kolon opened the first L/C with North Korea's national bank. In 
December 1989, an executive member of a South Korean private company met with his
17. Financial Times , 29 May 1992, supplement, p. 4.
18. Ibid.
19. Financial Times, 29 May 1992, supplement, p. 4.
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North Korean counterpart in Tokyo for the first time since the War to discuss trade and 
joint ventures.20 Also, the Hyundai group brought 40 kgs of fishery products for the 
first time since the division of the country from the North through indirect trade.21
In 1988, the total trade of both sides was 1.037 million dollars (see talbe 7.1).
The trade structure between North and South Korea began to change rapidly after 
1989. The bilateral trade volume amounted to 22.3 million dollars in 1989, about 21.5 
times as much as the 1988 figure of 1.0 million dollars. In 1990, trade volume reached
25.1 million dollars and amounted to 192.2 million dollars in 1991,22 or 10 percent of 
North Korea's total exports. South Korea was the fourth largest trade partner following 
the USSR, PRC and Japan in 1990. Total approved trade volume during 1992 reached 
213 million dollars, up 11 percent from 192 million dollars in 1991.23 Total bilateral 
trade volume could reach 26 billion dollars in a few years.24 Mostly North Korean zinc, 
gold, cement and herbal medicines were sent to the South, and while the latter exports 
chemical products, textile and home appliances. While the statistics are comparatively 
tiny, they accounted for roughly 6 percent of all o f North Korea's foreign trade.25 The 
following table shows North-South trade from 1988 to 1991.
Table 7.1 North-South Trade 
(US Million dollars)
Years Total Export Import Balance
1988 1.037 1.037 0 +1.037
1989 22.304 22.235 0.069 +22.166
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. The Chosun Ilbo, 8 February 1992, p. 6.
23. International Herald Tribune, 10-11 April 1993, p. 8.
24. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 24 December 1991, p. 4.
25. International Herald Tribune, 16 March 1993, p. 7.
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1990 25.085 20.354 4.731 +15.623
1991 192.172 165.996 26.176 +139.820
Source: The Korean Ministry of Trade and Industry 
In joint ventures, almost all major coporations and some small businesses in 
South Korea are trying to develop contacts with North Korea counterparts. Ideally, 
these ventures should be designed to combine South Korea's access to capital and 
technology with North Korea's abundant labour force and natural resources. Such 
ventures are most likely to be formed in areas including consumer electronics, textiles 
and other manufactured goods, and mining and refining o f zinc and other precious 
metals. For example, the chairman of South Korea's Daewoo Group of companies, Kim 
Woo-joong, agreed to set up two projects worth 1.1 billion dollars with North Korea in 
January 1992.26 Chosun Ilbo, a Seoul newspaper, reported that Kim had visited 
Pyongyang and agreed with Kim Dal-hyon, the North Korean deputy prime minister, to 
set up a garment factory that would cost each side 300 million dollars and would be 
built in Haeju, just north of the border. The two men also agreed on a 500 million dollar 
project to construct an international hotel in Pyongyang.27 Kim Woo-chung also 
discussed mining projects and a scheme in which 10,000 North Korean workers would 
be used on a Daewoo contract to build a highway in Pakistan.28
Lucky-Goldstar International Corp. received 20,566 metric tons o f coal from 
North Korea in the second barter deal between the two countries, the National 
Unification Board reported: it shipped 2,100 TV sets and 200 metric tons of polyester 
film in return.29 On 19 February 1992, Lucky Goldstar group, a major South Korean 
conglomerate, announced it had received a request from North Korea to supply 200 
million dollars worth of crude oil a year. The request adds credence to frequent reports
26. International Herald Tribune, 24 January 1992, p. 15.
27. International Herald Tribune, 24 January 1992, p. 15.
28. Financial Times, 29 May 1992, supplement, p. 4.
29. International Herald Tribune, 16 January 1992, p. 13.
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that the economically hard-pressed Communist state had a short supply o f crude oil and 
other raw materials. There have been reports that North Korea had no money to buy 
crude oil after China and the former Soviet states switched their trade with North 
Korea from a barter to a cash settlement basis.30
South Korea has strong economic incentives for furthering economic contacts 
with North Korea. South Korean industry, beset by rising wages and falling 
competitiveness, looks to North Korea as a place to set up a low-wage industrial base 
close to home.31
South Korean industries are facing soaring labour costs and a rapid loss in their 
export competitiveness. With their increasingly urgent need of cheap labour, South 
Korean businesses believe joint ventures with North Korea could cut one third or one 
fourth o f the present wage level to only 50-100 dollars a month. It could restore South 
Korea's declining competitiveness in traditional export items such as footwear and 
clothes by shifting production to the North, instead of to low wage countries in 
Southeast Asia. The application of even modest South Korean technology to the 
North's abundant supply of cheap and disciplined labour would lead to big productivity 
gains. A byproduct of the process would be the direct access to 20 million North 
Koreans, who would constitute a virtually captive consumer market for the south's 
industry. In addition, southern access to the North's mineral and other natural resources 
would lessen its dependence on imports, while defence spending, which constitutes a 
quarter o f government expenditure, could be substantially reduced.32
Pyongyang has made it clear that it has an ambitious development agenda of its 
own. Kim Dal-hyon said that Pyongyang would welcome broader foreign investment. 
Such statements, however, indicate just how far the North Korean government is
30. International Herald Tribune, 20 February 1992, p. 13. China tightened economic pressure on North 
Korea by publicly announcing on 29 December 1992 that all trade beginning in 1993 must be paid for in cash 
rather than in barter. International Herald Tribune, 30 December 1992, p. 1.
31. The Wall Street Joumal(Euiope), 2 January 1992, p. 2.
32. Financial Times, 29 May 1992, supplement, p. 4.
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prepared to go to attract foreign investment, which it believes can be confined to the 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) or other specific areas, such as proposed tourist 
developments in mountainous areas revered by both North and South Koreans.
If direct trade between two sides were to be realized, the volume of trade would 
increase rapidly in the short run. In the long run differences in resource endowments 
and in the level of industrialization suggest a great potential for trade between the two 
sides. Relatively abundant resource endowments in the North and more sophisticated 
industrialization in the South would guarantee a strong complementary pattern o f trade 
between the two sides. In addition, if the North's labour with the South's technology 
and capital could benefit greatly from such types o f joint venture, the North could also 
earn valuable foreign exchange through exports to third countries. South Korea could 
increase international competitiveness in wide categories of goods by being able to use 
relatively cheap and efficient North Korean labour. Especially, some economic 
transactions and cooperation between North and South Korea would contribute to 
laying the foundations for economic integration which would ultimately lead to a 
climate of mutual trust on the Korean peninsula.
However, trade between South and North Korea could change according to a 
changing domestic and international situation surrounding the Korean peninsula. 
Recently inter-Korean trade plunged, mainly because of tension over the North's 
suspected nuclear-weapons programme.33 So, North Korea will not expect any 
economic cooperation from the South unless and until the nuclear issue is resolved.
The Soviets' position on the unification of the K orean peninsula 
During the past 40 old years a number of suggestions were raised by South and
33. In March 1993, the volume plunged by 55 percent to 17.6 million dollars, from 39.1 million dollars in 
March 1992. South Korea approved 130.000 dollars of sales to North Korea in March, down 91 percent from 
a year earlier, while allowing 17.4 million dollars in purchases, down 27.5 percent. International Herald 
Tribune, 10-11 April 1993, p. 8.
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North Korea for the restoration of national unity,34 but little progress was made. South 
and North Korea set forth three principles of reunification adopted by both sides in 
1972.35 Both sides presented their own reunification plan. On the one hand, in his 
report to the Sixth Congress of the WPK on 10 October 1980, President Kim Il-sung 
put forth a comprehensive proposal for the establishment of a Democratic Confederal 
Republic o f Koryo (DCRK), a formula recognizing one nation and one state but two 
systems and two governments.36 In his new year address for 1991, Kim said "we 
believe that the idea of establishing the DCRK is the fair common ground for national 
reunification which can serve as the basis of national agreement".37 This would be a 
confederation o f two autonomous governments based on the principles o f coexistence, 
nonagression, and nonsuppression of either side, while preserving existing systems. In 
this context, North Korean Kim Il-sung rejected German-style reunification of the 
Korean peninsula.38
On the other hand, South Korea put forward an idea of the formation of a 
'Korean National Community' as an intermediate stage in the transition o f the
34. For more details of unification, see Donald S. Macdolad, 'Security in Northeast Asia: Two Koreas or 
One?', The Washington Quarterly (Autume 1989), pp. 139-153; Chol-sik Kim, Inter-Korea Relations: a view 
from Pyongyang, Far Eastern Affairs, no. 4 (1990), pp. 3-5; Nicholas Everstadt, 'Can the two Koreas be 
one?', Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 5 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 150-165; Sung-moon Pae, 'Fallacy of the 
Vulnerability Thesis for Unification in Korea by the 1990s', The Journal o f East Asian Affairs, vol. vii, no. 2 
(Summer/Fall 1993), pp. 321-344.
35. 1) Independent efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference, 2) peaceful means, and 
not through use of force against each other, 3) transcending differences in ideas, ideologies and systems. 
National Unification Board (ROK), A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea (Seoul: 31 December 
1988), p. 55.
36. For details about the North's plan, see Il-sung Kim, Report to the Sixth Congress o f the Workers' Party o f  
Korea on the work o f  the Central Committee, 10 October 1980 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing 
House, 1980), pp. 71-79; also see Byung-chul Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems o f North and South Korea 
(London: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 144-148; Rinn-sup Shin, 'Democratic Confederal 
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37. The Pyongyang Times, 1 January 1991, p. 3.
38. The Korea Herald, 4 January 1991, p. 1.
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unification of North and South Korea to a 'United Democratic Republic'.39 This plan, 
which was set forth by then President Roh on 11 September 1989, included provision 
for an interim Korean Commonwealth.40
Although there existed many similarities in the respective policies, both sides 
were not prepared to compromise. Of course, the attempts o f reaction by hardliners to 
unite the country by military means from 1950 to 1953 only widened the rift and caused 
incalculable sacrifices and devastation to the Korean people.41 This was the result of 
suspicions and mutual confrontations between both sides. Now Seoul and Pyongyang 
were prepared to make some real progress not only in talks but also for an improved 
political atmosphere in the peninsula. North and South Korean Prime Ministers met to 
pave the road to Korean unity, but the session ended in deadlock with each side's main 
proposals apparently unacceptable to the other. This was the highest level meeting 
between the two Koreas since the peninsula was divided in 1945.
We can see the series o f ideas contained in the South's suggestions took 
Pyongyang's position into account and reflected a constructive sprit. For example,
Seoul was willing to carry on a many-sided diologue with the KPDR, including 
negotiations of such important problems as military relaxation. South Korea also agreed 
to discuss American military presence in the South. The declaration of Roh Tae-woo's 
new steps in relation to the KPDR was not simple posturing but a preparedness for 
earnest dialogue with an equal partner.42
There was enough evidence of a sincere readiness for a compromise between 
both sides. But whenever the two sides met at a table for talks, they are restricted to 
discussions on insignificant procedural matters and mutual reproaches. Why do they not
39. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 10 October 1989, p. 3.
40. See Dae-sook Suh, "Changes in North Korea and inter-relations", in Korea and World Affairs, vol. 14, no. 
4 (Winter 1990), pp. 610-625; Hong-koo Lee, "Call for Building National Community - As a Prerequisite to 
Reunification", Korea and World Affairs, vol. 14, no. 4 (Winter 1990), pp. 609-610.
41. Izvestiya, 1 September 1989, p. 5.
42. Ibid.
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go further than handshakes? According to Pravda's view, the main reason is that both 
sides are not prepared to compromise. Sometimes it seems that they speak in different 
languages, not understanding each other or even not hearing the other party. Of course, 
it is the result o f suspicion and mutual attacks for the past 40 years.43
According to Izvesiiyds view, the problem of the unification of the Korean 
peninsula is not only an internal issue of the Korean people but is also connected with 
many international issues and with Soviet national interests.44
The Soviet Union considered Korean reunification as an internal affair of the 
Korean nation and to be achievable on the basis of the will of North and South Koreans 
themselves, without any outside interference. In principle, the Soviet government 
supported the idea o f peaceful unification.
However, the Soviet Union had always resolutely supported the DPRK's efforts 
to unify Korea. In his speech at a dinner in the Kremlin in honour o f Kim Il-sung in 
October 1986, Gorbachev said 'the Soviet people fully support the Korean people's just 
cause - the reunification of their motherland. It is clear that the path towards 
reunification does not pass across the Korean peninsula alone. It is inseparably bound 
up with the general struggle against imperialist policy in the Asian-Pacific region, with 
the genuine improvement of the overall situation there, and with the development of 
good-neighbourly relations'.45 In his interview with the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka, 
Gorbachev said 'we support the policy of the DPRK aimed at a peaceful reunification of 
the country, and at the elimination of military tension'.46 In his Beijing address in May 
1989, Gorbachev said 'I wish once again to reaffirm our unwavering support for the 
efforts o f the DPRK aimed at the peaceful and democratic reunification of Korea. This, 
obviously, requires the defusing of tensions on the peninsula and the withdrawal of US
43. Pravda, 16 October 1989, p. 6.
44. Izvesliya, 1 September 1989, p. 5.
45. Pravda, 25 October 1986, p. 2.
46. Izvestiya, 23 July 1987, p. 2.
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troops: any arguments favouring the continued presence of those troops in the region 
have long ceased to be justified'.47
In December 1990, however, Gorbachev pledged to support the South Korean 
government's step-by-step approach toward the reunification of the divided nation.48 
During a meeting on Cheju Island in April 1991, Gorbachev reaffirmed that the Soviet 
Union shared the Korean poeple's aspiration for unity and would support all 
constructive efforts leading to this goal, first of all the dialogue between the 
governments o f the northern and southern parts of the country. That, he made clear, 
was Moscow's unchanged position on this problem.49 As shown above, Gorbachev 
reiterated the Soviet Union's principled position on the peaceful reunification o f North 
and South Korea.
On the Soviet side, Korean reunification could not be settled on the basis of a 
capitalist or a socialist system. As the Korean War proved, any attempt to solve the 
Korean problem by force could only aggravate the situation in Korea and lead to a new 
international conflict. According to a Soviet Korean specialist, if a "neutral 
compromise" is suitable to both Pyongyang and Seoul then it could be accepted by the 
superpowers. Its main advantage lies in leading to an end of the Korean conflict and to 
the creation of preconditions for normal relations in the Far East.50
The reunification of Germany provided a clear-cut answer to the question of what 
it takes to make such processes possible. The Soviet Union recognized the existence of 
two Germanies back in the 1950s and claimed that their reunification was impossible.51 
But Gorbachev, in the event, accepted German reunification. On 4 October 1990,
47. Pravda, 18 May 1989, p. 2.
48. The Korea Times, 15 December 1990, p. 1.
49. Pravda, 23 April 1991, p. 5.
50. Vasily V. Mikheev, 'A Korean Settlement: New Political Thinking vs. Old Ambitions', Korea and World 
Affairs, vol. 13, no. 4 (Winter 1989), p. 681.
51. Leonid Mlechin, 'Weighing anchor: New Soviet Policy on the Korean peninsula', New Times, no. 26 
(1990), pp. 22-24.
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Ireunification occurred when the parliaments from East and West Germany were 
brought together in a single parliament. Similarly, the Soviet Union once refused to 
admit the existence of two Koreas and then recognized the two Koreas and insisted on 
a reunification.
Perestroika of the international system opened new possibilities and expectations 
in the process of the unification of Korean peninsula. To begin with, one of the primary 
obstacles to the unification of Korea, the ideological bipolar conflict between socialism 
and capitalism on world scale, disappeared. According to a Soviet Korean specialist, 
once the chain reaction of diplomatic recognition of the ROK was underway, it was 
important not to miss one chance. Adherence to old ideological dogmas should not 
prevent the opportunity for reunification from being used.52 Unqualified support for 
Pyongyang and refusal to recognize Seoul would hardly be advantageous to the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry which was anxious to rid itself of all aspects of the costly cold war 
structure.53 Today, it partly remains only on the national level.
The problem of national unity should be solved along the way of national 
consensus, improvement of relations and gradual rapproachment of the two parts o f the 
divided nation. Reunification does not seem to be feasible within a short period of time; 
it can be attained only through a gradual, peaceful and democratic process. The 
creation o f peaceful conditions with the elimination of military confrontation is the 
primary pre-requisite for resolving the whole matter.
If  the Russians could play a significant role in fostering Korean reunification 
under Seoul's direction, it could lead to a broad political modus vivendi between a 
noncommunist Moscow and a new unified Korea in the 1990s. With Korea's
antagonism toward both China and Japan, that would give Moscow a new vantage
point on East Asia geopolitics.
When he visited in Seoul in November 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin
52. New Times, no. 25 (1990), p. 31.
53. New Times, no. 26 (1990), p. 23.
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supported the South Korean position that inter-Korean issues including reunification 
should be resolved by the two Koreas. He said 'outside barriers in overcoming the 
division o f the Korean peninsula have collapsed. Now, reunification is in the hands of 
people in the two Koreas'.54 In the Korean-Russian joint statement of 20 November 
1992, the two presidents concurred that unification of the two Koreas should be 
realized in a peaceful manner through dialogues between the two parties concerned and 
reaffirmed that the faithful implementation of the 'South-North Agreement on 
Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation' and the 'South-North 
Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula' was essential for making 
meaningful progress in the South-North dialogues.55
Both Koreas are committed to the path of reunification by gradual transition. A 
more balanced and slower approach to unity will have greater chance o f establishing 
long term harmony and effective order.56 Peaceful reunification depends upon the 
ability o f the North and the South, together with their political partners, to reject old 
ambitions and to create new solutions out of old contradictions.57
However, as Alexander Vobin, a political analyst for Izvestiya, observed in an 
interview with the Yonhap News Agency: 'the reunification of the two divided halves 
may be possible only after there is an epochal change in the North'.58 As Vobin 
indicated, without a fundamentally changed government in North Korea, any 
substantive progress in the contacts for the unification between the North and the 
South will be slow at best.
7.2 Moscow-Seoul Relations
54. The Korea Herald, 20 November 1992, p. 2.
55. The Korea Herald, 21 November 1992, p. 2.
56. Dan C. Sanford, 'ROK's Nordpolitik: Revisited", the Journal o f East Asian Affairs, vol. vii, no. 1 
(Winter/Spring 1993), p. 28.
57. Mikheev, 'A Korean settlement: new political thinking vs. old ambitions', p. 688.
58. The Korea Herald, 3 November 1990, p. 2.
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Gorbachev's foreign policy towards South Korea took both internal and external 
factors into account. Internally, the Soviet Union had an economic problem. Gorbachev 
had been enforcing drastic economic reform since he came to power. For this 'national 
interest' he wanted economic cooperation with Seoul. Hence, he felt the necessity of 
changing their policies towards South Korea. Externally, the Soviet Union aimed to 
reduce the widely held perception of a Soviet threat and to gain acceptance as 
legitimate participant in the region's affairs.59 This goal entailed a desire for improved 
relations with South Korea and suggestions of a peaceful coexistence between the two 
Koreas.
Gorbachev in his Krasnoyarsk speech indicated a positive shift in the Soviet 
Union's policy towards South Korea. The following statement appeared in the 
concluding section of the speech: 'I think that in the context of a general improvement 
o f the situation in the Korean peninsula possibilities can open up for forming economic 
relations with South Korea as well'.60 In this sentence, Gorbachev spelled out the 
'possibility' o f the Soviet Union forming economic relations with South Korea. In the 
light o f the urgency and importance of accelerating the development of Siberia, the 
USSR viewed South Korean investment in natural resource exploration and 
infrastructure development as positive for the ongoing economic reform and 
modernization drive in the region.61 The second reference was made in his seven-point 
proposal: 'the USSR suggests that the question o f lowering military confrontation in the 
areas where the coasts of the USSR, the PRC, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea 
converge be discussed on a multilateral basis with a view to freezing and
59. See Jurgen Glaubitz, "The Soviet Union and the Korean Peninsula", Aussenpolitik, no. 1 (1992), pp. 82- 
91; Mette Skak, "External Dynamics of the Korean Conflict: The Present Soviet Policy Reorientation", 
Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 24 (1989), pp. 19-33.
60. Izvestiya, 18 September 1988, p. 2.
61. Chan-young Bang, 'Seoul-Moscow: Economic Cooperation and Security', Far Eastern Affairs, no. 6 
(1989), p. 76.
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commensurately lowering the levels of naval and air forces and limiting their activity'.62 
In this sentence, Gorbachev's proposal for a multilateral conference deserves particular 
attention for two reasons. Firstly, he called for a five-nation conference excluding the 
United States. Second, his five-nation conference idea was closer to then South Korean 
President Roh Tae-woo's proposal of a six-nation conference including the United 
States than North Korea leader Kim Il-sung's proposal of a three-way meeting.63 With 
Gorbachev's peace initiative, the Soviet government attempted to reduce external 
pressure so that it could concentrate on domestic issues.
All these proposals illustrated policies for closer economic ties and for a 
reduction of tension on the Korean peninsula. After Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk speech 
the Soviet Union steadily increased its activity within the framework of non-political 
relations with South Korea. When Gorbachev visited Beijing in May 1989 he again 
called for convening an international conference of the two Koreas and the four major 
powers to discuss Korean problems. Shevardnadze reiterated this proposal in his 
September 1990 speech in Vladivostok.64
By being the first great power to establish diplomatic relations with both Koreas, 
Moscow hoped to put itself into a good position to play a mediating role.65 In August 
1988, an assistant to President Roh reportedly carried a presidential letter to President 
Gorbachev; the latter also sent a letter through an ethnic Korean academician to the 
former in December 1988. President Kim Young-sam, then President o f the opposition 
Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), visited the Soviet Union at the invitation o f 
Yevgeniy Primakov, then director o f the Institute of World Economic and International
62. Bang, 'Seoul-Moscow: Economic Cooperation and Security', p. 76.
63. In Kim Il-sung's the three-way conference, he proposed a tripartite talk between North Korea, South Korea 
and the United States to deal with such outstanding issues as the US troop withdrawal, the withdrawal of the 
nuclear weapons, the reduction of the North and South Korean military forces, and the conclusion of a peace 
treaty, which will replace the present Military Amistice Agreement.
64. Eduard Shevardnadze, The Asia-Pacific Region - Dialogue, Peace, Cooperation', International Affairs 
(Moscow) (November 1990), p. 127.
65. Peggy Falkenheim Meyer, 'Gorbachev and post-Gorbachev policy toward the Korean peninsula', p. 765.
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Relations(IMEMO), in June 1989. The RDP and IMEMO agreed to develop mutual 
contacts.66 At a press conference in Moscow the leader of RDP called for far broader 
contact between South Korea and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.67
On 8 December 1989, the two countries agreed to establish de facto consular 
ties, and they exchanged consular offices in March 1990. The opening of a direct air 
service, and the establishment of telex, telephone and mail communication in March 
1990 also contributed to the development of bilateral ties.68
By the autumn of 1989 the Soviet government became sure of the desirability of 
total recognition as soon as possible. Deputy foreign minister Kunadze said that 'It was 
indeed a revolution of our perceptions. Of course, it had much to do with the dramatic 
changes in overall Soviet policy. Also, the international environment was obviously 
changing for the better [see chapters 2,3 and 4], enabling us to consider a much more 
radical approach towards the ROK than the Soviet Union imagined possible only a year 
earlier'.69
7 .2 .1  S o v i e t - S o u t h  K o r e a n  S u m m it  M e e t in g s
San Francisco Meeting (4 June 1990)
On 4 June 1990, President Roh Tae-woo met Soviet President Gorbachev in San 
Francisco, as the latter was completing his leg of the summit meeting with the U.S. 
President George Bush. The summit meeting became possible in the context of the 
positive changes that had begun in the Asian-Pacific region.70 It also reflected the 
USSR's principled approach in line with the new political thinking. From this junction
66. Moscow News, no. 26 (1989), p. 6.
67. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 8 July 1989, p. 5.
68. Faminsky, Nashi Delovie Partnery: Respublika Koreya, p. 36.
69. Kunadze, 'USSR-ROK: Agenda for the Future', p. 202.
70. Pravda, 6 June 1990, p. 6.
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Soviet-Korean ties were firmly put on a road to full-scale mutual recognition.71
Evidently, the Soviet leadership was prepared to normalize diplomatic relations 
between the two countries to maintain its own position in Northeast Asia, an area of 
vital importance to Soviet national interests.72 For example, Anatoly Dobrynin, an 
advisor to Gorbachev, came to Seoul to meet President Roh on 23 May 1990.
President Kim Young Sam, then executive chairman of the ruling Democratic Liberal 
party, also led a high-level party and government delegation to Moscow on 20 March 
1990. During a meeting between Kim and Gorbachev, it was agreed that it would be 
good for both countries to normalize bilateral relations in the near future. The meeting 
provided an impetus to Soviet-South Korean relations. Kim reported back to then 
President Roh that the Soviet leader saw no insurmountable obstacles to the 
establishment o f full diplomatic relations between the two countries, and President Roh 
began looking for the chance - a dramatic event to make it happen.73 On 2 August 1990 
a 20-member delegation from Seoul led by Kim Chong-in, Roh's senior secretary for 
economic affairs, visited Moscow for talks on economic cooperation and the 
establishment o f diplomatic ties with Soviet government leaders.74
On the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries, 
Gorbachev said 'this may arise as bilateral ties develop and in the context o f the general 
improvement o f the political situation in the region and on the Korean peninsula'.75 In 
reply to a question on the possibility of diplomatic ties in early September 
Shevardnadze, who was visiting the Soviet Far East, said 'we will develop the
71. Kunadze, 'USSR-ROK: Agenda for the Future1, p. 203.
72. Gennady Chufrin, 'The USSR and Asia Pacific in 1 9 9 0 Asian Survey, vol. 30, no. 1 (January 1991), p. 
16.
73. Newsweek, 11 June 1990, p. 22.
74. Hak-joon Kim, The Republic of Korea's policy to bring peace on the Korean peninsula', The Journal o f  
East Asian Affairs, vol. 6, no. 1 (Winter/ Spring 1990), p. 6.
75. TASS, 5 June 1990.
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relationship with South Korea, proceeding, first of all, from our national interest'.76 
Defence Minister Yazov said, for the first time, that it would be possible to establish 
diplomatic ties between Moscow and Seoul 'in this year'.77 Genrikh Kireev, general- 
director for Asian socialist countries at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, called Gong Ro- 
myung, then the head of the Korean Consular Department in Moscow, to his office in 
September 1990 and told him that his government might agree to set up full ties with 
South Korea during the foreign ministers' meeting on 30 September 1990, if Korea 
desired.78
On 30 September 1990, at a meeting in New York between Foreign Ministers 
Eduard Shevardnadze and Choi Ho-joong, it was announced that Seoul and Moscow 
would immediately establish diplomatic relations. The communique brought back to 
normalcy Korea-Soviet relations, which had been cut off with the abrogation o f all 
treaties between the Choson Dynasty and Russia in 1904 forced by Japan.
Shevardnadze said the normalization of ties between South Korea and the Soviet Union 
would become a turning point in Seoul-Soviet relations. Shevardnadze stated that the 
fact that there are two independent Korean states -the KPDR and the ROK- is the 
existing reality o f the situation.79 Shevardnadze emphasized at the same time that the 
Soviet Union intended to continue to develop its traditionally friendly and good- 
neighbourly relations with the KPDR. In this regard, no change was taking place 
between the two nations.80
Vasily Mikheev, deputy chief of the Asian socialist countries department at the 
Soviet Institute for International Economic and Political Studies, observed that 'these 
diplomatic relations are needed to fill the still-existing vacuum of political
76. Izvestiya, 11 September 1990, p. 5.
77. Kyodo press, 17 September 1990, cited in the Hankook Ilbo, 19 September 1990.
78. The Korea Herald, 2 October 1990, p. 2.
79. Izvestiya, 2 October 1990, p. 7.
80. Ibid.
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communication between and among the nations in the general Asian-Pacific structure of 
international relations. To reject normal contacts with any country only because the 
third side, let it be even our formal ally, objects, does not blend very well with the new 
philosophy of foreign policy'.81
Following this normalization of diplomatic relations, the process of interaction 
between Seoul and Moscow accelerated. On 16 November 1990, Vadim Medvedev, a 
member of the Soviet Presidential Council, came to Seoul with a 14-member mission, 
carrying a letter from President Gorbachev to President Roh, inviting Roh to visit 
Moscow. In the letter, Gorbachev expressed his strong desire for the expansion of 
bilateral economic cooperation in all fields.82
Moscow Meeting (14 December 1990)
At the historic meeting in Moscow on 14 December 1990, President Roh Tae- 
woo and the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev issued a joint "declaration on general 
principles of relations," dubbed the "Moscow Declaration", which sought to define the 
overall relationship between South Korea and the Soviet Union.83 After a two-hour talk 
at the Kremlin, they stated that Moscow and Seoul were fully determined to build 
relations in a spirit of good neighbourliness, trust and cooperation in the interests o f the 
peoples of both states.84
In a declaration jointly issued with Roh on 14 December 1990, Gorbachev 
stressed the 'inadmissibility of the threat or use of force, of providing one's own security 
at the expense of other states, and of settling international controversies and regional 
conflicts by any means other than reaching political agreements on the basis of
81. The Korea Herald, 21 December 1990, supplement, p. 4.
82. Izvestiya, 24 November 1990, p. 4.
83. In his letter, delivered by visiting Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev, Gorbachev said 'The 
declaration has contributed to laying a firm ground for the development of ties between the two countries and 
the fostering of peace, stability and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region'. The Korea Herald, 8 January 
1991, pp. 1-2.
84. Izvestiya, 15 December 1990, p. 1 and 7.
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reasonable consent by all the parties concerned'.85 It was an indication that Moscow 
would not back Pyongyang in the event of a northern invasion of the South. In his talks 
with Roh in Moscow, Gorbachev indicated that the Soviet Union was increasingly 
supportive o f Seoul's position regarding such issues as entry into the United Nations, 
arms reduction on the peninsula, and the ultimate task of national reunification.86
Gorbachev agreed with Roh that South Korea should gain U.N. membership, 
preferably simultaneously with North Korea. He also agreed when Roh said that South 
and North Korea should first try to restore mutual trust and tackle inter-Korean 
problems in a gradual manner. They also pledged joint efforts toward the elimination of 
the cold war in Asia, the relaxation of tension on the Korean peninsula, and the 
eventual reunification of South and North Korea.87 The principles of "good 
neighbourly" relations referred to respect for each other's sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political independence, non-interference in the internal affairs and freedom 
to choose their own way of political and socioeconomic development.88 In addition the 
two sides pledged to abide by such diplomatic norms as: compliance with the standards 
of international law, including respect for the U.N. Charter; rejection of the threat or 
use of force in settling international disputes; development o f mutually beneficial 
cooperative measures; dealing with the global issues of reducing the arms race, 
preventing environmental disaster, overcoming poverty, famine and illiteracy, and 
narrowing the gap between the rich and poor nations; and establishing a secure and 
equitable world for the future.89
Proceeding from these general principles, a variety of agreements were signed by
85. Izvestiya, 15 December 1990, p. 7; For full English text of the Moscow Declaration, see The Korean 
Journal o f  International Studies, vol. xxii, no. 1 (Spring 1991), pp. 149-151.
86. See VestnikMinisterstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR, no. 1(83) (15 January 1991), p. 2.
87. Ibid.
88. See, Izvestiya, 15 December 1990, p. 7; also see VestnikMinisterstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR, no. 1(83) 
(15 January 1991), pp. 3-4.
89. Ibid.
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the officials o f the two governments. These included agreements on trade, civil 
aviation, science and technology cooperation, and the avoidance of double taxation for 
investors. They also discussed the possibility of signing agreements on investment 
protection and fishery.90
On 6 January 1991 the Soviet deputy foreign minister Igor Rogachev arrived in 
Seoul, carrying a letter from Soviet leader Gorbachev. In his letter, Gorbachev said 
'The Soviet Union's economic difficulties are not only its domestic problem but a matter 
related with interests o f the international community. In this context, many countries o f 
the world have been providing assistance to us, and I also hope for support from South 
Korea'.91 Shevardnadze, until he announced his resignation on 19 December 1990, was 
scheduled to make the trip to Seoul to arrange, among other things, for Gorbachev's 
subsequent visit to Seoul in early 1991.92 As it turned out President Gorbachev stopped 
overnight at Cheju Island, to meet with President Roh, on his way back from a visit to 
Japan in April 1991.
Cheju Meeting (20 April 1991)
The historic visit o f Gorbachev to South Korea's southern island of Cheju, his 
third encounter with President Roh, symbolized the speedy pace of reconciliation 
between Seoul and Moscow. A couple of years earlier it would have been 
unimaginable.
Gorbachev and Roh touched on a broad range of issues, including trade 
expansion and new Soviet initiatives for peace between the two Koreas. "We view as 
valuable our relations with North Korea", Gorbachev told reporters before leaving. "At 
the same time I am happy that our relations with South Korea continue to develop." "I 
feel sympathy for the Korean people who feel deep pain about the division of the
90. Izvestiya, 15 December 1990, p. 1.
91. The Korea Herald, 8 January 1991, p. 1.
92. Izvestiya, 16 December 1990, p. 4.
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peninsula", he said.93
Gorbachev not only confirmed his promise to support the entry of South Korea 
into the United Nations later in the year but also proposed to conclude with Seoul a 
treaty of "good neighbourhood and cooperation" that would mark another step forward 
in Soviet-South Korean relations.94
In fact, during the meeting on Cheju Island President Roh appeared as a more 
consistent Gorbachev supporter than many prominent people who supported 
perestroika back home. It seems Roh understood the problems better than most: both 
hinted at their affinity as politicians burdened with the monumental task of liberating 
their societies from totalitarianism. South Korean's interest in the summit's success was 
even stronger. Seoul wanted and needed Soviet diplomatic support in its confrontation 
with communist North Korea. The "northern policy", crowned by relations with 
Moscow, was associated with Roh, who took the oppotunity to flaunt his special 
relations with Gorbachev.95
South Korea and Soviet military leaders firstly made reciprocal visits to both 
countries since Seoul and Moscow established fully-fledged diplomatic relations in 
1990. Lt. General Viktor I. Novozhilov, commander of the Soviet Army's Far Eastern 
Military District, exchanged views on peace and security in the Northeast Asian region 
with Defence Minister Lee Jong-koo in Seoul. General Novozhilov said that the Soviet 
Union had reduced its ground and naval forces deployed in the East Asian region down 
to the 200,000 level.96
What was in all this for Moscow? Although positive international shifts happened 
as indicated in chapter 3, 4 and 5, the biggest motivation to recognize the ROK grew
93. The Sunday Times, 21 April 1991, p. 14.
94. VestnikMinisterstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR, no. 9(91) (15 May 1991), p. 31; also see Gennady Chufrin, 
'The USSR and Asia in 1991: Domestic Priorities Prevail', Asian Survey, vol. xxxii, no. 1 (January 1992), p. 
15; For the full text of the Cheju summit agreement see The Korea Herald, 21 April 1991, p. 4.
95. Soviet Weekly, 9 May 1991, p. 3.
96. The Korea Times, 7 November 1991, p. 31.
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out of Soviet domestic politics. A market economy, liberal democracy, basic human 
rights - all these concepts had been remarkably absent in and indeed profoundly alien to 
Marxism-Leninism. That was the main reason why domestic political forces became 
divided along the lines of radical liberalism versus orthodox Marxism. That was also the 
reason why Soviet hard-liners started to attack the cause of perestroika openly, quite 
logically using North Korea and Cuba as examples of model socialist societies. In 
Georgii Kunadze's, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, interpretation 
starting from the moment when North Korea appeared at the centre of Soviet domestic 
controversy, it became vitally important for all supporters of radical reforms in the 
USSR to push through the cause of the diplomatic recognition of the ROK as fast as 
possible in order to deny conservatives the very ground for their obstinate arguments.97 
Moscow wanted investment and trade and was prepared to undermine its long-standing 
and barren ties with North Korea to get them. Although economically South Korea was 
not in the same league as Japan, there was potential for a dramatic rise in cooperation. 
And, most importantly, Moscow finally secured a supporter in the emerging Asian- 
Pacific economic members include the U.S., Japan and Australia. South Korea 
sponsorship offered the hope of not being left out in the cold. Moreover, Gorbachev 
and Roh drew the parallels.98
7.3 China's policy changes after Moscow-Seoul relations
7 .3 .1  C h i n a - S o u t h  K o r e a n  R e la t io n s
South Korea and China buried 40 years of Cold War hostility by establishing
97. George F. Kunadze, 'USSR-ROK: Agenda for the Future', Korea and World Affairs, vol. 15, no. 2 
(Summer 1991), pp. 202-203.
98. Soviet Weekly, 9 May 1991, p. 3.
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diplomatic relations on 25 August 1992." Beijing and Seoul lacked formal ties since 
the Korean peninsula had been divided after World War Two and Communist China 
had been founded in 1949. The two fought on opposite sides in the 1950-53 Korean 
war and China remained a North Korean ally. South Korea regarded the establishing of 
formal ties with Beijing as a key to eventual detente with North Korea. President Roh 
said "the normalization of ties between our two countries marks a significant turning 
point in world history in that it heralds the beginning of the end o f the cold war in East 
Asia."100
The two countries agreed to "develop good-neighbourly relations" and said the 
normalisation was "conducive to the relaxation of tension and stability on the Korean 
peninsula and also to peace and stability in Asia." Seoul recognised Beijing as "the sole 
legal government of China and respects the position of the Chinese side that there is but 
one China and Taiwan is part of China".101
A South Korean television report said on 8 September 1991 that Deng Xiaoping 
had sent a message to the South Korean government via Hong Kong calling for full 
diplomatic ties between Seoul and Beijing. The report also said that Mr. Deng had 
announced that the time had come for South Korea and China, once bitter foes, to set 
up diplomatic relations to enhance economic cooperation. Foreign Ministry officials 
were not available to comment. Although China recognized Communist North Korea 
only, its commercial ties with Seoul outstripped its trade with Pyongyang. The report 
further said Seoul and Beijing were expected to start talks on normalizing ties during 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen of China visit to Seoul in November 1991 to attend the
99. Over the 40 years China's ties toward South Korea has basically been changing to be subordinated to 
China-North relation as a part of China's East Asia strategy. Hao Yufan, 'China and the Korean Peninsula: A 
Chinese View', As/aw Survey, vol. 27, no. 8 (August 1987), p. 862.
100. Financial Times, 25 August 1992, p. 4.
101. Tiapei cut ties with Seoul pre-emptively and announced the suspension of airline flights. Taiwan officials 
said they were also considering trade retaliation and developing economic relations with North Korea. In 




ministerial meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference.102
Links with Beijing represented a vital part of Roh's "nordpolitik" policy - the 
wooing o f communist and former communist patrons of North Korea to pave the way 
for reunification of the peninsula, divided into hostile halves for nearly four decades. 
Since Roh assumed the presidency in February 1988, Seoul had established diplomatic 
ties with most eastern European countries. In 1990 it set up diplomatic relations with 
Moscow.
China was the only one powerful enough to exert any influence on a fiercely 
independent Pyongyang and its autocratic leader Kim Il-sung. North Korea was certain 
to be unhappy at the prospect of diplomatic ties between its northerly neighbour and 
China. China had backed the North since the partition of the peninsula after the Second 
World War. "There will not be any changes to the treaties and agreements signed with 
the DPRK," Foreign Ministry spokesman Wu Jianmin told reporters after the signing 
ceremony.103 Premier Li Peng told visiting then ROK Foreign Minister Lee Sang-ock 
that China maintained "very good" relations with the DPRK and that such relations 
would "continue to develop after the establishment of China's diplomatic ties with the 
ROK." He added that it would be conducive to the continued dialogue and 
improvement of relations between the ROK and the DPRK.104
Although Beijing insisted that its relations with North Korea would remain 
unchanged, the move would inevitably raise pressure on Pyongyang to be more 
accommodating in its dealings with Seoul. Thus, there was a danger that Chinese-South 
Korean relations might intensity North Korea's sense o f isolation. That could push it 
further down the road to self-reliance - which Pyongyang might believe could be 
assured only through possession of nuclear weapons as seen in section 6.2.2.
The development of Beijing-Seoul ties could lead Pyongyang to forge ties with
102. International Herald Tribune, 9 September 1991, p. 2.
103. China Daily, 25 August 1992, p. 1.
104. Ibid.
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the United States and Japan - traditional allies of South Korea - and break down a 
vestige o f the Cold War that had ended elsewhere in the world. The normalization 
would further enhance China's influence in Asia at a time of changing political 
relationships in the region and should boost already growing trade and investment links.
7 .3 .2  C h i n a - S o u t h  K o r e a n  E c o n o m ic  Ties
Despite the lack of diplomatic relations, trade and investment links between the 
two countries expanded quickly in the 1990s. The Beijing-Seoul rapproachment came 
as trade between the two neighbours soared over the last 10 years and as South Korean 
investors established footholds throughout northeastern China.
In October 1990, the two sides agreed to establish unofficial representative 
offices in each other's capitals with the power to issue visas. Economic relations were 
further stimulated after the beginning of 1991 by the exchange of trade offices in Seoul 
and Beijing. Xi Kayou, head of the Chinese trade representative office in Seoul, 
observed that increased economic exchanges between South Korea and China would 
encourage the early establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.105 
In 1992, the two countries opened Bank of China and Korean Exchange Bank offices in 
each other's capitals.106
Table 7.2 China-South Korean Trade 
(US Million Dollars)
Years 79 ’80 '81 ’82 ’83 ’84 '85 '86 '87 '88 '89 90 *91* '92**
Total 19 183 335 122 129 442 1.246 1.249 1.613 2.937 3.055 3.702 5.812 8.220
Export 15 73 148 81 83 233 607 615 866 1.387 1.705 2.268 3.441 3.730
Import 4 110 187 41 46 209 639 643 747 1.550 1.350 1.434 2.371 4.490
105. Financial Times, 23 August 1991, p. 6.
106. On 25 May 1993, the People's Construction Bank of China, the country's leading financier of capital 
construction, established a representative office in Seoul, South Korea. The move is designed to further 
promote trade between China and South Korea as well as strengthen co-operation in finance and investment. 
China Daily, 26 May 1993, p. 2.
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B alance +11 -37 -39 +40 +37 +24 -32 -27 +119 -163 +355 +824  + 1 .070 -760
Sources: Association of Korean Customc Trade: 1979-1990; * See Hankuk Ilbo , 25 August 1992, p. 6; ** See China D aily , 29 
March 1993, p. 2.
Beijing and Seoul began to have an indirect trade relationship since China carried 
out a reform and open door policy in 1979.107 Since then their trade volume continued 
to rise up to 5.812 billion dollars in 1991. The ROK has been China's seventh largest 
trading partner, ranking fifth in accepting Chinese exports, and China ranks third on the 
ROK's foreign trade list. In 1989, Sino-South Korean trade totalled less than 3.1 billion 
dollars, less than double the 1987 figure. On 20 December 1991, South Korea and 
China initiated a trade accord to grant each other most-favoured-nation trading 
status.108 Two-way trade in 1991 totalled 5.8 billion, putting China in fourth place close 
on the heels o f Germany. In 1992, bilateral trade topped 8.2 billion dollars, a hefty 41.2 
percent increase on the 1991 figure. Of the turnover, China's exports stood at 3.7 
billion dollars and imports at 4.5 billion dollars.109 The booming direct trade was 
expected to hit an 8 billion dollar level in 1993 with a first surplus seen for Seoul.110 In 
the first three months of 1993, China was the biggest importer of iron and steel 
products and second-biggest buyer of cars from South Korea, after the US.111
Table 7.3 1985-1992 Korean investment in China 
(U.S. Thousand dollars)
Total investment Investment through the third country
Year ----------------------------------------------------------
107. Xuecui Lou, Chen Xiurong, '"Yellow Sea Era' and Economic Cooperation between China and Korea", in 
The Changing World Order, Bum-joon Lee and Sung-chul Yang, eds. (Seoul: the Korean Association of the 
International Studies, 1992), p. 266.
108. International Herald Tribune, 21-22 December 1991, p. 15.
109. China Daily, 29 March 1993, p. 2.
110. Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 May 1993, p. 46.
111. For example, South Korean Hyundai models were selling at a premium in Peking and other cities, 
boosting the first quarter shipment to 14,700 units worth US$9.5 million. Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 
May 1993, p. 46.
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figure o f  item volum e o f  m oney figure o f  item volum e o f  money
1985 1 144 -
1986 2 1.750 1.500
1987 1 6.034 6.034
1988 5 5.046 2.006
1989 17 12.033 5.060
1990 40 56.178 1.315
1991* 116 79.000 -
1992** 943 619.000 -
Sources: Bank of Korea: 1985-90; * See Korea Ministry ofTrade and Industry; ** See China D a ily  Business W eekly, 11-17 
April 1993, p. 1.
Trade and investment links between the two countries have expanded quickly in 
recent years. The benefits of the bilateral ties forged in September last year are already 
evident in the trade and investment figures. Exports to China were up 162 percent in 
the first quarter over the previous year's levels, totalling 1.1 billion dollars; China now 
accounts for 30.2 percent of total overseas South Korean investment.112
Investments in China, concentrated mostly in six north-eastern areas including 
Shandong and Tianjin, grew impressively, reaching 140 millon dollars in 1992 alone. 
This represented an enormous increase of over 42.4 million dollars in 69 projects 
carried out in 1991. By the end of 1992, Seoul's cumulative investments in China 
totalled 205 million dollars in 270 projects.113
South Korean businessmen people had already launched a number of joint 
ventures in China. Wei Xiaorong, deputy director general of the Asian Affairs 
Department of the Ministry of Economic Relations and Trade(Mofert), explained that 
about 90 percent of ROK's investment in China ended up in the manufacturing sectors, 
including the food, drink, textiles and electric and electronics industries. Wei added that 
ROK investment in China was also ready to move into commerce, tourism and real
112. Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 May 1993, p. 42.
113. Ibid., p. 46.
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estate. China has been the third largest country of ROK's overseas investment in terms 
of total volume, and the second largest after the US in terms of the number of 
projects.114
The Republic of Korea has become an important trade partner of China's 
Shandong and Liaoning provinces in recent years. For example, Shandong province has 
traded with ROK for many years and in 1991 the province's export volume to that 
country reached 342 million dollars, seven times that of 1988. The ROK has become 
the province's third largest trade partner after Japan and Hong Kong. At the same time 
the country has established 105 joint ventures in the Shandong Province with a total 
investment of 91 million dollars, accounting for more than 50 percent of its total 
investment in China. Meanwhile, the ROK has funded 158 enterprises in the Liaoning 
province, according to Jiang Delong, Deputy Director of the Liaoning Provincial 
committee of Foreign Economic Relations with Trade.115
During the first half of 1992, the Bank of Korea, the central bank, approved 
South Korean investments o f 76 million dollars to China, compared with 79 million 
dollars for the whole of 1991 and 59 million dollars in 1990.116 According to Mofert 
statistics, the ROK promised to invest 170 million dollars in 228 projects in China in the 
first six months of last year. Between 1979 and 1991, actual investment in the period 
was only 56.3 million dollars.117 Through 1992 South Korea committed 619 million 
dollars to 945 projects in China. Actual input was 170 million dollars.118 By the end o f 
1992, South Korea had launched 433 projects in China, with a total of 388 million 
dollars in promised investment.119 The pace picked up sharply after the establishment of
114. China Daily Business Weekly, 20-26 September 1992, p. 1.
115. China Daily, 29 August 1992, p. 2.
116. Hankuk Ilbo, 25 August 1992, p. 6.
117. China Daily, 26 August 1992, p. 2.
118. China Daily Bisiness Weekly, 11-17 April 1993, p. 1.
119. China Daily, 26 March 1993, p. 2.
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diplomatic relations, and scores of new investment agreements are now being signed 
each month. Park Chan-hyuk, director of the Korea Trade Centre in Beijing, said he 
expected trade between China and South Korea to top 20 billion dollars in 1993, with 
South Korean investment in China hitting 1 billion dollars in 1995. By that time, South 
Korea will be China's fourth biggest trading partner after Hong Kong, the United States 
and Japan.120
Existing South Korean investments in China are mainly labour-intensive industrial 
projects in Northeast China around the Bohai Sea, partly because of their proximity to 
that area.121 Lin Kun, deputy director general of the foreign investment administration 
department of the Moftec, pointed out that "now they're moving to Central China, 
where lies the biggest potential economic power".122
In future, South Korean investors will expand to other parts of China. South 
Korean investors will feel it easier to invest in China now because their investments will 
be protected by formal ties. On the other hand, Beijing required close ties with Seoul 
because it needs economic cooperation for the attainment of its four modernization 
programmes. Taking the Beijing government's eighth five-year plan into account, China 
maily imports fertilizer, chemical raw materials, steel and synthetic fibres from the 
ROK.123
7.4 Soviet Economic Links with South Korea
Today, Soviet society is very interested in the ROK. This is, above 
all, because the ROK has achieved the economic success that we want. We 
are confident that mutual cooperation in economic fields will contribute to
120. Ibid.
121. So far, about 90 percent of South Korean investment in China has been in labour-intensive and raw- 
materials-processing sectors. China Daily Business Weekly, 11-17 April 1993, p. 1.
122. China Daily Business Weekly, 11-17 April 1993, p. 1.
123. China Daily, 26 August 1992, p. 2.
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our perestroika cause.124
On 30 September 1990, when Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and ROK 
Foreign Minister Choi Ho-joong met in New York to establish formal relations, 
Genrikh Kireev, the chief of the Socialist Countries of Asia Administration at the Soviet 
Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, stated: 'In deciding to establish diplomatic relations with 
the ROK we considered the economic factors too. As is widely known, we established 
direct trade and economic relations two years ago. At present, however, it has become 
very difficult to push economic cooperation without establishing government to 
government relations'.125
As mentioned above, the new economic relationship with Seoul with the 
opening of diplomatic ties was expected to help boost the Soviets' stagnant economy. 
The establishment of diplomatic relations paved the way for further strengthening of the 
economic partnership. When Roh visited Moscow in December 1990, both sides 
reached an agreement on 3 billion dollars of economic cooperation.126 The Soviets 
wanted South Korea to help develop their resources (natural gas, coal, copper, 
asbestos, apatite), heavy industry (petrochemicals, paper, synthetic rubber), consumer 
products (automobiles, personal computers, video equipment, photo-copiers).127
7 .4 .1  T r a d e
The new relationship between the Soviet Union and South Korea has a potential 
for strengthening the economic infrastructure of the Soviet Union and helping its
124. Aziya i Afrika Segodniya, 5 May 1991.
125. Interview with Genrikh Kiryev, Moscow International Radio Service, 2 October 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90- 
196, 10 October 1990, p. 18.
126. In January 1991, South Korea promised 3 billion dollars of economic aid - 1 billion dollars in bank loans, 
1.5 billion dollars in tied loans for the purchase of consumer goods and 500 million dollars for deferred 
payment for the procurement of industrial plants and equipment. Delovie Lyudi, June 1992, p. 42. It has 
provided 1 billion dollars in bank loans and 8 million dollars in export credit until March 1992. the Korea 
Herald, 18 March 1992, p. 2.
127. Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 September 1990, p. 86.
230
transition to a market economy. ROK had already made significant inroads into the 
trade of many Communist nations - for example, its trade volume even with PRC 
significantly exceeded that of the DPRK (see section 7.3.2).128 The DPRK's Gross 
National Product, at the same time, was just a sixth of the size of that of the ROK. 
While relations with ROK were no panacea for the Soviet Union's many economic ills, 
it was a contact with a strong, vibrant economy that had had to overcome some, 
although not all, of the barriers to the former Soviet Union's economic restructuring. 
The problem was how able the Soviet Union would be in absorbing the lessons it could 
learn from ROK business and management.
It is necessary to stress that from the very beginning the development of Soviet- 
South Korean economic relations depended not only upon bilateral but also upon the 
regional economic situation. On the other hand growing Moscow-Seoul dialogue 
became an important factor of the contemporary situation in the Pacific area. At the end 
of 1980 Soviet-South Korean trade started from practically a zero level, but developed 
rather rapidly, because both sides tried to take advantage in this process of their 
unrealized trade potential.
The Soviet Union indicated the possibility of Soviet-South Korean economic
128. Table 7.4 China-North Korean Trade
(US Ten Thousand Dollars)
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991*
Total 48,839 50,939 51,330
Export 23,147 23,339 27,711
Import 25,692 27,600 23,619
Balance -2,545 -4,261 +4,092
57,902 56,292 48,274 60,100
34,535 37,737 35,816 9,000
23,367 18,535 12,458 52,000
+11,168 +19,202 +23,358 -43,000
Sources: Chinese Customs, *Hankuk Ilbo, 27 August 1992, p. 3.
contacts in Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk speech.129 On 7 July 1989, "the week of the 
Republic of Korea" was opened at Krasnaya Presnya in Moscow. Such famous Korean 
firms as "Samsung", "Gold Star", "Daewoo", "Hundai" and other companies presented 
themselves and their products, especially, domestic electrics and consumer goods. The 
mission of KOTRA was also opened in the official atmosphere of the festival in 
Moscow. Its main goal was to assist the expansion of the economic ties between South 
Korea and the Soviet Union.130
Table 7.5 Soviet-South Korean Trade 
(US Million Dollars)
Years 1980 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Total 36.1 48.0 57.3 113.0 113.8 164.2 289.9 599.4 889.0 1202.4
Export 7.1 23.0 31.1 62.3 63.9 97.0 178.3 391.7 370.0 577.3
Import 29.0 25.0 26.2 59.7 49.9 67.2 111.6 207.7 519.0 625.1
Balance -21.8 -2.0 +4.9 +2.6 +14.0 +29.8 +66.7 +184.0 -149.0 -47.8
Sources: Korea Trade Promotion Corporation(KOTRA)
Trade between both countries began in an indirect way as early as the mid-1970s. 
It was made after President Park Chung-hee's Declaration o f June 23, 1973, which 
opened the road to South Korea's positive approach toward socialist countries. 
Economic cooperation between Korea and the Soviet Union remained in the form of 
indirect trade until the early 1980s.
As seen in Table 7.5, bilateral trade amounted to 36.1 million dollars in 1980 but 
it broke through the 113 million dollars level in 1985. In 1984 the trade volume 
between South Korea and the Soviet Union was relatively very low - 68 million dollars. 
Soviet-South Korean trade increased since 1985. The Soviet Union and South Korea 
increased their economic ties especially after the Seoul Olympics in 1988. Whereas in
129. Izvestiya, 18 September 1988, p. 2.
130. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 8 July 1989, p. 5.
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1987 its volume reached 164 million dollars, in 1988 the trade volume was 290 million 
dollars.
The total trade more than doubled in 1989 to 599.4 million dollars. Exports grew 
by 86 percent to 207.7 million dollars and imports grew by 120 percent to 391.7 million 
dollars, resulting in a Korean trade deficit of 184 million dollars. But the trade balance 
between the two countries was reversed, Korean exports increasing to 519 million 
dollars but Soviet exports decreasing to 370 million dollars.
In 1991, bilateral trade amounted to 12 billion dollars with Korea enjoying a 
slight surplus of 47.8 million dollars. The trade between South Korea and the Soviet 
Union had annually increased 51.8 percent on average during 1985-1989. Exports to 
the Soviet Union in the same period rose 36.6 percent per year as shown in Table 7.5.
In 1991, economic relations between the two countries had cooled down because 
o f the Soviet Union's internal turbulence. As indicated in Table 7.5, the average annual 
growth rate o f trade between Korea and the Soviet Union was especially high in the 
period 1987 to 1990, but began to slow down considerably after 1990. Thereafter, 
South Korean exports to Russia grew more rapidly than its imports from Russia (see 
Table 7.5). The trade surplus resulted from the South's donation of economic 
cooperation funds to the former Soviet Union. This also reflected the general situation 
in Soviet foreign trade. The total volume of trade between the two countries was very 
small compared with the trade volume between Korea and China as shown in Table 7.5 
and Table 7.2 in 1991.
The basis of Soviet exports to South Korea is the supply of raw materials. In 
1989, for example, the supply of electric and coking coal (1,2 million ton or 13,9%), 
steel and metal products (2,4 %), fishery-products (16,3%), nickel (8,5%), treated logs 
and cellulose (5,6%), fertilizers and so on predominated. The structure of Soviet 
imports is basically composed of manufactured articles and services. For example, in 
1989 the main items o f imports were yam (25,7%), repair ships (19,2%), electric and
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electronics articles (11,8%), footwear (6,1%), toiletries and tooth paste (6,7%)etc.131
As mentioned above, the composition of South Korean-Soviet trade was 
complementary, with South Korea mainly exporting manufactured goods and importing 
mostly raw materials.
7 .4 .2  J o i n t  V e n t u r e s
Table 7.6 Korean Investment in the Soviet Union 
(US Million Dollars)
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992*
Amount 480,000 16.45 2.9 7.3
Number of 2 3 9 12
Projects
*January-October. Sources: Bank of Korea; cited in Financial Times, 18 
November 1992, p. 4.
Korean investment in the Soviet Union was the area o f economic cooperation 
which recieved most attention from both sides. Despite the high expectations from the 
two countries, however, the actual level of Korean investments in the Soviet Union 
remained relatively low. Only a few Korean joint ventures are actually operating in the 
former Soviet Union.
For example, total Korean investment in the Soviet Union, mostly in Russia, has 
amounted to 27 million dollars since 1989, when the two countries established trade 
offices. This was only about a tenth of the investment Korean companies made during 
the same period in China, another recently opened market for Korea, as shown in 
Tables 7.2 and 7.5.
131. Faminsky, Voitolovsky, Ershov, Khaldin and Dykov (eds.), Hashi delovye partnery: Respublika Koreya, 
pp. 38-39.
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Korean firms' direct investment in the Soviet Union has dampened much more 
than to China. Since the first Korean investment to the USSR was implemented in 
1989, only three joint ventures, amounting to about 1.5 million dollars, have been 
established in Moscow and Svetlaya. Korean investment in the Soviet Union has 
declined from its peak in 1990, when it reached 16.4 million dollars. Investment 
dropped to 2.9 million dollars in 1991. Although it rose to 7.3 million dollars during the 
first 10 months o f 1992, only 306,000 dollars has been committed since June 1992. 
Korean companies have been deterred by growing political turmoil and foreign 
exchange problems.132 Political uncertainties in the former Soviet Union dampened 
investments, limiting the cumulative total to a surprisingly small 22.5 million dollars on 
the 19 projects realised so far. Potential for big-ticket projects such as energy 
extraction have however continued to excite Korean companies' interest.133
The Korean government had given permits to 27 investment projects in the 
former Soviet Union as o f the end of October 1992, over since Seoul and Moscow set 
up trade representative offices in 1989 as indicated in Table 7.6. Following the opening 
o f official diplomatic ties between Korea and Russia in 1989, Korean companies have 
successfully engaged in wider economic cooperation with the Soviet Union.
Korea's Jindo Corp., a local fur goods-producing firm, is presently doing business 
in the Soviet Union with total investments of 480,000 dollars and a handful o f Korean 
enterprises, including Hyundai and Samsung, are making a strong push for 
advancement into the Soviet Union. Among the contracts already concluded are 
Hyundai's 1 billion dollar project to develop Svetlaya's forestry and mineral resources, 
Daewoo's 1 billion dollars deal to ship electronics and other consumer goods,
Goldstar's 800 million dollars electronics plant exports and Samsung's 900 million 
telecommunications system exports.134
132. Financial Times, 18 November 1992, p. 4.
133. Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 May 1993, p. 46.
134. The Korea Herald, 13 December 1990, supplement, p.l.
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The ROK shows considerable interest in investing in a number of joint projects, 
including the development of timber resources in an area spanning 999 thousand 
hectares in Western Siberia; in the modernization of the ports of Nakhodka and Posiet; 
in building coal mines near the town of Partizansk; in processing fish and other marine 
products; in the development of coal deposits in South Yakut-Saha and in the 
construction of the railroad to Amur-Yakutsk.
The most notable cooperative project of Samsung has been the two VCR plants 
established in Voronezh and Novgorod. Each is capable of turning out 250,000 VCRs 
annually. The VCR plant project has brought parts and facilities costing a total of 160 
million dollars.135
Beginning in September 1990 the Hyundai Group launched the development of 
forestry in Siberia. Hyundai was the most active among the Korean business concerns 
in advancing to the Soviet Union as it considered Siberia the 'last frontier' in its 
investment overseas. The group has signed contracts with the Soviet government to 
develop a coal mine and build soap and personal computer plants.136
The Samsung company signed a joint venture contract with a state-run company 
under the Russian Ministry of Communication concerning the TDX business in 
November 1991, which is now under a purchasing guarantee contract. Following its 
joint venture contract signing in November 1991, the company conducted a test 
operation using the 2,000 line TDX system already installed free o f charge by Samsung 
at Petersburg City. President Yeltsin talked on the phone at the first test operation with 
Y.M. Chung, president o f Samsung Information System Business.137
In the short term, Korea's investments into the former Soviet Union did focus on
135. The Voronezh VCR plant turned out 250,000 units of VCRs in 1990, all of which were produced for the 
local market. Samsung exported VCR production facilities with an annual production capacity with an annual 
production capacity of 250,00 units and 30,000 parts to the Novogorod VCR plant with a loan worth 21 
million dollars from the economic cooperation committee. The Korea Herald, 18 November 1992, 
supplement, p. 4.
136. The Korea Times, 21 November 1990, supplement, p. 1.
137. The Korea Herald, 18 November 1992, supplement, p. 4.
236
joint ventures manufacturing consumer items. In the longer term, developing business 
in cities was regarded as the most promising, in view of the region's easy supply of 
labour and transportation.138
Of course, there were several constraints. For example, the authority and role of 
the central government vis-a-vis the republics did not clearly redefined. More resolute 
economic reforms must have implemented to expedite a transition to a market 
economy. Trade and joint investments between the two countries were also hampered 
by the complexity of the Soviet foreign exchange rate structure, the inconvertibility of 
the rouble, and delays in the payment o f import bills, as well as by infrastructure 
inadequacies in roads, telecommunications services and ports. Although the Soviet 
government was willing to come to grips with all those problems, the necessary reforms 
were not carried out quickly enough to enable ROK-USSR economic cooperation to 
move forward more vigorously.
In sum, the main problem complicating economic cooperation was the unstable 
political and economic situation in the former Soviet Union.
138. The Korea Herald, 30 April 1991, p. 6.
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Chapter 8. Conclusion
As science and technology spread, the world became so small that specialists in 
comparative politics could no longer hold international variables constant in their 
models and, conversely, those who specialized in international politics could no longer 
afford to treat domestic variables as constant features o f the world scene.1 As indicated 
in chapter 1, after all, it is virtually a truism that nations are becoming increasingly 
interdependent and that external factors intrude into the internal life of every nation.2
In short, a shrinking world is a knot of intertwined political, economic, ethnic, 
national, military, and environmental problems. Foreign and domestic matters have 
become inextricably linked in contemporary international relations. Nations are 
becoming increasingly interdependent in a highly developed industrialized society. In 
this process we may find a key to unlocking the riddle about how domestic and foreign 
policy stimuli interact in an environment characterized as 'cascading interdependence'.
In the preceding chapters, I have attempted to highlight the domestic and external 
factors which were very interactive under Gorbachev. Domestic policy within the 
Soviet Union had a profound impact on the nature of its foreign policy and, similarly, 
the impact of the later determined significant aspects o f domestic policy-making.
In other words, a major factor in the formation of Soviet foreign policy was the 
state of affairs in domestic politics which, in turn, was inextricably bound up with 
progress in the Soviet economic structure. Foreign policy results - and, equally, foreign 
policy developments outside direct Soviet influence and control - impacted upon 
domestic politics in a 'feedback loop' and occasionally substituted for domestic 
successes, but they were generally secondary to the internal scene in the pre-Gorbachev
1. James N. Rosenau, 'Theorizing Across Systems: Linkages Politics Revisited', in Jonathan Wilkenfeld, ed., 
Conflict Behavior & Linkage Politics (New York: Cavid Makay Company, 1973), p. 42.
2. Rosenau, Foreign Policy as an Issue-Area', in Rosenau, ed., Domestic Sourses o f  Foreign Policy (New 
York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 47.
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era.3 As Gorbachev said 'domestic and foreign policies are always interlinked',4 links 
between domestic and foreign policy in the Gorbachev government were brought closer 
together than during the pre-Gorbachev period.
The domestic developments of perestroika, democratization and glasnost' 
introduced by Gorbachev led to a remarkable transformation of national perceptions. 
These were decisive sources of foreign policy behaviour. All factors of domestic policy: 
transformations in the Soviets' political, economic and social system, formation o f 
parliamentary democracy, the elimination of the monopoly of ideology were 
transformed externally through foreign policy activity or other means. This was 
embodied in international relations (see chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7).
These kind of domestic policy changes led to new political thinking in foreign 
policy (see sections 2.1 and 2.2) that stressed rationality and pragmatism, departing 
from the ideological line of class revolution. New political thinking was a carefully 
thought out construction that integrated domestic and foreign policy and carefully 
linked policy in all regions of the globe.5 To bring about a favourable international 
atmosphere for a successful carrying out of perestroika, Gorbachev's new political 
thinking focused on achieving reconciliation and arms reduction, as well as promoting 
economic cooperation with western countries. Nikolai Slyunkov said at the meeting in 
the Kremlin Palace of Congresses on 5 November 1988 that 'this ensures more 
favourable foreign policy conditions for the successful implementation of the tasks o f 
perestroika',6 and also began receiving real benefits and fruits from cooperation with 
other states.7
3 . 1. Zemtsov and J. Farrar, eds., Gorbachev: The Man and The System (Oxford: Transaction Publishers, 
1989), p. 379.
4. Izvestiya, 20 November 1990, p. 1.
5. Deborah Nutter Miner, 'Introduction', in Roger E. Kanet, Deborah Nutter Miner and Tamara J. Resler, eds., 
Soviet Foreign Policy in Transition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 3.
6. Pravda, 6 November 1988, p. 2.
7. Pravda, 5 July 1990, p. 2.
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His Asia-Pacific policy was also based on a similar concept. The initiatives put 
forward by Gorbachev in Vladivostok (1986) and Krasnoyarsk (1988) played their role 
in the problem of reducing tension in the Asia-Pacific region and in normalizing 
relations between states in this area. To enhance the Soviets' involvement in the Asia- 
Pacific affairs was a timely and vital objective in Soviet national development. On the 
one hand, they tried to enter the Asia-Pacific region as a partner in the international 
economic community. Internal reforms in the Soviet Union and in particular the 
transition to a market economy made the task of evolving the USSR into the economic 
integration processes in this region all the more urgent. On the other hand, they also 
sought to solve security issues for stability in the Asia-Pacific region.8
It was in the context of the above policy framework that the Soviet Union began 
to pursue a pragmatic policy towards the Korean Peninsula, opposing any change 
disrupting stability. The following elements were at work behind the Soviet decision to 
establish diplomatic relations with South Korea. These elements can be applicable in the 
development of Soviet policy towards the Korean peninsula.
First, there was an economic factor. With regard to the Soviet Union's economic 
interests, the choice on the Korean Peninsula was very clear. The poor economic 
performance of the USSR was a strong stimulus to gain goods and credits from South 
Korea. The economic factor strongly influenced Moscow towards the renewal of 
diplomatic relations with South Korea. South Korea and the Soviet Union could have 
much to gain from each other. For example, highly advanced Soviet technology could 
be combined with Korea's manufacturing skills to produce advanced technology 
products. The Soviet Union could sell inexhaustible natural resources to Korea. Korea 
could provide consumer goods, build factories and develop natural resources.
Second, there was an international environment. The international environment 
was obviously changing for the better, enabling the Soviets to consider a much more
8. At that time, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze admitted that it is indeed difficult to get a solution to 
the question of Asia-Pacific security unless South Korea takes part in the discussions. The Korea Times, 2 
October 1990, p. 1.
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radical approach towards South Korea. As a Soviet Asian specialist, Vasily Mikheev, 
said, relations between Moscow and Seoul are needed to fill the still-existing vacuum of 
political communication between and among the nations in the general Asian-Pacific 
structure of international relations.9 In the Asia-Pacific region, new conditions for 
political and economic integration were being made, thus enabling closer cooperation 
with South Korea in the region that might be helpful to the Soviet Union. In this way, 
the Soviet Union received a good opportunity to demonstrate its active policy.
Third, the most important factor to recognize South Korea grew out o f Soviet 
domestic politics. As mentioned in chapter 2, the more the Soviet Union entered the 
process o f reforms, digging into the basics of what is good and what is bad for the 
society, the more it became clear that real reforms in the economics and politics, indeed 
in the conscience of the whole society were generally incompatible with the Marxist- 
Leninist theory. According to Kunadze's interpretation, starting from the moment when 
North Korea appeared at the centre of Soviet domestic controversy, it became vitally 
important for all supporters of radical reforms in the USSR to push through the cause 
of the diplomatic recognition of the ROK as fast as possible in order to deny pure 
conservatives the very ground for their obstinate arguments.10
Fourth, the political leadership also played a significant role (see 'policy thinking' 
in section 2.2.3).11 Without the rise of Gorbachev to the top Soviet leadership, such a 
dramatic change in the power configuration on the Korean Peninsula would not have 
taken place. The role played by Shevardnadze in both formulation and implementation
9. Vasily Mikheev, The USSR-Korea: gains or losses?, The Korea Herald, 21 December 1990, supplement, 
p. 4.
10. George F. Kunadze, 'USSR-ROK: Agenda for the Future', Korea and World Affairs, vol 15, no. 2 
(Summer 1991), pp. 202-203.
11. On Mikhail Gorbachev as leader, see Part IV. Mikhail Gorbachev as Leader, in Ed. A. Hewett and Victor 
H. Winston, eds., Milestones in Glasnost and Perestroika: Politics and People (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 385-495.
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of Soviet foreign policy based upon the new thinking should not be underestimated.12
Fifth, timing is another important factor. The rapprochement between the ROK 
and the USSR was conducted at the right time. The rapid progress of South Korea to a 
highly-efficient economy required a democratization of society that coincided in time 
with political changes in the Soviet Union as well as with good progress in international 
relations, especially between the East and the West.13 Due to the perestroika processes 
in the Soviet Union and democratization of social and political life in South Korea, both 
sides gradually started to change their perception of the external threat. Accordingly, 
this contributed to destruction of decades-long ideological dogmas in Soviet-Korean 
policy.14 In short, the two countries found themselves to be good partners in pursuit o f 
important policies: perestroika and glasnost' in the Soviet Union and democratic reform 
and northern policy in South Korea.
Finally, the Soviet recognition of South Korea was attributed in part to the latter's 
northern policy. Northern policy was remarkably successful in establishing diplomatic 
relations with socialist countries and creating favourable conditions for the peaceful 
coexistence between the two Koreas (see section 7.1).15
In the case of Korea, therefore, we can not say domestic factors had an important 
role or external factors an unimportant role. Rather, internal-external interaction was 
positively played under the situation of a reduction in cold-war hostilities and increasing 
accommodation between the superpowers in the late 1980s. So, it was successful to 
make a model for linkages between domestic and foreign policies under Gorbachev 
period.
12. Hiroshi Kimura, 'The Impact of the New Political Thinking Upon Northeast Asia' in Shugo Minagawa, 
ed., Thorny Path to the Post-Perestroika World: Problems o f  Institutionalization (Sapporo, Japan: Hokkaido 
University Press, 1992), p. 159.
13. Vladilen B. Vorontsov, 'Developments in the USSR and the ROK: Impact upon Soviet-South Korean 
Relations', a paper presented in the third Korean-Soviet Conference, Seoul, Korea (16-17 April 1990), p. 3.
14. Vorontsov, Developments in the USSR and the ROK: Impact upon Soviet-South Korean Relations', p. 4.
15. Seung-ho Joo, South Korea's Nordpolitik and the Soviet Union (Russia), the Journal o f East Asian 
Affairs, vol. vii, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 1993), p. 405.
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In sum, although domestic factors played an important role, it is my position that 
neither domestic nor external factors alone best explain Gorbachev's policy but, rather, 
the interplay of both in the complex interplay of international politics on domestic 
politics within the context of increasing global interdependence.
Appendix 1. Soviet Trade with China( 1918-1991)
( I n  M i l l i o n  R o u b l e s ) *
Y e a r T u r n o v e r E x p o r t I m p o r t Ba la nc <
1 91 8 4 , 6 - 4 , 6 - 4 , 6
1 9 1 9 0 - 0 0
1 9 2 0 - - - 0
1 9 2 1 0 , 1 - 0 , 1 - 0 , 1
1 9 2 1 / 2 2 0 , 1 - 0,  1 - 0 , 1
1 9 2 2 / 2 3 0 - 0 0
1 9 2 3 / 2 4 12 ,  4 3 , 7 8 , 7 - 5 , 0
1 9 2 4 / 2 5 20 ,  3 7 , 1 13,  2 - 6 , 1
1 9 2 5 / 2 6 3 7 , 8 13 ,  5 24 ,  3 - 1 0 , 8
1 9 2 6 / 2 7 38 ,  2 14 ,  7 23 ,  5 - 8 , 8
1 9 2 7 / 2 8 54 ,  7 19 ,  2 35 ,  5 - 1 6 ,  3
1 92 3  ( 8 - 1 2 ) 1 2 , 0 6,  3 5 , 7 + 6,  0
19 29 45 ,  4 18 ,  3 27 ,  1 - 8 , 8
1 9 3 0 41 ,  6 2 2 ,  4 19 ,  2 + 3 , 2
1 93 1 33 ,  0 19 ,  6 13 ,  4 + 6,  2
1 93 2 32 ,  9 18 ,  6 14 ,  3 + 4 , 3
1 9 3 3 30 ,  9 1 4 , 1 16,  8 - 2 , 7
19 34 12 ,  7 5,  3 7 , 4 - 2 , 1
1 93 5 1 1 , 4 5 , 1 6,  3 - 1 , 2
1 9 3 6 13 ,  5 6,  6 6 , 9 - 0 , 3
1 93 7 12 ,  9 6,  0 6 , 9 - 0 , 9
19 38 2 1 ,  7 7 , 4 14,  3 - 6 , 9
1 9 3 9 2 3 ,  5 5,  8 17,  7 - 1 1 , 9
1 9 4 0 2 6 ,  2 8 , 8 1 7 , 4 - 8 ,  6
1 9 4 1 - 4 5 - - -
1 9 4 6 67 ,  1 1 1 , 4 55,  7 - 4 4 ,  3
1 94 7 1 4 1 ,  1 68 ,  9 7 2 , 2 - 3 ,  3
19 48 1 9 3 ,  3 1 1 2 , 1 81 ,  2 + 3 0 ,  9
1 9 4 9 3 0 8 ,  6 1 7 9 ,  7 1 2 8 ,  9 + 5 0 ,  8
1 9 5 0 5 1 8 ,  9 3 4 9 ,  4 1 6 9 ,  5 + 1 6 9 , 9
1 9 5 1 7 2 8 ,  8 4 3 0 ,  6 2 9 8 , 2 + 1 3 2 , 4
19 52 8 7 1 ,  2 4 9 8 ,  8 3 7 2 ,  4 + 1 2 6 , 4








































1 2 0 3 , 9 683,  4 520,  5 + 1 6 2 , 9
1 2 5 2 , 7 673,  5 579,  2 + 94,  3
1 3 4 7 , 5 659,  7 687,  8 - 2 8 ,  1
1 1 5 4 , 0 489,  7 664,  3 - 1 8 4 , 6
1 3 6 3 , 7 570,  6 793,  1 - 2 2 2 , 5
1 8 4 9 , 4 859,  1 990,  3 - 1 3 1 , 2
1 4 9 8 , 7 735,  4 763,  3 - 2 7 ,  9
826,  9 330,  6 496,  3 - 1 6 5 , 9
674,  8 210, 1 464,  7 - 2 5 4 , 6
540,  2 168,  5 371,  7 - 2 0 3 , 2
404,  6 121, 8 282,  8 - 1 6 1 , 0
375,  5 172,  5 203,  0 - 3 0 ,  5
286,  6 157,  8 128,  8 - 2 9 ,  0
96,  3 4 5 , 2 51,  1 - 5 , 9
86, 4 53,  4 33,  0 +20,  4
51,  1 25,  0
i—tCDCM - 1 , 1
41,  9 22,  4 19,  5 +2,  9
138,  7 70,  1 68, 6 + 1,  5
210, 6 100, 2 110,  4 - 1 0 ,  2
201,  3 100,  5 100, 8 - 0 ,  3
213,  9 108,  4 105,  5 +2,  9
200,  9 93,  1 107,  8 - 1 5 ,  7
314,  4 179,  8 134,  6 + 4 5 , 2
248,  5 118,  4 130,  1 i -J
338,  7 163,  8 174,  9 - 1 1 , 1
332,  5 1 7 5 , 2 157,  3 + 17,  9
316,  6 169,  6 147,  0 +22,  6
176,  8 82,  6 94,  2 - 1 1 ,  6
223,  5 120,1 103,  4 + 16,  7
488,  2 255,  6 232,  6 +23,  0
977,  8 467,  9 509,  9
oCMI
1 6 1 4 , 9 780,  4 834,  5 - 5 4 ,  1
1 8 2 2 , 0 910,  3 911,  7 - 1 , 4
1 4 7 4 , 9 724,  3 750,  6 - 2 6 ,  3
1850,  1 1 0 0 5 , 2 844,  9 + 1 6 0 , 3
2 4 1 2 , 0 1 3 2 3 , 5 1 0 8 3 , 5 + 2 4 0 , 0
5668,  1 2 3 9 0 , 6 3 2 7 7 , 5 + 8 8 6 , 9
5 9 3 0 , 3 2 8 8 2 , 7 3 0 4 7 , 6 - 1 6 4 , 9
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S o u r c e s :  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  SSSR:  S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  s b o r n i k  1 9 1 8 -  
1 9 6 6  (Moscow: M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  za  
1 9 6 7 - 1 9 7 3  g o d :  S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  o h z o r  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  
o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ,  1 9 6 9 ,  1 9 7 1 , 1 9 7 3 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  v  1 9 7 5 - 1 9 7 6  
(Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 7 5 ,  1 9 7 6 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a ,
4,  1 9 7 8 ;  i b i d . ,  5,  1 9 7 9 ;  i b i d . ,  4,  1 9 8 0 ;  i b i d . ,  3,  1 9 8 1 - 1 9 9 0 ;  i b i d . ,  4 -
5,  1 9 9 2 ,  p .  4 9 .  *A N o n - c o m m e r c i a l  r a t e :  e n d - 1 9 8 6  R b o . 6 8 4 :  $ 1 ;  e n d - 1 9 8 7  
R b o . 6 0 2 :  $ 1 ;  e n d - 1 9 8 8  R b o .  6 1 2 : $ 1 ;  e n d - 1 9 8 9  R b o .  6 3 3 :  $ 1 .  S e e  The  
E c o n o m i s t  I n t e l l i g e n c e  U n i t  L i m i t e d  19 93 ,  3 r d  q u a r t e r  1 9 9 3 ,  L o n d o n .
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Appendix 2. Soviet trade
( I n  M i l l i o n
with Japan (1918
R o u b l e s )
-1991)
Y e a r T u r n o v e r E x p o r t I m p o r t B a l a n c e
1918 - - -
1919 0 - 0 0
1920 - - -
1921 - - -
1 9 2 1 / 2 2 0 - 0 0
1 9 2 2 / 2 3 - - -
1 9 2 3 / 2 4 13,  6 11,  6 2 , 0 + 9, 6
1 9 2 4 / 2 5 12,  0 9 , 9 2 , 1 + 7, 8
1 9 2 5 / 2 6 12,  0 10,  0 2 , 0 + 8 , 0
1 9 2 6 / 2 7 17,  9 1 5 , 1 2 , 8 + 12,  3
1 9 2 7 / 2 8 18,  0 13,  8 4 , 2 + 9, 6
1 9 2 8 ( 1 0 - 1 2 ) 3 , 6 2 , 6 1 , 0 + 1, 6
1929 21,  6 15,  1 6, 5 +8,  6
1930 25,  8 12,  6 13,  2 - 0 ,  6
1931 25,  4 15,  5 9 , 9 + 5, 6
1932 1 1 , 7 7 , 9 3,  8 + 4 , 1
1933 13,  0 7 , 2 5,  8 + 1 , 4
1934 9 , 9 4 , 5 5 , 4 - 0 ,  9
1935 12,  8 4 , 3 8,  5 - 4 , 2
1936 16,  1 5, 0 11,1 - 6 ,  1
1937 1 1 , 2 2,  0 9 , 2 - 7 , 2
1938 3 , 9 1 , 2 2 , 7 - 1 , 5
1939 0,  5 0 0,  5 - 0 ,  5
1940 1 , 0 0 , 2 0 , 8 - 0 ,  6
1 9 4 1 - 4 5 - - -
1946 0 0 0 0
1947 2 , 0 1 , 9 0,1 +1,  8
1948 7 , 5 5 , 1 2 , 4 + 2 , 7
1949 8 , 5 1 , 7 6, 8 - 5 , 1
1950 4 , 2 3, 6 0 , 6 + 3,  0
1951 0 0 0 0
1952 0,  5 0,  3 0,2 +0,  1















































3,  6 2 , 0 1/ 6 + 0,  4
3 , 4 2 , 7 0 , 7 + 2,  0
15,  4 7 , 6 7 , 8 - 0 ,  2
33,  9 1 7 , 9 16,  0 + 1,  9
51,  1 30,  0 2 1 / 1 +8,  9
123,  9 68,  5 55,  4 + 14,  1
161,  6 101,  7 59,  9 + 41,  8
232,  9 101,  7 131,  2 - 2 9 , 5
260,  4 111,  5 148,  9 - 3 7 ,  4
332,  1 148,  2 173,  9 - 2 5 ,  7
326,  1 166,  5 159,  6 + 6,  9
416,  6 214,  8 201,  8 + 13,  0
466,  8 317,  7 149,  1 + 1 6 8 , 6
518,  6 352,  1 166,  5 + 1 8 5 , 6
558,  7 321,  3 237,  4 + 83,  9
652,  3 341,  4 310,  9 + 30,  5
733,  6 377,  4 356,  2 + 2 1 , 2
815,  6 381,  7 433,  9 - 5 2 ,  2
994,  4 622,  0 372,  4 + 2 4 9 , 6
1 6 7 9 , 8 905,  7 774,  1 + 1 3 1 , 6
1 9 2 2 , 4 668,  9 1 2 5 3 , 5 - 5 8 4 , 6
2 1 2 0 , 5 748,  4 1372,  1 - 6 2 3 , 7
2 2 9 7 , 8 853,  4 1 4 4 4 , 4 - 5 9 1 , 0
2 3 1 9 , 8 736,  1 1 5 8 3 , 7 - 8 4 7 , 6
2 6 0 5 , 4 944 , 4 1 6 6 1 , 0 - 7 1 6 , 6
2 7 2 2 , 8 950,  2 1 7 7 2 , 6 - 8 2 2 , 4
3 0 2 9 , 5 816,  8 2 2 1 2 , 7 - 1 3 9 5 , 9
3 6 8 2 , 4 756,  6 2 9 2 5 , 8 - 2 1 6 9 , 2
3 0 0 0 , 5 825,  0 2 1 7 5 , 5 - 1 3 5 0 , 5
2 8 9 4 , 3 840,  0 2 0 5 4 , 3 - 1 2 1 4 , 3
3 2 1 4 , 9 928,  9 2 2 8 6 , 9 - 1 3 5 8 , 0
3 1 8 5 , 3 979,  9 2 2 0 5 , 4 - 1 2 2 5 , 5
2 6 0 0 , 7 972,  5 1 6 2 8 , 2 - 6 5 5 , 7
3 1 3 5 , 1 1 1 8 4 , 2 1 9 5 0 , 9 - 7 6 6 , 7
3 4 8 1 , 0 1 3 4 3 , 0 2 1 3 8 , 0 - 7 9 5 , 0
1 0 0 3 3 , 1 4 0 7 1 , 8 5 9 6 1 , 3 - 1 8 8 9 , 5
1 7 9 5 0 , 5 5 9 6 1 , 3 4 2 1 6 , 2 + 1 7 4 5 , 1
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S o u r c e s :  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  SSSR: S t a t i s t i d h e s k y  s b o r n i k  1 9 1 8 -  
1 9 6 6  (Moscow: M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  za  
1 9 6 7 - 1 9 7 3 :  S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  o b z o r  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  
1 9 6 7 ,  1 9 6 9 ,  1 9 7 1 ,  1 9 7 3 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  v  1 9 7 5 - 1 9 7 6  (Moscow:  
M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 7 5 ,  1 9 7 6 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a ,  4,  1 9 7 8 ;  
i b i d . ,  5 ,  197 9 ;  i b i d . ,  4 ,  1 9 8 0 ;  i b i d . ,  3,  1 9 8 1 - 1 9 9 0 ;  i b i d . ,  4 - 5 ,  19 92 ,  
p .  4 9 .
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Appendix 3. Soviet Trade with Korea(1918-1945)
( I n  M i l l i o n  R o u b l e s )
Y e a r T u r n o v e r E x p o r t I m p o r t B a l a n c e
1 9 1 8 - 2 3 - - - -
1 9 2 3 / 2 4 0 0 - 0
1 9 2 4 / 2 5 0,  3 0, 3 0 +0,  3
1 9 2 5 / 2 6 0 , 4 0 , 4 0 +0,  4
1 9 2 6 / 2 7 0 0 0 0
1 9 2 7 / 2 8 0 0 0 0
1928 ( 1 0 - 1 2 ) - - - -
1929 0 , 1 o, 1 -
1930 0 , 1 o, 1 -
1931 0 0 -
1932 0 , 1 0 , 1 -
1933 0 , 1 0 , 1 -
1 9 3 4 - 3 5 - - - -
1936 0 0 -
1937 0 0 -
1 9 3 8 - 4 5 - - - -
S o u r c e :  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  SSSR: S t a t i s t i c h e s k y  s b o r n i k  1 9 1 8 - 1 9 6 6  
( Moscow :  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ) .
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Appendix 4. Soviet Trade with North Korea(1946-1991)
( I n  M i l l i o n  R o u b l e s )
Y e a r T u r n o v e r E x p o r t I m p o r t B a l a n c
1 9 4 6 8,  6 3 , 4 5 , 2 - 1 / 8
1947 21 ,  5 12,  5 9 , 1 + 3,  4
194 8 4 8 , 4 25 ,  6 22 ,  8 + 2 , 8
1 949 13 9 ,  6 82 ,  6 57 ,  0 +2 5 ,  6
1 9 5 0 10 1 ,  1 62 ,  4 38 ,  7 +23 ,  7
1 951 43,  2 16,  4 2 6 ,  8 - 1 0 ,  4
1 952 61 ,  7 35,  6 26 ,  1 + 9,  5
1 95 3 52 ,  6 29 ,  5 23 ,  1 + 6, 4
1954 4 1 , 5 16,  5 2 5 ,  0 - 8 , 5
1 955 76 ,  4 39,  7 36 ,  7 + 3,  0
1 9 5 6 94 ,  5 48,  4 46 ,  1 +2 ,  3
1957 1 10 ,  3 54,  0 56 ,  3 - 2 , 3
1958 94 ,  6 52,  2 42 ,  4 + 9,  8
1 95 9 1 20 ,  0 73 ,  6 46 ,  4 +26 ,  2
19 60 1 0 2 ,  7 35,  5 67,  2 - 3 1 ,  7
1 961 1 40 ,  5 69,  3 7 1 / 2 - 1 /  9
1962 1 5 2 ,  0 72 ,  6 79 ,  4 - 6 ,  8
1 96 3 1 53 ,  2 73 ,  9 79 ,  3 - 5 , 4
1964 1 4 7 , 2 74 ,  6 72 ,  6 +2,  0
1 9 6 5 ' 1 60 ,  3 80 ,  8 79 ,  5 - 1 , 3
1 9 6 6 160 ,  1 77 ,  0 83 ,  1 - 6 , 1
19 67 1 96 ,  5 99,  3 97 ,  2 +2,  1
19 68 2 6 3 ,  8 1 55 ,  0 1 0 8 ,  8 +4 1 ,  2
1 9 6 9 2 9 5 ,  3 1 81 ,  4 1 1 3 ,  9 + 67 ,  5
1 9 7 0 3 3 6 ,  0 2 0 7 ,  0 1 2 9 ,  0 +7 8 ,  0
1 9 7 1 4 5 2 ,  3 3 30 ,  1 1 2 2 ,  2 + 2 0 7 , 9
1 97 2 3 80 ,  0 2 5 1 ,  6 1 2 8 ,  4 + 1 2 3 , 2
1 97 3 3 5 7 ,  3 2 2 4 ,  0 1 3 3 ,  3 +8 0 ,  7
19 74 3 4 3 , 2 1 94 ,  3 1 4 8 ,  9 +4 6 ,  4
1 97 5 3 3 8 , 2 1 86 ,  8 1 5 1 ,  4 +3 5 ,  4
1 9 7 6 3 00 ,  5 1 81 ,  8 1 1 8 ,  7 + 63 ,  1
19 77 3 2 8 ,  7 16 4 ,  7 1 6 4 ,  0 +0 ,  7
19 78 3 7 8 , 1 1 76 ,  5 2 0 1 ,  6 - 2 5 ,  1
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19 79 49 1 ,  8 2 3 5 ,  4 2 5 6 ,  4 - 2 1 ,  0
198 0 5 7 2 ,  1 2 8 7 ,  9 28 4 ,  2 + 3 , 7
1 98 1 5 2 9 ,  2 27 8 ,  9 2 5 0 ,  3 + 2 8 ,  6
1 982 6 81 ,  0 318 ,  5 36 2 ,  5 - 4 4 ,  0
1 98 3 5 8 7 ,  4 2 6 2 ,  4 32 5 ,  0 - 6 2 ,  6
1984 7 1 4 ,  3 3 4 7 , 2 36 7 ,  1 - 1 9 ,  9
198 5 1 0 5 1 , 2 648 ,  4 40 2 ,  8 + 2 4 5 , 6
1 9 8 6 1 2 0 7 , 1 75 7 ,  2 45 0 ,  7 + 3 0 6 , 5
1987 1 2 3 2 , 1 8 0 0 ,  2 43 1 ,  9 + 3 6 8 , 3
19 88 1 6 0 1 , 7 1 0 6 2 , 2 539 ,  5 + 5 3 2 , 7
1 9 8 9 1 5 0 2 , 0 940 ,  5 56 1 ,  5 + 3 7 9 , 0
1 9 9 0 1 7 7 4 , 4 1 0 4 9 , 5 72 4 ,  9 + 3 2 4 , 6
1 99 1 60 6 ,  3 307 ,  6 2 9 8 ,  7 + 8,  9
S o u r c e s :  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  SSSR: S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  s h o r n i k  1 9 1 8 -  
1 9 6 6  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  z a  
1 9 7 6 - 1 9 7 3  g o d :  S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  o b z o r  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  
o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ,  1 9 6 9 ,  1 9 7 1 ,  1 9 7 3 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  v  1 9 7 5 - 1 9 7 6  
(Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 7 6 ,  1 9 7 6 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a ,
4 ,  1 9 7 8 ;  i b i d . ,  5,  1 9 7 9 ;  i b i d . ,  4,  1 9 8 0 ;  i b i d . ,  3,  1 9 8 1 - 1 9 9 0 ;  i b i d . ,  4 -
5,  1 9 9 2 ,  p .  4 9 .
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S o u r
Appendix 5. Soviet Trade with South Korea
( I n  M i l l i o n  D o l l a r s )
T u r n o v e r  E x p o r t  I m p o r t  B a l a n c e
3 9 . 1 7 . 1 2 9 . 0 - 2 1 . 8
4 8 . 0 2 3 . 0 2 5 . 0 - 2 . 0
5 7 . 3 3 1 . 1 2 6 . 2 + 4 . 9
1 1 3 . 0 6 2 . 3 5 9 . 7 +2 . 6
1 1 3 . 8 6 3 . 9 49 . 9 + 14 .0
164 .2 97 .0 67 .2 + 2 9 . 8
289 .  9 1 7 8 . 3 1 1 1 . 6 + 6 6 . 7
59 9 . 4 3 9 1 . 7 2 0 7 . 7 + 184 . 0
8 8 9 . 0 3 7 0 . 0 5 1 9 . 0 - 1 4 9 . 0
1 2 0 2 . 4 5 7 7 . 3 6 2 5 . 1 - 4 7 . 8
K o r e a  T r a d e  P r o m o t i o n  C o r p o r a t i o n ( K O T R A )
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Appendix 6. Soviet trade with Vietnam(DPB)(1955-1991)
( I n  M i l l i o n  R o u b l e s )
Y e a r T u r n o v e r E x p o r t I m p o r t B a l a n c e
19 55 3, 3 3,  3 0 + 3,  3
1 9 5 6 - 5 7 - - -
19 58 16 ,  3 7 , 4 8 , 9 - 1 , 5
1 95 9 31 ,  9 1 7 , 9 14 ,  0 + 3,  9
1 96 0 42 ,  8 22 ,  0 20 ,  8 + 1 , 2
19 61 60 ,  3 37 ,  2 2 3 ,  1 + 14 ,  1
1962 76 ,  4 4 9 , 2 27 ,  2 + 2 2 ,  0
1 96 3 82 ,  8 51,  0 31,  8 + 19,  2
1964 74 ,  2 42,  9 31 ,  3 + 11 ,  6
19 65 9 4 , 9 67 ,  4 2 7 ,  5 + 39 ,  9
1 9 6 6 8 4 ,  2 61 ,  4 22 ,  8 + 38 ,  6
19 67 1 5 1 ,  7 1 32 ,  9 18 ,  8 + 1 1 4 ,  1
1968 1 59 ,  4 14 3 ,  3 16 ,  1 + 1 2 7 , 2
19 69 1 8 5 ,  6 1 7 0 ,  4 15,  2 + 1 5 5 , 2
19 70 1 8 3 ,  2 1 6 6 ,  5 16 ,  7 + 1 4 9 , 8
19 71 1 60 ,  8 13 9 ,  3 2 1 ,  5 + 1 1 7 , 8
1 97 2 1 1 6 ,  8 9 4 , 2 22 ,  6 + 71 ,  6
1 973 17 9 ,  8 1 4 2 ,  9 3 6 ,  9 + 1 0 6 , 0
1974 2 3 5 ,  7 1 9 2 ,  3 43 ,  4 + 1 4 8 , 9
1 97 5 2 0 6 ,  5 1 5 8 ,  7 47 ,  8 + 1 1 0 , 9
1 9 7 6 2 9 6 ,  1 2 3 2 ,  5 63 ,  6 + 1 6 8 , 9
19 77 4 0 4 ,  0 2 7 4 ,  2 1 2 9 ,  8 + 1 4 4 , 4
19 78 4 5 7 ,  8 3 0 5 ,  5 1 5 2 ,  3 + 1 5 3 , 2
1 9 7 9 5 9 3 ,  8 4 4 6 ,  2 1 4 7 ,  6 + 2 9 8 , 6
1 9 8 0 6 1 2 ,  4 4 5 4 ,  9 1 5 7 ,  5 + 2 9 7 , 4
1 9 8 1 8 9 1 ,  8 7 2 4 ,  6 1 6 7 , 2 + 5 5 7 , 4
1 982 1 0 1 0 , 7 8 0 4 ,  2 2 0 6 ,  5 + 5 9 7 , 7
1 9 8 3 1 1 3 9 , 0 9 0 4 ,  1 2 3 4 ,  9 + 6 6 9 , 2
1 984 1 2 6 1 ,  9 1 0 0 4 , 0 2 5 7 ,  9 + 7 4 6 , 1
1 9 8 5 1 4 4 6 , 1 1 1 6 5 , 3 2 8 0 , 8 + 8 8 4 , 5
1 9 8 6 1 6 1 2 , 7 1 3 1 8 , 4 2 9 4 ,  3 + 1 0 0 4 , 1
1 98 7 1 7 7 3 , 4 1 4 5 4 , 5 3 1 8 ,  9 + 1 1 3 5 , 6
1 98 8 1 7 8 2 , 2 1 3 9 3 , 6 3 8 8 ,  6 + 1 0 0 5 , 0
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1 9 8 9  1 9 1 0 , 6  1 3 9 0 , 9  5 1 9 , 7  + 8 7 1 , 3
1 9 9 0  2 0 1 0 , 6  1 3 0 7 , 1  7 0 3 , 5  + 5 0 3 , 6
19 91  8 5 0 , 8  4 4 4 , 8 .  4 0 6 , 0  + 3 8 , 8
S o u r c e s :  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  SSSR: S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  S b o r n i k  1 9 1 8 -  
1 9 6 6  (M oscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ) ;  V n e s h n a y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  
za  1 9 6 7 - 1 9 7 3  g o d :  S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  o b z o r  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  
o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ,  1 9 6 9 ,  1 9 7 1 ,  1 9 7 3 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  v  1 9 7 5 - 1 9 7 6  
(Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 7 5 ,  1 9 7 6 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a ,
4,  1 9 7 8 ;  i b i d . ,  5,  1 9 7 9 ;  i b i d . ,  4,  1 9 8 0 ;  i b i d . ,  3 ,  1 9 8 1 - 1 9 9 0 ;  i b i d . ,  4 -
5,  1 9 9 2 ,  p .  4 9 .
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Appendix 7.Soviet Trade with Cambodia(1958-1991)
( I n  M i l l i o n  R o u b l e s )
Y e a r T u r n o v e r E x p o r t I m p o r t B a l a n c e
19 58 0 , 4 0 , 4 0 + 0,  4
1 95 9 1 , 2 1 , 2 0 + 1,  2
1 96 0 4,  6 1, 9 2 , 7 - 0 ,  8
1 9 6 1 7 , 0 1 , 4 5, 6 - 4 , 2
1 96 2 7 , 5 2 , 0 5, 5 - 3 ,  5
1 9 6 3 4 , 8 2 , 9 1 , 9 + 1,  0
19 64 2 , 3 1,  6 0 , 7 +0,  9
1 96 5 3 , 7 2,  6 1 , 1 + 1,  5
1 9 6 6 2 , 7 2 , 2 0,  5 + 1 , 7
1 96 7 1 , 8 1 , 2 0,  6 +0,  6
1 96 8 2 , 5 0,  6 1 , 9 - 1 , 3
1 9 6 9 - - - -
1 9 7 0 1 . 7 0 . 3 1 . 4 - 1 . 1
19 71 0 . 1 0 . 1 - + 0 . 1
1 9 7 2 - 1 9 8 1 - - - -
1 9 8 2 55 ,  7 53,  4 2 , 3 + 51 ,  1
1 9 8 3 71 ,  8 67,  8 4 , 0 + 63 ,  8
19 84 81 ,  4 76 ,  2 5 , 2 + 71 ,  0
1 9 8 5 1 0 0 ,  2 9 1 , 1 9 , 1 + 82 ,  0
1 9 8 6 1 2 2 ,  7 1 14 ,  0 8 , 7 + 1 0 5 , 3
19 87 1 2 3 , 2 11 2 ,  0 1 1 , 2 + 1 0 0 , 8
1 98 8 1 3 0 ,  4 117 ,  3 13 ,  1 + 1 0 4 , 2
1 9 8 9 1 4 0 ,  8 128 ,  5 1 2 ,  3 + 1 1 6 , 2
1 9 9 0 3 1 1 ,  7 2 7 1 ,  0 4 0 ,  7 + 1 3 0 , 3
1 9 9 1 2 2 ,  0 13,  7 8,  3 + 5,  4
S o u r c e s : V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  SSSR: S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i s b o r n i k  :
1 9 6 6  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  z a  
1 9 6 7 - 7 1  g o d :  S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  o h z o r  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  
1 9 6 7 ,  1 9 6 9 ,  1 9 7 1 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a ,  3,  1 9 8 3 - 1 9 9 0 ;  i b i d . ,  4 - 5 ,  1 9 9 2 ,  
p .  4 9 .
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1 9 8 0
Appendix 8. Soviet Trade with Laos(1976-1991)
( I n  M i l l i o n  R o u b l e s )
Y e a r T u r n o v e r E x p o r t I m p o r t B a l a n c e
1 9 7 6 10,  6 10 ,  6 0 +10 ,  6
1 977 22 ,  6 2 2 ,  6 0 +22 ,  6
1 97 8 11,  8 11 ,  6 0,  2 + 11,  4
1 9 7 9 25 ,  2 25 ,  0 0 , 2 +24 ,  8
1 9 8 0 37 ,  3 37 ,  0 0,  3 + 36 ,  7
1 98 1 37 ,  1 36 ,  2 0 , 9 +35 ,  3
19 82 6 6 , 2 64 ,  2 2 , 0 + 63 ,  8
1 98 3 77 ,  8 7 5 ,  5 2 , 3 +73 ,  2
1984 67,  1 65,  0 2 , 1 + 62 ,  9
1 9 8 5 87 ,  8 85 ,  5 2 , 3 +83 ,  2
1 9 8 6 67 ,  3 62,  2 5 , 1 +57 ,  1
1 987 87 ,  6 78 ,  2 9 , 4 + 68 ,  8
1988 86 ,  0 74 ,  6 1 1 , 4 + 63 ,  2
1 9 8 9 89 ,  3 73 ,  7 15 ,  6 + 58 ,  1
1 9 9 0 8 2 . 0 5 5 .  6 1 6 . 4 + 3 9 . 2
1 99 1 1 4 . 4 9 . 7 4 . 7 + 5 . 0
S o u r c e s :: V n e s h n y a y a T o r g o v l y a ,  4, 1 9 7 8 ;  i b i d . ,  5, 1 9 7 9 ;  i b i d . ,
i b i d . , 3,  1 9 8 1 - 1 9 9 0 ; i b i d . ,  4 - 5 , 1 9 9 2 ,  p .  4 9 .
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Appendix 9. Soviet Trade with Singapore(1960-1991)
( I n  M i l l i o n  R o u b l e s )
Y e a r T u r n o v e r E x p o r t I m p o r t B a l a n c e
19 60 1,  9 1 , 9 0 + 1,  9
1 9 6 1 - 6 3 - - - -
1964 3 , 0 3,  0 0 + 3 , 0
1 9 6 5 2 ,  6 2 , 6 0 +2 ,  6
1 9 6 6 2 , 5 2 , 5 0 +2 ,  5
1 967 4 , 9 4 , 8 0 , 1 + 4 , 7
1968 8 , 0 6 , 2 1 , 8 + 4,  4
1 96 9 6, 6 5,  6 1 , 0 + 4,  6
1 97 0 8,  4 5,  5 2 ,  9 + 2 ,  6
1 97 1 8 , 1 4 , 4 3 , 7 + 0 ,  7
1 972 9 , 0 4 , 4 4 , 6 - 0 , 2
1 9 7 3 9 , 6 6 , 4 3 , 2 + 3,  2
197 4 18 ,  0 4 , 5 1 3 ,  5 - 9 , 0
19 75 1 4 ,  5 3,  8 1 0 ,  7 - 6 ,  9
1 9 7 6 2 1 ,  0 1 1 , 9 9 , 1 + 2 , 8
197 7 2 6 ,  7 13 ,  9 1 2 ,  8 + 1 , 1
19 78 3 8 ,  9 8 , 8 3 0 ,  1 - 2 1 ,  3
1 9 7 9 66 ,  9 1 5 , 1 5 1 ,  8 - 3 6 ,  7
1 9 8 0 8 3 ,  3 14 ,  9 68 ,  4 - 5 3 ,  5
1 98 1 1 1 7 ,  2 49 ,  0 68 ,  2 - 1 9 ,  2
1 98 2 7 1 , 4 30 ,  6 4 0 ,  8 - 1 0 ,  2
1 98 3 8 8 ,  8 2 3 ,  2 65 ,  6 - 4 2 ,  4
1 984 2 2 7 ,  4 2 4 ,  3 2 0 3 ,  1 - 1 7 8 , 8
1 9 8 5 90 ,  3 10 ,  7 7 9 ,  6 i cn CO
1 9 8 6 6 2 ,  6 2 6 ,  7 3 5 ,  9 - 9 , 3
1 98 7 8 5 ,  3 3 7 , 2 4 8 ,  1 - 1 0 ,  9
1 98 8 61 ,  5 2 5 ,  6 3 5 ,  9 - 1 0 ,  3
1 9 8 9 1 5 8 ,  6 58 ,  4 1 0 0 , 2 - 4 1 ,  8
1 9 9 0 7 5 2 ,  7 1 6 2 ,  0 5 9 0 ,  7 - 4 2 8 , 7
1 9 9 1 5 8 1 ,  3 2 4 6 ,  8 3 3 4 ,  5 - 8 7 ,  7
S o u r c e s :  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  SSSR: S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  s h o r n i k  1 9 1 8 -  
1 9 6 6  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  z a
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1 9 6 7 - 1 9 7 3  g o d :  S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  o h z o r  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  
o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ,  1 9 6 9 ,  1 9 7 1 ,  1 9 7 3 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  v  
(Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 7 5 ,  1 9 7 6 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  
4 ,  1 9 7 8 ;  i b i d . ,  5,  1 9 7 9 ;  i b i d . ,  4,  1 9 8 0 ;  i b i d . ,  3 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 9 0 ;  
1 9 9 2 ,  p .  4 9 .
1 9 7 5 - 1 9 7 6  
T o r g o v l y a , 
i b i d . , 4 - 5 ,
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Appendix 10. Soviet Trade
( I n  M i l l i o n
with Tailand(1958
R o u b l e s )
-1991)
Y e a r T u r n o v e r E x p o r t I m p o r t B a l a n c
19 58 0,  3 0,  3 0 +0,  3
1 9 5 9 3 , 4 0,  8 2,  6 - 1 , 8
19 60 4 , 4 1, 3 3 , 1 - 1 , 8
19 61 10 ,  3 1, 5 8 , 8 - 7 ,  3
19 62 9 , 3 0,  9 8 , 4 - 7 , 5
1 9 6 3 4 , 6 1, 4 3 , 2 - 1 , 8
1964 1 , 6 1, 6 0 - 1 ,  6
19 65 2 , 1 1, 6 0,  5 + 1,  1
1 9 6 6 2 , 2 2 , 2 0 + 2 , 2
1967 4 , 2 3, 4 0,  8 +2 ,  6
19 68 3 , 4 3,  0 0 , 4 +2,  6
19 69 2 , 8 2 , 5 0,  3 + 2 , 2
1 9 7 0 3 , 4 2,  6 0,  8 + 1,  8
1 97 1 6, 6 2 , 5 4 , 1 - 1 ,  6
19 72 6,  0 2 , 8 3 , 2 - 0 , 4
1 97 3 4 , 5 2 , 1 2 , 4 - 0 ,  3
1974 1 1 , 1 1,  3 9 , 8 - 8 ,  5
1 97 5 17 ,  3 4 , 0 1 3 ,  3 - 9 , 3
1 9 7 6 10 ,  2 7 , 8 2 , 4 + 5,  4
1977 8 , 4 5,  9 2 , 5 + 3,  4
19 78 11 ,  8 5, 7 6 , 1 - 0 , 4
1 9 7 9 34 ,  1 7 , 8 2 6 ,  3 - 1 8 ,  5
1 9 8 0 1 7 3 ,  1 8,  6 1 6 4 ,  5 - 1 5 5 , 9
1 98 1 3 2 0 ,  4 8,  0 3 1 2 ,  4 - 3 0 4 , 4
19 82 1 4 1 ,  8 8 , 9 1 3 2 ,  9 - 1 2 4 , 0
1 9 8 3 62 ,  5 7,  8 5 4 ,  7 - 4 6 ,  9
19 84 7 3 ,  9 11,  3 6 2 ,  6 - 5 1 ,  3
1 98 5 67 ,  9 13 ,  4 5 4 ,  5 - 4 1 , 1
1 9 8 6 90 ,  9 1 0 , 2 8 0 ,  7 - 7 0 ,  5
19 87 54 ,  8 2 4 , 0 3 0 ,  8 - 6 ,  8
19 88 64 ,  4 2 4 , 2 4 0 ,  2 - 1 6 ,  0
1 98 9 2 5 6 ,  6 35 ,  9 2 2 0 ,  7 - 1 8 5 , 2
1 9 9 0 3 5 6 ,  3 16 4 ,  3 1 9 2 ,  0 - 2 7 ,  7
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1 9 9 1  4 8 9 , 7  3 3 4 , 4  1 5 5 , 3  + 1 7 9 , 1
S o u r c e s :  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  SSSR: S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  s b o r n i k  1 9 1 8 -  
1 9 6 6  (M oscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  za  
1 9 6 7 - 1 9 7 3  g o d :  S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  o b z o r  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  
o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ,  1 9 6 9 ,  1 9 7 1 ,  1 9 7 3 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  v  1 9 7 5 - 1 9 7 6  
(Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 7 5 ,  1 9 7 6 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a ,
4,  1 9 7 8 ;  i b i d . ,  5,  1 9 7 9 ;  i b i d . ,  4,  1 9 8 0 ;  i b i d . ,  3,  1 9 8 1 - 1 9 9 0 ;  i b i d . ,  4 -
5,  1 9 9 2 ,  p .  4 9 .
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Appendix 11. Soviet Trade with Indonesia(1951-1991)
( I n  M i l l i o n  R o u b l e s )
Y e a r  T u r n o v e r  E x p o r t  I m p o r t  B a l a n c e
1 9 5 1 - 5 3 0 0 - -
1 954 0,  1 0 , 1 0 + 0 ,  1
1 9 5 5 3 , 4 0 , 1 3 , 3 - 3 , 2
1 9 5 6 11,  8 0 , 2 11 ,  6 - 1 1 , 4
1 9 5 7 22 ,  9 5 , 1 17 ,  8 - 1 2 , 7
1 9 5 8 34 ,  9 24,  5 10 ,  4 + 14 ,  1
1 9 5 9 2 4 , 1 1 4 , 2 9 , 9 + 4,  3
1 9 6 0 42 ,  9 14 ,  6 2 8 ,  3 - 1 3 ,  7
1 9 6 1 58,  7 2 8 , 2 30 ,  5 - 2 , 3
1 96 2 87 ,  5 52 ,  7 34 ,  8 + 17 ,  9
1 96 3 71 ,  7 4 4 , 9 26 ,  8 + 18 ,  1
1 964 65 ,  6 42,  4 2 3 ,  2 + 19 ,  2
1 9 6 5 77 ,  8 49,  0 2 8 ,  8 + 2 0 ,  2
1 9 6 6 32 ,  0 4 , 3 27 ,  7 - 2 3 ,  4
1 967 26 ,  6 4 , 7 2 1 ,  9 - 1 7 , 2
1 96 8 21 ,  9 4 , 7 17 ,  2 - 1 2 ,  5
1 9 6 9 2 4 ,  6 3 , 2 2 1 ,  4 - 1 8 ,  2
1 9 7 0 2 9 ,  5 4 , 5 2 5 ,  0 - 2 1 ,  5
1 97 1 2 0 ,  2 10,  1 10 ,  1 0
1 97 2 9 , 4 2 , 6 6,  8 + 4 , 2
19 7 3 6 , 9 2 , 7 4 , 2 - 1 , 5
1 97 4 2 7 ,  9 8 , 0 19 ,  9 - 1 1 ,  9
1 9 7 5 28 ,  6 7 , 7 2 0 ,  9 - 1 3 ,  2
1 9 7 6 3 2 ,  3 4 , 4 27 ,  9 - 2 3 ,  5
1 97 7 31 ,  7 7 , 6 2 4 , 1 - 1 6 ,  5
1 9 7 8 36 ,  4 8 , 4 2 8 ,  0 - 1 9 ,  6
1 9 7 9 4 9 ,  3 10,  3 39 ,  0 - 2 8 ,  7
1 9 8 0 5 9 ,  9 15,  0 44 ,  9 - 2 9 ,  9
1 9 8 1 93 ,  1 34,  1 59,  0 - 2 4 , 9
1 98 2 5 3 ,  8 34,  4 19 ,  4 + 15 ,  0
1 9 8 3 58 ,  3 22 ,  2 3 6 , 1 - 1 3 ,  9
198 4 56 ,  9 5,  6 51 ,  3 - 4 5 ,  7
1 9 8 5
CM<3*
CT> 3 , 7 90 ,  5 - 8 6 ,  8
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1 9 8 6 45 ,  4 3 , 1 42 ,  3 - 3 9 ,  2
1987 67,  8 11,  2 56 ,  6 - 4 5 , 4
1 988 40,  4 16 ,  1 2 4 ,  3 - 8 , 2
1 98 9 94 ,  5 26 ,  3 68 ,  2 - 4 2 ,  1
1 99 0 1 7 6 ,  9 24 ,  1 15 2 ,  8 - 1 2 8 , 7
1 991 1 0 6 ,  0 53,  9 52 ,  1 + 1,  8
S o u r c e s :  V n e s h n i y a  T o r g o v l y a  S SSR : S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  s b o r n i k  1 9 1 8 -  
1 9 6 6  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  z a  
1 9 6 7 - 1 9 7 3  g o d :  S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  o h z o r  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  
o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ,  1 9 6 9 ,  1 9 7 1 ,  1 9 7 3 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a ,  4,  1 9 7 8 ;  
i b i d . ,  5,  1 9 7 9 ;  i b i d . ,  4,  1 9 8 0 ;  i b i d . ,  3,  1 9 8 1 - 1 9 9 0 ;  i b i d . ,  4 - 5 ,  1 9 9 2 ,  
p .  4 9 .
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Appendix 12. Soviet Trade
( I n  M i l l i o n
with Malaysia(1934
R o u b l e s )
-1991)
Y e a r T u r n o v e r E x p o r t I m p o r t B a l a n c
1934 0 , 4 - 0 , 4
1935 1 , 7 - 1 , 7
1 93 6 2 , 4 - 2 , 4
1937 3 , 2 - 3 , 2
1938 4 , 7 - 4 , 7
1 939 1 , 3 - 1 , 3
1 9 4 0 - 4 6 - - - -
1947 12 ,  0 - 12 ,  0
1948 40 ,  6 - 40,  6
1 949 2 8 ,  2 - 28 ,  2
1 950 30 ,  5 - 30 ,  5
1951 18 ,  5 - 18 ,  5
1952 4 , 5 - 4 , 5
1 95 3 3 , 7 - 3 , 7
1954 - - - -
19 55 19 ,  6 - 19,  6
19 56 7 5 ,  6 - 75,  6
1957 43 ,  9 - 43,  9
1958 1 0 6 ,  2 - 1 06 ,  2
19 59 1 1 4 , 8 0,  8 1 14 ,  0 - 1 1 3 , 2
1 96 0 1 0 2 ,  3 1 , 9 100 ,  4 - 9 8 ,  5
19 61 1 5 4 ,  4 1 , 8 1 52 ,  6 - 1 5 0 , 8
1962 1 4 6 ,  9 2 , 0 14 4 ,  9 - 1 4 2 , 9
19 63 1 2 4 ,  3 3 , 9 1 20 ,  4 - 1 1 6 , 5
1 964 63 ,  8 0 63,  8 - 6 3 ,  8
1 96 5 1 0 1 ,  4 0 1 0 1 ,  4 - 1 0 1 , 4
1 9 6 6 1 1 3 ,  0 0 1 1 3 ,  0 - 1 1 3 , 0
1967 8 7 ,  0 0 , 1 86 ,  9
00VO00i
1968 90 ,  5 0 , 1 90 ,  4 - 9 0 ,  3
1 96 9 1 1 1 ,  1 1 , 5 10 9 ,  6 - 1 0 8 , 1
1 97 0 1 1 2 ,  6 1 , 6 1 1 1 , 0 - 1 0 9 , 4
1 971 7 9 , 1 1 , 5 77 ,  6 i CTi I-*
197 2 5 9 ,  4 1 , 0 58 ,  4 - 5 7 ,  4
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1 97 3 97 ,  6 0,  9 96 ,  7 - 9 5 ,  8
1974 188 ,  7 0 , 7 1 88 ,  0 - 1 8 7 , 3
1 97 5 10 2 ,  1 0,  8 1 0 1 ,  3 - 1 0 0 , 5
1 9 7 6 1 0 7 ,  7 4 , 2 1 0 3 ,  5 - 9 9 ,  3
1977 1 3 6 ,  4 8,  6 1 2 7 ,  8 1 1 9 ,  2
1978 1 2 5 ,  3 4 , 2 1 2 1 ,  1 - 1 1 6 , 9
19 79 1 67 ,  7 4 , 0 1 6 3 ,  7 - 1 5 9 , 7
1 9 8 0 2 0 7 ,  5 1 4 , 2 1 9 3 ,  3 - 1 7 9 , 1
1 9 8 1 1 9 0 ,  0 15 ,  0 1 7 5 ,  0 - 1 6 0 , 0
19 82 2 5 0 ,  6 15 ,  9 2 3 4 ,  7 - 2 1 8 , 8
1 98 3 2 5 9 ,  2 12,  0 2 4 7 , 2 - 2 3 5 , 2
1984 2 2 8 ,  8 14,  0 2 1 4 ,  8 - 2 0 0 , 8
1 98 5 1 91 ,  2 10,  8 1 8 0 ,  4 - 1 6 9 , 6
1 9 8 6 1 0 4 ,  2 7 , 6 96 ,  6 - 8 9 ,  0
1 987 11 5 ,  8 11,  0 1 0 4 ,  8 - 9 3 ,  8
1 98 8 99,  1 1 7 , 7 81 ,  4 - 6 3 ,  7
1 98 9 16 5 ,  6 12,  9 1 5 2 ,  7 - 1 3 9 , 8
1 9 9 0 3 3 0 ,  6 65,  6 2 6 5 ,  0 - 1 9 9 , 4
1 99 1 2 4 3 ,  4 58,  9 1 8 4 ,  5 - 1 2 5 , 6
S o u r c e s :  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  SSSR: S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  s b o r n i k  1 9 1 8 -  
1 9 6 6  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ) ;  V n e s h n i y a  T o r g a v l y a  za  
1 9 6 7 - 1 9 7 3  g o d :  S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  o b z o r  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  
o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ,  1 9 6 9 ,  1 9 7 1 ,  1 9 7 3 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o g o v l y a  v  1 9 7 5 - 1 9 7 6  
(Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 7 5 ,  1 9 7 6 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a ,
4 ,  1 9 7 8 ;  i b i d . ,  5,  1 9 7 9 ;  i b i d . ,  4,  1 9 8 0 ;  i b i d . ,  3,  1 9 8 1 - 1 9 9 0 ;  i b i d . ,  4 -
5,  1 9 9 2 ,  p .  4 9 .
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Appendix 13. Soviet Trade with Philippine(1976-1991)
( I n  M i l l i o n  R o u b l e s )
Y e a r T u r n o v e r E x p o r t I m p o r t B a l a n c e





19 76 68 ,  3 1 / 4 66 ,  9 - 6 5 ,  5
1977 1 0 8 ,  1 1 , 8 10 6 ,  3 - 1 0 4 , 5
1978 35 ,  3 6, 9 28 ,  4 - 2 1 ,  5
197 9 63,  0 7 , 6 55 ,  4 - 4 7 , 8
1 980 1 3 4 ,  2 8,  5 12 5 ,  7 - 1 1 7 , 2
1 981 1 5 7 ,  5 0,  5 1 5 7 ,  0 - 1 5 6 , 5
1 982 93,  6 13,  1 80 ,  5 - 6 7 ,  4
1 98 3 60 ,  6 5,  6 55,  0 - 4 9 ,  4
1984 62 ,  6 4 , 7 57 ,  9 - 4 3 , 2
19 85 39,  7 10,  9 2 8 , 8 - 1 7 ,  9
1 98 6 17 ,  4 7 , 4 10,  0 - 2 ,  6
1987 2 7 ,  1 11 ,  3 1 5 ,  8 - 4 , 5
1988 2 4 ,  6 13 ,  3 1 1 ,  3 + 2 , 0
1989 21 ,  6 5,  5 16 ,  1 - 1 0 ,  6
1 990 66 ,  9 34,  3 32 ,  6 + 1 , 7
1 991 56 ,  4 41 ,  3 15 ,  1 + 2 6 ,  2
S o u r c e s :  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  SSSR v  1 9 7 6  g .  (Moscow:
M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 7 6 ) ,  p .  12 ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a ,  4,  1 9 7 8 ;  
i b i d . ,  5 ,  1 9 7 9 ;  i b i d . ,  4,  1 9 8 0 ;  i b i d . ,  3,  1 9 8 1 - 1 9 9 0 ;  i b i d . ,  4 - 5 ,  1 9 9 2 ,  
p . 4 9 .
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Appendix 14. Soviet Trade with Australia(1921-1991)
( I n  M i l l i o n  R o u b l e s )
Y e a r T u r n o v e r E x p o r t I m p o r t Ba lan<
1 9 2 1 / 2 2 0 - 0 -
1 9 2 2 / 2 3 0 , 1 - 0 , 1 -
1 9 2 3 / 2 4 1,  6 - 1 , 6 -
1 9 2 4 / 2 5 2 3 ,  4 0 2 3 ,  4 - 2 3 ,  4
1 9 2 5 / 2 6 13 ,  2 - 13 ,  2 -
1 9 2 6 / 2 7 12 ,  2 0 12 ,  2 - 1 2 ,  2
1 9 2 7 / 2 8 22 ,  8 0 2 2 ,  8 - 2 2 ,  8
1 9 2 8 ( 1 0 - 1 2 ) 7 , 7 - 7 , 7 - 7 , 7
1 929 13 ,  7 0 13 ,  7 - 1 3 ,  7
1930 9 , 7 0 , 2 9 , 5 - 9 , 3
1931 2 , 4 0 2 , 4 - 2 , 4
1932 4 , 7 0 , 1 4 , 6 - 4 , 5
19 33 0 , 1 0 0 , 1 - 0 ,  1
1934 1 , 4 0 1,  4 - 1 , 4
193 5 3,  5 0 3,  5 - 3 ,  5
19 36 4 , 5 0 4 , 5 - 4 , 5
1937 5 , 5 0 5,  5 - 5 ,  5
1938 8,  6 0 8,  6 - 8 ,  6
19 39 3,  0 0 3,  0 - 3 , 0
19 40 0 0 - -
1 9 4 1 - 4 5 - - - -
1 9 4 6 0 0 - -
1947 0,  3 0 0 , 3 - 0 ,  3
1948 2 9 ,  4 0 2 9 ,  4 - 2 9 ,  4
19 49 2 4 ,  5 0 , 7 2 3 ,  8 - 2 3 ,  1
19 50 2 6 ,  3 1 , 6 2 4 ,  7 - 2 3 ,  1
19 51 15 ,  1 1 , 7 13 ,  4 - 1 1 , 7
1 952 0,  8 0,  8 0 + 0 ,  8
19 53 2 1 ,  5 1 , 9 1 9 ,  6 - 1 7 ,  7
1954 38 ,  1 1 , 2 3 6 ,  9 - 3 5 ,  7
1 95 5 7 , 2 1 , 1 6 , 1 - 5 ,  0
1 9 5 6 0 0 0 0
1957 0 , 4 0 0 , 4 - 0 , 4
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1958 0,  4 0,  4 0 + 0,  4
195 9 5, 3 0,  2 5,  1 - 4 , 9
19 60 31 ,  6 0,  4 31 ,  2 - 3 0 ,  8
1 961 26 ,  6 0,  6 26 ,  0 - 2 5 ,  4
1962 27 ,  1 0,  4 26 ,  7 - 2 6 ,  3
19 63 53 ,  6 1,  1 52 ,  5 - 5 1 ,  4
1964 12 3 ,  3 1,  1 1 2 2 ,  2 - 1 2 1 , 1
19 65 92,  1 1,  4 90 ,  7 - 8 9 ,  3
1 96 6 35 ,  2 0,  9 34 ,  3 - 3 3 ,  4
1967 18 ,  6 1,  3 17 ,  3 - 1 6 ,  0
1 968 36 ,  9 1 / 0 35 ,  9 - 3 4 ,  9
1 96 9 41 ,  9 1 / 7 40 ,  2 - 3 8 ,  5
1 97 0 61 ,  8 1/ 5 60 ,  3 - 5 8 ,  8
19 71 69,  4 1/ 3 68,  1 - 6 6 ,  8
1972 73,  0 1/ 8 71 ,  2 - 6 9 ,  4
1 973 19 8 ,  0 3 , 2 1 9 4 ,  8 - 1 9 1 , 6
1974 183 ,  9 5,  4 1 7 8 ,  5 - 1 7 4 , 1
1 97 5 32 9 ,  4 2 , 1 3 2 7 ,  3 - 3 2 5 , 2
1 9 7 6 40 9 ,  7 3,  1 4 0 6 ,  6 - 4 0 3 , 5
1977 328 ,  9 4 , 3 3 2 4 ,  6 - 3 2 0 , 3
1978 2 79 ,  4 4 , 6 2 7 4 ,  8 - 2 7 0 , 2
19 79 3 98 ,  5 5,  3 3 9 3 ,  2 - 3 8 7 , 9
1 98 0 ' 7 8 1 , 4 6,  0 7 7 5 ,  4 - 7 6 9 , 4
1 98 1 5 4 9 ,  3 11 ,  2 5 3 8 ,  1 - 3 2 6 , 9
1982 5 2 3 , 2 13 ,  6 5 0 9 ,  6 - 4 9 6 , 0
1 98 3 4 16 ,  0 1 1 , 7 4 0 4 ,  3 - 3 9 1 , 6
19 84 5 03 ,  3 2 2 , 1 4 8 1 ,  2 - 4 5 9 , 1
19 85 5 45 ,  8 13,  7 5 3 2 ,  1 - 5 1 8 , 4
19 86 5 1 7 ,  3 8 , 2 5 0 9 ,  1 - 5 0 0 , 9
19 87 3 6 0 ,  6 12 ,  4 3 4 8 ,  2 - 3 3 5 , 8
1988 36 3 ,  9 13,  9 3 5 0 ,  0 - 3 3 6 , 1
19 89 6 0 5 , 1 1 7 , 7 5 8 7 ,  4 - 5 6 9 , 7
1 99 0 69 0 ,  9 4 9 , 8 6 4 1 , 1 - 5 9 1 , 3
19 91 70 6 ,  5 15 ,  3 6 9 1 ,  2 - 6 7 5 , 9
S o u r c e s : V n e s h n y a y a T o r g o v l y a  SSSR: S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i s h o r n i k  1
1 9 6 6  (Moscow: M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ) ;  V n e s h n i y a  T o r g o v l y a  z a  
1 9 6 7 - 1 9 7 3  g o d :  S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  o h z o r  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e
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o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ,  1 9 6 9 ,  1 9 7 1 ,  1 9 7 3 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  SSSR v  1 9 7 5 -  
1 9 7 6  g .  (Mosocw:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 7 5 ,  1 9 7 6 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  
T o r g o v l y a , 4,  1 9 7 8 ;  i b i d . ,  5,  1 9 7 9 ;  i b i d . ,  4,  1 9 8 0 ;  i b i d . ,  3,  1 9 8 1 - 1 9 9 0 ;  
i b i d . ,  4 - 5 ,  1 9 9 2 ,  p .  5 1 .
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Appendix 15. Soviet Trade with New Zealand(1955-1991)
( I n  M i l l i o n  R o u b l e s )
Y e a r T u r n o v e r E x p o r t I m p o r t B a l a n c
1955 3 , 7 0 3 , 7 - 3 , 7
1 9 5 6 - 5 7 - - - -
1958 4 , 9 0 4 , 9 - 4 ,  9
19 59 0 , 4 0 0 , 4 - 0 , 4
19 60 8 , 0 0 8,  0 - 8 ,  0
1961 7 , 9 0 7 , 9 - 7 ,  9
1 962 2,  4 0 2 , 4 - 2 , 4
1963 0 , 8 0, 8 0 + 0,  8
1964 3,  5 0,  2 3,  3 - 3 , 1
1 965 7 , 4 0,  4 7 , 0 - 6 ,  6
19 66 1 4 ,  8 0 , 2 1 4 ,  6 - 1 4 ,  4
1967 13 ,  4 0,  3 13 ,  1 - 1 2 ,  8
1968 9 , 6 0,  6 9 , 0 - 8 , 4
1 969 1 8 ,  8 0,  6 18 ,  2 - 1 7 ,  6
1 970 19 ,  6 0,  7 18 ,  9 - 1 8 ,  2
19 71 2 7 , 4 1, 3 2 6 ,  1 - 2 4 ,  8
1972 2 2 ,  6 1 , 0 2 1 ,  6 - 2 0 ,  6
19 73 3 8 ,  7 1, 4 3 7 ,  3 - 3 5 ,  9
1974 6 0 ,  4 2,  4 5 8 ,  0 - 2 5 ,  6
19 75 3 1 ,  1 2 , 0 2 9 , 1 - 2 7 , 1
1 97 6 8 1 ,  1 2 , 4 7 8 ,  7 - 7 6 ,  3
1977 1 2 1 ,  6 3, 0 1 1 8 ,  6 - 1 1 5 , 6
1978 4 5 ,  2 3 , 2 4 2 ,  0 - 3 8 ,  8
19 79 1 1 6 ,  9 3,  2 1 1 3 ,  7 - 1 1 0 , 5
198 0 1 6 9 ,  6 3 , 1 1 6 6 ,  5 - 1 6 3 , 4
1 981 1 7 4 ,  4 6,  5 1 6 7 ,  9 - 1 6 1 , 4
198 2 2 3 7 ,  4 7 , 7 2 2 9 ,  7 - 2 2 2 , 0
198 3 1 8 5 ,  5 6, 4 1 7 9 , 1 - 1 7 2 , 7
1984 5 6 ,  5 7 , 9 4 8 ,  6 - 4 0 ,  7
198 5 9 0 ,  9 4 , 3 8 6 ,  6 - 8 2 ,  3
1 9 8 6 9 3 ,  7 5,  2 8 8 ,  5 - 8 3 ,  3
1987 7 4 ,  2 6, 3 6 7 ,  9 - 6 1 ,  6
1988 1 1 1 ,  8 9,  8 1 0 2 ,  0 - 2 , 2
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19 89  1 4 3 , 8  1 5 , 9  1 2 7 , 9  - 1 1 2 , 0
1 99 0  4 1 8 , 3  3 5 , 8  3 8 2 , 5  - 3 4 6 , 8
19 91  2 9 7 , 4  2 , 1  2 9 5 , 3  - 2 9 3 , 2
S o u r c e s :  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  SSSR: S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  s b o r n i k  1 9 1 8 -  
1 9 6 6  (Moscow: M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  za  
1 9 6 7 -  1 9 7 3  g o d :  S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  o h z o r  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  
o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ,  1 9 6 9 ,  1 9 7 1 ,  1 9 7 3 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  SSSR v  1 9 7 5 -  
1 9 7 6  g .  (Moscow: M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 7 5 ,  1 9 7 6 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  
T o r g o v l y a ,  4,  1 9 7 8 ;  i b i d . ,  5,  1 9 7 9 ;  i b i d . ,  4,  1 9 8 0 ;  i b i d . ,  3,  1 9 8 1 - 1 9 9 0 ;  
i b i d . ,  4 - 5 ,  1 9 9 2 ,  p .  5 1 .
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Appendix 16. Soviet Trade
( I n  M i l l i o n
with Mexico(1955-
R o u b l e s  )
1991)
Y e a r T u r n o v e r E x p o r t I m p o r t Ba lan<
1 955 2 ,  0 0 2 , 0 - 2 , 0
1 9 5 6 - 5 7 - - - -
1958 0 , 7 0,  5 0 , 2 +0 ,  3
1 959 1,  6 0,  4 1 , 2 - 0 ,  8
1 960 3,  6 0,  6 3,  0 - 2 ,  4
1961 0 , 4 0 , 1 0 ,  3 - 0 , 2
1962 6 , 7 0,  1 6,  6 - 6 ,  5
1963 7 , 5 0,  1 7,  4 - 7 ,  3
1964 2 , 2 0,  3 1 , 9 - 1 ,  6
1 965 - - - -
1 96 6 9 , 9 0,  6 9 , 3 - 8 , 7
1967 9 , 0 0 , 7 8 ,  3 - 7 , 6
1968 1 0 ,  0 2 , 4 7 , 6 - 5 , 2
1969 5,  8 0,  8 5,  0 - 4 , 2
1 970 1 , 0 0,  7 0,  3 +0 ,  4
1971 9 , 5 0,  3 9 , 2 - 8 ,  9
1972 8 , 4 0,  6 7 , 8 - 7 , 2
1973 0 ,  6 0,  5 0 , 1 +0 ,  4
1974 2 , 4 1, 1 1 , 3 - 0 , 2
1975 6 , 1 4 , 4 1 , 7 +2 ,  7
1 976 18 ,  0 6,  9 1 1 , 1 - 4 , 2
1977 2 , 9 1, 2 1 , 7 - 0 ,  5
1978 13 ,  4 2,  4 1 1 ,  0 - 8 ,  6
1979 4 , 8 0 , 7 4 , 1 - 3 ,  4
1 980 1 3 ,  8 1 1 , 9 1 , 9 + 1 0 ,  0
19 81 2 2 ,  7 4 , 0 1 8 ,  7 - 1 4 , 7
1982 2 8 ,  8 7 , 8 2 1 ,  0 - 1 3 ,  2
198 3 1 1 ,  6 2 , 9 8 , 7 - 5 ,  8
1984 1 6 ,  1 1,  7 1 4 ,  4 - 1 2 ,  7
1 985 2 0 ,  3 4 , 2 1 6 ,  1 - 1 1 , 9
1 98 6 1 1 , 9 4 , 3 7 , 6 - 3 ,  3
1987 4 3 ,  0 6 , 2 2 7 ,  8 - 2 1 ,  6
1988 9 0 ,  8 2 , 5 8 8 ,  3 - 8 5 ,  8
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19 89  6 2 , 1  4 , 5  5 7 , 6  - 5 3 , 1
1990  1 1 2 , 5  2 2 , 6  8 9 , 9  - 6 7 , 3
1991  8 7 , 3  1 1 , 1  7 6 , 2  - 6 5 , 1
S o u r c e s :  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  SSSR: S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  s b o r n i k  1 9 1 8 -  
1 9 6 6  (Moscow: M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  z a  
1 9 6 7 - 1 9 7 3  g o d :  S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  o b z o r  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  
o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ,  1 9 6 9 ,  1 9 7 1 ,  1 9 7 3 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  SSSR v  1 9 7 5 -  
1 9 7 6  g .  (Moscow: M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 7 5 ,  1 9 7 6 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  
T o r g o v l y a , 4,  1 9 7 8 ;  i b i d . ,  5,  1 9 7 9 ;  i b i d . ,  4,  1 9 8 0 ;  i b i d . ,  3,  1 9 8 1 - 1 9 9 0 ;  
i b i d . ,  4 - 5 ,  1 9 9 2 ,  p .  5 1 .
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Appendix 17. Soviet Trade with the United States(1918-1991)
( I n  M i l l i o n  R o u b l e s )
Y e a r T u r n o v e r E x p o r t I m p o r t B a la n c <
1918 11 ,  8 0 , 6 11 ,  2 - 1 0 ,  6
19 19 0 - 0 -
19 20 0,  8 - 0,  8 -
1 921 31 ,  7 0 31 ,  7 - 3 1 ,  7
1 9 2 1 / 2 2 34 ,  5 0 34 ,  5 - 3 4 ,  5
1 9 2 2 / 2 3 3 , 9 0 , 4 3,  5 - 3 , 1
1 9 2 3 / 2 4 45 ,  6 5, 6 40 ,  0 - 3 4 ,  4
1 9 2 4 / 2 5 1 8 0 ,  5 22 2 1 58 ,  3 - 1 3 6 , 1
1 9 2 5 / 2 6 1 1 9 ,  8 24 0 95 ,  8 - 7 1 ,  8
1 9 2 6 / 2 7 1 3 2 ,  8 18 4 11 4 ,  4 - 9 6 ,  0
1 9 2 7 / 2 8 1 6 9 ,  1 21 9 1 47 ,  2 - 1 2 5 , 3
1 928  ( 1 0 - 1 2 ) 3 0 , 3 7, 2 3 ,  3 - 1 6 ,  3
1 92 9 1 7 2 ,  5 33 5 1 3 9 ,  0 - 1 0 5 , 5
1 9 3 0 2 3 9 ,  4 32 1 2 0 7 ,  3 - 1 7 5 , 2
19 31 1 9 8 ,  1 17 8 1 8 0 ,  3 - 1 6 2 , 5
19 32 3 8 ,  3 13 5 2 4 ,  8 - 1 1 ,  3
1 93 3 2 4 , 0 11 0 13 ,  0 - 2 , 0
19 34 2 5 ,  2 11 2 14 ,  0 - 2 , 8
1 9 3 5 4 3 ,  9 20 8 2 3 ,  1 - 2 ,  3
1 9 3 6 60 ,  7 23 3 37 ,  4 - 1 4 , 1
1937 64 ,  6 22 8 4 1 , 8 - 1 9 ,  0
1938 8 4 ,  5 15 1 69 ,  4 1 Cn £> Co
1 93 9 66 ,  1 14 6 51 ,  5 - 3 6 ,  9
1 94 0 95 ,  3 19 2 7 6 , 1
<nVOinI
1 9 4 1 - 4 5 - - - -
1 9 4 6 3 0 3 ,  9 90 9 2 1 3 ,  0 - 1 2 2 , 1
1947 1 7 0 ,  0 70 7 99 ,  3 - 2 8 ,  6
19 48 1 1 9 ,  7 73 1 46 ,  6 + 2 6 ,  5
19 49 66 ,  4 43 7 2 2 ,  7 + 2 1 ,  0
1 95 0 5 0 ,  4 43 2 7 , 2 +3 6 ,  0
1 9 5 1 2 4 , 3 23 8 0 ,  5 +2 3 ,  3
1952 1 6 , 2 15 8 0 , 4 + 15 ,  4
1 9 5 3 1 5 ,  2 14 8 0 , 4 + 1 4 ,  4
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1954 1 4 , 7 14 ,  2 0,  5 + 13 ,  7
1955 21 ,  9 21 ,  4 0,  5 + 2 0 ,  9
19 56 28 ,  4 2 4 , 5 3,  9 + 20 ,  6
1957 23 ,  5 14,  4 9 , 1 + 5,  3
1958 27 ,  7 23 ,  5 4 , 2 + 19 ,  3
1959 39 ,  1 23 ,  1 16 ,  0 + 7 , 1
1960 76 ,  1 22 ,  2 53 ,  9 - 3 1 ,  7
1961 67,  5 21 ,  9 45 ,  6 - 2 3 , 7
1962 40 ,  0 15 ,  7 24 ,  3 - 8 ,  6
19 63 4 7 , 4 22 ,  3 25 ,  1 - 2 , 8
1964 1 6 4 ,  9 18 ,  6 1 4 6 ,  3 - 1 2 7 , 7
19 65 8 9 , 2 31 ,  0 58 ,  2 - 2 7 ,  2
1 96 6 99,  0 42 ,  0 57 ,  0 - 1 5 ,  0
1967 91 ,  7 35 ,  4 56,  3 - 2 0 ,  9
1968 89 ,  5 38,  6 50 ,  9 - 1 2 ,  3
1969 1 5 9 ,  6 54 ,  5 1 0 5 ,  1 - 5 0 ,  6
19 70 1 60 ,  9 57 ,  8 1 0 3 ,  1 - 4 5 ,  3
1971 .183, 6 54,  4 1 2 9 ,  2 - 7 4 , 8
1972 5 3 7 ,  8 76 ,  4 4 6 1 ,  4 - 3 8 5 , 0
19 73 1 1 6 1 , 0 137 ,  8 1 0 2 3 , 2 - 8 8 5 , 4
1974 7 4 2 ,  2 17 7 ,  3 6 5 4 ,  9 - 4 7 7 , 6
19 75 1 5 9 9 , 5 13 7 ,  4 1 4 6 2 , 1 - 1 3 2 4 , 7
1 9 7 6 2 2 0 5 , 5 198 ,  7 2 0 0 6 , 8 - 1 8 0 8 , 1
1977 1 5 2 7 , 9 2 7 1 ,  6 1 2 5 6 , 3 - 9 8 4 , 7
1978 1 8 5 5 , 2 2 5 5 ,  3 1 5 9 9 , 9 - 1 3 4 4 , 6
19 79 2 8 3 7 , 1 35 0 ,  2 2 4 8 6 , 9 - 2 1 3 6 , 7
19 80 1 5 0 2 , 5 151 ,  0 1 3 5 1 , 5 - 1 2 0 0 , 5
19 81 1 8 4 5 , 4 1 83 ,  4 1 6 6 2 , 0 - 1 4 7 8 , 6
1982 2 2 2 6 , 4 1 5 4 ,  8 2 0 7 1 , 6 - 1 9 1 6 , 8
19 83 1 9 0 0 , 5 3 30 ,  5 1 5 7 0 , 0 - 1 2 3 9 , 5
1984 3 1 3 4 , 9 3 0 5 ,  9 2 8 2 9 , 0 - 2 5 2 3 , 1
1 98 5 2 7 0 2 , 5 3 2 6 ,  1 2 3 7 6 , 4 - 2 0 5 0 , 3
1 9 8 6 1 4 5 8 , 5 31 2 ,  5 1 1 4 6 , 0 - 8 3 3 , 5
1987 1 1 9 8 , 5 2 7 9 ,  0 9 1 9 ,  5 - 6 4 0 , 5
1 988 2 1 0 4 ,  1 3 3 1 ,  5 1 7 7 2 , 6 - 1 4 4 1 ,  1
1 98 9 3 3 9 5 , 1 5 2 9 ,  9 2 8 6 5 , 2 - 2 3 3 5 , 3
1 99 0 7 6 9 0 , 1 1 5 7 7 , 9 6 1 1 2 , 2 - 4 5 3 4 , 3
1 991 7 8 7 4 , 6 1 2 6 7 , 8 6 6 0 6 , 8 - 5 3 3 9 , 0
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S o u r c e s :  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  SSSR: S t a t i s t i c h e s k y  s b o r n i k  1 9 1 8 -  
1 9 6 6  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  za  
1 9 6 7 - 1 9 7 3  g o d :  S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  o b z o r  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  
o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ,  1 9 6 9 ,  1 9 7 1 ,  1 9 7 3 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  SSSR v  1 9 7 5 -  
1 9 7 6  g .  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 7 5 ,  1 9 7 6 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  
T o r g o v l y a ,  4,  1 9 7 8 ;  i b i d . ,  5,  1 9 7 9 ;  i b i d . ,  4,  1 9 8 0 ;  i b i d . ,  3,  1 9 8 1 - 1 9 9 0 ;  
i b i d . ,  4 - 5 ,  1 9 9 2 ,  p .  5 1 .
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Appendix 18. Soviet Trade
( I n  M i l l i o n
with Canada(1921
R o u b l e s )
-1991)
Y e a r T u r n o v e r E x p o r t I m p o r t B a l a n
1921 1 , 0 - 1 , 0 -
1 9 2 1 / 2 2 1 , 0 - 1 , 0 -
1 9 2 2 / 2 3 0 - 0 -
1 9 2 3 / 2 4 0,  1 - 0 , 1 -
1 9 2 4 / 2 5 1, 9 - 1 , 9 -
1 9 2 5 / 2 6 0,  6 0 0 ,  6 - 0 ,  6
1 9 2 6 / 2 7 2 , 1 0 , 1 2 , 0 - 1 ,  9
1 9 2 7 / 2 8 8,  9 - 8 , 9 -
1 9 2 8 ( 1 0 - 12) 0 , 5 - 0 ,  5 -
1 92 9 0,  8 - 0 , 8 -
19 30 2 , 0 0 , 9 1 , 1 - 0 , 2
19 31 0,  1 0 0 ,  1 - 0 ,  1
1932 2 , 4 0,  8 1 , 6 - 0 ,  8
1 93 3 0,  6 0 0 ,  6 - 0 ,  6
1934 1, 3 0,  2 1 , 1 - 0 ,  9
1 93 5 1,  9 0 , 2 1 , 7 - 1 , 5
1 9 3 6 0,  7 0 , 1 0 ,  6 - 0 ,  5
19 37 10,  0 0 , 7 9 , 3 - 8 ,  6
1 938 5,  5 0,  3 5 , 2 - 4 ,  9
1 93 9 1 , 0 0 , 2 0 , 8 - 0 ,  6
1 94 0 0,  3 - 0 ,  3 -
1 9 4 1 - 4 5 - - - -
1 9 4 6 5,  8 0 , 7 5 , 1 - 4 , 4
19 47 0,  3 0 , 2 0 , 1 +0,  1
19 48 0,  3 0,  3 - -
1 94 9 0,  1 0 , 1 0 + 0 ,  1
1 9 5 0 0,  3 0,  3 0 +0 ,  3
1 95 1 0,  8 0,  8 - -
19 52 1,  6 1 , 6 0 + 1 ,  6
19 53 0,  7 0 , 7 0 +0,  7
1 954 5,  3 0 , 7 4 , 6 - 3 , 9
1 95 5 4 , 1 1 , 8 2 , 3 - 0 ,  5
1 9 5 6 2 4 ,  0 1 , 9 22 , 1 - 2 0 ,  2
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1957 11 ,  8 3 , 8
o00 - 4 , 2
1958 2 4 , 8 2 , 1 2 2 ,  7 - 2 0 ,  6
1959 17 ,  2 3,  6 13 ,  6 - 1 0 ,  0
1960 13 ,  7 4 , 7 9 , 0 - 4 , 3
1961 45 ,  3 4 , 2 41 ,  1 - 3 7 ,  9
1962 4 , 7 2 , 3 2 , 4 - o ,  1
1963 1 6 0 ,  4 3,  1 1 5 7 ,  3 - 1 5 4 , 2
1964 2 9 6 ,  5 4 , 7 2 9 1 ,  8 - 2 8 7 ,  1
19 65 2 4 0 ,  0 12,  2 2 2 7 ,  8 - 2 1 5 , 6
19 66 3 2 4 ,  8 13,  1 3 1 1 ,  7 - 2 9 8 , 6
1967 1 4 7 ,  0 20 ,  3 1 2 6 ,  7 - 1 0 6 , 4
1968 1 31 ,  2 17,  6 1 1 3 ,  6 - 9 6 ,  0
1969 40 ,  1 10 ,  5 2 9 ,  6 - 1 9 ,  1
1970 1 2 5 ,  3 7 , 5 1 1 7 ,  8 - 1 1 0 , 3
1 971 1 4 8 , 6 12,  4 1 3 6 ,  2 - 1 2 3 , 8
1972 2 9 9 ,  8 18 ,  7 2 8 1 ,  1 - 2 6 2 , 4
1973 2 6 5 ,  0 20 ,  9 2 4 4 , 1 - 4 2 3 , 2
1974 11 1 ,  0 28 ,  9 8 2 ,  1 - 5 3 ,  9
1 975 4 7 1 ,  2 31,  9 4 3 9 ,  3 - 4 0 7 , 4
1 976 5 4 1 ,  2 41 ,  9 4 9 9 ,  3 - 4 5 7 , 4
1977 41 7 ,  3 49 ,  2 3 6 8 ,  1 - 3 1 8 , 9
1978 3 8 7 ,  6 2 8 ,  7 3 5 8 ,  9 - 3 3 0 , 2
19 79 4 8 5 ,  8 32 ,  4 4 5 3 ,  4 - 4 2 0 , 0
19 80 1 0 0 1 , 6 30,  0 9 7 1 ,  6 - 3 4 1 , 6
1981 1 4 2 6 , 4 49 ,  5 1 3 7 6 , 9 - 1 3 2 7 , 4
1982 1 3 9 8 , 8 20 ,  7 1 3 7 8 , 1 - 1 3 5 7 , 4
1 983 1 3 0 1 , 9 2 4 , 1 1 2 7 7 , 8 - 1 2 5 3 , 7
1984 1 4 2 1 , 7 18 ,  7 1 4 0 3 , 0 - 1 3 8 4 , 3
1 985 9 66 ,  8 17 ,  8 9 4 9 ,  0 - 9 3 1 , 2
1 98 6 6 33 ,  6 9 , 8 6 2 3 ,  8 - 6 1 4 , 0
1987 4 9 6 ,  7 47 ,  3 4 4 9 ,  4 - 4 0 2 , 1
1988 5 5 1 ,  4 16 ,  4 5 3 5 ,  0 - 5 1 8 , 6
19 89 4 51 ,  4 38 ,  5 4 1 2 ,  9 - 3 7 4 , 4
19 90 2 0 3 7 , 8 1 5 5 , 2 1 8 8 2 , 6 - 1 7 2 7 , 4
19 91 2 1 6 9 , 6 1 3 3 ,  4 2 0 3 6 , 2 - 1 9 0 2 , 8
S o u r c e s :  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  SSSR: S t a t i s t i c h e s k y  s h o r n i k  1 9 1 8 -  
1 9 6 6  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  z a
1 9 6 7 - 1 9 7 3  g o d :  S t a t i s t i c h e s k i i  o h z o r  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  
o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 6 7 ,  1 9 6 9 ,  1 9 7 1 ,  1 9 7 3 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  T o r g o v l y a  SSSR v  1 9 7 5 -
1 9 7 6  g .  (Moscow:  M e z h d u n a r o d n y e  o t n o s h e n i y a ,  1 9 7 5 ,  1 9 7 6 ) ;  V n e s h n y a y a  
T o r g o v l y a ,  4,  1 9 7 8 ;  i b i d . ,  5,  1 9 7 9 ;  i b i d . ,  4,  1 9 8 0 ;  i b i d . ,  3,  1 9 8 1 - 1 9 9 0
i b i d . ,  4 - 5 ,  1 9 9 2 ,  p .  5 0 .
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Soviet Trade with South Korea(1985-1991)
( I n  M i l l i o n s  o f  US D o l l a r s )
Y e a r T u r n o v e r E x p o r t I m p o r t B a l a n c e
1 98 5 1 1 3 ,  0 53,  3 59 ,  7 - 6 , 4
1 9 8 6 1 1 3 ,  8 63 ,  9 4 9 , 9 + 14 ,  0
1987 1 64 ,  2 97,  0 67 ,  2 + 2 9 ,  8
1 988 2 8 9 ,  9 178 ,  3 1 1 1 ,  6 + 66 ,  7
1 98 9 5 9 9 ,  4 3 91 ,  7 2 0 7 ,  7 + 1 8 4 , 0
19 90 8 8 9 ,  0 3 7 0 ,  0 5 1 9 ,  0 - 1 4 9 , 0
1 99 1 1 2 0 4 , 4 57 7 ,  3 6 2 5 ,  1 - 4 7 , 8 *
S o u r c e s :  K o r e a  T r a d e  P r o m o t i o n  C o r p o r a t i o n ( K O T R A ) : s e e ,
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